We present a reduction semantics for the LySa calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.
A Formal Analysis for Capturing Replay Attacks in Cryptographic Protocols
BODEI, CHIARA;DEGANO, PIERPAOLO;
2007-01-01
Abstract
We present a reduction semantics for the LySa calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.File in questo prodotto:
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