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# PHAINOMENA

Revija za fenomenologijo in hermenevtiko  
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## PHAINOMENA

## Revija za fenomenologijo in hermenevtiko

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Alfredo Rocha de la Torre <b>La crisi dell'abitare. L'ethos dell'occidente</b> <i>Kriza prebivanja. Etos zahoda</i>	5
Miklós Nyíró <b>Hermeneutics, Practice, Event. An Attempt at Re-Conceptualizing Human Agency</b> <i>Hermenevtika, praksa, dogodek. Poskus re-konceptualizacije človeškega delovanja</i>	29
Dario Vuger <b>Spektakel in čas v sodobni filozofiji</b> <i>Spectacle and Time in Contemporary Philosophy</i>	53
Ming-Hon Chu <b>La primauté de la constitution de l'objet transitionnel chez Marc Richir</b> <i>Primarnost konstitucije tranzicijskega objekta pri Marcu Richirju</i>	91
Maxim D. Miroshnichenko <b>The Silent Biomedical Others. Intimacy, Communication, and Neurological Queerness</b> <i>Nemi biomedicinski drugi. Intimnost, komunikacija in nevrološka kvirnost</i>	111
Jaroslava Vydrová <b>Man as a Being of Hygiene in a Phenomenological and Anthropological Perspective</b> <i>Človek kot bitje higiene s fenomenološkega in antropološkega stališča</i>	139
Malwina Rolka <b>Between Philosophy and Literature. Friedrich Schlegel's Concept of Romantic Irony in <i>Fragments</i> and in <i>Lucinde</i></b> <i>Med filozofijo in literaturo. Pojem romantične ironije v Fragmentih in v Lucinde Friedricha Schlegla</i>	169
René Dentz <b>Biblical Hermeneutics and the Word about the Ineffable</b> <i>Biblična hermenevtika in beseda o neizgovorljivem</i>	191

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Igor W. Kirsberg <b>Is Causality Admissible in Phenomenology? A Corrective to Edmund Husserl's Idea</b> <i>Je v fenomenologiji kavzalnost sprejemljiva? Korektiv k ideji Edmunda Husserla</i>	203
Izak Hudnik Zajec <b>O dveh fizikah. Utelešena formalnost matematičnih znanosti</b> <i>On Two Kinds of Physics. The Embodied Formality of Mathematical Sciences</i>	221
Primož Turk <b>Aristotel in Descartes o zmožnostih duše</b> <i>Aristotle and Descartes on the Capacities of the Soul</i>	255
TRANSLATION   PREVOD	
Adriano Fabris <b>Etika uživanja hrane. Hrana in mi: vprašanje nekega odnosa</b> <i>The Ethics of Eating. Food and Relationship</i>	283
<i>Manuscript Submission Guidelines</i>	307
<i>Navodila za pripravo rokopisa</i>	311

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# LA CRISI DELL'ABITARE L'ETHOS DELL'OCCIDENTE

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**The Crisis of Dwelling. The Ethos of the West**

*Abstract*

The paper attempts to describe the fundamental features of the cultural ethos of the contemporary world, which within humanity causes the crisis of dwelling. Referring to the Heideggerian diagnostic of *Weltzivilisation*—as characterized by the prevalence of calculative thinking and thus by the demand of the availability of all entities—, we

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alfredo rocha de la torre

underline the features of thoughtlessness and emptiness of the technical civilization tied predominantly to calculation. Upon the basis of these features, one can conclude that the ethos of the current world has a banal and nihilistic character, which is linked, in a very general way, to the comprehension structure of today's man that constitutes the way of the latter's opening to the world and understanding of the disclosure itself. The prepositions of such a deliberation allow us to recognize that the crisis of dwelling resides, ultimately, in the crisis of thinking already indicated by Heidegger.

*Keywords:* crisis of dwelling, current cultural ethos, calculative thinking, *Weltzivilisation*, banal nihilism.

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### **Kriza prebivanja. Etos zahoda**

#### *Povzetek*

6 Priskevek skuša opisati poglobitne poteze kulturnega etosa sodobnega sveta, ki povzročata krizo človekovega prebivanja. S sklicevanjem na Heideggrovo diagnozo *Weltzivilisation* – zanjo je značilna prevlada računajočega mišljenja in potemtakem tudi zahteva po razpoložljivosti vsega bivajočega – poudarimo potezi brezmiselnosti in praznine tehnične civilizacije, vezane predvsem na kalkulativnost. Na njuni osnovi lahko sklepamo, da ima etos sedanjega sveta banalen in nihilističen značaj, kakršen se, na zelo splošen način, zrcali znotraj razumevanjske strukture današnjega človeka, ki konstituira način njegove odprtosti za svet in njegovega razumevanja tega odstiranja samega. Predpostavke takšnega razmisleka nam omogočijo pripoznanje, da kriza prebivanja, navsezadnje, leži v krizi mišljenja, kakor jo je naznačil že Heidegger.

*Ključne besede:* kriza prebivanja, sodobni kulturni etos, računajoče mišljenje, *Weltzivilisation*, banalni nihilizem.

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## Introduzione

L'abitare è stato affrontato tradizionalmente da una prospettiva limitata dalla concezione dello spazio nella sua caratterizzazione parametrica: come stare in un luogo determinato dallo spazio misurabile e calcolabile, nel quale si sta quotidianamente e regolarmente e, innanzitutto, nel quale si pernotta. È, in altre parole, stare in un luogo in cui si vive, benché questa delimitazione spaziale sia geografica-regionale, com'è il caso in cui si afferma l'abitare di un gruppo umano in una zona determinata del pianeta o in una regione specifica. Questa è la concezione propria dell'uomo comune e del costruttore tradizionale (architetto e muratore), i quali, come indicato da Biella (2000, 53-77), rappresentano la versione "fattuale" dell'abitare (*faktisches Wohnen*), centrata sullo spazio geometrico-matematico, cioè, quantificabile e misurabile, e sulla concezione sociale del benessere del luogo in cui si vive: si spera uno spazio illuminato, ampio, vicino al luogo di lavoro e nelle vicinanze di luoghi di divertimento e vendita di alimenti, silenzioso, fra le tante altre caratteristiche della comodità e del confort (Führ 2000, 19). Questa accezione dell'abitare segnerà anche con il suo marchio, ovviamente, la definizione dell'esperienza dello "stare a casa", concepita sotto il profilo dell'"incontrarsi in un ambito privato" che serve da riparo di fronte ai pericoli del mondo esterno e come spazio per riposare.

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Però ci si può anche riparare dalle intemperie, dai rischi e dalle minacce esterne, e tuttavia si può passare la notte in un luogo in cui non si abita nel senso già menzionato, cioè, in un luogo nel quale si rimane regolarmente usufruendo di tutto quello che configura liberamente la propria vita nella sua quotidianità: non sempre lo stare in un luogo delimitato e protetto a livello spaziale significa, quindi abitare, così come succede, per esempio, in un'esperienza di reclusione carceraria. Si può anche pernottare comodamente in un luogo visitato regolarmente ed in buona compagnia senza arrivare, tuttavia, a sperimentare un autentico abitare; questo è il caso, conosciuto da tutti, del soggiorno in un hotel o in un ostello.

Con un primo tentativo per superare questa prima concezione fattuale dell'abitare, Bollnow si domanda sul "come" dello stesso (Führ 2000, 20) e risponde, conseguentemente, con una serie di lineamenti che caratterizzano,

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alla fine, nella parte fondamentale, semplicemente il “come” vivere bene, così come lo evidenzia Eduard Führ:

Bollnow wird sogar zum Einrichtungsberater, der in neun Punkten Ratschläge für die wohnliche Wohnung gibt, eine Wohnung müsse u. a. abgeschlossen sein, warm, hell und freundlich, mit Liebe gepflegt, weder zu große Ordnung noch Unordnung zeigen, die Möbelstücke müßten ebenfalls mit Liebe ausgesucht und gepflegt sein, nicht auf einmal gekauft, sondern Ausdruck einer Lebensgeschichte sein, Gebrauchsspuren besitzen, um dadurch Dauer und eine sichere Stetigkeit des Lebens zu demonstrieren. Wohnung müsse vor allem Ort einer Familie sein. (Ibid., 19.)

8 Una prospettiva che va più in là di queste due concezioni fattuali dell’abitare segnalate da Biella (2000) e Führ (2000, 9–29), è quella di Martin Heidegger, chi in testi come “Bauen Wohnen Denken” (GA 7, 145–164), “... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ...” (GA 7, 189–208), “Brief über den Humanismus” (GA 9, 313–364) e *Hölderlins Hymne “Der Ister”* (GA 53, 1993) tratta l’abitare iniziando da alcune coordinate di carattere esistenziale, che cercano di descrivere la sua struttura ontologica a partire dalla domanda sulla sua essenza.<sup>1</sup> Non si tratta più, quindi, di indagare sul “cosa”, – la sua definizione di come stare in uno spazio determinato che fornisce un “riparo” – né tantomeno sul “come” dell’abitare – i tratti di un confortevole rimanere in un luogo sicuro – ma sull’avvenire di quello che è proprio a esso in quanto abitare.

In questo contesto iniziale è possibile sostenere che a partire da nessuna di queste due prospettive è possibile sperimentare (*erfahren*) l’abitare nella sua essenza.<sup>2</sup> Al contrario, Heidegger proporrà, come è tradizione nel suo procedere riflessivo, la domanda sull’essenza dell’abitare, cercando in questo modo di delucidare il modo in cui l’uomo (*Mensch*) può sperimentare autenticamente

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1 Un’approssimazione all’esperienza dell’abitare lungo tutta l’opera di Heidegger – non solo a partire della conferenza nel simposio di Darmstadt (1951) – può essere veduta nello scritto *Per una fenomenologia dell’abitare. Il pensiero di Martin Heidegger come oikosophia* (Cesarone 2008).

2 Per il significato heideggeriano di essenza cf. Heidegger, GA 7, 5–36, soprattutto 33 ss.

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il suo rimanere libero (*fry*) sulla terra (GA 7, 143).<sup>3</sup> Alcuni dei presupposti di base da tenere conto per la comprensione della lettura heideggeriana di questa esperienza, sono i seguenti.

a) Troviamo il senso originario dell'abitare, il modo in cui esso si dispiega in quello che è proprio (*eigen*), attraverso la delucidazione "linguistica" della sua origine. Però questa delucidazione non consiste semplicemente in un chiarimento etimologico del termine citato, così come una lettura frettolosa del procedere heideggeriano può lasciare intendere, ma, fondamentalemente, in una mostra dell'esperienza inerente al dispiegamento del linguaggio. Si tratta, pertanto, di concepire l'analisi heideggeriana della fonte "linguistica" dell'abitare a partire dalla considerazione del linguaggio come un "lasciarsi manifestare" (*Erscheinenlassen*) e, in questo modo, come un "portar lì davanti" (*Hervorbringen*); come un lasciar comparire (Heidegger, GA 12, 188 e 196). Il monitoraggio "linguistico" heideggeriano non indaga, quindi, semplicemente sul significato dell'abitare, ma sul modo in cui esso si manifesta nella parola; sulla maniera in cui esso appare nel "Dire" (*Sagen*).<sup>4</sup>

b) L'abitare non deve essere identificato con il semplice fatto di possedere un'abitazione. Questa è precisamente la novità introdotta da Heidegger di fronte al gruppo di architetti riuniti nel simposio di Darmstadt (1951) per discutere sulla crisi dell'abitazione successiva alla seconda guerra mondiale. Abitare non è, chiaramente lo segnala il filosofo tedesco, pertanto, avere ed occupare un domicilio dove vivere. Questa prospettiva sfocia, ovviamente, nella considerazione non spaziale-parametrica né fattuale dell'essenza dell'abitare e, con ciò, nel bisogno di presentare la sua accezione strutturale attraverso il vincolo di essa con la quaternità mutuamente dipendente (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) di terra, cielo, mortali e divini.

c) Malgrado l'importanza che rappresenta per Heidegger la quaternità, ed il modo in cui descrive la sua mutua dipendenza in relazione all'abitare ed al

<sup>3</sup> Schirmacher concepisce questa interpretazione come una possibilità di lettura etica della filosofia dell'abitare di Heidegger: abitare la terra non significa distruggere (*Zerstören*) o dominare (*Beherrschen*) le cose (*Dinge*) (1982, 407 e 409-410).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. questo senso del "Dire" (*Sagen*) come uno scoprire in cui il fenomeno si manifesta nel linguaggio, per esempio, in Heidegger, GA 7, 193; GA 12, 188, 202, 207, 224 e 233; GA 8, 12 e 201 ss.

costruire (GA 7, 151 ss.), questo lavoro sarà concentrato esclusivamente sul fenomeno specifico dell'“abitare la terra”, senza entrare, pertanto, nei dettagli circa i legami stabiliti dallo stesso Heidegger fra il costruire e l'abitare, o nella descrizione di questa mutua adesione dei componenti della quaternità, né nella spiegazione di ciascuno di essi. In questa maniera, si pretende riflettere sul modo in cui l'uomo “sperimenta” attualmente la sua permanenza sulla terra, e circa la crisi dell'abitare che deriva direttamente da questo modo.

d) Questa focalizzazione sull'esperienza dell'“abitare la terra” permette segnalare il primo tratto della crisi nella carenza di terra natale (*Heimatlosigkeit*), frutto della preminenza del pensiero calcolante e dell'essenza della tecnica come esigenza di disponibilità di tutto l'ente come riserva (*Bestand*). Questa suddetta preminenza culmina nel predominio di un pensare estraneo alla domanda sul senso e, pertanto, vuoto, quello che significa in ultima analisi la caratterizzazione di un modo di pensare – andando oltre Heidegger – banale e nichilista. Questo secondo aspetto della crisi dell'abitare non solo porta a sostenere che al di là di una semplice carenza di alloggi – la posizione chiave del Simposio di Darmstadt – o di un deficit nel livello del benessere prodotto da essi – una lettura vicina a quella realizzata da Bollnow –, la crisi dell'abitare radica, alla fine, nella crisi del pensare segnalata dal filosofo di Meßkirch, specialmente nella sua lezione del 1951/52, *Che cosa significa pensare?* (GA 8).

Questi quattro presupposti per la comprensione corretta dell'interpretazione heideggeriana dell'abitare, che simultaneamente permettono di arrivare a derivazioni filosofiche che eccedono i limiti stabiliti dalla propria riflessione di Heidegger, possono essere sintetizzati attraverso le stesse parole del filosofo tedesco:

Per quanto dura e penosa, per quanto grave e pericolosa sia la scarsità di abitazioni, *l'autentica crisi dell'abitare* non consiste nella mancanza di abitazioni. La vera crisi degli alloggi è più vecchia delle guerre mondiali e delle loro distruzioni, più vecchia anche dell'aumento della popolazione terrestre e della condizione dell'operaio dell'industria. La vera crisi dell'abitare consiste nel fatto che i mortali sono sempre ancora in cerca dell'essenza dell'abitare, che *loro devono anzitutto imparare ad abitare*. (Heidegger 2019, 108; GA 7, 163.)

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## L'esperienza dell'abitare

La domanda di Heidegger, contraria all'indagine realizzata dalla posizione fattuale dell'abitare, per esempio, non è diretta, quindi, verso la stessa cosa che architetti e costruttori propongono oggi come fondamentale nel processo che porta a costruire ed abitare un'abitazione – il calcolo degli spazi e dei costi, ed il loro legame al benessere soggettivo del potenziale “abitante” –, ma al modo dell'accadere lo stare dell'uomo sotto il cielo. In questo senso, l'abitare non rimane circoscritto all'ambito delle faccende architettoniche, ma si apre, a partire da una prospettiva ontologica, all'esperienza di abitare la terra in quanto espressione dell'essere lanciato dell'uomo verso la libertà e, in questa maniera, verso la cura di ciò che gli è proprio.

Heidegger mostrerà questa relazione ricorrendo al “Dire” (*das Sagen*) del linguaggio che presenta l'esperienza stessa dell'abitare. In primo luogo, segnalerà che tanto la parola sassone “*wunon*”, come la gotica “*wunian*”, uguale a “*bauen*”, significano (*bedeuten*) “rimanere” (*das Bleiben*) e “risiedere” (*das Sich-Aufhalten*); evidenziando che “*wunian*” significa (*heißt*), a sua volta, “essere soddisfatto” (*zufrieden sein*), “essere condotto alla pace” (*zum Frieden gebracht*), “rimanere in essa”. Sfruttando la vicinanza terminologica, asserirà, quindi, in un secondo momento, che “pace” (*Friede*) vuol dire anche “il *Freie*” – *das Frye, fry* –, che significa “essere tutelato dal danno e dalla ‘minaccia’”, quello che conduce ovviamente all'esperienza del “aver cura” (*schonen*): l'abitare in questo modo, quindi, è una cura (GA 7, 150). Alla fine, il filosofo sosterrà che l'autentico prendersi cura è solo un lasciare accadere qualcosa nella sua essenza (*ibid.*, 151). Un'altra parola per designare questa esperienza dell'abitare concepita sotto il profilo del “aver cura” “in” y “per” “il *Freie*” è quella di “salvare” (*retten*), che Heidegger definisce in “La domanda per la tecnica”, per esempio, come “[...] andare a cercare qualcosa e condurla alla sua essenza, con il fine che così, per la prima volta, possa portare questa essenza al suo risplendere proprio” (GA 7, 29). In questo modo si può sostenere che abitare veramente la terra consista nel “aver cura” del dispiegamento di ciò che gli è proprio e, pertanto, lasciarla accadere liberamente nella sua essenza. La libertà è, perciò, un “aver cura” che conduce verso l'essenza.

Però con questa riflessione Heidegger non pretende realizzare una semplice analisi etimologica che ci indichi la provenienza della parola “abitare”, per, a partire da ciò, avere chiarezza circa il suo significato originario, ed in questo modo portare a termine le derivazioni semantiche del caso. In questo contesto non si deve ignorare, quindi, il molto importante chiarimento fatto da Heidegger nelle sue lezioni del semestre invernale 1951/52, *Che cosa significa pensare? (Was heißt Denken?)*, circa il senso ontologico, e non semplicemente linguistico, del verbo “significare” (*heißen*). Tenendo conto la pluralità della domanda che costituisce il titolo delle menzionate lezioni, il pensatore tedesco evidenzia tre versioni di “*heiben*”: “chiamare (si)” (*Ich heiße ...*), “dire” (*das heißt*) e “significare” (*Was heißt Denken?*).

12 “*Heißen*” è “significare”, però anche “chiamare”. Chiamare in quanto espressione del nominare (*nennen*)<sup>5</sup> vuol dire anche “richiedere da questa parte” (*herbeiverlangen*) e “affidare” (*anbefehlen*), quello che rinvia a “incarico” (*Geheiß*) e, con ciò, a “interpellanza” (*Anspruch*).<sup>6</sup> Il “significare” si riferisce, pertanto, per Heidegger, non esclusivamente e nemmeno fondamentalmente ad una categoria semantica in cui si esplicita il significato di un termine, ma ad un tipo di interpellanza, un appello, che proviene dal fenomeno stesso che interPELLa e chiama. La domanda “Cosa significa abitare?” non indaga, quindi, sul significato dell’abitare, ma sul modo in cui l’abitare stesso ci chiama ed in questo modo compare di fronte a noi in quello che gli è proprio (*eigen*). All’interpellare dell’abitare corrispondiamo (*entsprechen*) lasciandolo nel suo libero accadere, cioè, prendendoci cura del dispiegamento della sua essenza come salvazione (*Rettung*).

Questo modo di considerare il senso delle parole, che ormai non è solo etimologico nell’accezione comune del termine, né semantico in quanto delucidazione del significato di un vocabolo, coincide ovviamente con la concezione heideggeriana dell’essenza del linguaggio in quanto “nominare” (*nennen*) e “dire” (*sagen*), che trattati in rapporto al manifestarsi di un

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5 Cf. il senso del “nominare” (*nennen*), per esempio, in Heidegger, GA 12, 18 s.; GA 8, 123 ss.

6 Cf. Heidegger, GA 8, 128 s. Una simile struttura è segnalata da Heidegger in rapporto all’interpellare del linguaggio ed al corrispondere della lingua umana in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (GA 12, 29 s., 149, 203 e 251).

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fenomeno facendo presenza, si esprime come un “lasciar manifestarsi” (*erscheinenlassen*). Quello che pretende portare a termine Heidegger è, pertanto, un accompagnamento dell’accadere stesso dell’essenza dell’abitare e non, semplicemente, il chiarimento del significato di un termine o il riferimento alla sua origine linguistica: si tratta quindi di fare l’esperienza dell’abitare nella sua essenza; l’esperienza del suo modo proprio di accadere.<sup>7</sup> Questa peculiare maniera di procedere di Heidegger, permetterà esaminare il modo in cui una forma determinata di abitare la terra compromette nella sua totalità l’esistenza dell’uomo<sup>8</sup> e, con ciò – andando alla fine al di là dello stesso Heidegger –, l’esperienza della nostra relazione con sé stesso, con l’altro e con la natura, che caratterizza il mondo contemporaneo.

Però qual è il luogo (*Ort*)<sup>9</sup> che “nel libero” (“*das Freie*”) conduce attraverso la cura fino al proprio? Cioè, il “luogo” che lascia accadere l’abitare nella sua essenza? Facendo attenzione a quello che sostiene Heidegger nella sua ormai canonica concezione del linguaggio nella “Lettera sull’umanismo” (GA 9), e non ignorando quello che evidenzia Führ (2000, 13) con riferimento alla concezione dello spazio nella filosofia de Gaston Bachelard, si deve rispondere che tale “luogo” non è niente più che “la casa”. La definizione heideggeriana del “linguaggio come casa dell’essere” deve essere capita, di conseguenza, come la più chiara espressione del superamento della determinazione “spaziale-parametrica” dell’abitare e, dunque, come la manifestazione del “luogo” primigenio del dispiegamento della sua propria essenza.<sup>10</sup> È “nel” linguaggio in quanto “lasciare manifestarsi” (*Erscheinenlassen*) dove si presenta quello che è, ed in questo modo compare in ciò che gli è proprio. Questa è la ragione per

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7 La domanda sull’essenza nel suo senso non metafisico tradizionale caratterizza il procedere heideggeriano. La prova di ciò la forniscono le domande sull’essenza del linguaggio, della tecnica, della poesia, dell’abitare ecc., tra le altre cose.

8 Cf., per esempio, Heidegger, GA 7, 189–208.

9 Heidegger concepisce “il luogo” (*Ort*) come cosa (*Ding*) che conferisce (*verstattet*) spazio (*Raum*), e perciò essenza a esso (GA 7, 156 ss.). Cf. anche “Heidegger’s Thinking on Architecture”, in cui Norberg-Shulz (1983, 61–68) esamina nel dettaglio la riflessione heideggeriana circa l’arte, l’architettura e lo spazio, tra le altre cose, basato in sostanza nell’ “Origine dell’opera d’arte”, “La cosa”, “Costruire, abitare, pensare” e come sostegno, “Hebel – l’amico della casa”.

10 Cf. Rocha de la Torre 2008, 241–255.

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cui Heidegger considera il linguaggio come casa dell'essere e, in questo modo, come il "luogo" del libero dispiegamento dell'ente nella sua manifestazione, perciò, alla fine, è il linguaggio che si prende cura (*rettet*) del libero accadere dell'ente nella sua essenza, ossia, in quanto presenza.<sup>11</sup>

Seguendo questa descrizione di quello che "significa" l'essenza dell'abitare in termini di "stare a casa" e, simultaneamente, della stessa "casa" nel senso di "luogo" del libero dispiegamento di quello che si è, "abitare" sarà allora l'esperienza del dispiegamento e salvazione del proprio, cioè, l'esperienza del "aver cura" della propria essenza. Però si tratta di pensare l'essenza dell'abitare la terra ed il modo in cui questo abitare compromette nella sua struttura l'esistenza umana, per in questo modo affrontare a partire dalla caratterizzazione temporale e spirituale del mondo contemporaneo la crisi dell'abitare.

14 Stare realmente (*eigentlich*) a casa implica spaziare lo spazio (*einräumen*), per in questo modo farlo proprio (*eigen*) e solo così abitarlo come "luogo" aperto al dispiegamento libero di quello che si è. È per questo che la "casa" è il "luogo" del lasciar (*lassen*) essere proprio (*eigen*) nell'appropriarsi (*eignen*) dello spazio come forma di dispiegarsi liberamente nella propria essenza. Questa concezione trova fondamento nella relazione stabilita da Martin Heidegger fra costruire (*bauen*) ed abitare (*wohnen*) attraverso il seguimento "etimologico" del verbo "costruire" in termini di "*buan*", "*bhu*", "*beo*", e "*bin*", ormai rinvia direttamente all'esperienza dell'"essere" quello che si è, nella semplice però profonda espressione "io sono" (*ich bin*), che per Heidegger "significa" anche "io abito" (*ich wohne*) e, pertanto, in modo derivato, "io mi prendo cura" (*ich pflege*) ed "io salvaguardo" (*ich hege*):

Costruire significa originariamente abitare. Là dove la parola costruire parla ancora in modo originario essa dice anche *fin dove* arriva l'essenza dell'abitare. *Bauen* (costruire), *buan*, *bhu*, *beo* sono

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11 Cf. il riferimento di Cataldo Sanguinetti (2007, 217-222) ai due sensi del linguaggio come casa, e il suo legame con l'abitare poetico contrapposto al calcolo e, in questo senso, alla concezione metafisica e umanista dell'uomo. In questo stesso senso, Viviani (2005, 233) evidenzierà come il modo tecnico (calcolatore) dell'abitare restringe gli altri modi dell'abitare (come il poetico).

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infatti la stessa parola che il nostro *bin* (sono) nelle sue varie forme: *ich bin* (io sono), *du bist* (tu sei), la forma imperativa *bis*, sii. Che significa allora: *ich bin*, io sono? L'antica parola *bauen*, a cui si ricollega il “*bin*”, risponde: “*ich bin*”, “*du bist*” vuol dire: io abito, tu abiti. Il modo in cui tu sei e io sono, il modo in cui noi uomini *siamo* sulla terra è il *Buan*, l'abitare. Essere uomo significa: essere sulla terra come mortale; e cioè: abitare. L'antica parola *bauen*, secondo la quale l'uomo è in quanto *abita*, significa però anche, nello stesso tempo, custodire e coltivare il campo (*den Acker bauen*), coltivare la vigna. (Heidegger 2019, 97–98; GA 7, 149.)

La cosa più rilevante della precedente citazione di Heidegger per il proposito di questo testo è la seguente: 1) la considerazione dell'abitare come custodire e “aver cura” nel senso di coltivare; 2) il legame dell'abitare con l'essere dell'uomo sulla terra, dato che ciò apre alla possibilità di mettere al centro della riflessione la domanda sul modo specifico in cui stiamo abitando nel mondo di oggi, segnato dai principi di un modello politico ed economico particolare, che incide in modo determinante non solo sulla definizione dei principi e delle regole sociali, culturali e morali che reggono un'epoca, ma anche, e questo è fondamentale, sullo stato d'animo da cui ci apriamo al mondo ed esso compare davanti a noi; e 3) il nesso inerente tra l'uomo e l'abitare,<sup>12</sup> ammesso che questa relazione essenziale implichi che il fatto di essere uomo (*Mensch*), e con ciò la propria essenza dell'esperienza umana è, in un certo senso, determinato dal modo stesso di abitare la terra.<sup>13</sup> In questo contesto quindi possono essere sollevate le seguenti domande come linee guida. Cosa sta definendo il modo di abitare la terra nell'epoca contemporanea? Quale incidenza ha questo modo di abitare sull'esistenza dell'uomo e sulla maniera di aprirci al mondo e sul modo in cui questo compare davanti a noi? Le risposte condurranno – al di là di quello sostenuto da Heidegger, però appoggiati sulle basi dai suoi presupposti – al modo del pensiero calcolante, al nichilismo ed alla banalità, considerati come

12 Cf. anche Heidegger, GA 7, 193.

13 Cf. Pedregosa 2011 ed Acevedo Guerra 2017.

fondamento – il primo – e conseguenze epocali del “capitalismo spirituale”<sup>14</sup>  
– i secondi.<sup>15</sup>

### **Il modo contemporaneo di abitare**

È possibile riassumere la caratterizzazione del modo di abitare contemporaneo a partire da tre conferenze di Martin Heidegger, dettate nei primi anni 50 (GA 7, 5–36, 165–187, 189–208); dalle lezioni impartite all’Università di Friburgo im Breisgau durante il semestre invernale 1951/52 (GA 8); dalla raccolta che comprende conferenze, articoli ed un dialogo interculturale realizzato fra il 1950 ed il 1959 (GA 12); così come da una varietà di testi corti, la maggior parte dei quali provenienti da discorsi commemorativi che furono portati a termine nell’ultima fase della sua vita accademica (GA 13 e GA 16). Pensando al di là di Heidegger, tuttavia, si può sostenere che l’ethos culturale ed economico del mondo occidentale attuale e, ovviamente, del mondo occidentalizzato contemporaneo, permetterà di fare il passo di

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14 Cf. dell’autore: a) “El Otro y el capitalismo espiritual de occidente” (III Simposio internacional: memoria, conflicto y paz) (2023, in fase di pubblicazione); b) “Capitalismo espiritual: una introducción a la estructura comprensiva de occidente” (2023, in fase di pubblicazione). Questo termine fa riferimento alla “struttura comprensiva” dell’uomo contemporaneo nel suo rapporto con la natura, con sé stesso e con gli altri, da cui tutta la “relazione” si converte in transazione a favore del guadagno e del consumo. Tanto il carattere transazionale del legame con la natura e con l’Altro, per esempio, quanto l’ansia dell’usufrutto e del consumo, si convertono, pertanto, in valori supremi, interiorizzati sotto forma di “disposizione comprensiva-costitutiva” dalla quale l’uomo si apre al mondo. Una riflessione che cerca un altro modo di essere che rompa con la logica che governa il mondo attuale, è sviluppata da Michele Borrelli nel suo testo “La historia de la humanidad interpretada de manera humanista” (2020, 75–89).

15 È per questa ragione che l’esperienza dell’abitare in Heidegger non può essere capita a partire da parametri conformi al pensiero che calcola né con forme architettoniche specifiche, diseguate dal calcolo con l’obbiettivo di dominare l’uomo. In questo senso è totalmente errato quello che sostiene Rodriguez Serrano (2015, 153–164). Da una lettura rigorosa di quello che propone lo stesso Heidegger, il campo di concentrazione è, precisamente, una negazione dell’esperienza dell’abitare, dato che non implica il “aver cura” (*schonen*) né il salvare (*retten*) proprio della casa (*Haus*), e non potrà mai essere concepito come spazio (*Lebensraum*) omologato frettolosamente alla terra natale (*Heimat*), come è possibile dedurre con certa facilità ciò che è sostenuto, per esempio, in “Brief über den Humanismus” (Heidegger, GA 9, 313–364) e vari testi di *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (GA 16) già riferiti.

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queste “previsioni” del filosofo di Meßkirch sulla descrizione dell’abitare oggi a partire del concetto di “capitalismo spirituale”, che marcherà, alla fine, il culmine (*Vollendung*) di ciò che è possibile segnalare come crisi dell’abitare. I tratti fondamentali del fenomeno contemporaneo della crisi dell’abitare, segnalati da Heidegger – o derivati direttamente dalla sua filosofia –, sono i seguenti.

a) La celerità e l’accorciamento delle distanze a partire da una concezione parametrata dello spazio e del tempo, come è segnalato nella sua conferenza del 1950 “Das Ding”: “Tutte le distanze, nel tempo e nello spazio, si riducono [...] L’essere umano ricorre i più lunghi tratti nel più breve tempo [...] Ebbene, questa affrettata soppressione delle distanze non porta nessuna vicinanza; perché la vicinanza non consiste nella piccola distanza.” (GA 7, 167.) I mezzi di comunicazione di massa, i social network segnati dalla fretta e dalla superficialità nello scambio comunicativo,<sup>16</sup> lo sviluppo dei mezzi di trasporto massivo ecc., permettono che le distanze siano percorse in dei lassi di tempo ogni volta più corti e che siano considerate come facilmente superabili. Tutto questo, insieme all’esigenza del sistema economico imperante, basato sulla coscienza del valore dell’uso del tempo, legato alle esigenze della produttività e del guadagno, fanno del mondo contemporaneo l’esperienza della vertigine e dell’urgenza. In questo contesto in cui tutto ciò che è nuovissimo come espressione della modernità, e tutto ciò che è superficiale come manifestazione della fretta che non pensa (GA 16, 517–529), incontrano la loro nicchia e la loro ragion d’essere.

b) L’occupazione nella produzione, la ricerca del successo e il predominio mediatico come testimonio dell’ethos culturale di un’epoca dominata dai principi del sistema economico che ci governa. La produzione, intesa come tratto del nostro abitare attuale, ha come base quello che Heidegger ha denominato il processo di “oggettivazione incondizionata” dell’ente (GA 6.2, 387), che sostiene il dominio su esso in tutti i campi dell’esperienza umana, attraverso la sua considerazione come mera disponibilità (*Bestand*) aperta al calcolo e all’uso. Il successo, da parte sua, stimato come progetto congiunto, sociale e culturalmente radicato – mediaticamente promosso e rafforzato

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16 Cf. Schuck 2020, 111–126.

–, ed in questo senso come parte dell’atmosfera in cui oggi ci incontriamo immersi, è un aspetto in più della permanenza nel “si” (*man*) “della pubblicità” (*Öffentlichkeit*), che caratterizza il modo massivo di aprirsi al mondo come oggetto di progetti non propri (*uneigentlich*). Tutto questo configura un ethos che permette definire il nostro oggi come un’“era dei risultati”, frutto del gioco di successi e insuccessi nel compimento di ciò che è stabilito massivamente come appropriato ed auspicabile. Ciò che è sostenuto da Heidegger nella sua conferenza del 1951, “... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ...”, sigla l’interpretazione di questo secondo tratto: “[...] oggigiorno il nostro abitare è spronato dal lavoro – instabile a causa della ricerca di vantaggi e successi –, imprigionato dal sortilegio dell’impresa del piacere e dell’ozio [...] Ciò che è attuale, a sua volta, è prodotto e diretto dagli organi che formano l’opinione pubblica della società civilizzatrice.” (GA 7, 191.) Non si può dimenticare in questo contesto, che il successo, come l’accorciamento delle distanze parametriche segnalato nel punto a), ha come scenario la ricerca ed il raggiungimento del guadagno, uno dei tratti spirituali propri dell’essere contemporaneo dominato dall’interiorizzazione di elementi fondamentali del capitalismo economico.

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c) La considerazione della distanza (*Entfernung*) e la vicinanza (*Nähe*) nello stretto e limitato senso parametrico, nel quale la misurazione dello spazio intermedio (ibid., 157 s.) non costituisce di per sé un indicatore valido del livello di riparo e cura che offre un determinato luogo come “abitazione”. È per questa ragione che Heidegger sosterrà in primo luogo, nella sua conferenza nell’agosto del 1952, “Bauen Wohnen Denken”, che alloggiare in un luogo, o avere un alloggio nello stesso, non è uguale ad abitare o a stare a casa (ibid., 147), facendo capire con ciò, e dall’inizio stesso della conferenza, che non è lo spazio misurabile ciò che determina il vero abitare e, con questo, nemmeno l’autentico “aver cura”. Ciò alla fine permette sostenere che anche nel caso di trovarci in un alloggio adeguatamente costruito, non siamo necessariamente al riparo liberamente per il dispiegamento della nostra propria essenza, né stiamo alloggiando propriamente nel vicinato che custodisce. Il classico esempio di ciò è offerto da Heidegger nelle sue tre conferenze del 1957 e del 1958, “Das Wesen der Sprache” (GA 12, 198), nelle quali descrive l’autentica vicinanza a partire dall’esperienza della prossimità (*Nachbarschaft*) fra due case di campagna molto lontane fra loro, in contrapposizione a due case di città – una

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di fronte o accanto all'altra – che non offrono, tuttavia, la possibilità di essere considerate veramente vicine. Ciò è possibile solamente perché si è invertito l'ordine della relazione, sostenendo che non è la prossimità (parametrica) quella che produce vicinanza, ma, al contrario, è la vicinanza (non misurabile) quella che fa avvenire la vicinanza (ibid., 197).

d) Il carattere calcolante del pensiero (*rechnendes Denken*) e la disposizione di tutto l'ente come riparo (*Bestand*), evidenziato dal pensatore tedesco principalmente nel suo discorso del 1955 in onore a Conradin Kreutzer "Gelassenheit" (GA 16, 517–529), così come nella sua conferenza del 1953, "Die Frage nach der Technik" (GA 7, 5–36), e negli schizzi circa la nascita della tecnica moderna, "Abhandlungen und Entwürfe zur Entstehung der modernen Technik" (GA 76, 283–379). In questi testi c'è una caratterizzazione dell'epoca contemporanea attraverso il suo fondamento tecnico, concepito nella sua essenza in termini di una "disposizione congiunta di tutto ciò che è come riserva" (*Ge-stell*), cioè, di tutto l'ente come disponibilità. Allo stesso modo, si presenta in modo conciso il predominio attuale del modo del pensiero calcolante, in cui primeggia la relazione di mezzi e fini a favore di risultati efficaci nei processi di discendenza tecnica-tecnologica e scientifica. Questo modo di pensare si appiglia all'oggettivazione incondizionata dell'ente nella sua totalità, e contraddice nella parte fondamentale il modo di pensare che indaga sul senso e che, perciò, potrebbe essere definito come un pensare di carattere meditativo (*besinnliches Denken*). Apparteniamo, di conseguenza, a un'epoca eminentemente calcolatrice, che nel suo predominio soverchiante e nella sua maniera di procedere unilaterale, avanza a scapito del pensare riflessivo e della sua caratteristica "lentezza".

e) Realizzando una specie di diagnosi dell'epoca, Heidegger sosterrà fin dall'inizio delle sue lezioni dell'inverno del 1951/52, *Was heißt Denken?*, che la cosa più degna che possa essere pensata è che *non siamo ancora capaci di pensare* (GA 8, 6). Questa affermazione, che nelle citate *Vorlesungen* ha come obiettivo quello di segnalare in altri termini l'"oblio dell'essere", coincide con quanto sostenuto in un'altra maniera tre anni dopo in "Gelassenheit", dove si formula il fenomeno epocale della "carenza del pensare" (*Gedankenlosigkeit*) e la fuga dello stesso (*Flucht vor dem Denken*) (GA 16, 518–519). Mentre nel primo scritto Heidegger si concentra nell'evidenziare il predominio della

logica e la sua conseguenza più evidente nella scienza “logistica” (GA 8, 23, 167, 242 e 265) – convertita nella “forma di organizzazione planetaria del tutto rappresentare” (GA 8, 167) –, nel discorso commemorativo sottolineerà il potere del calcolo nella determinazione del modo comune di procedere della razionalità predominante nell’era atomica. Malgrado queste differenze di enfasi in ciascuno degli scritti riferiti, i due rimandano, alla fine, allo stesso punto: al predominio dell’essenza della tecnica nella razionalità occidentale contemporanea. L’epoca sarà considerata, di conseguenza, come l’era della disposizione congiunta di tutto l’ente in quanto richiesto come riserva o disponibilità (*Ge-stell*).

20 f) Finalmente, e legato al predominio del pensare tecnico-calcolante, Heidegger mostrerà un tratto centrale della crisi attuale dell’abitare “la carenza di terra natale” (*Heimatlosigkeit*). Però questa assenza del “patria [terruño]” (*Heimat*) non significa esclusivamente – come una concezione tradizionale e limitata di questo lo potrebbe sostenere – una perdita del passato espresso nelle manifestazioni folcloriche di un paese o una regione né, ovviamente, del radicamento conservatore nella tradizione, ma fondamentalmente la negazione del proprio (*das Eigene*), concepito come il modo particolare di entrare in dialogo con l’altro (GA 16, 647) e come manifestazione della differenza che sostiene la possibilità stessa del rapporto aperto con il mondo. “Il proprio” può essere concepito come *un* modo di aprirsi al mondo e, di conseguenza, come una forma di entrare in relazione comprensiva con questo, con l’altro, con la natura e con se stesso.

Il carattere non conservatore di questa concezione della terra natale (*Heimat*) si può osservare, come uno dei tanti esempi possibili, nel rimando che fa Heidegger al poema di Hebel in “Hebel – Der Hausfreund” (GA 13, 149), in “Gelassenheit” e in “Johann Peter Hebel (Göppingen, 9. November 1955, Volkshochschule)” (GA 16, 529 e 530), in cui prendendo come esempio una pianta si vincola il radicamento (*Wurzeln aus der Erde*) all’apertura al mondo (*Äther*).

La difesa del proprio come manifestazione della differenza (*Differenz*), e non come incapsulamento in sé stesso, si può osservare, a sua volta, tanto nel già citato testo del volume 16 della *Gesamtausgabe* come nell’acerrima critica di Heidegger all’identità vuota (*Gleichheit*) inerente alla carenza di differenze

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(GA 11, 55). Di fronte al carattere diverso delle esperienze del mondo insite nell'esistenza del proprio della terra natale (Rocha de la Torre 2012, 37–55), il mondo contemporaneo, attraverso il versante omogeneizzatore della globalizzazione, tende verso la identità vuota e, con ciò, verso il nichilismo.

### **La crisi dell'abitare e l'ethos dell'occidente**

La tesi di questo lavoro supportata nei sei fenomeni segnalati da Heidegger intorno al mondo contemporaneo, e che finiscono per costituirsi in tratti fondamentali della crisi attuale dell'abitare, va al di là, tuttavia, di ciò che sostiene il filosofo di Meßkirch nella sua opera: l'esigenza di celerità caratteristica del mondo attuale, che incide in modo determinante sulla sottovalutazione della "lentezza" propria della riflessione e del pensare meditativo, così come l'apparente accorciamento delle distanze e la sua limitazione della cura dell'autentica vicinanza che supera la sua determinazione parametrica; il primato del lavoro produttivo, che conduce al successo secondo i parametri stabiliti dalla società e dall'economia attuale; il predominio del calcolo e la carenza del pensare che configurano la validità epocale della strumentalità in tutto il rapporto dell'uomo con la natura, con gli altri e con se stesso, e la permanenza dell'identità vuota (*Gleichheit*) sulla differenza (*das Selbe*) dovuta al versante colonizzatore della civilizzazione mondiale (*Weltzivilisation*), possono essere intesi come un'unità spirituale *sui generis* che determina il modo particolare in cui l'uomo (*Mensch*) si apre al mondo ed esso avviene nella sua apertura. Questa unità sarà concepita come la struttura che regge la crisi dell'abitare dell'uomo sulla terra e, dunque, che porta al tramonto ed alla miseria di esso, dal momento che impedisce l'autentico abitare (*wohnen*) dell'uomo in quanto salvazione (*Rettung*) della terra come dimora (GA 7, 152).

Tanto il calcolo quanto la vacuità propria dell'identità vuota di differenze, che costituiscono i pilastri fondamentali di questa struttura spirituale unitaria dell'epoca contemporanea, conducono verso la irriflessione e verso il nichilismo che configurano l'ethos culturale d'occidente, e delle regioni e paesi così velocemente conquistati da questo. Con questa caratterizzazione si vuole sottolineare che l'apertura di mondo propria dell'esistenza umana concepita in termini di progetto gettato (*geworfen*), di "essere lanciata verso" (*Hinausstehen*),

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con le parole di “Lettera sull’umanismo” (GA 9, 350), è bloccata e surrogata in una vacuità.

Il calcolo e la disponibilità di tutto quello che è concepito come riserva (*Bestand*), non solo genera, di conseguenza, la concezione strumentale di processi tecnici e relazioni pragmatiche come quelle che caratterizzano l’economia e la politica nella sua dimensione attuale, ma anche la forma di sentire e rapportarsi con il proprio (*das Eigene*) che si esprime nella terra natale (*Heimat*), nel linguaggio materno (*Muttersprache*), ed anche nel legame che si stabilisce con gli altri e con se stessi. Riconoscendo il valore della terra ed il linguaggio natale, e con esso della differenza (*Differenz*)<sup>17</sup> nel mezzo del dispiegamento totalizzatore e uniformante della disposizione congiunta di tutto l’ente sollecitato come riserva (*Gestell*), Heidegger affronterà nel contesto del primato del calcolo e della civilizzazione mondiale, il senso del proprio (*das Eigene*) e la sua sottovalutazione per la preminenza del pragmatico inerente alla ricerca ormai incontrollata di appartenenza all’universale ed ai valori supremi della cultura occidentale. La questione che risulta da questo campanello d’allarme sarà per il pensatore tedesco indagare “[...] se nell’epoca della civilizzazione mondiale tecnicata ed uniforme ci sia ancora la terra natale” (GA 13, 243).<sup>18</sup>

Tre idee fondamentali dell’opera della maturità di Heidegger sono presenti in questa semplice domanda, riferita all’ethos della civilizzazione mondiale contemporanea: a) il carattere tecnico di tale ethos, che in altre parole segnala il primato del calcolo organizzato come un intreccio di disponibilità e di esigenze di disponibilità di tutto l’ente, che sposta in un secondo piano quello che sfugge al suo dispiegamento unilaterale e totalizzatore: la riflessione; b) l’uniformità (*Gleichförmigkeit*) e, di conseguenza, la perdita della differenza a cui essa conduce in un mondo dominato dalla forma unilaterale ed universale di esigere all’ente già descritta; c) la perdita del proprio (*das Eigene*: consustanziale all’essenza della terra natale e del linguaggio materno come forme di aprirci al mondo, agli uomini ed alle sue opere ed alle cose) (GA 16,

17 Cf. Rocha de la Torre 2012, 37–55; 2021, 207–231.

18 Al riguardo cf. anche, fra gli altri, *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* (Heidegger, GA 16) ed *Etica y política en perspectiva fenomenológica* (Held 2012, 99–113).



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495), che si traduce nell'egemonia dell'identità vuota di differenze e, dunque, nella carenza di un'autentica alterità.

La descrizione di questo ethos culturale permette concepire la civilizzazione attuale come una civilizzazione caratterizzata dal calcolo generatore di vacuità (identità carente di differenze) e di mancanza di riflessione propria della carenza di pensare (GA 16, 517–529 e GA 8). Ambedue prodotti del pensare che calcola – con derivazioni culturali, sociali, politiche, economiche e spirituali – sono le manifestazioni palesi della banalità e del nichilismo, che dominano il modo più comune di rapportarsi l'uomo (*Mensch*) con il mondo, con sé stesso e con la natura. Il calcolo originariamente economico del sistema che governa oggi il mondo, basato sulla transazione a favore del guadagno e del consumo incontenibile, fonda un modo di essere – una “struttura spirituale” – che si converte nel modo costitutivo del comprendere dell'esistenza umana. In questo modo, il calcolo transazionale che guadagna e consuma, si erge come valore supremo dell'ethos culturale del mondo occidentale attuale.

La morte dei valori supremi – legati direttamente alla concezione cristiana – segnalata da Nietzsche come l'avvenimento che marca l'esperienza del nichilismo, smette di essere il punto di rottura fra il senso e l'insensato nel mondo contemporaneo, dato che tali valori, pensati con rigore, ormai non sono fondamentali per l'esistenza umana. Contrariamente a quanto ipotizzato da Nietzsche, e dallo stesso Heidegger nella sua accezione ontologica del nichilismo come rifiuto (*Weigerung*) o sottrazione (*Enzug*) dell'essere nell'eccesso di ente, il nichilismo del presente si esprime nella forma della carenza di differenza: identità vuota (*Gleichheit*) nel processo contemporaneo di dissoluzione del proprio, consustanziale all'esperienza della dissoluzione della terra natale e del linguaggio materno, dovuto al passo in avanti pianificato e solido di un linguaggio universale e di una civilizzazione mondiale sempre più uniforme nelle sue forme culturali e linguistiche di aprirsi al mondo.

Identità vuota nella preminenza universale del capitalismo economico divenuto spirituale (“capitalismo spirituale”), cioè, nella struttura di rapporto con il mondo, con la natura e con gli altri, fondata nella transazione a favore del

guadagno e del consumo, convertiti in valori supremi interiorizzati.<sup>19</sup> Identità vuota nella supremazia globale dell'azione irriflessiva – o razionalmente strategica –, rinnegatrice del pensare che indaga sul senso dell'azione e del calcolo, portato a termine dinnanzi ai fini strategici nei diversi ambiti dell'esperienza umana.

Questa vacuità dell'esistenza umana in tutti i suoi ambiti e in tutte le sue sfaccettature, è il frutto dell'uniformità prodotto dell'imposizione del pensiero calcolante e della sua esigenza universale, unilaterale e totalizzante. È nell'intreccio di esigenze di tutto l'ente come riserva, che la rapidità e l'accorciamento parametrico delle distanze fondano la loro importanza, e in cui i mass media ricevono il riconoscimento come facilitatori di tale riduzione. Però è nella carenza di differenza (nichilismo) e nella fuga del pensare (banalità) – in cui alla fine si perde la cura e il riparo che fornisce un autentico abitare dell'uomo sulla terra – dove incontriamo la fonte primaria delle crisi dell'abitare: il “io sono”, in quanto “io abito prendendo cura e custodendo” la terra, perde il suo senso nella trasformazione di essa in semplice abitacolo in cui primeggia la disposizione congiunta di tutto come riserva, il calcolo irriflessivo e la vacuità uniforme priva di autentica differenza. Dato che il pensiero calcolante da dove alla fine procedono tutti i tratti che configurano il modo di abitare dell'uomo attuale, così come l'ethos della civilizzazione mondiale contemporanea caratterizzata dalla sua vacuità irriflessiva, la crisi dell'abitare dell'uomo sulla terra è, in sintesi, l'espressione della “crisi del pensiero e del senso”, motivata da un modo dell'uomo di aprirsi al mondo, basato sulla transazione che ha come obiettivo il guadagno e il consumo, convertiti in valori supremi del presente; trasformati in questa maniera – in quanto “struttura comprensiva” – in “capitalismo spirituale”.

*Traduzione di Salvatore Italiano*

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19 Cf. rispetto ai nuovi valori fondamentali, ormai non religiosi, ma laici, Maffei 2016, 75 ss.

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# HERMENEUTICS, PRACTICE, EVENT

## AN ATTEMPT AT RE-CONCEPTUALIZING HUMAN AGENCY

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*Abstract*

The paper deals with the problem of a re-conceptualization of the basic modes of human agency. This task is prompted by a consideration, according to which our traditional conceptuality (going back to the Greek distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis*) cannot account for the very emergence of true praxis that in turn can be explained by a certain oblivion institutionalized in our culture, namely, already on the level of grammar. Such oblivion is revealed by pointing out that the voice systems of

the primordial Indo-European languages, as opposed to those of the major occidental languages, were still able to capture the all-encompassing notion of “pure event” and of “medial (event-related) agency.” This yields a tripartite typology of agency, which can account for the kind of human activity that mediates between *poiesis* and *praxis* and may, therefore, prepare for the latter.

*Keywords:* hermeneutics, practice, agency, grammar, middle voice, event.

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### **Hermenevtika, praksa, dogodek. Poskus re-konceptualizacije človeškega delovanja**

#### *Povzetek*

30 Članek obravnava problem re-konceptualizacije temeljnih načinov človeškega delovanja. Takšno nalogo sproža razmislek o tem, da naša tradicionalna pojmovnost (podedovana od grškega razlikovanja med *poiesis* in *praxis*) ne zmore zajeti pojavljanja resnične prakse samega, kakršnega je mogoče razložiti z določeno pozabo, institucionalizirano znotraj naše kulture, in sicer že na ravni slovnice. Tovrstno pozabo lahko razkrijemo tako, da pokažemo, kako so glagolski načini primordialnih indoevropskih jezikov – v nasprotju s poglobitnimi zahodnimi jeziki – še bili sposobni zajetja vseobsežne ideje »čistega dogodka« in »medialnega (tj. na dogodek vezanega) delovanja«. Na podlagi tega razgrnemo trojno tipologijo delovanja, kakršna lahko razjasni takšno človeško delovanje, ki posreduje med *poiesis* ter *praxis* in nas potemtakem lahko pripravi za slednjo.

*Ključne besede:* hermenevtika, praksa, delovanje, slovnica, srednjik, dogodek.

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## I. Introduction

As the theory of understanding and proper interpretation, hermeneutics has always been a practice-oriented discipline. Its so-called “ontological turn,” however, as it was inaugurated by Heidegger and furthered by Gadamer, elevated the issue of understanding into the center of philosophy and at the same time shed a new light on human practice and agency. Nevertheless, it is especially in Gadamer’s formulations that hermeneutics takes on a distinct socio-political significance. The ontologically constitutive openness of human individuals, as Heidegger highlighted it, has been shown by Gadamer to be embedded in a public, dialogical dimension, and as such it has proved to be the basis for both the formation of communities and individual action. In Gadamer’s view, accordingly, human practice, in general, and genuine praxis, in particular, are always already conditioned by a broadly conceived process of formation (*Bildung*). Nevertheless, since dialogically conditioned praxis is in principle bound up with tradition, whereas modernization as a rule has a dissolving effect on such traditions, dialogically maintained social praxis experiences a peculiar kind of crisis within the context of (post)modernity.

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In connection with this, critics called for a move beyond hermeneutics, towards a social theory that is to analyze the structure and dynamics of power and domination for the sake of the concrete realization of dialogue-accommodating communities. As opposed to such a legitimate requirement, there remains a truly hermeneutic task in our view regarding the issue of the prospects of dialogical praxis.<sup>1</sup> Namely, one should ask whether there are *internal* obstacles to the *Bildung* process itself, obstacles that stem from our very traditions.

In an attempt to answer this question, I will point to a specific kind of “oblivion,” which has become institutionalized in our culture on the level of grammar from early on, one that pertains to our understanding of human agency as well. Here, my procedure relies on linguistic insights regarding the historical development of certain grammatical features of the Indo-European

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout the text, the term “praxis” appears in italics only when used for referring to the ancient Greek equivalent of it.

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languages, a method that ultimately finds its justification on the basis of the notion—central to philosophical hermeneutics—that language is an elemental medium of human existence. Assuming that alterations of the basic structural features of languages mirror deep tendencies within the historically changing self-understanding of humans, and particularly, that historically conceived modes of activity and human agency are specifically reflected in the voice systems of languages, a typology of agency becomes apparent on the basis of a diachronic investigation of voice systems, one that surpasses the basic traditional conceptuality—originating from the Greeks—, by which human practice has for long been approached. Such a typology, also supported by Gadamer’s ontological exposition of the Being of artwork, promises to shed some light on the crisis previously highlighted in the very heart of the prospects of praxis.

32 Thus, in what follows I firstly summarize the problem of practice in two steps, namely, by showing the way it figures in the tradition of hermeneutics and especially in the works of the early Heidegger and Gadamer, and also by pointing out the supposedly paradoxical conditions that efforts to implement praxis-accommodating communities must face within the context of the (post)modern era. In the second part of the paper, I turn to the issue of a re-conceptualizing of agency prompted by the problem exposed in the first part. Here, I firstly justify the methodical turn to grammar and, secondly, proceed by highlighting and comparing the voice systems of the primordial Indo-European languages, on the one hand, and the major occidental languages, on the other hand, in order to sketch the basic features of the notions of agency they imply. On that basis, I outline in the following step a tripartite typology of agency and relate it to the Greek distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis*, also giving a few examples from the 20<sup>th</sup> century for the decisive impact the latter distinction exercised on many of the Western theories of practice. Finally, I focus on the type of activity that the distinction of the Greeks cannot account for and I exhibit both Gadamer’s parallel insights and the sense, in which this type of activity is able to shed light on the supposed paradox of praxis.

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## II. The problem of practice

### 1. *Hermeneutics and practice*

The tradition of hermeneutics has been concerned with practice in a number of specific senses. As a discipline originally referring to the art and theory of the understanding and correct interpretation of sacred, legal, classical, or other kinds of texts, signs, or utterances, it was mostly understood as a *Kunstlehre*, a normative theory prescribing some technique or methodology for the practice of interpretation. Even Dilthey's expansion of hermeneutics into an organon of the humanities was still conceived as such a guide for artful interpretation. There have, of course, been efforts to grasp the significance of understanding and interpretation in more general, philosophical terms—already in the Enlightenment and later on in the age of Romanticism, especially in Schleiermacher's work (see, e.g., Grondin 1994, 45-75)—, yet nothing really comparable to the outburst of hermeneutic ideas in the philosophical program of the early Heidegger.

In sharp contrast to the hermeneutic tradition, Heidegger approached the issue of understanding in a descriptive, phenomenological manner, and conceived understanding—beyond its merely cognitive-disciplinary role—as the fundamental mode of Being of human existence, that is, *Dasein's* very “potentiality-for-Being” (*Seinkönnen*; Heidegger 1962, 183). With that, hermeneutics has evolved from its previous subsidiary status to a mode of thinking that is of universal, philosophical, ontological significance. Namely, the young Heidegger's project of a hermeneutic-phenomenological description of human existence was ultimately put in the service of his leading fundamental-ontological quest for the meaning of Being as such (the so-called *Seinsfrage*), a project that was conceived in utter opposition to the contemplative-theoretical tradition as it first came to language in Greek ontology.

In turn, with Gadamer, hermeneutics acquired an explicitly practical, ethical (and political) significance, one that obfuscates the fundamental-ontological issue of the *Seinsfrage* as such. Although this “practical turn” of hermeneutic philosophy is traceable in *Truth and Method* in a number of interrelated

respects,<sup>2</sup> it becomes most explicit in Gadamer's claim, according to which the issue of application is "the central problem of hermeneutics [...] to be found in all understanding" (Gadamer 2004, 306; see also Gadamer 1987b, 224-225).<sup>3</sup>

On this matter, Gadamer refers to Aristotle's account of *phronesis* as an exemplary model for the problem of application and, thus, for hermeneutics in general. For inasmuch as the issue of hermeneutics is defined by an all-encompassing historicity, hermeneutic philosophy is concerned exclusively with the kind of reason and knowledge that are not separable from "being that had become what it is" (*gewordenes Sein*). As it is the case with *phronesis*, "hermeneutic rationality," too, represents a kind of "embodied knowledge," a knowledge that is not abstract-technical, but, rather, factual-existential-practical-ethical-communal-political throughout. Understanding, as Gadamer conceives it, is a kind of *phronesis*. It is primarily in this sense that Gadamer's hermeneutics is the heir of the old tradition of practical philosophy.

34 Now, one of the peculiarities of Gadamer's *Truth and Method* is that it presents the "hermeneutic phenomenon" as if its relevance pertained mainly to the problem of the self-understanding of humanities.<sup>4</sup> However, Gadamer's lifelong concern revolved around the significance of what can be called the principle of dialogicality, namely, the peculiar role that the true (Socratic) dialogue plays not only in the field of the disciplines—already in the emergence of Aristotelian apophantic discourse—, but also in the communal and political

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2 It is foreshadowed already in Gadamer's introduction of the theme of significance of the humanist tradition—and especially the notion of *Bildung*—for the humanities, and also in the emphasis laid on the renewed continuity of self-understanding acquired through all kinds of "hermeneutic experience" (eminently in the experience of art or history and in the linguistic world-experience in general).

3 It is noteworthy, furthermore, that Habermas was among the first observers who realized the fact that linking hermeneutics to application—and with that, to praxis—was one of Gadamer's most significant contributions (Habermas 1971).

4 One can certainly find more or less explicit allusions to the ethical-political implications of the humanities. Yet, when the thematic emphases of *Truth and Method* are compared with the early Gadamer's politically inspired hermeneutics (see Sullivan 1989; Sullivan 1997) and also with his writings after the publication of his 1960 volume, one cannot fail to recognize the fact that Gadamer's focus in his magnum opus on the problem of the humanities was not really his most basic concern, but was at the time, rather, the inherited philosophical problem, to which his own, most elemental insights could immediately be applied.

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life of humans. What is truly peculiar to Gadamer's hermeneutics, then, is that it fuses *phronesis* with dialogue. It is this double—practical *and* dialogical, Aristotelian *and* Platonic—orientation that comes so relevantly to expression already in the very title of Gadamer's 1931 book: *Plato's Dialectical Ethics*. It does “not assert that Plato's ‘ethics’ is dialectical. Rather, [it is to point out that] Plato's *dialectic is ‘ethics’*” (Gadamer 1991, xxv) *and*—in the case of the Greeks that also means—*politics*.

Accordingly, the Gadamerian reformulation of hermeneutics proves to be relevant in two major dimensions: within the matrix of disciplines, and perhaps with even greater weight in the socio-political context of modern societies. Its socio-political, critical thrust is most explicit in the ideal of “hermeneutic community” it implies, of a communal solidarity brought about and maintained dialogically—as opposed, e.g., to the ideal of a “classless society” or to a society primarily integrated by constraints of legality. By highlighting the significance of dialogically worked-out social bonds, the notion of hermeneutic community can serve as a regulative idea of praxis.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The critical potential of the notion of hermeneutic community becomes evident against the backdrop of Gadamer's diagnosis concerning our contemporary socio-political situation. It can be summarized as follows. In our epoch, which is but “the age of science,” we are confronted with the constant threat that technology, fed by science, will dominate society more and more, that public opinion is manipulated by powerful techniques, that the type of practical-political reason required for citizens to make responsible decisions gets undermined, and that—as a result—people are losing their moral and political orientation. Such a loss of meaning and prospect is reflected in the widely prevalent passivism and conformism, and in its seeming opposite, infatuated and rabid activism. In that state, people are longing to find in science a substitute for their lost orientation, and, consequently, science with its methodologically secured results and anonymous authority, as well as the role of experts, become more and more a matter of false idolatry. In sum, it is social and political praxis as such that is endangered in the modern technologically developed societies, insofar as the very concepts of true agency and praxis as such may sink into oblivion. It is for that reason that Gadamer regards it as “the chief task of philosophy” that it should justify and “defend practical and political reason against the domination of technology based on science. That is the point of philosophical hermeneutics.” (Gadamer 1987a, 262; my translation.)

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## 2. *The (post)modern paradox of social praxis*

Nonetheless, the shift from the disciplinary applicability of the notion of a dialogically conceived *phronesis* to its applicability in the socio-political dimension, that is, Gadamer's fusion of dialogical hermeneutics with practical philosophy, implies a crucial difficulty, one that pertains to the conditions of the emergence of hermeneutic community as such. Richard Bernstein calls it "the modern (or post-modern) paradox concerning the prospects of human praxis," a paradox which consists in the fact that

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[...] the type of solidarity, communicative interaction, dialogue, and judgment required for the concrete realization of praxis already presupposes incipient forms of the community life that such praxis seeks to foster. [...] A community or a *polis* is not something that can be made or engineered by some form of *techné* or by the administration of society. There is something of a circle here, comparable to the hermeneutical circle. The coming into being of a type of public life that can strengthen solidarity, public freedom, a willingness to talk and to listen [...] presupposes the incipient forms of such communal life. (Bernstein 1983, 175, 225-226.)

Yet, such a circularity is an elemental characteristic of *phronesis* itself. What is so distinctive about *phronesis* is that it is a knowledge determined by, and determinative of, praxis. It is a know-how of praxis, in the senses of both the subjective and the objective genitive. In other words, *phronesis* is a matter of *gewordenes Sein*, of a being that is not only becoming, but also had become what it is, and therefore has taken up into itself its own past.

It is on this point that ways depart, decisively. At issue are the conditions of the possibility of the coming-about of such a *gewordenes Sein*, and also the human means for furthering its coming-about. For Gadamer, the answer to these questions is to be found in *Bildung* (broadly conceived), in the process of which *sensus communis*—a sense also for what is commonly good or valid—is to be acquired. As opposed to that, Bernstein and others stress the point that there are external obstacles to the flourishing of *phronesis*, and that extant *phronesis* needs to be informed primarily by "a detailed understanding of

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how power as domination (*Herrschaft*)—the type of domination that deforms praxis—operates in the modern world.” Such an approach is certainly right to claim that an “immanent critique of philosophic hermeneutics [...] leads us to questions and practical tasks that take us beyond hermeneutics” (Bernstein, 156, 161).

But, here, we are interested in another direction of questioning. Our question is whether or not there are discernible directions, in which hermeneutic philosophy can and, indeed, needs to be further developed—internally, so to speak. For that, we need to focus especially on the internal obstacles of the *Bildung* process itself, obstacles that stem from the peculiarities of our own historical situation, our traditions. We need a deepened understanding of the conditions of the emergence of *gewordenes Sein*, and for that we need to detect further roots of inherited, yet estranged forms of *Bildung*, beyond the already unveiled sources of such forms.

Now, the aforementioned paradox implies that the emergence of praxis-accommodating communities depends on something that is not quite in our power to achieve, something which cannot artificially be brought about. Regarding its inception, praxis must depend on something that transcends it, namely, on some foundational event or series of events making it possible. We have to consider the possibility that the commencement of such uncontrollable, yet foundational events—events, in which the participants happen to come across some common ground—is the condition of the possibility of the sprouting of dialogical *phronesis* and praxis. By the same token, however, the inception and flourishing of dialogical praxis must depend on some other kind of human activity, too, some prior practice of learning and realizing how to participate in such foundational events.<sup>6</sup> Thus, our considerations of

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<sup>6</sup> The following quote from Gadamer pertains to this point: “Practice is conducting oneself and acting in solidarity. Solidarity, however, is the decisive condition and basis of all social reason. There is a saying of Heraclitus, the ‘weeping’ philosopher: The *logos* is common to all, but people behave as if each had a private reason. Does this have to remain this way?” (Gadamer 1987b, 228; my translation.) This passage implies that practice as a socially reasonable way of acting is a possibility for all, but it requires a change in mentality, a kind of “conversion,” an alternative, communal, and intersubjective way of thinking that is able to realize what is common and to guide action accordingly. Among the candidates for such an alternative, neither idiosyncratic

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the sketched paradox lead us to the task of understanding the very notion of the “event” playing a foundational role at the inception of human praxis, and to the question of the nature of a specific activity—which is neither *poiesis* nor *praxis*—that corresponds to such an event. It is the fact that our basic traditional conceptuality betrays us in accounting for the emergence of praxis that prompts us to investigate the possibility of finding some means for a re-conceptualizing of human agency.

### III. Re-conceptualizing human agency

#### 1. Language as medium and the problem of conceptualizing agency

38

My proposal for shedding light on both aforementioned issues rests on one of the central insights of Gadamer. For in the middle of Gadamer’s considerations one finds the notion of the “medium of language” (*die Mitte der Sprache*). As such, “language is the record (*Spur*) of finitude,” “a medium where I and world [...] manifest their original belonging together” (Gadamer 2004, 453, 469). Since language is such a first, all-encompassing, and unsurpassable medium, it embodies an immense stock of knowledge regarding the ways, in which humans proved to be able to settle in, and come to terms with, their historical existence. It is for that reason that time and again Gadamer reverts to the interpretation of idiomatic expressions and that in many cases a surveying of the history of concepts (*Begriffsgeschichte*) functions in his philosophy as an argument for the presented case.<sup>7</sup> But if the idioms of language and the

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nor merely cognitive, communal and intersubjective mode of thinking developed in the course of the 20th century are—besides the Gadamerian notion of a dialogical-applicative understanding—, e. g., Habermas’s concept of communicative reason and Arendt’s so-called “representative thinking” (derived from Kant’s notion of reflective judgment).

<sup>7</sup> The paradigmatic case for Gadamer relying on the prior understanding of a concept as it is reflected in language is his elucidation of the phenomenon of play. For insofar as play itself cannot in principle “appear” as such to the consciousness of those who play, its elucidation has to, by necessity, rely on language, on the linguistic usages and contexts of the concept. “Here as always the metaphorical usage has methodological priority. [...] Language has performed in advance the abstraction that is, as such, the task of conceptual analysis.” (Gadamer 2004, 103.)

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historical development of concepts can be regarded as such original sources of knowledge and meaning—meaning that transcends and at the same time determines all reflexive knowledge—, *how much more should this be true of the basic structural elements of language*.<sup>8</sup> Certain structural features of languages, and especially the historical developments of such features, must be interrogated as basic records of the deep tendencies within the historical self-understanding of humans.

It is primarily the voice systems of the languages, approached in a historical perspective, that can be instructive regarding the notion of event and the corresponding type of activity we are looking for. Since it is the voice systems of languages that can be considered to be the basic linguistic means, by which conceived modes of activity and human agency can be given voice, an investigation into the kinds and historical developments of such systems may contribute to outlining a tentative typology of activity and human agency.

In fact, the exposition of the philosophical significance of certain extant linguistic research concerning the historical transformation of the voice systems of the Indo-European languages seems to attest to such a claim. Here, I will refer to the events supposedly constitutive in the emergence of praxis by the term “medial event.” One of my central claims concerning such medial events is that awareness of them was preserved in the very grammar of certain languages, and that such awareness is reflected in, and medial events are most properly expressible by, the so-called middle voice of verbs.

The middle voice is primarily known to us from ancient Greek (as *mesotes*), because in most of the major occidental languages the middle voice is not expressible by a morphologically distinct form.<sup>9</sup> Thus, our occidental linguistic

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8 Accordingly, the fact that the problem of metaphysics as such has much to do with the impact of grammar on thinking has been repeatedly observed. Nietzsche claimed that the foundation of all metaphysics is trust in grammar, namely, that one projects an agent—a subject—behind every event “following grammatical habits,” under the “spell of particular grammatical functions” (Nietzsche 2002, 17, 20). Heidegger claims something similar when he says that for the task of grasping “entities in their *Being* [...] we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the ‘grammar’” (Heidegger 1962, 63).

9 For example, the English sentence “This book reads easily.” uses the active form, whereas the German sentence “*Dieses Buch liest sich leicht.*” utilizes the reflexive form

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development attests to the fact that *thinking in terms of activity and passivity has become predominant*, and the original functions and meaning of the middle voice have characteristically been lost. Such a loss is clearly indicated by the fact that even standard introductions to ancient Greek grammar describe the middle voice as some mixture of the active and passive voices. As they explain, the middle voice “represents the subject as acting either upon himself (reflexive) or in his own interest,” or it “is often used for actions which in some way affect the subject” (Chase and Phillips 1961, 90; Wilding 1986, 68). As it is conspicuous, in such characterizations *the subject remains in the centre of the action* expressed by the verb: it is the subject who acts and at the same time is being acted upon.

As opposed to that, the real significance of the middle voice is that it expresses a third, autonomous meaning, not reducible to any mixture of the meanings expressed by the active and passive voices. That such a reduction is illegitimate, is also shown by the claim—generally accepted among linguists (e.g., Cline 1983, v)—that the middle is more primordial than the passive voice. This is  
40 the view of the eminent expert of Indo-European languages, Emile Benveniste, too. He also offers a delineation of the function and meaning of the middle voice, according to which it brings to language an “action” of a “subject” who stands in the medium of an event, whereby *the subject is displaced, it gets out of the focus in favor of the event taking place*.

Benveniste’s main claims are the following (Benveniste 1971, 145-151). 1) The distinction between the active and passive voices, fundamental as it is in the voice systems of spoken occidental languages, is “inessential to the Indo-European verbal system.” 2) The passive voice stems from the more ancient middle voice. 3) The primordial Indo-European verbal system consisted of two voices, namely, the middle and the active ones. This was then replaced by the triad of active–middle–passive (“only for a given period in the history of Greek”). Finally, the opposition between the active and passive voices replaced the former triad. 4) The usual categorization of the diatheses as well as the terms used for grasping them (active–middle–passive) stem from the Greek

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for expressing middle-voiced meaning. It is noteworthy, however, that Hungarian as well as many other spoken languages do have distinct middle voice forms.

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grammarians “who gave expression only to a peculiarity of a certain stage of language.” Therefore, the meanings and functions of the different diatheses should be made accessible in a different, more original way. 5) The principle of a properly linguistic distinction between the two primordial voices, middle and active, turns on the relationship between subject and process—the subject is either external, and therefore active, or internal, and therefore middle, to the process.

Several observations are apposite here concerning Benveniste’s claims. First, the Greek notion of *mesotes* should not be construed—in Benveniste’s manner—as the “middle” or “transitional” between the active and the passive, but, rather, it is to be understood as “*the medial*”: as that verb, which brings to expression an “action” of a “subject” who *stands in the medium* of a process or event. Second, the philosophical significance of Benveniste’s approach can be delineated in a preliminary manner by comparing the primordial and the occidental opposition of voices. It yields the following results. Within the primordial, medial–active opposition both voices express three aspects: 1) the (temporal) event expressed by the verb; 2) the “subject” of the event; and 3) the locality (“existential spatiality”) of the “subject” with respect to the event (with respect to which the active and the medial differ one from the other). As opposed to that, within the frames of the occidental, active–passive opposition both voices express merely two aspects: 1) the action (not any more an event) expressed by the verb; and 2) the subject; and the difference between the two voices here is, whether the subject is the agent of the action or is the one being acted upon. This is a one-dimensional perspective (active subject→action→object/passive subject), and in each case the subject stands in the focus. Accordingly, due to the transition from the primordial to the occidental voice systems, two notions, essential to the middle voice, namely, *the locality of the subject* as well as that, “in which” it could be localized, i.e., *the notion of a pure event as such* (as opposed to some “action”) *were lost*. As opposed to that, within the paradigm of the ancient medial–active opposition, both diatheses are able to express in a single unit the threefold aspects of *temporal event–“subject”–its locality*.

We may summarize the philosophical significance of the above considerations as follows. The primordial opposition between the middle

and active voices represents a kind of *thinking in terms of verb and subject, event and agent*. As opposed to that, the occidental opposition between the active and passive voices represents the predominance of a kind of *thinking in terms of subject and object, agent and patient*. Therefore, the return to the primordial and mostly forgotten insight into “mediality” may indeed be *one* of those forms, in which the philosophical fixation of such thinking in terms of agent and patient, namely, the Cartesian subject–object dichotomy may be overcome.

## 2. *Poiesis, praxis, and the “medial” typology of agency*

42 The primordial and occidental voice systems enable us to sketch a typology of agency, in the frames of which three distinct senses of being an agent are discernible: 1) pure agency in the (occidental) sense of being the spontaneous source of action without involving any notion of event; 2) agency in the (primordial active) sense of being the source of action externally related to some event taking place; and 3) agency in the (primordial medial) sense of being an agent internal to some event taking place.

This is a pregnant triad. In any case, it implies more than what is inherent in the Greek distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis*. The sharp opposition between the two latter concepts seems to preclude an adequate account of the type of activities that are expressible by the primordial active voice. While *poiesis* is a matter of pure agency, and *praxis* involves a kind of medial agency, their all-encompassing opposition seems to leave no place for a notion of agency, which is externally active in relation to some event taking place.

According to Aristotle, who conceptualized the pertaining distinction, *praxis* is distinguished from *poiesis* by the fact that, instead of being related to an end external to it, true *praxis* includes its end within itself (Aristotle 1990, 1048b 25–6).

In *poiesis*, the thing done (*to poieton*) is not an end in itself, it is only for something or somebody else (*pros ti kai tinos*). The opposite should be said about what is achieved in and by *praxis*, since *eupraxia* is the end and this is what desire aims at. (Aristotle 1985, 1139a 35–b 4.)

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In a commentator's words, "actuality and potentiality do not function identically in the case of *praxis* as in *poiesis*," namely, "in the case of *poiesis*, *dynamis* [potentiality] is external to *energeia* [actuality], whereas in the case of *praxis*, *dynamis* is internal to *energeia*" (Taminiaux 1991, 123).

There is a gap, however, left open by this Aristotelian distinction. This gap—or lack of differentiation—concerns the fact that the contrast between "pros ti" and "hou heneka" pertains for Aristotle only to the contrast between producing (via *poiesis*) and *eupraxia* (what can be achieved in and by *praxis*). That is to say, the contrast conceptualized by Aristotle does not seem to cover those instances where *eupraxia* is to be distinguished from some achievements that we esteem equally highly, yet primarily we do not cherish them for their productivity. Works of art are such achievements, and for the type of human activity that leads to their emergence I reserve the term "creating" (in the primordial active sense) as opposed to making, producing, or constructing, and, in turn, to acting.

In fact, the lack of a sufficient conceptualization of the distinction between products and works of art, and *a fortiori* between the corresponding activities of making and "creating," is pervasive in our philosophical traditions. The Greek distinction between *praxis* and *poiesis* proved to be decisive for most Western theories of practice, well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

One finds the same lacuna even in the early Heidegger's destructive re-appropriation of Aristotle's practical philosophy. It can immediately be seen in the well-known fact that the most basic division of Heidegger's existential analytics between the inauthentic and authentic modes of existence is modelled after the Aristotelian distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis* (see, e.g., Taminiaux 1991, 114 ff.). Accordingly, this analytics deals with our everyday pragmatic-instrumental dealings—where "sign" plays a central role—and with the depths of authentic existence. The exposition of the latter is a peculiar, indeed, a violent re-appropriation of the Aristotelian notion of *praxis*, to be sure. For it interprets true *praxis* as a solitary understanding of Being, where *phronesis* is conceived as an existential-ontological matter purified from its public aspects, namely, as conscience devoid of its originally implied communal, ethical, and political aspects. A further astonishing feature of such a framing of human existence is that it leaves no place for the issue of art, whatsoever. *Being and Time*

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does not deal with the world of symbols, images, presentations, or exhibitions (*Darstellungen*), of all the medial forms of transmitting meaning. “All [...] presentations [...] and symbols have [the] basic formal structure of appearing,” namely, “appearing is a *not-showing-itself*,” Heidegger claims (1962, 52). And since these have such a formal structure, the appearing of “presentations and symbols” is something not worthy of dealing with in the young Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology, for such an appearing is the very opposite to its proper subject matter, namely, the self-showing of phenomena.

44 Hannah Arendt dealt with the concepts of *praxis* and *poiesis* in depth, too, with the clear intention of opposing Heidegger’s violent re-appropriation of them. In her typology of *vita activa*, Arendt follows a threefold division between labor (which is to satisfy the necessities of the cycle of life), work (*poiesis*, producing), and action (*praxis*, self-disclosing of the agent in speech and action), also highlighting features of the latter two notions, which are not explicit in Aristotle’s texts. The most decisive differences she points to between work and action are the following. Making products is defined by a tendency to univocity, predictability, and reversibility, a tendency that is inherent in the pre-set plan, goal, means, and capacities at work in the largely anonymous productive activity. As opposed to that, human action is characterized according to Arendt by a thorough ambiguity, irreversibility, and unpredictability, a frailty mainly due to the constantly renewed network of relationships and verbal exchanges, in the context of which it takes place, thereby providing a plurality, in which individualization and self-disclosing speech and action can for the first time appear. In our view, works of art do not fit into such a division and characterization of human practice and, indeed, nowhere in her typology of practical life does Arendt refer to the distinctiveness of the very activity of creating artworks. In fact, the issue of art is approached by her from a very peculiar horizon, namely, with regard to the question: How do artworks contribute to “the permanence of the world”? The “world” is primarily understood here as the sum total of man-made tangible things (as “an ‘artificial’ world of things”; Arendt 1958, 7), and works of art are regarded as being especially able to contribute to the permanence of the world, because they are not to be used-up (artworks are “without any utility whatsoever”; *ibid.*, 167). For Arendt, works of art have a permanence throughout the ages

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in virtue of their material—or spiritual—inscription and thereby durability. Accordingly, she sees the essence of *poiesis* in “reification,” and takes it for granted that the activity of creating artworks is “*the same workmanship*” as that of making products (ibid., 169; my emphasis).<sup>10</sup> To that extent, Arendt does not differentiate between *poiesis*, on the one hand, and the activity of creating works of art, on the other hand, but, rather, maintains the old Aristotelian distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis* in this regard, even if she re-interprets these terms in important ways.

In turn, the question of the status and assessment of the activity of creating artworks proved to be the subject matter of a major—although latent—controversy within the American pragmatist-naturalist tradition, between Justus Buchler, the prominent Columbia School Naturalist, and his colleague, John Dewey. Dewey is well known for having developed a non-dualistic metaphysics of experience and nature (Dewey 1958). This metaphysics promotes an overall primacy of practice, understood as “the practical machinery for bringing about adaptation of the environment to the life requirements of the organism” (Dewey 2008, 133), in short, as the functioning of organic human life. Within the frames of this comprehensive notion of practice, however, there seems to be no clear distinction between scientific truth and that kind of truth, which artworks are able to convey, and no clear distinction between making a product and creating works of art, either (see Ryder 2013, ch. 7: “Art and Knowledge”). In turn, Buchler developed a theory of judgment with the explicit aim of improving on Dewey’s conception of experience in such a way that it recognizes and acknowledges the *various* ways, in which humans interact with their environment (Buchler 1990). Such interactions are based

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<sup>10</sup> It is far from convincing, however, that the process of creating artworks could be characterized with the same tendency to “univocity, predictability, and reversibility” that is inherent in the production of artifacts. Arendt’s emphasis on reification disregards the very *Sache* that works of art exhibit, and, furthermore, her explicit characterization of artworks as “thought things” (Arendt 1958, 169) seems to imply some sense of subjectivization of them. In turn, it is the notion of *die Sache* and the pertaining notion of truth, by which such a subjectivization can powerfully be opposed, as it is the case in Gadamerian hermeneutics. To my knowledge, the best discussion of the Gadamerian notion of “*die Sache*” can be found in Nicholas Davey’s powerful volume on Gadamer’s hermeneutics (Davey 2006, 69–91).

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on judgments—purposeful orderings of surrounding complexes—according to him, and they are threefold: either assertive, exhibitive, or, else, active judgments. Accordingly, science is a matter of assertive judgment, creating artworks is that of exhibitive judgment, whereas making products results from a form of active judgment in Buchler’s theory.<sup>11</sup>

### 3. *Event and creating*

46 Buchler’s views on art show remarkable affinities to Gadamer’s exposition of the issue (see Nyíró 2015), although the latter does not explicitly address the peculiarities of the process of artistic creating as such. Gadamer’s account of the mode of Being of artworks refers to a peculiar *ontological process*, however, an event that is certainly constitutive in the very activity of creating, too. He follows ancient Greek insights—besides some of those of the late Heidegger—, according to which there is a sense of continuity between art and nature. He underlines such continuity by maintaining that the forms of motion, which prevail in nature and which constitute the Being of artworks (as they are experienced, in a verbal sense), are self-same. Both take place in the form of play (*Spiel*), namely, as “self-presentation (*Selbst-Darstellung*) [which] is the true nature of play” (Gadamer 2004, 115).<sup>12</sup> However, for Gadamer the aforementioned continuity prevails not merely between art and nature, but, indeed, between any mimetic presentation and its “original.” Such presentations stand in an essential, ontological relation to that which they exhibit. Every mimetic presentation is that of some original (in the senses of both the subjective and the objective genitive, but with a greater emphasis on the latter), where the so-called “original” is to be conceived as a pure,

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11 Buchler’s classification of judgments coincides to a remarkable extent with the related division introduced by Wilhelm Dilthey who differentiated—among the so-called objectifications of life (*Lebensäußerungen*)—the following three groups: concepts, judgments, patterns of thought; acts or actions; and expressions of life-experience (*Erlebnisausdrücke*; Dilthey 1927, 189–291).

12 As Gadamer claims, “the being of the work of art is connected with the medial sense of play (*Spiel*: also, game and drama). Inasmuch as nature is without purpose and intention, just as it is without exertion, it is a constantly self-renewing play, and can therefore appear as a model for art,” “self-presentation is a universal ontological characteristic of nature” (2004, 105, 108).

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self-commencing, medial event, one that has its own sense of “agency” (as a variation of its primordial medial sense). As Gadamer claims:

The work of art is conceived as an event of being (*Seinsvorgang*) [...] Its being related to the original is so far from lessening its ontological autonomy that, on the contrary, I had to speak [...] of an increase of being [*Zuwachs an Sein*]. (Ibid., 145.)

Self-presentation (*Selbst-Darstellung*) is an utter ontological notion for Gadamer, one that refers to an anonymous process of the emanation-like self-presentation of Being, a temporal fulfilment (*Vollzug*), in which we are faced with, and our understanding may be enlightened by, whatever presents itself to us. What is primarily “exhibitive” in the context of philosophical hermeneutics is the fulfilment of some supra-individual and even—partly—supra-human event.<sup>13</sup>

It is with reference to such a notion of an ontologically constitutive event that the activity of creating unique works is to be distinguished from that of making, producing, or constructing. For it is part of the essence of making or producing something that there is a plan (based on an idea of the product) available in advance, and the task is to realize it—which can be done repeatedly. As opposed to that, true artistic creations cannot in principle be reproduced. Works of art are unique and irreplaceable. This fact points to an essential feature of artworks, namely, that every truly artistic creation is as much the outcome of an uncontrollable event, of a unique and unrepeatable event of “succeeding,” as it is the result of an effort on the artist’s part with all her technical abilities. Creativity is best understood then in terms of “mediality,”

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<sup>13</sup> The notion of some ontologically constitutive “event” is a neuralgic point for many, among them Habermas. According to his disapproving claim, the “critique of the Western emphasis on *logos* inspired by Nietzsche proceeds in a destructive manner [...] it draws the conclusion that the subject positing itself in knowledge is in fact dependent upon something prior, anonymous, and transsubjective—be it the dispensation of Being, the accident of structure-formation, or the generative power of some discourse formation” (Habermas 1998, 310). Although in the broader context of this paragraph Habermas—tactfully—does not mention Gadamer, his objection is certainly meant to pertain to him as well.

as a practice relying on *techne* while striving towards participation in the fulfilment of an uncontrollable event.

Bernstein writes: “Like play itself, which reaches presentation (*Darstellung*) through the players, so language itself reaches presentation through those who speak and write.” (Bernstein 1983, 145.) The same holds true for genuine communities. Such communities reach presentation through those who speak and act as members of those communities, who practice and cultivate the appropriate communal virtues. The emergence of such communities is partly a matter of unpredictable events, however events, through which whoever partakes in them happens to realize some sense of commonality, happens to come across some common ground. But such events do not simply “happen” to us. The commencement of such events requires of us that we be ready to truly participate in them. It is that kind of ability and readiness, to which the medially oriented activity of creating—and also the medial participation in its creations—might be able to yield support. The event, towards which the creative act is oriented, is certainly not the only kind of event, in which some supra-individual commonality may be experienced. But it is one of them, and it is to be conceptualized accordingly.

We are in a position now to chart our typology of practice anew. *Poiesis* involves pure agency, where the action is done spontaneously without any sense of a constitutive event in the process. Creating involves active agency, where the action is guided by *techne*, but it strives towards participation in an event—to that extent, the creative action is externally related to the event and with the fulfilment of the latter it terminates. In turn, *praxis* involves medial agency, where the action done is internal to some event taking place. As we can see, in this characterization the activity of creating proves to be akin to *poiesis* to some extent, but it also points towards a recognition of what is essential to *praxis*, namely, to the discernment of a constitutive event. As such, creating is on the way towards *praxis*, it prepares for *praxis*.

#### IV. Conclusion

The first part of the paper pointed to the fact that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics highlights a distinctive sense of human practice, namely,

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dialogically maintained praxis, and that—insofar as such a praxis can be cultivated only on the basis of already existing forms of praxis-accommodating communal life and therefore a circularity is involved in the possibility of implementing such communities—the concern for the prospects of praxis is deeply rooted in the constellation of (post)modernity due to the latter’s tradition-weakening effects. Since our basic traditional conceptuality for grasping practice in general rests on the ancient Greek distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis*—as is the case even in the discussed examples from the 20<sup>th</sup> century—and, in turn, this distinction is not able to account for the transition between them, i.e., for the very emergence of praxis, we proceeded by arguing that a deeper understanding of the conditions of the possibility of emerging praxis is needed, and that a certain oblivion may have been present in our culture from early on.

For that reason, in the second part of the paper we searched for a possible way of re-conceptualizing human agency. Assuming that the voice systems of languages embody historically conceived modes of agency—an assumption that rests on the implication of Gadamer’s insight, according to which language is the medium of human existence, namely, the assumption that it is pre-eminently the structural features of languages that mirror basic components of human self-understanding—, we turned to Benveniste’s linguistic account concerning the voice systems of the primordial Indo-European languages and compared their characteristics with those of the occidental voice systems. In sharp contrast to the latter, the primordial languages have proved to reflect an insight into the elemental “mediality” of the human condition. Namely, their fundamentally “medial” voice systems, consisting of a middle voice and a medially active voice, have still proved to be able to capture—in an immediate and pre-ontological manner, to be sure—a pure notion of “event,” fundamental in any world-comportment and understanding, and also that of a “medial” (event-related and thus existentially localized) agency. Thus, upon the ground of the examined primordial and occidental voice systems, a tripartite typology of agency has emerged, in which the fundamental principle of distinguishing basic kinds of human agency is, whether a practice is related—either internally or externally—to a pure event or it is not. As we have claimed, this is a fertile typology, one that not only outstrips the Greek division between *poiesis* and

*praxis*, but is also able to account for the kind of human activity that mediates between the two. One form of this type of activity is the artistic creative process, which is guided by *techne*, but at the same time strives towards partaking in the fulfilment of an unrepeatable event, as it is attested to by its “succeeding,” with which it terminates, issuing thereby unique works, such as works of art are.

In sum, our considerations point to the possibility that our philosophically refined, yet grammatically always already defined conceptuality may have impressed its stamp on our grasp of human practice and agency. For not only the whole tradition of the Western practical philosophy, but the entire development of our occidental languages, too, seem to have overshadowed the distinctness of a certain type of activity that is vital for our culture, vital, inasmuch as such activities are able to prepare us for understanding and partaking in pure events, in which one may happen to come across some common ground, that is to say, one may become ready for true *praxis*.

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# SPEKTAKEL IN ČAS V SODOBNI FILOZOFIJI

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## *Povzetek*

S pomočjo zgodovinske in fenomenološke analize želimo v pričujoči študiji centralizirati raziskovanje fenomena spektakla kot pomembnega predmeta sodobne filozofije. Pojem spektakla proučujemo na podlagi zgodovinskega razvoja modernega pojmovanja časa kot enega izmed osrednjih vprašanj sodobne filozofije ter tudi kot osrednjega pojma za razumevanje sodobne znanosti, kulture in družbe kot celote. Znotraj sodobne kontinentalne filozofske tradicije je namreč koncept časa tesno povezan s pojmi

prisotnosti, percepcije in mediacije. Filozofska razprava med Henrijem Bergsonom in Albertom Einsteinom je pojma spektakel in čas pripeljala v neposredno povezavo kot del novega konceptualnega okvira sodobne filozofije. Tedaj se je prvič pokazalo, da ima znanost bistveno vrednost za konstrukcijo sodobnega življenja. Nadaljnemu razvoju sledimo z razpiranjem filozofskega in kibernetičnega okvira za vzpostavitev filozofskega odnosa do spektakla kot enega izmed temeljnih fenomenov sodobnega življenja. Pri razpravljanju upoštevamo metodologijo, kakršna je prikazana v filozofiji Martina Heideggra. Prefiguracijo določene teorije spektakla nazadnje zasujemo z razmislekom o prelomni kritiki kibernetike pri Gilbertu Simondonu.

*Ključne besede:* spektakel, čas, kibernetika, vizualizacija, fenomenologija, teorija medijev.

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### **Spectacle and Time in Contemporary Philosophy**

#### *Abstract*

54 Through historical and phenomenological analyses, the present paper attempts to centralize the research of the phenomenon of spectacle as a viable subject of contemporary philosophy. We study the notion of the spectacle upon the basis of the historical development of the modern comprehension of time not only as one of the central issues of contemporary philosophy, but also as a central concept for the understanding of contemporary science, culture, and society as a whole. Within contemporary continental philosophical tradition, the concept of time is closely connected with the notions of presence, perception, and mediation. The philosophical debate between Henri Bergson and Albert Einstein brought the ideas of spectacle and time into immediate connection as a part of the new conceptual framework of contemporary philosophy. It demonstrated, for the first time, that science holds an essential value for the construction of modern life. We follow further developments by outlining the philosophical and cybernetic framework for the establishment of a philosophical attitude towards spectacle as one of the fundamental phenomena of contemporaneity. The elaboration of the theme seeks to respect methodological determinations demonstrated in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. The groundbreaking critique of cybernetics in Gilbert Simondon allows us, finally, to draft a specific prefiguration of a certain theory of spectacle.

*Keywords:* spectacle, time, cybernetics, visualization, phenomenology, media theory.

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## 1. Uvod

Razpravo o konceptih spektakla in časa v sodobni filozofiji začenjamo z nelinearno, etimološko in elementarno filozofsko razlago konceptov spektakla, časa, podobe in gibanja, pa tudi pojmov situacije in dogodka, obravnavanih sprva kot del vsakdanjega jezika, nato kot del projekta situacionistov in slednjič kot del Debordove konceptualizacije spektakla. Takšna razprava je nujna za vzpostavitev poglobljenega interpretativnega izhodišča tega dela, kakršnega bomo uporabili kot metodo za konceptualno strukturo hipoteze, ki: 1) na filozofski način obravnava pojem spektakla (ne družbe-spektakla ali spektakularne »konstrukcije« družbe); 2) uvaja nove avtorje v konceptualizacijo sodobne filozofije (Gilbert Simondon) kot kritični aparat za razumevanje in obravnavo vprašanj sodobne socialne organizacije; 3) združuje teorijo spektakla z impliciranimi strukturami in cilji eksistencialne fenomenologije, posebej fenomenologije, kakršna izhaja od Martina Heideggra in vzhodne šole fenomenologije (interpretacije kjotske šole). Na začetku se torej ukvarjamo s pojmom spektakla kot konkretne besede iz vsakdanje rabe ali pogovornega termina v francoskem jeziku, ki se nanaša na širok razpon fenomenov, notranje povezanih z uporabo pozornosti, gledanja in prepoznavanja/identifikacije življenjskega sveta s podobami.

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Eno izmed odkritij, ki izhaja iz etimološke in pogovorne študije termina spektakla in je pomembno za njegovo fenomenologijo (v smislu pojavljanja), je, da moramo vprašanje spektakla v prevodu vselej reševati tako, da najdemo v lastnem jeziku primeren termin, ki nima samo konceptualne podobnosti, temveč odseva vsakdanjo rabo termina in njegovo zakoreninjenost znotraj jezika vsakdanjega življenja, ki oblikuje lastne odnose glede razumevanja drugih vsakdanjih fenomenov. V središču tega odkritja je pojem pozornosti (*pažnja*) in pazljivosti. Pazljivost glede spektakla je konstitutivna za opazovalca. Tu vidimo razliko v odnosu do zgodovinske konstitucije pojava opazovalca v socio-kulturnih in tehno-znanstvenih premikih poznega osemnajstega in devetnajstega stoletja, kakor jo obravnava Jonathan Crary (Crary 1990, 18–19). Pojmovanje spektakla predhodi in osenčuje razpravljanje o njem, kajti priznava, da je mogoče spektakelske učinke – redukcija posameznika na opazovalca – opazovati skozi celotno zgodovino zahodnega sveta in da so tesno

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povezani s pojmi moči, nadzora in z različnimi načini, kako se moč manifestira s pomočjo vizualizacije. S temi koncepti sta neposredno povezana pojma časa in podobe. Kakor smo videli doslej, spektakel s tem, ko ujame našo pozornost, prevlada nad našim občutkom za čas in nad našo uporabo časa, kakršen nam je dan kot dejavnim posameznikom. Ko se bomo poglobili v tako imenovano »teorijo spektakla«, ki jo implicitno predlaga francoski radikalni teoretik Guy Debord, bomo videli, da pogoji za pravo razumevanje njegovih izhodišč in ciljev v in ob njegovem poglavitnem delu *Družba spektakla* tičijo v primernem razumevanju vseh omenjenih terminov, tesno povezanih s pojmom spektakla. Zato moramo na kratko orisati načine, na katere pojmi časa, podobe, a tudi situacije in dogodka, obstajajo tako v njihovi vsakdanji rabi kot v relevantnih književnih virih tistega časa. To raziskavo opravimo z uporabo več metod: prva med njimi je pregled relevantnih primarnih in sekundarnih virov iz intelektualne in kulturne zgodovine, druga pa je odprto tekoča komunikacija s kuratoriko arhiva Guya Deborda v Bibliothèque nationale de France (BnF), Laurence le Brace. V tem pogledu obstaja več kulturnih in biografskih elementov, ki vplivajo na filozofsko pravilno interpretacijo Debordovega dela. Ti elementi so tesno povezani z novo oceno in radikalno premostitvijo Debordove zadolženosti kakršnikoli obliki klasičnega marksizma ali neo-marksizmu in hegeljanstvu, na kar namigujejo nekateri sodobni komentatorji (prim. Bunyard 2018). Naša raziskava jasno kaže sinhronost Debordovega intelektualnega razvoja in konceptualizacije »teorije spektakla« z razvojem in velikimi kulturnimi premiki, ki v veliki meri ostajajo tako zunaj dometa marksističnega premisleka kakor tudi onkraj večine sočasnih filozofskih raziskav. Vendar spektakel svojo dosledno filozofsko relevantno dobi prav s pojmom časa in podobe. Čas in podoba nista bistvenega pomena samo za sleherno razpravo o sodobni kulturi, temveč sta nujna tudi za vsako razpravo o fenomenu spektakla.

Na takšen način lahko identificiramo konkretno poreklo filozofskih idej in kulturnih premikov, ki so oblikovali Debordovo misel v teku njegovega razvoja znotraj poznega letrističnega in zgodnjega situacionističnega obdobja, ki odstopata od njegovega najbolj neposrednega zanimanja in najočitnejše povezave z marksistično literaturo in s filozofijami, ki neposredno podpirajo marksistične ideje. Debord je vsekakor zelo zgodaj odkril, da je potrebno

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kritiko politične ekonomije na novo razviti in oceniti ne samo glede njenih tem, temveč v njeni dispoziciji kot projekta radikalne volje, in sicer tako, da bi vključevala totaliteto kulture, ki ni omejena zgolj na ekonomijo in politično-socialna vprašanja, temveč obsega tudi tehnologijo in posredovano družbenost, kakršno promovirajo temeljno novi vizualni fenomeni, od fotografije do filma in naprej, od emisije do transmisije podob, informacij in oddaljenega nadzora nad obsežnimi teritoriji (mapiranje) (Debord 1992, 129–137). Ker je imel le malo omembe vrednih predhodnikov – predvsem nemškega filozofa Güntherja Andersa (Anders 1980) in ameriškega zgodovinarja Daniela J. Boorstina (Boorstin 1992) –, je Debord lastnoročno razvil zamisel in promoviral pogled na podobe kot na nov družbeni in ekonomski fenomen in obenem kot na obliko kapitala in jezika znotraj spektakularne reorganizacije naše tradicionalne vizualne kulture v smeri kulture vizualizacij, kjer spektakel postane fenomen, ki ga ustvarjajo, distribuirajo in konzumirajo isti igralci s pomočjo istih procesov, za katere bi morala zadostovati samo izkustvena potrditev; prosumentska kultura predstavlja – od platform družabnih medijev do fenomena novih medijev – prevladujočo oblika potrošništva, ustvarjanja in komunikacije. Debordova originalnost je v tem, da je razvil polivalentno metodologijo, ki jo lahko apliciramo na prakso in teorijo koncepta unitarnega urbanizma (Knabb 1981, 45). Nekaj podobnega, a samo implicitno, je storil Martin Heidegger z uporabo nekaterih izmed najbolj radikalnih stilističnih in intelektualnih gest v zahodni misli.

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Spektakel potemtakem lahko identificiramo s projektom komodifikacije človeške pozornosti kot nove oblike ekonomije, ki jo Jonathan Beller poimenuje *kinematografski modus produkcije* (Beller 2006), a pomembneje je, da spektakel s svojo izrecno intenco, da sleherno človeško dejanje v svetu zajema – s pomočjo podob in tehnologij njihove diseminacije – kot vir za lastno propagacijo, ni nič drugega kot tehnologija v smislu heideggrovskega pojma *Gestell* – postavlje kot u-okvirjanje ali čista in-formacija, ki je samo na sebi že nekaj temeljno vizualnega: nekaj, kar je in-formirano ali u-okvirjeno, je postavljeno na ogled. A da bi bolje razumeli to ključno povezavo Debordove teorije in Heideggrove fenomenologije in s tem tudi konkreten način, na katerega si prihajata nasproti in nas približata razumevanju filozofije kot projekta in prakse, moramo nadalje preučiti ne samo način, na katerega Heidegger filozofira, temveč tudi način, na

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katerega Debord vzdržuje impliciten dialog z mejnimi znanostmi in kulturo lastnega časa.

Upoštevajoč sprva zgolj kulturno in intelektualno zgodovino zgodnjega 20. stoletja, opazimo, kako se pojma časa in podobe znotraj sodobne filozofije pojavita s pomočjo del Henrija Bergsona, a tudi Alfreda N. Whiteheada in Ludwiga Wittgensteina. Takšen razvoj je neposredna posledica napredka v moderni znanosti in tehnologiji. Zlasti vznik sodobne fizikalne teorije in posledičen razvoj številnih teorij informacij sta oblikovala in pomembno dekonstruirala naš odnos do in razumevanje tudi najbolj vsakdanjih pojavov. To se je v glavnem odvijalo s pomočjo fenomenov mediacije, ki je postala pomemben ali celo temeljni fenomen moderne dobe. Mediacija ima marsikaj opraviti ne samo z učinkovitim, temveč tudi z optimalnim in popolnoma racionaliziranim upravljanjem s časom v dvojnem procesu popolne vizualizacije časa (kot nečesa diskretnega) in njegove hkratne absolutne transparentnosti in negacije (kot nečesa postajajočega). Obenem rojevajoča se popularna kultura postane glasnik tega procesa, kjer znanstveniki z obrobja postajajo mainstreamovski filozofi, medtem ko naše izkustvo sveta 58 čedalje bolj preplavljajo psevdo-dogodki in novi formati pridobivanja znanja in informacij, kakor je to v poznih 50. letih 20. stoletja s svojimi temeljnimi raziskavami opisal ameriški zgodovinar Daniel Boorstin (Boorstin 1992, 7 isl.). Tako komodifikacija časa postane slika moderne dobe enako, kakor tudi slike moderne dobe postanejo popolne vizualizacije misli. To jasno pokaže analiza, kakršno je prvi opravil Henri Bergson v svoji *Ustvarjalni evoluciji* (Bergson 2005, 296) in je bila kasneje raziskana v kontroverzni debati s fizikom Albertom Einsteinom (Bergson 1965). Radikalno re-konceptualizacijo našega izkustva, o kateri je govoril Einstein, je istočasno na neposreden način prevzel Whitehead, njen vpliv lahko najdemo tudi v opombah prvih raziskav o problemu in fenomenu časa v Heideggrovih delih pred *Bitjo in časom*. Vse to nam kaže, kako globoko sodobna znanost – in za njo tudi tehno-znanost – vpliva na snov in teme nekaterih izmed najpomembnejših filozofov našega časa. Ni samo kinematografski proces vizualiziral čas v diskretnih segmentih, temveč je v veliki meri tudi teorija relativnosti njegovo stabilnost in absolutno naravo naredila za iluzorni. Diskrecija, mediacija in vizualizacija potemtakem postanejo ne samo socialni fenomeni, temveč so tudi temeljni fenomeni

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nove znanosti: teorije relativnosti, kvantne mehanike in kibernetike. Zato moramo vse tri obravnavati ne samo v smislu podob in komodifikacije časa, ampak kot temeljne za razumevanje sodobnega koncepta spektakla. Kaj tri omenjene pojave – diskrecijo, mediacijo in vizualizacijo – privede skupaj, je natanko fenomenološko korigiran prevod termina spektakel, kakršnega je doslej zakrivala njegova teoretska trivializacija v popularnem prevodu, ki ni bil nič drugega kot prenos francoske besede *le spectacle* kot neologizma v angleščino ali kakšen drug jezik. Takšna transpozicija je sama na sebi lastna »jeziku novih medijev« in je že simptom spektakularne organizacije družbe in znanja, potopljenega v vizualizacijo. To krivico lahko popravimo tako, da spektakel obravnavamo kot »the-show« (»show-ing«) in ga tako poimenujemo z besedo, ki ima pogovorni pomen in vsakdanjo rabo, podobna tistima, kakršna ima spektakel v francoskem jeziku, in precej podobno dnevni rabi nemških terminov *Dasein* ali *Gestell*, ki ju prav tako napak »prevajamo« kot filozofska neologizma in ne kot pogovorna izraza znotraj nacionalne filozofije in naravnega jezika (prim. Komel 1996, 30 isl.), iz česar je jasno razvidno, čemu Heideggrova filozofija nima razvoja, temveč samo komentatorje recepcije in dosledne rekuperacije (historizacije) njegove filozofije.

59

Uvod v glavno razpravo nam dovoljuje tudi kratko vpeljavo nekaterih pomembnih predhodnikov, sodobnikov in nadaljevalcev Debordove misli, za katere se zdi, da pokrivajo iste teme in obravnavajo iste probleme, a jim manjka osnovna terminologija, kakršna bi prinesla resnično praktičen spoprijem z zamisljivo ponovne ocenitve ali celo izpodbijanja sodobnega stanja. V povezavi s podobo moramo tako omeniti Baudrillardovo teorijo simulacije in Flusserjevo teorijo komunikacije, ki sta popolnoma zanemarili kakršenkoli neposreden Debordov prispevek na področju kritičnih študij novih medijskih okolij. V povezavi s pojmi trenutka, situacije in dogodka upoštevamo Güntherja Andersa in njegove kritične eseje, ki jim, četudi so po svoje radikalni, manjkajo struktura, cilj in družbena matrika, s pomočjo katerih bi postali relevantni na porajajočem se področju kritike medijev. Debord ni imel samo široke mreže dopisovalcev (kot lahko vidimo na podlagi objavljenih pisem), temveč se je tudi močno zanimal za preoblikovanje filozofije v smislu strategije in zgodovinskega boja za novo obliko prebivanja v svetu, kakršna ni samo cilj neomarksistov (v socio-političnem smislu), temveč tudi cilj

eksistencialne fenomenologije, kolikor jo dojamemo kot projekt radikalne volje in zato kot predhodnika določene filozofske prakse, ki je ne moremo zvesti na noben neo- ali postmarksističen interes. Poglavitna pomanjkljivost omenjenih konkurenčnih filozofij je, da podležejo sodobnemu – ali spektakelskemu – imperativu vizualizacije in da nam prinašajo zgolj pozorne podobe teorij, s kakršnimi je potrebno upravljati in jih uporabljati znotraj dosledne izgradnje svetovnih nazorov kot dela sodobne podobe sveta, znotraj procesa, ki ga je že v prvi polovici 20. stoletja opisal in kritiziral Martin Heidegger v svojem ključnem besedilu »Doba podobe sveta«.

60 S pomočjo skrbnega branja primarnih virov za pričujočo razpravo glede metode, prevzete za kritično ekspozicijo teze, lahko nadalje preliminarno pridemo do zaključka, da se Debordova in Heideggrova, a tudi Bergsonova in številne druge njim podobne filozofije razlikujejo ne samo glede globine in dometa njihovih tem in obravnav, temveč bistveno tudi glede sloga njihove literarne ekspozicije, kakršno so prevzeli kot določeno filozofsko metodo. Ta fenomen najprej izpostavimo ob specifični obravnavi terminologije, ki je osrednjega pomena za Debordovo razpravljanje (spektakel, podoba, čas, situacija, dogodek), nadalje pa ga raziščemo ob Heideggrovi eksistencialni fenomenologiji in ob tistem, čemur nekateri komentatorji pravijo »eksperimentalne etimologije« ali zagovor pogovornega jezika znotraj Heideggrove filozofije. Za takšen namen skušamo najti filozofsko utemeljitev s pomočjo razkritja, da skupna tla pri Debordu, Bergsonu, Heideggru in tudi Gilbertu Simondonu – slednji nastopi v osrednjem delu besedila – predstavlja literarni slog, znan kot cirkumlokucija (perifraza).

Obravnavajoč cirkumlokucijo kot metodo znotraj eksistencialne fenomenologije, ki ni samo del filozofske raziskave, temveč tudi del prakse in oblika čuječega spoprijema z življenjskim svetom, si potemtakem prizadevamo razgrniti novo intelektualno poreklo sodobne filozofije. S pomočjo tega metodološkega orodja raziskujemo, na kakšen način lahko temu poreklu rečemo teorija ali filozofija spektakla in/ali za spektakel. Novo filozofsko poreklo zahteva ne samo reinterpretacijo metod, temveč tudi privzetje določenega sloga, ki natanko takšni filozofiji omogoča, da se pojavi zunaj kakršnegakoli dominantnega razumevanja in avtoritarne interpretacije dostopnih virov. Skupaj z zgodovinsko in fenomenološko raziskavo pokažemo,

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kako nujno je bilo filozofijo premakniti proti novi radikalni *aisthesis*, ki je tako postala zmožna zoperstavljanja neposrednim učinkom tehno-znanstvene reorganizacije tako življenjskega sveta kot intelektualnega okolja sodobne dobe, kakršno povzema znana Debordova slika, ki prikazuje samo z roko napisano besedilo na zamegljenem platnu: »Réalisation de la philosophie« (Debord 2004, 116).

## 2. Filozofski okvir

V prvem delu naše razprave potemtakem raziskujemo navidezno odvečnost in hermetičnost Heideggrove filozofije kot filozofskega projekta ali, bolje rečeno, kot projekta radikalne volje. Prizadevamo si za radikalno moderno, sodobno revalorizacijo Heideggra, kakršna bi njegovemu izjemno obsežnemu delu lahko podarila novo vlogo znotraj sodobne misli – vlogo napotka in metode za udejanjanje filozofije kot prakse čuječega spoprijemanja – ali, bolje, vlogo *aisthesis*, ki nam je bila predtem nedostopna ne samo zaradi avtoritativnih interpretacij Heideggra, temveč tudi zaradi njegovega intelektualnega sopostavljanja s filozofskimi osebnostmi in pogledi, kakršni so njegovo filozofijo omejevali in odmikali od vsakdanjega življenja. Primarno motivacijo za to najdemo v enem izmed njegovih komentarjev znotraj dela, ki neposredno predhodi *Biti in času*, in sicer razprave z naslovom *Prolegomena k zgodovini pojma časa*, kjer pravi, da bomo v tej razlagi tubiti »naleteli na veliko število formulacij, ki imajo sprva čuden značaj in predvsem v formulaciji morda *značaj oklevanja*« (hrv. okolišanja [Borislav Mikulić]; Heidegger 2000, 171; moj poudarek).<sup>1</sup> Če ga prenesemo skoz vsakdanji jezik, ima oklevanje kot praksa in kot modus misli vse lastnosti spoprijemanja, ki premošča razlikovanje med povsem praktičnim in intelektualnim, med filozofskim in poetičnim, kar je bila tudi ena izmed poglobitvenih Heideggrovih preokupacij v celotnem teku njegove kariere.

Oklevajoč značaj je opazen v celotnem delu *Bit in čas* in v bolj strnjeni obliki tudi v vseh Heideggrovih esejih, kjer se takšen značaj praktično udejanja,

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<sup>1</sup> Prim. nemški izvornik: »[...] die auf den ersten Anhieb den Charakter des Fremdartigen und vor allem in der Formulierung vielleicht den Charakter des Umständlichen haben« (Heidegger 1979, 203).

da bi podal novo *aisthesis* glede sodobnih fenomenov s pomočjo konceptov skupnega vsakdanjega jezika (prim. Heidegger 2001, 38). Toda značaj oklevanja z ozirom na formulacijo lastnega dela se kaže v konkretnem slogu njegove filozofije, ki se močno opira na figuro cirkumlokucije, kroženja in skiciranja in raztezanja, obrisovanja in zaobračanja, kar prinaša splošni ton oklevanja (tesnobe kot formalne motivacije) v okviru njegovega celotnega dela, in sicer oklevanja glede tega, da bi fenomen razgrnili definitivno in da bi se tako ôno sámó zavarovalo pred padcem na območje teorije in znanstvenosti. S tem, ko kombinira pomene, ko kroži okrog konceptov in zarisuje določeno *aisthesis* ali afektivno omrežje skrbnih razmislekov o fenomenih, Heidegger zaobkroženje in zaobračanje uporablja kot elementa, lastna njegovi fenomenologiji, s katerima želi spodbuditi občutek ali vtis fenomena, ki gre onkraj tega, kar je enostavno izraženo v besedah ali kar je neposredno razvidno v fenomenu samem, četudi ga konstituira.

62 Na takšen način lahko Heideggrov projekt z ozirom na jezik in *konec* filozofije razumemo kot ekstenzivno kritiko v primerjavi z intenzivno kritiko Deborda, ki želi pretirano uporabljati določene termine – kot denimo »spektakel« –, da bi dekonstruiral njihovo begajoče vplivanje znotraj našega vsakdanjega življenja. Oba sta elementa, lastna cirkumlokuciji kot metodi *čuječega raziskovanja*. Cirkumlokucijo tukaj razumemo kot literarno perifrazo, a tudi v bolj dobesednem pomenu kroženja, *Umschreibung* ali hrvaške besede *okolish-enje* – db. *okolje-nja* [*environment-ing*] ali *oklijevanja* (*o-klajoti*, *potepati*). Hrvaška beseda nosi primarni pomen *oklevanja* ali zadržanosti ob prihodu na določeno fiksno mesto, pri čemer je to mesto prej nekaj, okoli česar krožimo in se s tem ne spoprimeemo kar neposredno, kot nekakšno *gravitiranje*. Eksistencialna fenomenologija znotraj Heideggrovega projekta si potemtakem prizadeva za ustvarjanje konceptualnega okolja za določeno spoprijemanje z življenjskim svetom in na takšen način dekonstruira fenomenološke trope, da bi končala na obrobjih filozofskega toposa in radikalnih teorij.

Naslednja pomembna implikacija cirkumlokucijskega sloga fenomenološke obravnave – poleg tega, da je globoko ikonoklastičen – je, da zahteva uporabo določene pripadajoče terminologije, ki jo najdemo samo v pogovornem jeziku ali v jeziku vsakdanjosti. Medtem ko njen ikonoklazem izhaja iz oklevajočega značaja, ki nam ponuja ogromno okolje, v katerem določeni pojmi ali fenomeni

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razkrivajo svoje različne vidike, cirkumlokucija zahteva določeno središčno točko, okoli katere to okolje postaja prezentno, koncentrirano in (proti) usmerjeno. Identificirali smo že več takšnih konceptov. Eden izmed njih je spektakel, še posebej, če ga obravnavamo skupaj s Heideggrovo filozofijo tubiti. Cirkumlokucija kot metoda neprestano poudarja in opozarja na vsakdanost terminologije, zajete v Heideggrovo fenomenološko in Debordovo radikalno obravnavo novih družbenih pojavov. Zato – na robu metodološke ekspozičije – uvedemo še en pomemben primer: fenomenologijo kjotske šole filozofije in konkretno filozofijo Kitara Nishide z njegovim osrednjim konceptom *basho*, ki ne pomeni samo *kraja*, temveč je pogovorni izraz znotraj japonščine in gravitacijski termin, okoli katerega lahko izgradimo dosledno fenomenološko ekspozičijo (prim. Nishida 2012; Weinmayr et al. 2005).

Da bi lahko dovršili našo tezo, moramo uvesti nov okvir, v katerem cirkumlokucijo uporabljamo kot metodo filozofskega raziskovanja, ki meji na čuječo prakso, kakršna zagovarja nov tip spoprijemanja z življenjskim svetom, ki bi ga lahko pojmovali kot anti-spektakelsko in kot nasprotno dominantnemu gibanju vizualizacije, kakršno velja za večino fenomenov znotraj sodobne družbe, ki jih vse lahko zreduciramo na tehno-znanstveni okvir kibernetiko-socialne, ekonomske in epistemične reorganizacije, kakor je na delu od začetka 20. stoletja. To razgrinjajo številna Heideggrova besedila, posebej njegovi eseji »Doba podobe sveta«, »Vprašanje po tehniki« in »Konec filozofije in naloga mišljenja«. Naša metodološka razprava kaže, da moramo vzpostaviti nov konceptualni in metodični okvir, ki se bo naslanjal na pojem cirkumlokucije kot oklevanja in zarisovanja z gravitiranjem okrog pogovorne terminologije kot *okolj(enj)a*. Heideggrovo delo *Prolegomena k zgodovini pojma časa* in njegovo sklepno besedilo o »Koncu filozofije in nalogi mišljenja« imamo lahko za osrednji nanašalnici pri vzpostavljanju takšne metodologije. Medtem ko *Prolegomena* vzpostavljajo ideji oklevanja in kroženja, »Konec filozofije« uvaja pojem *habitualnega konca* (Heidegger 1972, 57), kar Heideggrovo fenomenologijo bliža določenim situacionističnim interesom.

Naše poglavitno razpravljanje se na podlagi tovrstne metodološke in zgodovinske obravnave osredotoča na vzpostavitev dveh poglavitnih okvirjev za možnost določene teorije spektakla, in sicer filozofskega okvirja, ki – s premislekom o tem, kako novi tehnološki fenomeni vplivajo na naše

razumevanje časa in podobe – pelje k vzpostavitvi kibernetkega okvirja, kakršen se osredotoča na implicitno in eksplicitno kritiko kibernetike kot družbenega projekta pri Wienerju, ki so jo v praksi povzeli situacionisti, v filozofiji pa Gilbert Simondon, in kakršen vodi k enakemu nizu zaključkov: k potrebi po določeni tehnični kulturi, ne samo v smislu kulture, ki se prilagaja tehniki, temveč tudi kot umetelne in situacijske kulture ali tehnične kulture v idiomatskem smislu – k potrebi po pojmu kulture, odprte za sprejetje igredogodkov (igre naključij) kot njenega bistva.

64 Za oba okvirja je bilo pomembno, da jima sledijo razmisleki o poglavitnem razvoju tehnologije in kulture tistega časa, začenši s prihodom 20. stoletja. Za največja odkritja tistega časa lahko imamo izume in teorije, ki so doživeli neposredno aplikacijo v vsakdanjem življenju ali so implicirali reorganizacijo vsakdanjega življenja v skladu z novimi nizi praktičnih principov. Na eni strani imamo iznajdbo fotografije in tehnologijo gibljivih slik (prim. Canales 2009, 117 isl.), njuno standardizacijo in njuno komodifikacijo iz znanstvenega instrumenta v popolnoma nov tip potrošniške kulture. Na drugi strani – in v najtesnejši povezavi z njo – imamo teorijo relativnosti in moderno fiziko. Če obe strani dojamemo skupaj, predstavljata najpomembnejši temi naše razprave. Najprej imamo razvoj iluzije gibljive slike, ki sama na sebi predstavlja vizualizacijo drugega razvoja: teorije diskretnega časa, kakršnega predpisuje moderna znanost. Samo s pomočjo diskretnih vizualizacij in miselnih eksperimentov si namreč lahko zamišljamo fundamentalna načela teorije relativnosti, še posebej glede paradoksov časa, s katerimi je posejana.

Najpomembnejša intelektualna debata znotraj tega razvoja je razpita diskusija o teoriji relativnosti med fizikom Albertom Einsteinom in filozofom Henrijem Bergsonom (Canales 2017). Ta debata je bila simbolično soočenje filozofije in sodobne fizike. A medtem ko je fizikalno pojmovanje časa ena sama teorija, so filozofski pojem časa razvijale številne filozofske šole in discipline, od Svetega Avgušтина do Newtona in McTaggarta. Šele pri Bergsonu lahko govorimo o sodobni filozofski obravnavi fenomena časa. Zato je debata Einstein–Bergson tako odločilnega pomena za vzpostavitev teorije spektakla. Potrebno je opozoriti, da omenjena debata ni samo intelektualni razvoj, temveč tudi fenomen znotraj popularne kulture tistega časa, zato nas ne sme presenetiti, da Debord v svojih *Komentarjih k Družbi spektakla* rojstvo spektakla – ob

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razvoju filma in kulture vizualizacij – postavi približno v ta čas (Debord 1990, 3). Gre za zgodovinski trenutek, ko tehno-znanstvena razlaga sveta zavladava nad popularnimi idejami in razumevanjem vsakdanjega življenja, ki mu nato zavladajo tudi praktične materializacije teh istih teorij; svet, od radia in filma do razvoja ultra natančnih urnih mehanizmov, postane tehničen in življenjski nazori, kakršne predpisujeta znanost in tehnologija, ki vse to omogočata, postanejo na videz objektivna dejstva. Tu korenini Debordova karakterizacija spektakla (šova) kot *objektivizirane Weltanschauung* (Debord 1992, 11).

Debata nas, s pomočjo razmislekov, podanih v nekem drugem pomembnem, sočasno objavljenem delu – *Načelo relativnosti* Alfreda N. Whiteheada –, napoteva k pripoznanju, da je – čeprav tako filozof kot fizik govorita o času – čas za filozofa v temelju drugačen fenomen in da ima fizikova prisvojitve koncepta posledice za vsakdanjo rabo termina (Whitehead 1922; 4, 56). Bergson je nadalje pokazal, da čeprav se s fizikom lahko strinjamo, to ne spremeni dejstva, da za vsakdanji razmislek čas ni ne diskreten ne relativen, temveč traja; prvi je odprt za vizualizacijo in rekonstrukcijo, drugi je dostopen samo neposrednemu izkustvu življenjskega sveta. Zato lahko Bergsonovo knjigo *Trajanje in istočasnost* obravnavamo kot prvi opis konkretnega gibanja vizualizacije, ki bo postala ključna za sodobno družbo (Bergson 1965, 80). V tem smislu je njegovo delo v povezavi s fenomenološko kritiko Einsteinove teorije sestavni del njegovega projekta v zaključnih poglavjih *Ustvarjalne evolucije* in zlasti *Snovi in spomina*. Tu se teorije moderne fizike združijo z napredki v popularni kulturi in na novo začrtajo okolje vsakdanjega izkustva sodobne zahodne civilizacije.

Diskusija, ki jo je sprožil Bergson, se intelektualno dosledno razvije ob koncu prve polovice 20. stoletja, posebej v Heideggrovem eseju »Doba podobe sveta«, ki skoraj neposredno sledi stališčem in tonu Bergsonove knjige, posvečene zavrnitvi teorije relativnosti. Medtem ko lahko pokažemo, kako se pojem podobe-sveta pojavi v delu *Trajanje in istočasnost*, mu Heidegger sam podari filozofsko in metodološko vrednost znotraj svojega radikalnega fenomenološkega projekta. S tem, ko prevzame temeljne koncepte sodobne znanosti (načrt, raziskava, eksperiment), Heidegger obravnava bistvo modernega sveta, kakršnega je mogoče zreducirati na sistem podob in, povrhu vsega, na vizualne fenomene. Podoba-sveta je sama na sebi takšen sistem, ki

v prostorskem in časovnem smislu odprto usmerja naš čut za svet kot stanje pred njim in ne več notri ter tako, kakor je lastno našemu prebivanju v svetu in znotraj njega (Heidegger 1977, 119–125). Enako naj bi se ob razvoju tehnologije gibljivih slik zgodilo z domišljijo in spominom. Fenomen filma je komodificiral človeško domišljijo in razvoj tehno-znanosti je komodificiral način, na katerega pomnimo in uporabljamo znanje.

66 Medtem ko koncept podobe-sveta v Heideggrovem eseju prefigurira spektakel kot temeljni fenomen modernega sveta, neko drugo veliko odkritje označuje bistven premik glede prihoda spektakla – obrat od vizualne kulture, ki obvladuje moderno dobo, h kulturi vizualizacij, ki smo ji priča v sodobnem tehno-znanstvenem svetu. Tema se na ekspliciten način pojavi v »Vprašanju po tehniki«, a je implicitno prisotna med vrsticami celotne »Dobe podobe sveta«. Pojem *in-formacije*, ki pomeni, da imamo vedno na voljo potrebna sredstva za transformacijo sveta v skladu z lastno podobo ali interesom, je predstavljen kot sestavni proces bistva moderne znanosti in s tem tudi bistva modernega sveta. Z ozirom na smisel fenomenološke metodologije, kakršno smo vpeljali v prvem poglavju, lahko Heideggrov pojem *Gestell* (Heidegger 1977) izenačimo s konceptom informacije in tako diskusijo o tehnologiji ponovno povežemo z vizualnimi fenomeni. To je mogoče zaradi pogovorne dispozicije besede *Gestell* v nemščini in zaradi Heideggrove lastne spekulativne etimologije, ki nas spet privede do pojma *strukturirane podobe* (Heidegger 1977, 141). Ker je ne-razpoložljiva za *Gestell* moderne tehnologije, prevladujoča podoba-sveta postane del plastičnega (Daniel J. Boorstin), spekulativnega (Guy Debord) ali fotografskega (Vilém Flusser) vesolja. To je mogoče razumeti na podlagi predpostavljene znotraj »Dobe podobe sveta« s poudarkom na pojmu biti-informiran [being-informed] (Heidegger 1977, 125), sprva s pomočjo raziskav, nato s pomočjo novic. Ne gre samo za in-formiranje, temveč – z vso spektakelsko neposrednostjo – za trans-formiranje našega čuta za svet in njegove temeljne koncepte, kakršna sta čas in kraj. Ker sta notranje povezana, tehno-znanstvena reorganizacija našega neposrednega okolja prav tako zamegljuje in transformira naše pojmovanje časa.

Sodobno pojmovanje časa je potemtakem na globalni ravni omadeževano s koncepti žive, simultane emisije in transmisije, v realnem času podane projekcije dogodkov. S pomočjo tovrstne komodifikacije časa in prostora, ki

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jo omogoča moderna tehno-znanost, svet postane podoba v tehničnem smislu – fenomen, ki ga je mogoče razvrščati in z njim tudi upravljati, a ki obenem deluje kot šov [*the show; prikaz*] takšnih tehnologij. Gre za način razgrnitve tehnologije v Heideggrovem smislu, kakršnega najdemo v eseju »Vprašanje po tehniki«. Na drugi ravni – opisuje jo ameriški zgodovinar Daniel J. Boorstin – je to tudi način, na katerega so narejeni psevdo-dogodki, ki se jih nato razširja, dokler ne prevladajo v sodobnem svetu. Radikalni preskok od tehnoloških izumov, ki jim je človek lahko sledil in jih opazoval, do tehnoloških emisij in transmisij, je pustil globok pečat na vsakem vidiku prebivanja v svetu. Že napredek od tehnik k tehnologiji sam govori o tej premeni. Tehnika namreč dejansko zadeva fenomene, ki jih je mogoče opazovati in uporabnost katerih je v tem, da so pri roki. Tehnologija pa implicira tehniko, združeno z izjemno količino znanja, ki ni več neposredno dosegljiva uporabniku, njeni učinki, uporabe in funkcije so neposredno dostopne samo specialistu. Tehnologija ne potrebuje več orodij, temveč ustvarja aparate, ki nadomeščajo celoten sklop človek–orodje. Ker ne vemo, kako delujejo, je tehnološke aparate mogoče razumeti samo v smislu njihovega šova (Simondon 2017, 236).

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Enake premike je mogoče opisati s stališča povečanega prostega gibanja dobrin, ki prevladuje nad prostim gibanjem ljudi in znotraj katerega so ljudje obravnavani kot dobrine proizvajajoči dejavniki in nosilci določenega kapitala, ne pa potrošniki v bolj konvencionalnem smislu. To je samo en način, na katerega se prebivanje v svetu preobrazi v nov tip *prisostvovanja* (*prisutnosti*), prilagojen potrebam kapitala in tistih, ki vodijo šov. Z oddaljitvijo od Heideggrovih esejev zdaj lahko vidimo, kako radikalni koncept *Dasein* deluje kot kritično premagovanje tega novega tipa *prisostvovanja*, kakršnega dvajseta leta 20. stoletja komajda implicitno naznanjajo. A pomembneje je, da filozofija *Dasein*, zasnovana kot projekt in obravnavana kot metoda, ki izhaja iz sloga filozofiranja, kakršnega je uporabljal Heidegger, promovira radikalno nov odnos do biti, ki si – na predvečer prihoda spektakla – prizadeva preseči filozofijo v smislu kritike, kakršno je kasneje zagovarjal Guy Debord kot širši zahodni intelektualni projekt. Heidegger v celotnem delu *Bit in čas* neprestano razpravlja o metodi, kakršno navadno ali splošno uporablja, ko pripravlja svojo filozofijo *Dasein* (Heidegger 1992, 88). Struktura njegove cirkumlokucije uvaja – v obliki *eksistencialnega* ali *fenomenološkega* izraza

(ali *odkritja*) – zapiske o širokem razponu tém, o katerih navadno razpravljajo različne filozofske discipline, tu pa so obravnavane kot postanki *bivanja* na poti k singularnemu filozofskemu izrazu – h »kako« fundamentalne ontologije kot eksistencialne fenomenologije, ki je v aplikaciji postala teorija spektakla v Debordovem smislu, omeniti pa jo je mogoče tudi v smislu tehnološke fenomenologije Gilberta Simondona. *Dasein* je s pomočjo cirkumlokucije ponovno ovrednotena kot oblika razkrivanja, ki človeka pripelje nazaj k čuječi povezavi s časom kot bistvom tu-bitu.

68 Samo s pomočjo takšnega metodološkega cilja cirkumlokucijske skrbi (*okolišajúce brige*) lahko razumemo Heideggrovo lastno karakterizacijo *Dasein* kot raz-daljitev, ki sleherni entiteti pušča, da jo srečamo od blizu kot entiteto, kakršna je. Takšna raz-daljitev (Heidegger 2001, 141–142) je časovni izraz skrbi, tako kot je cirkumlokucija virtualna uprstoritev tesnobe, kakršno srečujemo pri premagovanju sleherne vizualizacije. Od Bergsonove kinematike do Heideggrove podobe-sveta lahko zasledujemo filozofijo *Dasein* kot preliminarni konceptualni okvir za spodbijanje spektakla natanko v smislu preseganja filozofije same na sebi. Zaključiti je mogoče, da se tehn-znanstvene razlage sveta osredotočajo na šov v pomenu kina kot podobe sveta (kinematografije kot ultimativne tehnologije podobe in pozunanjenja sanj, komodifikacije spomina itn.). Kolikor se sleherni neposrednost umakne v reprezentacijo, sta ne samo prostor, temveč tudi čas dojemana kot podoba. A če čas postane tehničen in znanstven, potem v skladu s Heideggrovo analizo *Dasein* nismo daleč od zaključka, da z novo tehnologijo in znanostjo v bistvo človeka prodre nekaj tehničnega, nekaj, kar na novo strukturira odnos do časa, tako da *Dasein* ni več avtorefleksija biti, kakor to predstavlja *Bit in čas*. S prihodom sodobne znanosti in tehnologije se moderni človek nauči upravljati s časom in s tem dejanjem upravljanja svoj lastni čas zaupa stroju in strukturirani podobi ali informaciji. Upravljanje s časom postane način, kako človek kot tehnološko bitje in-formira svojo družbeno prisotnost.

### 3. Kibernetški okvir

Za tako dejanje – za razumevanje tega tehničnega vodenja Šova – moramo upoštevati tudi kibernetški okvir, ki konstituira moderni svet in oblikuje

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družbo v tehno-estetskem smislu. Omenili smo že, kako kibernetški okvir med vrsticami v filozofiji uvajata Heideggrovi razpravi »Doba podobe sveta« in »Vprašanje po tehniki«, zlasti s cirkumlokucijsko razpravo o konceptu *Gestell*, ki je dejansko – v vsej njegovi aktualnosti – fenomenološki opis fenomena informacije in u-okvirjanja ali in-formiranja. Ta razprava neposredno napaja Debordovo konceptualizacijo Spektakla, ki jo moramo obravnavati natanko kot tovrsten fenomenološki opis fenomena šova ali tehno-znanstvene vizualizacije kot novega dejstva *družbene* resničnosti. Tako spektakel kot informacija, ki se v družbenosti javljata kot radikalni in moteči inovaciji – predvsem znotraj kolektivnih ekonomij pozornosti, izkustva in kulturnih politik –, družbo temeljno spremenita tako, da se razgubi sleherno trdno razlikovanje med družbenostjo in spektakelskostjo ali vizualizacijo. Pritrjujoč mnenju, da bistvo moderne tehnologije ni nič tehničnega, o idejah in-formacije ali u-okvirjanja razpravljamo v smislu zatrtjevanja povsem vizualnega bistva moderne znanosti in tehnologije ali znanstvene tehnologije – ki leži v vseh vrstah vizualizacije in si na takšen način svet podreja – v totaliteti heideggrovske obravnave pojma – »človeški prevladi« (Heidegger 2013, 123). A na žalost, ko govorimo o naravi u-okvirjanja (nastopu in-formiranja) modernih tehno-znanosti, ne smemo pozabiti zgoraj izpostavljenega uvida, da natanko iste tehnologije u-okvirjajo in podrejajo čas podobi, da tako postane diskreten in ga je mogoče kvantificirati z nečim drugim, kot sta trajanje in postajanje. S takšno mediacijo lahko vidimo, da ima bistvo modernih tehno-znanosti – ki jih vedno lahko zreduciramo na kibernetško znanost – opraviti z in-formiranim odnosom človeka, časa in podobe-sveta.

Rezultat tovrstne obravnave se sklada z Debordovo karakterizacijo sodobnega (zahodnega) sveta kot sveta tehnične racionalnosti v idiomatskem smislu (Debord 1992, 15), sveta (in družbe), ki je to samo tehnično, ko bi moral biti tudi situacijsko. Preučiti je mogoče, kako je filozofija časa, kakor jo predlaga Heidegger in vzpostavlja Bergson, bistvena za razvoj teorije spektakla, ki ga lahko primerno označi kot tehnološki in kibernetški fenomen. Tako je, ker naj bi vso moderno znanost zaznamovalo, da temelji na povratnih zankah (re)konfiguracije našega izkustva sveta z neprestanim nizanem vizualizacij. Sodobno tehnologijo Gilbert Simondon sooča s strogostjo kritične obravnave pri fundamentalni ontologiji s svojim izvirnim okvirjem idej informacije,



*tehnicizma, mehanologije, tehno-geneze, tehno-individuacije in tehno-kulture*, kakor jih zasnuje v temeljnem delu *O modusu eksistence tehničnih predmetov*. Znotraj njegove konceptualizacije in z metodologijo, vzpostavljeno ob ponovnem branju Heideggra v smislu nove metodologije, ki izhaja iz sloga in temeljne preokupacije njegove filozofije (cirkumlokucija, oklevanje, skrb in premagovanje), je mogoče razviti kibernetiski okvir za teorijo spektakla, ki se ukvarja s temeljnim izkustvom tehnologije s pomočjo njenih vizualizacij v kulturi, ekonomiji in slehernem intelektualnem delu, a obenem vztraja na poti, ki jo je načrtoval sam Simondon, ko je izjavil: »Filozofska misel mora izpeljati integracijo tehnične resničnosti v univerzalno kulturo tako, da ustanovi tehnologijo.« (Simondon 2017, 159.) Že tu lahko vidimo, da Simondonova raba terminov, kakršna sta *tehnična resničnost* in tehnologija, implicira nekaj radikalno drugačnega od tega, kar navadno razumevamo z njimi, čeprav so bili isti koncepti že del vsakdanjega jezika njegovih sodobnikov. Na sledi Heideggra in precej pred Debordom Simondon preučuje koncept, ki stoji za določeno besedo, kakršno lahko najdemo v najbolj mundani vsakdanji komunikaciji.

70 Pojem »tehnične resničnosti« v veliki meri odmeva in napaja Debordov pojem »tehnične racionalnosti« in tako še bolj zbližuje njuni pojmovanji družbenosti in kulture, saj ne smemo spregledati, da tako Simondon kot situacionisti kasneje zahtevajo deklarativno preseganje kulture in razvoj orodij za vzpostavitev radikalno nove družbenosti, utemeljene na čuječem odnosu do sveta v vseh njegovih vidikih. Simondonov filozofski projekt lahko potemtakem primerjamo s konceptualnimi projekti s področja psihogeografije, unitarnega urbanizma in situacionistične arhitekture nekaterih vidnih in kibernetike večjih situacionistov, kakršni so Mustapha Khayati, Gilles Ivain in Constant Nieuwenhuys (Berreby 1985, Constant 1959).

Če Simondonovo delo obravnavamo, ne prevladujočega stališča »metafizike tehnologije« ali »filozofije kibernetike«, temveč z osredotočenostjo na slog in temeljne preokupacije njegove misli, najdemo jasne vzorce cirkumlokucije kot metode, ki jo uporabi za razvoj svoje implicirane teze – to je potreba po deskriptivnem tipu misli, ki bi nam priskrbela sredstva za vzpostavitev »nove« kulture, situacionistične – konstruirane in konstruktivne – *tehnične kulture*. V tem pogledu nam Simondon prinaša prepotreben razvoj ideje informacije kot bistvenega pojava tehnologije, ki je obenem eden od bistvenih fenomenov

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sodobne znanosti in družbe. Tako kot je bil Bergson prvi, ki je filozofsko pojasnil teorije moderne fizike, Heidegger pa prvi, ki je rekonceptualiziral ne samo znanstveno, temveč tudi filozofsko pojmovanje časa (v njem ni videl drugega kakor romantičen opis fizikalnega časa), Simondon prvi uvaja konkretno in popolnoma razvito filozofijo informacije kot komunikacijski proti-model, ki se lahko kosa s kibernetiko (Wienerja) in s tehno-znanstvenimi napredki, kakršne prinaša družba na splošno. Na probleme, s katerimi se je srečevala filozofija njegovega časa, se je odzval tako, da je nadaljeval in težavo premagal, pri čemer si nikakor ni prizadeval, da bi podal odgovor na vprašanje, za katerega se zdi, da je formulirano na napačnih osnovah. Na vrhu dozdevno povsem jasno razvidnega konca filozofije Simondon začenja graditi teorijo tehnologije kot modusa mišljenja in kulture, ki tehnično resničnost strojev privzema v dejavnost človeške kulture, da bi tako izgradila tehno-individualizirane sestave višjega reda in potemtakem razširila raven igre, kakršno je zagovarjal projekt situacionistov (Debord 2002, 40–42; Simondon 2017, 17–20).

Ob lastnem zagovoru določene kulture ali konstrukcije, ki bi omogočala razširitev kulturne dejavnosti na tehnološke predmete, lahko zaznamo, kako Simondonova filozofska obravnava tehnologije napaja Debordove cirkumlokucijske opise spektakla in Heideggrovo kritiko kibernetike. Nadalje napredujemo proti zadnji ekspoziciji *Družbe spektakla* kot realizacije znanstvenega koncepta časa kot tehnične komodifikacije vsakdanjega življenja. Tu lahko pokažemo, kako Debordova kritika družbeno organizirane uporabe časa predstavlja jasen vidik teorije spektakla kot temporalizacije ali kot tehno-znanstvene komodifikacije življenjskega sveta. Ta vidik Debordovega dela, ki naj bi bil središče *Družbe spektakla* – a očitno je tudi v analizi njegovih del o filmu (Debord 2003) –, povezuje teorijo spektakla z analizami Deleuza, ki ni bil samo Debordov sodobnik, temveč tudi Bergsonov naslednik in komentator Simondonove tehnološke filozofije. Spektakelski modus proizvodnje znanja/pomena/spomina je bil kot teoretska tema prvič inavguriran pri Bergsonu in nato radikaliziran pri Debordu, kot tema akademskega raziskovanja pa se je prek Deleuza uveljavil pri Jonathanu Craryju, Jonathanu Bellerju in drugih.

Doslej je razpravljanje skušalo ustvariti nov okvir za ponovno oceno kritičnega pomena in analitične potence Debordovega središčnega termina – spektakla – za napredovanje v in o filozofiji proti njenemu »koncu« kot »nalogi mišljenja«.

kakor jo je opisal Martin Heidegger. Oba teoretična pristopa k fenomenom sodobnega življenja je mogoče zreducirati na temeljni premik v pojmovanju in izkustvu časa, ki je nastopil s prihodom moderne fizikalne znanosti in z njeno aplikacijo na vsakdanje življenje, kakršna je na najgloblji način preoblikovala pojme družbenosti, epistemologije in politične ekonomije. Pri objavljeni korespondenci ter na podlagi uvida v arhiv in osebno knjižnico v Debordovem primeru ter pri opombah, stranskih opombah in biografiji v Heideggrovem primeru lahko vidimo nesporne dokaze, da koncepti sodobne znanosti, tehnologije in kibernetike igrajo ključno vlogo v njunem intelektualnem razvoju, zlasti pod vplivom očitnega pritoka tehnične in specialistične terminologije v vsakdanjem življenju navadnih ljudi in pod vplivom popularne kulture v smislu ustvarjanja vsečne podobe sveta tistega časa.

#### 4. Od »realnega čas« do realizacije časa (kot filozofije)

72 Fenomen podobe-sveta in diskretno razumevanje časa predstavljata dva vidika realizacije prevlade tehno-znanstvenega svetovnega nazora nad kulturo kot celoto, ki se nato transformira v kulturo vizualizacij ali kulturo, ki ji vladajo vizualni fenomeni kot primarni učinek vse dejavnosti v zahodni družbi. S tem, ko čas sam naredi za podobo, se človeški razvoj tako rekoč ustavi, pospešijo pa se transhumane perspektive, kakršne propagira neslutena tehnološka rast, kjer kapital prevzame formo skrajnega upravljanja s časom, kar je statistično in matematično vizualizirano vsepovsod, od borznih grafov do TV programov in živega prenosa dogodkov. Tako pridemo do zaključka, da je tehno-znanstvena ideja časa, kot radikalno disociirana od »tega, kar je res živeto« (Debord 1992, 120–121; Bergson 2005, 296), od trajanja kot »dajanja časa« ali »biti tu«, dejansko simulaker (v smislu Deleuzove filozofije ponavljanja) in primarni produkt spektakelskega globalnega trga dobrin (kupovanje izdelkov, ki »prihranijo čas«). Kiberkultura, kakršna se pojavi v drugi polovici 20. stoletja, je že kultura, ki je radikalno brezčasovna, situirana med lažno nostalgijo in ciničnim zavedanjem Spektakla, ki življenje zverži v izračunljivo podobo. Jasno bi tako moralo postati, da je ena izmed osrednjih premis Debordove knjige, premisa, ki jo predstavlja že sam naslov knjige, dejansko samo duh znotraj razkrajajoče se kiberkulture njegovega časa.

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Tako lahko – s pomočjo cirkumlokucijske metode – razpravljamo o idiomatski dispoziciji Debordovih konceptov v *Družbi spektakla*, ki smo jih zdaj že večkrat implicirali znotraj te obravnave. Ko se družbenost spremeni v podobo, ki je obenem kibernetško optimizirana za mediatizirano potrošnjo – s pomočjo vizualizacije –, lahko opazimo, da je ideja »družbe spektakla« skoraj ironično podcenjevanje tega, kar je dejansko na delu znotraj sodobnega sveta. Že Heidegger je v svojih delih navajal, da ni – ko je s časom samim mogoče upravljati kot s podobo – avtentičnih konstrukcij družbenosti, saj svet sam postane obstojna zaloga spektakelskih dogodkov (kjer se dogodki »godijo«). Spektakel s tem, ko samega sebe cinično imenuje spektakel, želi biti koncept, ki je zamenljiv z družbenostjo; to je njegova osnovna ontologija. A če ga dojamemo kot šov (*prikaz*), postane hitro dostopen za raziskavo in kritiko s stališča fenomenologije tehnologije, kibernetike in eksistencialne analize. To je nadalje mogoče demonstrirati, če imamo Debordovo *Družbo spektakla* za del projekta radikalne volje – tako kot cirkumlokucijo pri Heideggru –, ki je sestavljen in ga ni mogoče zreducirati – kakor kažeta kasnejši deli »*Cette mauvaise réputation...*« (Debord 1993) in *Considérations sur l'assassinat de Gérard Lebovici* (Debord 2001) – na eno samo knjigo in ga moramo imeti za del prizadevanj za ohranjanje kritičnega trenutka v času, ko je bila mogoča natanko takšna fenomenološka obravnava Spektakla, ki jo je bilo mogoče izraziti in demonstrirati s pomočjo približno enakega niza fenomenov, kakor jih Spektakel sam uporablja, da samega sebe poganja kot prevladujoči svetovni nazor: z umetnostjo, filmom in popularno kulturo. V tem oziru se Debordov projekt sestoji iz knjig, filmov, ovržb, konceptualnih umetnin in pričevanj, a tudi iz zvezka *Komentarjev k Družbi spektakla*, ki – kakor je izjavil v »*Cette mauvaise réputation...*« – niso komentarji o knjigi *Družba spektakla*, tako kot tudi *Družba spektakla* ne govori o kakršnikoli družbi v smislu spektakla (Debord 1993, 62). Od analize ameriške družbe Daniela J. Boorstina do sredine 20. stoletja in vse do Deborda, spektakel kot šov nadomešča celotno družbenost tako, da izgradi podobo. Znotraj tega strukturnega premika in novega razumevanja podobe – prek Heideggra do Simondona – zdaj tako vemo in lahko pokažemo, da je podoba (*imidž*) obenem kapital, svetovni nazor in komodificiran čas kot vizualizacija človekovega lastnega stališča znotraj povsem iluzorne družbene strukture. Takšen pogled je prevzela tudi

ena izmed najbolj vplivnih komentatork in nadaljevalk Debordove misli v akademski sferi, McKenzie Wark, zlasti v svoji knjigi *Spektakel dezintegracij*, ki popolnoma prekine s konceptom družbe in vpelje četrto stopnjo samorganizacije spektakla (Wark 2013, 7): od koncentrirane in difuzne do integrirane in dezintegrirane v obdobju skoraj natanko dvajsetletnih razmikov od leta 1920 do zgodnjih let 21. stoletja, ko kiber-tehnologije in kulture (tako kot estetska gibanja, kakršen je kiberpunk), prevladajo nad vsakršno komunikacijo.

74 Nazadnje je znotraj vzpostavljenih okvirjev potrebno razmisliti o pojmu tehnosfere (Paić 2018, 1) kot konkretne materializacije kibernetске družbene organizacije, ki izhaja iz tehn-znanosti, kakor jo obravnavajo Norbert Wiener ter teoretika informacijske komunikacije Shannon in Weaver in drugi. Koncept je uvedel filozof Žarko Paić in kot pomemben razvoj znotraj sodobne filozofije napaja našo diskusijo v smislu »izpopolnjene separacije« (Debord 1992, 9), o kateri govori Debord in o kateri kasneje razmišlja Jonathan Beller v svojem delu *Kinematografski modus produkcije* (Beller 2006). Spektakel je pazljiv, kliče k pozornosti in tako vedno spodbuja prisostvovanje k temu, da opazuje šov, kakor ga v svoji totalnosti vizualizira konkretna tehnična resničnost, ki zdaj opredeljuje večji del celotnega izkustva sveta, od TV-ja do družabnih medijev. Ob izpostavljenih vizualizaciji na površini in tehnosferi za ekranom lahko opazimo, da Paićeva teorija razgrinja infrastrukturno operacijo tehn-znanosti v njihovi kalkulaciji, programabilnosti in konstrukciji »novih« svetov, ki niso nič drugega kot vizualizacija časa in prostora osvobojenih starih svetov: zgolj pozorni spektakli. Filozofija potemtakem, tako kot misel sama, nima avtentičnega mesta v tehnosferi, saj je vsa komunikacija absolutno posredovana in re-konstruirana s pomočjo podob, iz njih in vanje, zgolj zato, da bi bila podobna misli in filozofiji; misel postane del oblikovanja (Paić 2013, 462; Paić 2019). Eden izmed stranskih učinkov takšne re-konstrukcije je vseprežemajoči občutek nostalgije v različnih novih tehnoloških vizualizacijah.

Zaključek razprave znotraj vzpostavitve konceptualnega, filozofskega in kibernetkega okvirja za obravnavo fenomenov šova in časa v sodobni filozofiji sestavlja vpeljava pojmov odpadništva, secesije in preloma znotraj sodobne filozofije ob upoštevanju njene izgube mesta, razkranjanja in deteritorializacije znotraj zahodne intelektualne tradicije spričo nastopa tehn-znanstvenih

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odkritij v 20. stoletju. To je posebej pomembno za našo razpravo o ideji »konca filozofije« v Heideggrovem poznem besedilu »Konec filozofije in naloga mišljenja«. Tu Heidegger razvije zaključno obravnavo svojega projekta v smislu habitualne filozofije, njene nadaljnje discipline in njenega varovanja misli zunaj podobe-sveta in kulture vizualizacije, ki sta sinonima kibernetike kot osrednje znanosti (metafizike) sodobnosti. Ideja habitualnega konca ali konca kot kraja nas privede nazaj k našemu metodološkemu razpravljanju, kjer se ideja cirkumlokucije in gravitacije, kroženja okrog določenih konceptov z namenom, da bi jih privedli v razkrivajoče družjenje, ponovno poveže z enako fenomenološko skrbjo glede ideje kraja (*basho*) pri Kitaru Nishidi. Oba predstavljata odpadniški ton znotraj sodobne filozofije natanko z njuno radikalno voljo po premagovanju očitne nesposobnosti akademske filozofije, da bi obravnavala sodobne fenomene, ki tako kaže na njeno izgubo lastnega mesta v revoluciji družbe proti novim oblikam biti. Njen kraj, habitualni konec (*kraj, zavičaj*), *basho* (*mjesto, zavičaj*) je v praksi filozofije kot situacijskega potenciala za utemeljitev takšne vrste prisotnosti (*Da-sein, pri-sutnosti*), ki ponovno odkriva čas kot bit (postajajoča prisotnost) in ne kot podobo (diskretna in večna prisotnost, razdvojena sedanost) (Nishida 1987, 124). V tem oziru Heideggrova eksistencialna fenomenologija vzpostavlja avtentično linijo filozofije, ki je ni več mogoče zreducirati na nikakršno tradicionalno filozofsko ontologijo, temveč predstavlja sodobno oddaljevanje od koncepta filozofije proti bolj praktičnemu in angažiranemu tipu mišljenja, s katerim ohranjamo možnosti kritičnega prevpraševanja vsakdanjega življenja – od njegovega jezika do njegovih podob – z jasnimi »političnimi« ali »revolucionarnimi« poudarki in v nasprotju s tem, kar je v »Dobi podobe sveta« sam poimenoval »kulturna politika« in kultura kot politika (Heidegger 1977, 116).

Odpadniško filozofsko držo in nezadovoljstvo z nezmožnostjo filozofije, da bi obravnavala sodobne fenomene, nadalje lahko raziščemo s primerjalno razpravo o Deleuzovem postfilozofskem konceptu filma in o Debordovih filmih, ki so na nasprotni strani linearnega razvoja evropske kinematografije med 50. in 70. leti 20. stoletja, posebej Godarda, Resnaisa in ostalih. Kljub temu s svojimi projekti oba avtorja orišeta in razgrneta tehno-estetski fenomen, ki ga je ameriški radikalni teoretik Mark Fisher poimenoval »kapitalistični realizem« (Fisher 2008), kar odseva Debordovo idejo »tehnične

racionalnosti«, ki je v nasprotju s Simondonovo »tehnično kulturo«. Deleuze je sicer ostal eden izmed redkih intelektualcev, ki je – tako kot Baudrillard – , vpeljeval obrobne teme sodobnosti v akademsko razpravo. Deleuzov primer je toliko pomembnejši, ker se je ukvarjal – s posredovanjem fenomena filma – z idejami, ki so jih mnogo prej v nekoliko drugačnem kontekstu razvijali Heidegger, Debord in, predvsem, Bergson: z načinom, na katerega vizualni pojavi sodobne tehno-znanosti oblikujejo naš odnos do znanja, spomina in izkustva. Pod vplivom Bergsona in Simondona je Deleuze razvil filozofski pogled, ki se je v drugi polovici 20. stoletja izkazal za nepogrešljivo orodje pri analizi umetnosti, kulture in politike. A medtem ko Deleuze svoj projekt nadaljuje z iskanjem bistva podobe s pomočjo tehničnosti filma, Debord že ve, da je »tehnična podoba« (Flusser), ki naj bi ležala v jedru spektakla, podoba zgolj v tehničnem smislu in da moramo samo idejo podobe dekonstruirati (s kritičnim kibernetiskim okvirom), da bi preseгли šov sodobne tehno-znanosti. Zunaj tovrstnega projekta se zdi, da je vsak intelektualni razvoj druge polovice 20. stoletja, ki se ukvarja s fenomenom podobe, samo cinično nadaljevanje filozofije zaradi filozofije same.

76

V tem pogledu je pomemben citat s samega začetka *Družbe spektakla*, kjer Debord izjavi, da je spektakel – tako kot film sam – »avtonomno gibanje ne-živečega« (Debord 1992, 10) ali animacija v najbolj evokativnem smislu besede, od Bergsonovega gibanja znotraj aparata do »duha v stroju«. Opaziti je mogoče, da je ta ideja prisotna že v Debordovih zgodnjih filmih ter tudi v poznejši ekranizaciji knjige *Družba spektakla* in v vizualnem eseju *Zavrnitev vseh sodb, dobrih in slabih, doslej izraženih o filmu »Družba spektakla«* kot »anti-koncept« filma (kina) (Debord 2003). V nasprotju z Debordom in Heideggrom ostaja Deleuzova filozofija hermetična in v precejšnji meri simptomatična za kulturo in čas, v katera je potopljena, saj nikakor ni, medtem ko je predeloval drže in skušal spodbuditi zanimanje za določene starejše filozofije, storil ničesar, da bi filozofiji priskrbel bolj avtentično mesto, niti ni prepoznal potrebe po takem dejanju. Namesto Deleuzovih filmskih teorij, ki so v nekem trenutku – in sicer v istem času, ko nastaja Debordov *Panegirik* – zagovarjale določen umik filozofije v umetnost, nam Debord prinaša opise in praktične primere zavračanja šova s pomočjo reapropriacije odtujenih sredstev (vizualne) produkcije. Za Deborda je za

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film kot fenomen šova bistvena pozornost in pazljivost; za Deleuza pa je še vedno zgolj glorificirana metafora.

Obravnavana se potemtakem mora spustiti globlje v razumevanje konkretnega sodobnega fenomena šova, s katerim se človeška pozornost preusmerja in odtuja od slehernega avtentičnega odnosa do lastnega časa. Tovrstne fenomene lahko povzamemo kot gibanja nostalgije (Tanner 2016, 60) in njihovo kritično zavrnitev uzremo v praksi digitalne umetnosti, kakršno ponuja *vaporwave*, kot ga opisuje eden izmed najbolj obetajočih novih teoretikov spektakla, mlad ameriški raziskovalec Grafton Tanner v svoji prvi knjigi *Blebetavo truplo: Vaporwave in komodifikacija duhov*.

Kot odgovor, ki v splošnem rečeno ni bil preveč ploden ali učinkovit, je to gibanje izkazalo možnost določenega afektivnega spoprijema, ki seže onkraj estetike, politike ter filozofije in se nahaja znotraj splošnejšega prostora drž, afekcij in čuječega spoprijemanja z neposredno prisotnim svetom – četudi je vse, kar je danes neposredno prisotno, dejansko že in vedno hipermediatizirano. Kot artefakt sodobnega boja za proti-spektakelsko avtentičnost v vseobsegajoči bitki za pomenljivejši in koristnejši čas, *vaporwave* prinaša bistveno empirično znanje o rekuperaciji, ki je lastno sleherni spektakelski dejavnosti, in je zato živ primer kulture vizualizacije. Ključnega pomena je tudi, da razumemo, kako mora biti od nastopa spektakla vsako veliko filozofsko odkritje obravnavano s stališča popularne kulture ali kulture na splošno in tako historizirano znotraj konkretnih časovnic znanosti, tehnologije, ekonomije, politike in kulture kot intenziteta spektakla. Ko moderni znanstveniki postanejo filozofi in preroki, konec filozofije – kakor pravi Heidegger – postane prava naloga mišljenja, ki se je lahko lotimo samo, če samo ime filozofije pustimo za seboj. Patafizično pot iz filozofije so – kot kaže naša raziskava – poudarjala že besedila Situacionistične Internacionale, zlasti teksti Asgerja Jorna (Jorn 1961), čigar vpliv na Baudrillarda ostaja neopažen.

Obenem resno revalorizacijo Debordove teorije spodbujajo tako njegova objavljena korespondenca kot prizadevanja Bibliothèque nationale de France, kjer dokumentirajo in javnosti predstavljajo celoten arhiv Debordovih zapiskov, besedil in ohranjene knjižnice. Ti viri zdaj postajajo primarni vzgibi za študijo Debordovega intelektualnega življenja, njegovih vplivov in neposredne dediščine. V tem pogledu lahko omenimo vse poglavitne Debordove



komentatorje – zlasti Baudrillarda in Agambena –, ki jim koncepta spektakla zaradi dvoumnega odnosa do Debordovega pisanja, ki so ga na eni strani imeli za filozofski vir in ga na drugi zavračali kot teorijo ter so zato Debordov radikalni projekt skoraj oportunistično izkoriščali za promocijo lastnih akademskih ciljev, ni uspelo obravnavati s fenomenološko resnostjo. Na enak način tudi Heideggrov konec filozofije v konkretni fenomenološki razgrnitvi *das Ende* kot *okoljskega* (cirkumlokucijskega) termina ostane brez obravnave v vseh poglavitnih razpravah o Heideggrovem poskusu, da bi filozofijo presegel s prakso v smislu eksistencialne fenomenologije, ki jo zagovarja številnih poznih esejih in predavanjih. Preprosto si ne moremo privoščiti, da bi podlegli filozofskemu cinizmu, medtem ko razmišljamo o najpomembnejši nalogi našega časa, ki je – enostavno rečeno – ohranitev misli v tehno-znanstveni vizualizaciji življenja samega. Dve pomembni stranski opombi k tej razpravi: obsežna obravnava Simondonove kritike kibernetike kot del heideggrovskega filozofskega manierizma in implicirano preseganje tradicije in zahodne misli v fenomenologiji šole iz Kjota nam kažeta, kako natanko se lahko tovrsten razmislek razvije v popolnoma pragmatično filozofsko prakso, kar zanesljivo ni daleč od velikega filozofskega odkritja v jugoslovanski filozofiji z Vanjo Sutličem in njegovo svežo interpretacijo Heideggrova (Sutlič 1987).

S pomočjo predložene obnove Debordove intelektualne zapuščine v smislu kritike ideje spektakla, ki ga je zdaj mogoče razumeti v njegovi pravi pogovorni in vsakdanji obliki »šova«, lahko *Družbo spektakla* in »Dobo podobe sveta« rekonfiguriramo v trdno izhodišče za neke vrste sodobno filozofijo spektakla kot *Dobe Svetovnega Šova* (*svijet-prikaza*). Praktična fenomenologija šova naj bi potemtakem označevala ne samo nalogo mišljenja, temveč pot k jeziku in skozenj, kakršne ne zanima učinkovitost nastopa, temveč dejansko miselno izkustvo, ki se vzpostavlja samo znotraj jezika in se ga podobe šole morajo naučiti posnemati ali dosegati. S takšnim spoprijemom se pojavi nov odnos do časa, kar tudi predstavlja pravi podtekst Heideggrovih, Simondonovih in Debordovih projektov težavne naloge sprave med bitjo ter njenimi omejitvami in neskončnim bistvom trajanja. To niso zgolj filozofije, ki jih moramo zares upoštevati, temveč s svojimi fenomenološkimi dispozicijami in vključenostjo v življenjski svet, s svojo sodobnostjo in povezavo s tehno-znanstvenimi in socio-ekonomskimi problemi kot elementi določene čuječe prakse tudi kličejo k dejanju.

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Nazadnje lahko pokažemo radikalno novo obliko branja koncepta spektakla, za katero odkrijemo, da se veliko bolj sklada z Debordovim projektom in je v tem pogledu blizu nekaterim primarnim vprašanjem eksistencialne fenomenologije (kot »filozofske psihogeografije«), kakor izhaja od Heideggra in njegovega intelektualnega presejanja zahodne metafizične tradicije. Ne da bi namerno iskal bistvo spektakla, je Debord orisal totalno okolje šova, znotraj in skoz katerega moramo vsak dan krmariti, da dosežemo kakršenkoli pomen. V tem oziru je spektakel lahko dojet kot tērmin, ki je – v svoji pogovorni dispoziciji in na mestu, kakršnega zavzema znotraj Debordovega projekta kot celote – podoben ideji Dasein pri Heideggru. Gre za obkrožajoč termin in prazno gravitacijsko središče projekta, ki si prizadeva preseči filozofijo (kakor se realizira v kibernetiki) z novim čuječim spoprijemom z življenjskim svetom. Simondonova vizija de-konstrukcije temeljnih konceptov tehnologije na poti k njihovi totalni implementaciji v vsakdanje življenje sodobne družbe je – tako kakor Heideggrov in Debordov projekt – globoko ikonoklastična in v svoji aktualnosti izgrajena na intelektualni dediščini bergsonovskega izvora. To izhaja predvsem iz subtilne, a bistvene razločitve med podobo, upodobljenjem, zamišljanjem in domišljijo, ki je sama na sebi pomenljiva za drugo razločitev, namreč za razlikovanje med diskretnim časom in časom kot postajanjem (trajanjem). S svojo filozofsko preiskavo tehničnosti Simondon izgradi idejo tehnologije kot dela humanističnih ved in kot fenomenološke mehanologije (Simondon 2017, 60). Ne gre več za zaprt proces produkcije (črne škatle) aparata, obravnavanega v smislu industrije tehnologije, temveč bolj za tehnološko kulturo, kjer tehnologija deluje kot odprt projekt ali je podvržena neprestanim spremembam, rasti in prilagajanju znanju operaterja. Ta operater kot avtentični igralec v svetu ali kot prisostvovanje uporablja domišljijo, da bi presegel neposredno prisotno podobo tehnološkega aparata z razumevanjem njegovih različnih rekonfiguracij na poti k odprtemu koncu – čuječemu odnosu do tehnologije kot obliki skrbi. Ta oblika skrbi se naslanja na kroženje, obkroževanje in cirkumlokucijo kot na način, kako fenomen tehnologije kot odprt projekt napraviti razviden v njegovi prisotnosti, kot prikazovanje (njegove razprtosti) in ne kot šov (spektakel, zastrtost). Simondon družbo razume kot v bistvu tehno-estetsko, medtem ko jo ima prevladujoča kibernetična teorija Norberta Wienerja za del večje

termo-dinamične organizacije, ki mora biti organizirana tako, da je entropija zmanjšana v prid optimalne tehnične organizacije, kakor jo dosežemo z učinkovitim upravljanjem z informacijami (Wiener 1948). Po Simondonu mora kibernetika kot tehnologija ali teorija informacij rokovati z informacijami, po Wienerju pa kibernetika rokuje z vsem zato, da bi informacija prosto krožila kot organizirajoči potencial. Simondonova tehno-estetika ohranja strukturo razkrivanja ali splošno trajanje, o katerem je mogoče pričevati samo tako, da prikažemo smer prehodne narave postajanja ali prihajanja-k-bitu [coming-into-being]. To je razvidno iz načina, na katerega opisuje tehnično pokrajino modernega sveta kot porajajoče se okolje, ki prinaša nove vrste aisthesis in izziva nove afektivne situacije ne samo s svojo narejenostjo, temveč tudi s svojo absolutno spremenljivostjo, kot novo naravo, kot postajanje nove narave, v kateri se človek ne ustali, če nadaljuje z igro, učenjem in inkulturacijo svojih strojev (Simondon 2017, 257). Wienerjeva kibernetika vselej deluje kot šov, matrica in strukturirana podoba. Simondon in Wiener tako predstavljata dve radikalno različni pojmovanji kibernetike kot družbenega projekta, vendar oba lahko zreduciramo – s pomočjo fundamentalne ontološke analize – na enako radikalni konceptualizaciji idej časa in pripoznavanje nians v razlikah med podobo in domišljijo ter med šovom in prikazovanjem. Medtem ko Wiener gradi neposredno na temelju znanstvene ideje diskretnega časa in jo izenačuje z vrednostjo informacij, Simondonova porajajoča se tehnološka individuacija spominja na bergsonovsko postajanje in tudi na novo vrsto razkrivanja z estetsko rekonfiguracijo prenovljene jezikovne pokrajine tehnoloških konceptov.

Pokazali smo, kako si Simondonova ideja tehno-kulture prizadeva preseči Wienerjevo kibernetiko kot spektakelski projekt tehnološke družbene organizacije. Na tej točki je pomembno povedati, na kakšen način Simondonova kritika vpliva na nekatere sodobne debate o popularni aplikaciji in uporabi moderne tehnologije. Takšno kritiko sta razvila že omenjena Günther Anders v eseju o »Svetu kot fantomu in matrici« in Daniel J. Boorstin v historični analizi v knjigi *Podoba*. Oba opisujeta nenavadno združevanje popularne kulture in tehnologije tako, da sleherno izkustvo – komodificirano s pomočjo sodobne tehno-znanosti – postane matrica (Anders 1956) za produkcijo psevdo-dogodkov ali spektaklov. Simondon ponuja prvi pomemben korak

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pri premagovanju tovrstne spektakelske družbene organizacije s tem, ko njeno infrastrukturo – tehno-znanost – dojame kot odprt projekt razvoja človeškega bitja in ne družbe. Celo več, z uporabo heideggrovske metodologije cirkumlokucije, ki nas usmerja k drugačni teoretski rabi pojma spektakla (kot šova; v hrvaščini: prikaza, kar je mogoče prevesti tudi z besedo »nakaza [specter]«), lahko поблиže preučimo, kako Andersov *fantomski-svet* odgovarja *podobi-sveta* in Debordovemu *objektiviziranemu svetovnemu nazoru*.

Na takšen način lahko vidimo, da se celovita struktura sveta, kakor se je razvijala od dvajsetih let 20. stoletja dalje, zrcali v načrtovanju, projektiranju in konstrukciji družbe kot šova tehnologije in znanosti, ki radikalno reinterpretirata človekovo neposredno okolje. Najprej okolje mediatizirata, nato vse ljudi izenačita kot delavce in slednjič implementirata infrastrukturo, potrebno za termodinamično družbeno organizacijo, ki je sama na sebi izrazito tehnična ali, bolje rečeno, kibernetična. Edina razlika med kibernetično družbeno organizacijo in dejanskim kiberprostorom je intenzivnost šova. A to je samo ena možna interpretacija tehno-estetske organizacije družbe, kjer je vse, kar smo neposredno živeli, porinjeno v šov, v nekaj, kar samo »izgleda kot«, a obenem dovoljuje množično sodelovanje pri vsakršnem fenomenu, najsi smo umetniki ali samo (cinični) delavci. To fenomensko komoditeto podpira tehnična infrastruktura, kakršna se razvija znotraj okvira kibernetične znanosti, ki je rodila idejo omrežene družbe, kakor se je realizirala v internetu in v zadnjem času v družabnih medijih. Vse obstaja kakor prej, a umaknilo se je v reprezentacijo. In vse deluje enako: teorija umetnosti, estetika, znanstvene raziskave, znanje, celo protest in revolucija, a tudi suverenost držav; vse je zaznačeno kot del družbene *aisthesis*, kakor jo podpira določen tehno-znanstveno strukturiran svet. To je mogoče samo zahvaljujoč temeljnemu učinku tehno-znanstvenih operacij – vizualizaciji.

Zato je potrebna vrnitev k ponovnemu razmisleku o *Družbi spektakla* kot k idiomu, ki označuje stanje kulturnega razpada pod paradigmo tehno-znanstvenega Šova, kakršen deluje kot bistvo primarnega modusa biti v 20. stoletju – kot vizualizacija. Vizualizacija v bistvu zahteva pozornost opazovalca in s tem, ko ga kliče, dejansko krade človekov čas in tako usmerja ali moti običajen tok delovanja v vsakdanjem življenju. Doslej smo videli, da tehno-znanstveni in intelektualni razvoj v prvi polovici 20. stoletja res vodi

k radikalni reinterpretaciji vseh zgodnejših filozofskih obravnav izkustva sveta, ne samo s tem, da jih ovrže, temveč jih dejansko potrdi in prilagodi znanstvenemu raziskovanju na področju fizikalne in informacijske znanosti. Filozofija potemtakem postane šov, s katerim se tehno-znanost razkriva kot najpomembnejši razvoj v zgodovini zahodne civilizacije v širšem pomenu. Znanost tako postane »zahodni filozofski projekt«, kakor je to opisal Debord (Debord 1992, 15). In s pomočjo tega posredovanja lahko pokažemo tudi, kako razvoj tehno-znanosti v 20. stoletju vrh doseže s fenomenom popularne znanosti in popularne kulture, znotraj katerih vizualizacija prehiteva neposredno življenjsko izkustvo in tako »filozoficira« resničnost samo. To tvori konceptualno ozadje Spektakla kot Šova, na katerem je potrebno utemeljiti fenomenološko razgrnitev *Družbe spektakla*.

82 Razgrnitev pričujočega besedila se opira na dvoje ključnih točk: 1) pokaže, da je cirkumlokucija metoda za (ponovno) povezovanje dejstev, konceptov in informacij v pomenljivem, a obsežnem razpravljanju, ki ga sestavljata dva temeljna ozira – zgodovina in jezik, od historizacije fenomenov do besednih iger in eksperimentalnih etimologij; 2) pokaže, da je ključna značilnost spektakla to, da gre za šov [the-show] (hr. *prikaz*), kar je v nasprotju s konvencionalnim nekritičnim in slabo definiranim dobesednim prevodom besede *le spectacle* v »spektakel« (hr. *spektakl*): to temelji na metodološki razpravi o pogovornosti v Heideggrovi filozofiji in tudi na njegovem cirkumlokucijskem spoprijemanju pri iskanju bistva nekaterih sodobnih fenomenov, kakršna sta tehnologija (informacija) in znanost (podoba-sveta), a tudi tistih temeljnih fenomenov, kakršen je čas (tu-bit).

## 5. Zaključek

Radikalna preprostost eksistencialne fenomenologije kot projekta pri Heideggro v bistvu nasprotuje in sezoperstavlja reduktivnemu in restriktivnemu konceptu Spektakla. Kot je to opisal sam Debord, Spektakel sleherni fenomen zreducira na »tisto, kar je mogoče videti«, in obenem to, kar je mogoče videti, napravlja za »vse, kar je«, tako da mora biti vse, kar je mogoče reči ali opaziti pri nekem fenomenu, vedno in že je vizualizirano. S pomočjo Heideggro, njegovih predhodnikov in sodobnikov – zlasti Bergsona in Simondona –

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smo razgrnili, da gre za tendenco, ki jo je mogoče opazovati v celotnem teku 20. stoletja, začenši z napredkom moderne znanosti in tehnologije kot njene neposredne materializacije. Če je bistvo moderne znanosti svet-slik (podoba-sveta) in če je bistvo moderne tehnologije *Ge-stell* (in-formacija) – vemo, da v Heideggrovem besedilu »Doba podobe sveta« obe povezuje koncept sistema –, moramo biti sposobni uvideti, kako in zakaj naj Spektakel velja za konkretno družbeno aplikacijo skorajda stoletja tehno-znanstvenega razvoja, ki si prizadeva za nastop spekulativne politike in ekonomije pozne kapitalistične družbe. Taki ekonomiji sta ekonomija pozornosti in kinematografski modus produkcije, ki delujeta in se okoriščata s temeljnim napredkom sodobne fizikalne znanosti – komodifikacijo časa. Za nas je spektakel trenutek v sodobni kulturi, ko se sleherna izmed temeljnih človeških značilnosti in sposobnosti transponira v tehno-znanstveni vmesnik – šov. Skorajda vse so domala neposredno povezane s fenomenom časa – od domišljije do sanj, od znanja do spomina, našega pojmovanja preteklosti, sedanjosti in prihodnjih obetov itn. Kibernetška družbena organizacija, ki obenem uničuje družbenost s tem, ko jo transformira v dejanja čiste digitalne družbene medializacije, deluje kot varuh tega šova, tako njegovega okvirja kot njegove infrastrukture. Kot pa smo pokazali, moramo, da bi kritika kibernetike učinkovala, najprej razmisliti o biti, ki jo zahteva za zmožnost avtentičnega delovanja v svetu, ujetem v mrežo psevdo-fenomenov šova.

Zaključili smo, da ni sodobne filozofije, ki bi se ukvarjala z Debordom z namenom ohranitve pojma prakse, kakor ga je zagovarjal, da bi zavrnil in kritiziral spektakel kot projekt, s katerim je tudi filozofija sama odrinjena v reprezentacijo (šov); namesto tega povsod opažamo nepravilno »ontološko preseganje« (Debordove) filozofije, kakršno ni nikoli bilo uvedeno, formalizirano, razširjeno in obranjeno kot filozofija, kakršno tudi nikjer ni bilo eksplicitno obravnavano, temveč samo implicitno razgrnjeno, zlasti pri Jeanu Baudrillardu. Baudrillardov projekt je nazadnje propadel zaradi »filozofske« kratkovidnosti njegovih kiberkulturnih konceptov, ki nimajo nobene intelektualne uporabnosti v dobi kripto-pojavov, decentralizirane in hiperglobalizirane izmenjave znotraj družabnih medijev, mešane resničnosti ter umetelnega in prirejenega življenjskega sveta, a tudi inteligence in kulture kot celote. Baudrillard sam je takšne omejitve predvidel v knjigi *Le*

*Pacte de lucidité ou l'intelligence du Mal*, kjer namenoma izbere esteticizem pred kritiko v prizadevanju, da bi obravnaval razvoj sodobnega tehn-znanstvenega fenomena inteligentne umetnosti (Baudrillard 2006, 165 isl.). A pojem spektakla preživi zlasti zaradi svoje radikalne preprostosti, ki v bistvu ostane »šov«, ko enkrat opravimo z vsemi zgodovinskimi netočnostmi in akademskimi prekinitvami, kakršne so Deborda porinile v tesno zvezo z neoavangardističnim marksizmom, hegeljanstvom itn. Debord – če temo šova povzamemo na način, ki so ga glede časa, podobe, tehnologije kritično razgrnili Bergson, Heidegger in Simondon – postane paradigma radikalnega misleca na obrobju filozofije, ki svoj konec<sup>2</sup> najde v praksi kot v edini zgodovinsko primerni potezi misli, ki časa in zagona ne more več avtentično nuditi nobeni infra-filozofski obravnavi premagovanja, razvoja, opustitve in dezintegracije družbenosti. Zdaj se ukvarjamo samo še s tem, kako se sprijazniti z zavrnitvijo spektakla v *tehnosferi* (kot predlaga Žarko Paić), ki še deluje kot edina zgodovinsko popolna reprezentacija sveta v njegovi funkcionalni totaliteti. »A spektakel, kakor pravi Debord, je tudi ‚*Weltanschauung*, ki se je aktualizirala, svetovni nazor, transponiran v samo arhitekturo naših velemest in mest, materializirana ideologija. Za kakšen in za čigav svetovni nazor gre?« (Gilman-Opalsky 2011, 74.) To je pogled sodobne tehno-znanosti, znotraj katere umetnost prevlada nad vsakršnim konstruktivnim človeškim vedénjem (vedénjem situacionista). Ne gre za hiper-realnost, temveč za tehnosfero v smislu tehnično u-okvirjenega in za totalni prostor in čas dogodka, kjer je vse to-in-óno, a samo v tehničnem pomenu, samo za šov. Tako kot pri aplikacijah za pametni telefon, pretočnih video storitvah itn.: kaže se kot igre, novice, TV itn., čeprav gre samo za kode in puščice, usmeritve in distrakcije, ki našo pozornost odvrtaajo od dejstva, da uporabljajo jezik in strukture, ki so za nas dostopne, a je obenem njihova prosta uporaba vendarle vsepovsod zatirana in potisnjena v novo proletarizacijo in prekariat delovne sile informacijskih tehnologij.

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2 Ugotovimo lahko, da ima konec pri Heideggrovem projektu kvalitete, ki ga razlikujejo od drugih »postmodernih« razglašanj konca – kakor jih kritično obravnava Komel (2019, 155 isl.) – in ki se bolj skladajo z našo hipotezo glede ideje *okoljenja*, in sicer kot oklevanja in cirkumlokucije v filozofiji, kakršna lahko oriše čuječe okolje za določeno »filozofsko prakso« ali prakso radikalne misli.

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Ker smo v pričujoči študiji želeli obravnavati Debordovo konceptualizacijo spektakla z opiranjem na njegovemu pisanju predhodne filozofije in s stališč dostopnosti, zanimanj ter kulturne in zgodovinske klime, ki obkrožajo Debordovo nalogo mišljenja, se nam je zdelo nujno, da se samo sporadično sklicujemo na njegove sodobne komentatorje. Kritično moramo ovrednotiti tudi izrecno odločitev Giorgia Agambena, da se z Debordom sooči v njuni korespondenci,<sup>3</sup> medtem ko se je Baudrillard oddaljil od Deborda in v teku svoje celotne kariere ostal avantgardni akademski raziskovalec,<sup>4</sup> zaradi česar smo se v prispevku razprave o njem skoraj popolnoma vzdržali, saj je Debordovo odrekanje akademskemu dialogu temeljno za njegov projekt. Njuna navidezna podobnost se vzpostavlja znotraj akademskega diskurza in zunaj njega ne funkcioniira – to pomeni: nima pomembnosti za resnično življenje in pri vprašanih kritične obravnave fenomenskega življenjskega sveta naše sodobnosti ostane brez moči. Debordu, Heideggru, Bergsonu, Simondonu in drugim je skupna njihova sposobnost, da spodbudijo novo držo glede vsakdanjih fenomenov in našega vsakdanjega spoprijemanja z bitjo-v-svetu zunaj kakršnegakoli ciničnega namena pridobivanja kulturnega ali intelektualnega kapitala. Zato smo si v študiji prizadevali pokazati, da metode, ki jih uporabljajo ti avtorji, niso zgolj filozofske, temveč si z njimi prizadevajo ohraniti misel tako, da jo radikalno odvežejo kakršnekoli odgovornosti za disciplino misli.

Vendar smo eksplicitno izpostavili, da se fenomen spektakla povsod izvršuje kot kibernetiski psevdo-dogodek: kot kibernetiski v skladu s kritiko tehnologije pri Heideggru in Simondonu in kot psevdo-dogodek v skladu s kritiko družbene aplikacije moderne tehnologije na vsakdanje življenje pri Bergsonu in Boorstinu. Natanko takšna konceptualizacija spektakla nam nudi sredstvo, zaradi katerega lahko idejo »družbe spektakla« dojamemo

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3 Leta 1989 Debord pošlje Agambenu svoje nedavno objavljeno delo *Panegirik* kot iskren odziv na njegovo pismo in kot začetek kratke, a plodne korespondence. Ker je leta 1994 umrl, Debord ni imel časa, da bi ocenil in komentiral Agambenovo poznejšo recepcijo Debordovih idej (Debord 2008, pismo z dne 24. 8. 1989).

4 Pomanjkljivosti tega odnosa so bile opisane že na številnih mestih. Pomembna razširitev kritike Baudrillarda kot dela spektakelskega projekta prihaja od profesorja Richarda Gilmana-Opalskega v njegovi knjigi *Spektakelski kapitalizem: Guy Debord in praksa radikalne filozofije* (posebej Gilman-Opalsky 2011, 54).

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predvsem kot idiomatsko izjavo, lastno Debordovemu slogu pisanja, saj je sleherna možna družbenost v dobi šova razdana in zaupana preprosti vizualizaciji, uprizoritvi in usmerjanju pozornosti k iluzornim učinkom psevdo-dogodkov znotraj »vulgarne psevdo-realnosti« (Paić 2013, 462). V tem okviru osnovno eksistencialno človeško vprašanje – vprašanje preživljanja časa – zasenči spektakelska implementacija psevdo-problemov, za katere se rojevajo nove discipline misli, od upravljanja s časom do nadzora nad podobami, od presojanja do vizualizacije diskretnih fenomenov sodobne znanosti in ciničnega sprejemanja novih tehnoloških fenomenov. Izginjajoča družba se povsod kaže kot porajajoče se obilje družbenih fenomenov: »V starih časih je bil vodja ekskurzije ‚vodič‘, zdaj je ‚družabni direktor‘.« (Boorstin 1992, 93.)

86

Za zaključek želimo poudariti možnost nove avantgarde znotraj digitalnega okolja kot situacionistični projekt preseganja odtujitvene ne-zgodovinskosti sodobne tehnologije, ki izrablja lažno nostalgijo (Tanner 2021), kar je eden od primarnih simptomov komodifikacije časa znotraj spektakla. Kaže estetske možnosti, kako narediti predmete dostopne in obvladljive v času, odprte za re-kompozicijo in re-konstrukcijo v novih afektivnih okoljih in situacijah. V našo kulturo ponovno uvaja vizualni, slušni in afektivni zagon dobe, ki je svoj pozitiven pogled prejela natanko s pomočjo odprtosti možnosti sodobne tehnologije, kakršna se danes razgublja in je prepuščena zgodovini, ki postaja čedalje bolj nedostopna z našim tehnološkim aparatom: zgodovina tehnologije je zavržena, tako kot je fizična kompaktna plošča našla ne samo rabo, temveč dejanski vmesnik, ki jo lahko prebere, ali celo um, ki razume njeno rabo. Razkrivanje, kakor ga prinaša nova digitalna umetniška praksa, je razgrinjanje odprtosti kiberprostora kot neizčrpnega peskovnika afektivne izmenjave sanj; projekt, odprt vsem z dostopom do stroja, kar potemtakem dostop sam napravlja za orodje izražanja in kar je transgresija, podobna tisti, ki jo prinese preklon z umetnikovega čopiča na fotografski aparat. *Vaporwave* si šov Interneta na novo zamišlja, ne več kot tehnologijo, temveč kot umetniški in potemtakem navsezadnje tudi kot situacionistični projekt (Vuger 2020).

V tem smislu in v nasprotju z »maškarado virtualne resničnosti« (Komel 2019, 173) porajajoče se post-situacionistične prakse znotraj virtualnih okolij

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sovpadajo z idejo umetnosti kot *techné* – in obratno –, kakor je to opisal Heidegger, in sicer kot načina razkrivanja prisotnosti, kjer se človek sooči z lastnim časom bodisi s falzifikacijo nostalgije bodisi s kreativno dekonstrukcijo slehernega dostopnega digitalnega artefakta v sredstvo estetizirane, afektivne komunikacije čuječih drž, ali kot skrbi [care-ing].

Čedalje močneje konsolidirano zasebno lastništvo sredstev za masovno komunikacijo [hiper-individualizirano komunikacijo; moja opomba] – in čedalje bolj zasičen milje fragmentiranih družabnih medijev, kjer lahko najdemo vse, a kjer se vse tudi razgublja – dela [delovanje] danes celo težje kot v Debordovih časih. Gibanja se morajo ozirati onkraj medijev – zaradi tega je situacionističen pristop neprestano in vedno bolj primernejši za politično akcijo [...] [ki] [...] mora preseči konvencionalno tekstualnost. (Gilman-Opalsky 2011, 107.)

Spektakel smo si prizadevali analizirati kot fenomen sodobnega tehno-znanstvenega in družbenega razvoja, kar nam je omogočilo, da smo po razglašenem koncu filozofije Deborda obravnavali kot avtonomno figuro znotraj teorije. Heideggrovo filozofijo cirkumlokucije lahko po metodi primerjamo in glede skupnih potez soočimo z drugimi tu omenjenimi filozofijami natanko v ideji psihogeografije. Na podlagi cirkumlokucije, oklevanja in okoljenja lahko natančno vidimo, kako zamisli odklona in odvrčanja znotraj Heideggrove filozofije delujeta kot sredstvi izražanja in praktičnega spoprijemanja s svetom; v tem smislu je njegova filozofija priročnik za razvitje drž, ki spodbuja spoprijemanje s svetom, radikalno drugačno od tistega, kakršnega nam povsod predpisuje pazljivo izkustvo šova.

Konec filozofije v smislu iskanja mesta (*basho*) za misel v dobi podobe-sveta (filozofija *Dasein*), okolj(enj)e (*okoliš-anje*) in cirkumlokucija kot metoda za to radikalno misel (in kot potepanje), teorija spektakla kot celovit pregled nad lastno témo takšne cirkumlokucije in Simondonova kritika kibernetike predstavljajo okvir, kakršnega si kritično zadaja teorija spektakla, da bi vzpostavila pogoje možnosti tehnološko utemeljene situacionistične kulture – tehno-kulture, kakršno orisujejo in estetsko zagovarjajo nova robna gibanja praks digitalne umetnosti od zagona *vaporwave* dalje, ki se izkazujejo za

pomembne nasprotnike porajajočih se fenomenov lažne nostalgije in nostalgije kot kapitala, kar je drug izraz komodificiranega časa in komodifikacije časa v potrošni izdelek na svetovnem odru vizualizacij.

Prevedla Alenka Koželj

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# LA PRIMAUTÉ DE LA CONSTITUTION DE L'OBJET TRANSITIONNEL CHEZ MARC RICHIR

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## The Primacy of Constitution of the Transitional Object in Marc Richir

### *Abstract*

Among the psychoanalysts, it was primarily Donald Winnicott who helped Marc Richir to clarify and develop genetic phenomenology, which had already been outlined by Edmund Husserl. The paper attempts to demonstrate the use Richir makes of Winnicott's works for his own research devoted to the elaboration of Husserl's project.

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According to Richir's reading, Winnicott insisted on the "primacy of constitution of the transitional object" for the access to the real. By referring to Winnicott's own words, we seek to show in what sense he privileges the constitutional role of the transitional object, and how Richir adopts and reinterprets his teachings. We explicate that the transitional object reveals its complexity through the function that at once enables and disturbs the process of "hominization."

*Keywords:* Winnicott, psychoanalysis, genetic phenomenology, play, breakdown.

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### **Primarnost konstitucije tranzicijskega objekta pri Marcu Richirju**

#### *Povzetek*

92

Med psihoanalitiki je zlasti Donald Winnicott pomagal Marcu Richirju razjasniti in razviti genetično fenomenologijo, kakor jo je bil pred njim zasnoval Edmund Husserl. Prispevek skuša pokazati, na kakšen način Winnicottova dela služijo Richirju pri njegovem raziskovanju glede Husserlovega projekta. V skladu z Richirjevim branjem je Winnicott vztrajal pri »primarnosti konstitucije tranzicijskega objekta« za pristop k realnemu. S sklicevanjem na Winnicottove lastne besede želimo osvetliti, v kakšnem smislu privilegira konstitutivno vlogo tranzicijskega objekta ter kako Richir privzame in reinterpreтира njegov nauk. Razgrnemo, da tranzicijski objekt svojo kompleksnost razkriva s funkcijo, ki hkrati omogoča in moti proces »hominizacije«.

*Ključne besede:* Winnicott, psihoanaliza, genetična fenomenologija, igra, zlom.

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Parmi les psychanalystes, c'est principalement Donald Winnicott qui a aidé Marc Richir à éclaircir et à approfondir la phénoménologie génétique déjà amorcée par Edmund Husserl.<sup>1</sup> Ce travail a pour but de montrer les usages que Richir fait de Winnicott dans ses recherches visant à prolonger le projet husserlien. Si, d'une part, selon la lecture de Richir, Winnicott insiste sur « la primauté de la constitution de l'objet transitionnel » (Richir 2004, 508) en termes d'accès au réel, et, d'autre part, il trouve chez Winnicott les descriptions des premiers âges de la vie particulièrement intéressantes, qui « se prêtent aussitôt aux descriptions phénoménologiques engagées par Husserl dans ses analyses du 'primordial' et de l'institution intersubjective » (Richir 2004, 325), nous nous demanderons alors si la primauté de la constitution de l'objet transitionnel s'applique également à la phénoménologie de Richir. Et si oui, en quel sens ?

Cet ouvrage est structuré en cinq parties. La première partie présente la problématique husserlienne de l'intersubjectivité et celle du corps primordial, qui servent de fil conducteur aux prolongements phénoménologiques de Richir. Dans la deuxième partie, à travers une lecture attentive de *Jeu et réalité*, nous voyons comment les analyses de Winnicott sur l'objet transitionnel permettent de mieux comprendre les problématiques qui préoccupent Husserl et puis Richir. La troisième partie aborde au préalable deux phénomènes tributaires de l'objet transitionnel, à savoir l'expérience culturelle et la folie, qui élaborent davantage la complexité intrinsèque de l'objet transitionnel. Dans la quatrième partie, nous examinons l'article de Winnicott intitulé « La crainte de l'effondrement », qui approfondit ses études antérieures et dans lequel Richir a trouvé des implications riches et profondes. Dans la dernière partie, nous concluons dans quelle mesure l'objet transitionnel mérite une primauté phénoménologique.

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<sup>1</sup> Ce projet est présenté lors du premier Congrès International de Marc Richir à la Bergische Universität Wuppertal du 26 au 29 mars 2019. Nous remercions les organisateurs et les modérateurs d'avoir facilité une telle occasion d'échanger. Nous remercions tout particulièrement notre ami Léo Antoine pour les corrections de langue et les discussions préliminaires.

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## I. Le paradoxe de l'intersubjectivité

Il s'agit d'abord d'une tâche d'éclaircir la phénoménologie de Husserl, car la problématique husserlienne de l'intersubjectivité – en tant qu'une couche constitutive de l'objectivité – souffrait du destin d'être mal comprise, comme Richir l'a rappelé :

Il est à peine besoin de souligner que la problématique husserlienne de l'intersubjectivité a été le plus souvent fort mal comprise, ne serait-ce que parce qu'on a voulu y voir une version de la problématique proprement métaphysique du Même et de l'Autre, et non pas la tentative de description phénoménologique, sans cesse remise sur le métier pendant plus de trente ans, des paradoxes constitutifs de l'intersubjectivité. (Richir 2004, 271.)

94 Richir a remarqué un clivage entre deux façons de concevoir la problématique husserlienne de l'intersubjectivité : soit métaphysiquement soit phénoménologiquement. Concernant la version métaphysique, de nombreux lecteurs l'ont accusé de solipsisme, autrement dit d'avoir privilégié l'ipsité en tant que fondement de l'altérité, principalement en raison d'une lecture unilatérale de la « Cinquième méditation cartésienne ».

Ce paradoxe est déjà bien remarqué et articulé sous la plume de Husserl. Par exemple, il a déjà affirmé dans le texte crucial des *Méditations cartésiennes* que les autres sont à la fois perçus comme objets du monde et comme sujets qui perçoivent le même monde (Husserl 1966, 76). Dans la mesure où chaque sujet est le centre de son propre monde primordial « dans le mode d'un *hic absolu* » (Husserl 1966, 99), n'est-il pas énigmatique de considérer quelqu'un d'autre comme étant simultanément *hic* et *illic* (Husserl 1966, 103) ?

Pour illustrer avec l'image préférée de Richir depuis ses premiers travaux, l'intersubjectivité compose un univers dont « *le centre est partout et la périphérie nulle part* » (Richir 1976, 10). Si l'égo primordial est le point zéro de l'orientation, la présence d'un autre ego va soit voler « ma » position centrale, soit doubler

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le centre dans la même coordonnée, ce qui est apparemment absurde.<sup>2</sup> Il est inimaginable pour une sphère d'avoir deux centres. L'émergence d'autres sujets en marge du monde primordial fait donc apparaître un paradoxe, à savoir « la » coexistence transcendantale « d'une *pluralité originare d'absolus* en tant qu'ici absolus » (Richir 2006, 36).

Ce qui est remarquable, c'est que ce soi-disant paradoxe sur lequel Husserl est tombé au cours de la réduction radicale n'est pas un signe d'échec doctrinal. Comme Richir l'a fait remarquer à juste titre, ce paradoxe demeure constitutif de l'intersubjectivité. Du coup, la tâche phénoménologique, à la suite de l'exigence descriptive, consiste précisément à rendre compte de cette problématique en termes rationnels.

Suivant la démarche de Husserl pour aborder le problème de l'intersubjectivité en se référant à l'appréhension d'autres corps, Richir prend le *Leib* ou le corps vécu comme fil conducteur pour reformuler le paradoxe de l'intersubjectivité (Richir 2004, 271 ; Richir 2006, 35). En ce qui concerne le corps, d'après le diagnostic de Richir, il y a une fausse lecture répandue de la phénoménologie de Husserl qui l'accuse d'hypostasier « mon » *Leib* primordial en un principe métaphysique, à partir duquel les autres *Leiber* sont dérivés. Ce qui préoccupait Richir, c'était ainsi de sauver la phénoménologie husserlienne de la fausse lecture métaphysique du *Leib* primordial. En d'autres termes, il vise à rendre compte de la coexistence transcendantale des *Leiber* ou de ce qu'il appelle alternativement « interfacticité transcendantale » (Richir 2006, 37), sans retomber dans une « ontologisation » prématurée du primordial phénoménologique (Richir 2006, 36).

Or, le problème richirien de l'interfacticité n'est pas une simple répétition du problème husserlien de l'intersubjectivité. Tant que les différents ici absolus se rencontrent, la pluralité des *Leiber* – en tant que base phénoménologique de la pluralité des ego primordiaux – induit naturellement un paradoxe reflétant

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2 De manière dramatique, Jean-Paul Sartre décrit l'apparition d'autrui comme un vol et un décentrement du monde : « Ainsi tout à coup un objet est apparu qui m'a volé le monde. Tout est en place, tout existe toujours pour moi, mais tout est parcouru par une fuite invisible et figée vers un objet nouveau. L'apparition d'autrui dans le monde correspond donc à un glissement figé de tout l'univers, à une décentration du monde qui mine par en dessous la centralisation que j'opère dans le même temps. » (Sartre 1943, 313.)

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celui de l'intersubjectivité. Or, comme le souligne Richir, le paradoxe du *Leib* primordial est d'abord vécu plutôt qu'une abstraction (Richir 2004, 272). Ce paradoxe vécu concerne la spatialité spécifique du *Leib* primordial. Malgré la métaphore géométrique du point zéro, le *Leib* primordial n'est pas vraiment un point dans l'espace, mais plutôt un « lieu » formateur d'espace ou ce qu'il appelle une « matrice transcendantale » de spatialisation (Richir 2004, 272 ; Richir 2006, 36). Paradoxalement, l'ici absolu ne se situe pas dans un espace qui le précède.

Comment ce primordial phénoménologique, qui apparaît toujours comme transcendantale à l'apparition des autres corps, peut-il finalement subir les modifications des autres corps et devenir un parmi d'autres ? Richir caractérise d'abord le *Leib* primordial comme un « proto-espace », qui constitue génétiquement notre espace commun (Richir 2004, 273). Ce proto-espace est en lui-même indéfini et infini et précède toute localisation. Un tel « lieu » kinesthésique, où la frontière entre un dedans et un dehors reste manquante, est à nouveau décrit par Richir comme une sphère dont la périphérie est partout et le centre nulle part (Richir 2004, 274).

Un tel proto-espace sert alors « de base phénoménologique à la rencontre intersubjective explicitement reconnue » (Richir 2004, 275). Or, on peut se demander si un tel « tout sans dehors » (Richir 2004, 273) est prêt pour une rencontre explicite. Est-il possible pour un espace radicalement clos de se différencier ou d'incorporer l'altérité ? Pour assurer « l'expérience bouleversante d'autrui » en tant qu'un « second moment » sur la base phénoménologique du primordial, il faut que l'intersubjectivité – ou l'interfactivité en termes proprement richiriens – soit déjà mise en fonction avant toute figuration (Richir 2004, 274–275).

Selon Richir, l'ici absolu primordial ne peut avoir de sens que par rapport à d'autres ici absolus, dont le modèle est la mère, même si ce proto-rapport ne se figure pas encore. Richir précise que le proto-espace est essentiellement marqué par un « discord originaire », qui ouvre en même temps la possibilité de l'accord entre l'un et l'autre (Richir 2004, 275–276).

Autrement dit, la rencontre concrète avec d'autres sujets ne peut s'effectuer que si le proto-espace est déjà structuré tacitement par l'intersubjectivité. Par conséquent, avant que le « second moment » approche du *Leib* primordial,

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Richir introduit le « premier moment » de la base phénoménologique qui implique déjà l'échange entre plusieurs ici absolus, surtout entre le nourrisson et la mère. Les ici absolus appartenant au premier moment se distinguent architectoniquement pour ainsi dire des ici absolus relativisés :

Ce premier « moment » est donc, en d'autres termes : IL Y A plusieurs (concrètement, à l'origine, deux : le nourrisson et la mère) ici absolus, sans que, d'aucune manière, la pluralité de ces absolus ne les relativise (c'est le sens de l'interfactivité transcendantale comme base phénoménologique demeurant transpassible à la transposition), donc sans qu'il n'y ait, phénoménologiquement, à chercher plus haut un absolu encore plus absolu qui subsumerait (ou sursumerait) dans un idéal transcendantal ou existentiel (ou les deux) les absolus soi-disant relativisés mutuellement de la pluralité : celle-ci est donc originaire, au même titre que le primordial. (Richir 2004, 276.)

Paradoxalement, le *Leib* primordial demeure pour une part « indifférent au 'dedans' et au 'dehors' », et recueille, d'autre part, « tout à la fois une dimension externe et une dimension interne » (Richir 2004, 277). Afin d'illuminer davantage cette énigme phénoménologique déjà élaborée par Husserl, Richir voit dans les descriptions de Winnicott des premiers âges de la vie une ressource particulièrement utile, qui correspond bien aux études husserliennes du primordial et de l'institution de l'intersubjectivité.

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## II. Le paradoxe de l'utilisation de l'objet transitionnel

Comparable à la manière dont le paradoxe constitutif de l'intersubjectivité a motivé des réflexions phénoménologiques en profondeur, les études psychanalytiques de Winnicott sont également orientées par un paradoxe fondamental. Il s'agit d'un paradoxe impliqué dans l'utilisation par le nourrisson de ce qu'il appelle « l'objet transitionnel ». Winnicott a souligné à plusieurs reprises que le paradoxe de l'utilisation de l'objet transitionnel a une valeur positive s'il est accepté, toléré et respecté au lieu d'être résolu sur le plan intellectuel. La psychanalyse, d'après lui, est donc obligée d'éclairer

précisément le caractère paradoxal de l'objet transitionnel, avec la conviction qu'une telle étude va démêler de nombreux vieux problèmes (Winnicott 1975, 25). Alors, qu'entend-il par « objet transitionnel » ?

Tout d'abord, nous pouvons en esquisser deux traits généraux comme points de départ d'analyses plus compliquées. Littéralement, quelque chose appelé « transitionnel » implique une médiation entre deux autres choses. Ensuite, en étant transitionnel, la chose indiquée demeure de nature ambiguë, de sorte qu'elle peut faire la jonction entre deux choses hétérogènes. Dans ce qui suit, nous préciserons les deux autres choses médiées par l'objet transitionnel et en clarifierons la nature ambiguë, en nous appuyant sur les textes de Winnicott et les commentaires de Richir.

98 Quelles sont exactement les deux choses médiées par l'objet transitionnel ? En effet, ce n'est pas l'objet en tant que tel qui est transitionnel, comme l'a précisé Winnicott. L'objet dit transitionnel représente la transition d'un état primordial où le nourrisson et la mère sont fusionnés à un état où ils sont séparés (Winnicott 1975, 50). À cet égard, l'objet transitionnel est un symbole de l'état transitionnel – ou de ce que Winnicott préfère nommer le « phénomène transitionnel » –, un état qui se trouve génétiquement à l'arrière-plan de nos expériences perceptives qui sont orientées vers des objets. Bref, trois états de la vie infantile sont en jeu dans ces analyses, y compris l'état transitionnel qui sert de médiateur entre l'état primordial et l'état de séparation. Reprenons le résumé que Richir en donne, la problématique de l'objet transitionnel concerne pour lui le « passage du primordial sans extériorité à la distinction d'une intériorité et d'une extériorité » (Richir 2004, 508). Ainsi, la lecture de Richir fait remarquer que Winnicott insiste sur « la primauté de la constitution de l'objet transitionnel », car l'expérience de l'objet transitionnel, au sein de laquelle se déroule la première expérience du jeu, précède et donne lieu au réel. Le mérite de Winnicott est qu'il permet à Richir de creuser vers ce qui est premier génétiquement, vers le registre plus archaïque que la figuration interfacciale (Richir 2004, 513).

Winnicott fait du sein de la mère le prototype de l'objet transitionnel. D'après lui, le sein de la mère est « un symbole de l'union du bébé et de la mère (ou d'une partie de la mère) » (Richir 2004, 513). Au cours de leur interaction, le sein se trouve « en transition entre deux états : être confondue avec l'enfant

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(dans l'esprit du bébé) et être éprouvée comme un objet perçu » (Richir 2004, 508), d'où la nature ambiguë de l'objet transitionnel. Autrement dit, il oscille entre faire partie du bébé et faire partie de la mère. Cette ambiguïté est bien saisie par ce que Winnicott nomme par ailleurs « objet subjectif » (Winnicott 1975, 152).

L'objet subjectif est le « premier objet » qui n'est pas encore répudié en tant que non-moi. Or, il demeure tout de même quasiment objectif dans la mesure où il s'agit de la relation originaire avec le non-moi. Grâce à ce proto-objet, qui se confond avec le moi tout en se rapportant au non-moi, « l'idée de soi » et « le sentiment du réel » peuvent émerger. En plus de désigner l'ambiguïté foncière d'une relation originaire, Winnicott recourt au terme d'objet subjectif pour décrire la divergence entre ce qui est observé de l'extérieur et ce que le bébé éprouve de l'intérieur (Winnicott 1975, 234). Ainsi, un objet faisant partie de la réalité externe a été à l'origine un objet subjectif en tant qu'« extension du moi ». En outre, l'ambiguïté de l'objet subjectif ouvre un espace potentiel, selon Winnicott, qui permet au bébé de quitter son état primordial – ce qui est sous son contrôle omnipotent – puis d'avancer vers la réalité partagée – ce qui est hors du contrôle omnipotent (Winnicott 1975, 186). Et le paradoxe impliqué par l'utilisation de l'objet transitionnel réside dans le conflit entre le contrôle omnipotent et sa perte, entre l'illusion et la désillusion, entre la magie et la réalité.

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Le paradoxe réside dans les expériences conflictuelles qui suivent le modèle de celle où le sein de la mère apparaît à la fois sous et au-delà du contrôle omnipotent. D'une part, il semble avoir été créé par le bébé, d'autre part, il semble être déjà là avant toute création (Winnicott 1975, 138, 167). Ce paradoxe demeure une caractéristique essentielle de l'objet transitionnel, de sorte que toutes les analyses de Winnicott en présupposent l'acceptation.<sup>3</sup>

Si le paradoxe concernant la phénoménologie génétique se situe entre l'ici absolu et la relativisation de ce même ici absolu, il en va de même *grosso modo*

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<sup>3</sup> Richir élabore ce conflit entre la « création » et la « découverte » à la lumière de la *phantasia* perceptive : « Et en ce sens, Winnicott a raison de dire de l'objet transitionnel (et du sein lui-même devenu transitionnel dans l'amorce de l'hominisation) qu'il est à la fois 'créé' et 'trouvé'. La 'création' renvoie en effet au jeu de la *phantasia* et de ses aperceptions dans les phénomènes de langage, et la 'découverte' à ce qu'il y a de 'perceptif' dans ces mêmes aperceptions. » (Richir 2004, 518.)

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pour celui qui concerne Winnicott. Primordialement, le bébé vit pour ainsi dire dans une illusion où le sein de la mère est sous son contrôle magique, dans la mesure où l'apparition du sein correspond parfaitement à ses besoins. Dans ce cas, le sein est vécu comme s'il avait été créé suivant le désir du bébé. Néanmoins, cette illusion d'omnipotence est d'emblée sous la menace de désillusions, ce qui aboutira à une relativisation de l'état primordial de l'omnipotence illusoire. Le sein qui résiste au contrôle magique relativise l'ici absolu dans un être humain. En conséquence, l'apparition de l'objet transitionnel déclenche le passage à l'état de séparation.

Faisant écho à l'énigme du proto-espace qui est un « tout sans dehors », toutefois susceptible de connaître le bouleversement d'autrui, il est également énigmatique de parler de perte de l'omnipotence, car cela implique que cette soi-disant omnipotence ne soit en fait qu'illusoire. Tout comme Winnicott qualifie ailleurs l'état primordial de « dépendance quasi-absolue » (Winnicott 2005, 69), la soi-disant omnipotence du bébé est essentiellement conditionnée par un « environnement suffisamment bon et facilitant » (Winnicott 1975, 248). Pour dévoiler le mystère du passage de la fusion originaire à la séparation, il faut que se creuse l'écart entre le bébé et la mère, phénomène que Winnicott nomme l'« espace potentiel », afin de comprendre pourquoi l'« expérience de l'omnipotence » relève essentiellement de la dépendance (Winnicott 1975, 71).

Si « l'omnipotence est presque un fait d'expérience » (Winnicott 1975, 44), elle est destinée à devenir un paradis perdu, car le contrôle magique est effectivement facilité par la technique du maternage. Autrement dit, l'autosuffisance n'est qu'une illusion menacée de destruction à cause de la divergence – soit progressive soit abrupte – entre les besoins du nouveau-né et l'apparition du sein. Grâce à son statut ambigu, la mère en tant que premier objet est d'une importance capitale pour le processus de maturation. Si la mère n'est pas à l'origine éprouvée comme fusionnée, elle n'a aucune chance de casser l'enceinte de la cellule narcissique. Si elle ne contient pas en même temps le potentiel de s'en séparer, l'accès au réel reste bloqué. L'union primordiale n'est ni une ni plusieurs. Elle est les deux à la fois. En étant à la fois intérieur et extérieur, à la fois subjectif et objectif, à la fois une partie du moi et l'autre du moi, la mère manœuvre le discord originaire de l'état primordial et réalise ainsi l'état de séparation. C'est pourquoi, comme Winnicott n'a pas manqué

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d'y insister, « on ne saurait écrire l'histoire d'un bébé en tant qu'individu en se référant uniquement au bébé » (Winnicott 1975, 137).

Si, depuis le tout début de l'histoire, la vie infantile est d'ores et déjà structurée par la dépendance, on peut alors se demander comment l'état primordial et l'état transitionnel se distinguent génétiquement. Selon la lecture de Richir, les deux états qui précèdent l'accès au réel entrent conjointement en jeu, d'où le paradoxe de la primordialité (Richir 2004, 513). Ce qui mérite une remarque, c'est que les deux états qui précèdent celui de séparation ne s'excluent pas l'un l'autre. En principe, l'état primordial, où le bébé et la mère sont fusionnés, et l'état transitionnel, où l'apparition de la mère oscille entre le côté subjectif et le côté objectif, ne se déroulent pas successivement. En écho aux descriptions richiriennes du proto-espace, un discord originaire est d'ores et déjà en fonction à l'état primordial. L'objet transitionnel réside tacitement dans l'unité primordiale et la déchire de l'intérieur, débouchant ainsi sur « le voyage qu'accomplit le petit enfant et qui le mène de la subjectivité pure à l'objectivité » (Winnicott 1975, 36).

### III. La diffusion du transitionnel

Du coup, l'expression de « transitionnel » nous tromperait, puisque ce qu'elle indique est plus qu'une phase secondaire de la vie. Outre le croisement intrinsèque entre le primordial et le transitionnel, Winnicott a par ailleurs une pensée révolutionnaire concernant la diffusion de l'état transitionnel dans l'état de séparation, dont les implications phénoménologiques sont bel et bien intégrées par Richir. Si l'on suit Winnicott, on trouve grossièrement deux catégories d'expériences qui servent à en révéler la diffusion, à savoir l'expérience culturelle et la folie.

Le processus de maturation ne s'achève jamais, non pas au sens où il n'aurait pas de point final, mais au sens où l'état final ne se réalise pas une fois pour toutes. Comme le souligne Winnicott, il s'agit d'une tâche humaine interminable qui consiste à maintenir la distinction entre l'intérieur et l'extérieur, parce qu'il y a encore une « troisième partie » de la vie de tout être humain (Winnicott 1975, 30). Cet « aire intermédiaire d'expérience » n'est pas simplement dépassé dans la vie adulte. Il se transforme en art et en religion, voire en folie.

Si l'on suit Winnicott en qualifiant d'illusoires les états d'avant l'acceptation de la réalité, on peut alors mieux distinguer le mode sain d'illusion, par exemple l'art et la religion, du mode pathologique qu'est alors la folie. Dans le mode sain, comme l'explique Winnicott, le phénomène transitionnel n'est pas refoulé, il se diffuse plutôt dans la « zone intermédiaire », c'est-à-dire dans le « domaine culturel » tout entier (Winnicott 1975, 35). Alors que le phénomène transitionnel se répand dans le domaine culturel, ce qu'il appelle le domaine culturel n'est pas une nouvelle instance, mais en effet l'espace potentiel lui-même qui est initialement ouvert par l'objet transitionnel. En d'autres termes, l'espace potentiel supporte l'état de maturité et réapparaît sous forme d'expérience culturelle (Winnicott 1975, 108).

102 Dans l'appendice de *Phantasia, imagination, affectivité*, Richir juxtapose ses réflexions sur le jeu théâtral – en suivant les analyses de Husserl – à celles sur l'objet transitionnel de Winnicott. Ce rapprochement est légitime car les deux phénomènes traités sont également révélateurs de l'opération de ce que Husserl appelle la « *phantasia* perceptive » (*perzeptive Phantasie*). Si l'on suit Winnicott, l'expérience esthétique du jeu théâtral est tributaire du phénomène transitionnel du jeu infantin (Winnicott 1975, 105). L'expérience culturelle, en continuité directe avec le jeu infantin, atteste du fait que la tâche de l'acceptation de la réalité ne se termine jamais (Winnicott 1975, 47).

Les jeux, soit culturels soit infantins, révèlent les médiations de la *phantasia* perceptive à la perception de la réalité, dont le passage ne s'achève jamais complètement (Richir 2004, 527). D'ailleurs, en ce qui concerne la folie, les jeux sont également un indicateur d'un traumatisme archaïque, c'est-à-dire le « choc immense que représente la perte de l'omnipotence » que chacun subit au tout début de sa vie. Si la folie demeure un effet inévitable après le choc, une mère suffisamment bonne permet au bébé d'éprouver la folie à un degré modéré, de telle sorte que le choc n'entraîne aucune « véritable folie » par la suite (Winnicott 1975, 137–138).

En résumé, le rôle de la mère en tant que premier objet est double. D'une part, elle met fin à l'état de dépendance quasi-absolue, provoquant ainsi l'immense choc de la désillusion. D'autre part, elle est responsable du soulagement de la tension liée à la séparation et détermine donc à quel point le bébé sera traumatisé. D'où la remarque de Richir selon laquelle « les

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relations intersubjectives sont soit fiables, soit traumatiques » (Richir 2004, 326). Et grâce aux études psychopathologiques sur les traumatisés, nous pouvons comprendre plus en profondeur les obstacles que la constitution de la vie humaine a surmontés ou ne peut pas surmonter. Comme l'a bien dit Winnicott, « il est rare que nous allions jusqu'à ce point où nous pourrions commencer à décrire ce qu'est la vie en dehors de la maladie ou de l'absence de maladie » (Winnicott 1975, 183). Alors que l'expérience culturelle représente la diffusion du phénomène transitionnel au cours de la vie, la folie expose plutôt la rupture, voire le renversement de la maturation de la vie, à laquelle Richir trouve que Winnicott a apporté une contribution originale (Richir 2004, 326).

En lieu et place qu'un malheur, la rupture de la vie est ici comprise comme un mal nécessaire. Néanmoins, le traumatisme archaïque duquel découle tout le processus d'humanisation demeure impensable. De plus, cette rupture impensable dans la continuité de la vie nécessite l'organisation de défenses, d'après les remarques de Winnicott :

103

Le traumatisme implique que le bébé a éprouvé une coupure dans la continuité de son existence, de sorte que les défenses primitives vont dès lors s'organiser de manière à opérer une protection contre la répétition d'une « angoisse impensable » (*unthinkable anxiety*) ou contre le retour de l'état confusionnel aigu qui accompagne la désintégration d'une structure naissante du moi. (Winnicott 1975, 181.)

Sans entrer dans les détails, les défenses sont donc organisées pour se prémunir contre la répétition d'une « angoisse impensable », ce qui signifie un retour à l'état fusionnel. Ce retour au fusionnel entraîne la désintégration de la structure de l'ego. Autrement dit, les organisations de défense servent à empêcher le renversement de la maturation humaine, même si elles peuvent tomber en panne et conduire ainsi à leur renversement. Ce renversement n'est possible que parce que le moi et le non-moi, le bébé et la mère, ou le sujet et l'objet sont fondamentalement indissociables, ce que Winnicott exprime par l'« impossibilité de séparation » :

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On pourrait dire qu'avec les êtres humains, il ne peut y avoir séparation, mais seulement menace de séparation, la menace étant extrêmement ou peu traumatique, selon l'expérience faite des premiers modes de séparation.

Mais, dira-t-on, comment se fait-il que la séparation du sujet et de l'objet, du bébé et de la mère advienne et que chacun en bénéficie, dans la majorité des cas ? Et ceci, bien qu'il y ait impossibilité de séparation ? (Il faut accepter le paradoxe.) (Winnicott 1975, 198–199.)

Mais pourquoi parler de menace de séparation ? Pour les adultes, la première séparation a déjà eu lieu. Si la séparation décrit la phase postérieure à la constitution de la réalité partagée, il s'agit alors d'un fait acquis plutôt qu'une menace. Alors, comment pouvons-nous comprendre qu'une telle menace, qui a déjà surgi dans les premiers âges, puisse resurgir dans la vie humaine établie ? Pourquoi sommes-nous toujours menacés de séparation alors que nous en avons déjà subi des désillusions ?

104 Il faut en chercher les éclaircissements dans le texte court mais très fécond « La crainte de l'effondrement ».

#### **IV. La crainte du transitionnel**

L'expression de « transitionnel » nous tromperait à un deuxième égard, car ce qui se passe entre l'état primordial et l'état de séparation est en effet plus une rupture qu'une médiation. Si jamais il y a une transition de l'enfance à la maturité, cette transition reste traumatique.<sup>4</sup>

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4 Si l'on suit l'interprétation de Roussillon, on peut distinguer deux formes de paradoxe impliquées dans les travaux cliniques de Winnicott. D'une part, il y a les « paradoxes logiques » qui fonctionnent comme un pont entre la réalité interne et la réalité externe et qui facilitent ainsi le processus de maturation. D'autre part, il y a les « défenses paradoxales » qui interviennent dans le processus de maturation en bloquant la transition entre les deux réalités. C'est pourquoi il caractérise les défenses paradoxales comme d'« anti-phénomènes transitionnels » (Roussillon 1981, 507). Bien que cette distinction ne soit pas formulée par Winnicott lui-même (Roussillon 1981, 504), l'interprétation de Roussillon permet de saisir la complexité intrinsèque de l'« espace psychique » où le paradoxe puisse être mis (Roussillon 1981, 506).

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Comme le laisse entendre le titre, l'article « La crainte de l'effondrement » introduit les concepts clés de la « crainte » et de « l'effondrement », sur lesquels Richir a beaucoup travaillé. Or, le sens de l'effondrement dans ce contexte est délibérément vague, comme l'explique Winnicott :

C'est à dessein que j'ai employé le mot « breakdown », parce que ce mot est vague et qu'il pourrait vouloir dire diverses choses. *Grosso modo*, dans ce contexte, le mot peut signifier : échec de l'organisation d'une défense. Mais, aussitôt, nous demandons : une défense contre quoi ? Ce qui nous conduit à une signification plus profonde du mot, puisque nous avons besoin d'employer le mot « effondrement » pour décrire l'état de choses impensable qui est sous-jacent à l'organisation d'une défense. (Winnicott 2000, 206–207.)

Alors, l'effondrement, dans ce contexte, peut soit signifier un échec de l'organisation d'une défense, soit décrire l'état de choses impensable qui est sous-jacent à l'organisation d'une défense. Du coup, la réponse à la question « une défense contre quoi ? » est double, c'est-à-dire qu'il s'agit à la fois d'une défense contre sa propre défaillance et, en premier lieu, contre le retour d'un traumatisme impensable. Et les défenses sont menacées car elles sont vulnérables à l'« échec de l'environnement » dans la mesure où « la dépendance fait partie de la vie » (Winnicott 1974, 103–104).

105

L'organisation de l'ego est précaire en ce sens que son établissement dépend fondamentalement d'un environnement facilitant. Une fois que la provision environnementale n'est plus suffisante, le processus de maturation s'inverse. Donc, si la vie humaine est pavée par un état transitionnel, la transition fonctionne de deux manières : elle peut nous faire avancer ou reculer (Winnicott 2000, 207–208).

Si l'effondrement signifie d'abord la désintégration de la structure de l'ego établie, puis la répétition du traumatisme archaïque, le problème suivant est alors de caractériser cette rupture originare de la vie. Cependant, comme nous l'avons déjà souligné, une telle séparation, soit primitive soit traumatique, demeure impensable (Winnicott 2000, 209).

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Nous arrivons maintenant aux descriptions intéressantes de la relation entre la crainte et l'effondrement. Comme le souligne Winnicott, ce que nous voyons cliniquement, c'est toujours une organisation défensive, à savoir une maladie psychotique comme l'autisme. Et cette maladie observable se dirige vers l'agonie sous-jacente – en corrélation avec ce qu'il nomme l'« angoisse » dans *Jeu et réalité*.<sup>5</sup> Pourtant, c'est bien la crainte de l'agonie archaïque qui cause la maladie psychotique. En d'autres termes, bien que l'agonie archaïque soit en elle-même impensable, elle produit l'effet pathologique manifeste chez le patient, d'abord par crainte, puis par maladie psychotique (Winnicott 1974, 104).

Curieusement, Winnicott affirme que l'effondrement en tant que répétition de l'agonie archaïque a déjà été éprouvée, même s'il reste impensable. En d'autres termes, la cause de la maladie psychotique est en réalité la crainte de quelque chose qui s'est déjà passé et a été éprouvé dans le passé, mais qui pourtant reste impensable. Ainsi Richir félicite Winnicott d'avoir découvert un inconscient « bien plus archaïque que celui mis en évidence par Freud » (Richir 2004, 329).

Si l'on suit la caractérisation par Richir de cette inconscience plus archaïque, le traumatisme se situe hors du temps, de sorte qu'il a été et n'a pas été vécu (Richir 2004, 330). Il explique davantage ce caractère paradoxal du traumatisme au moyen de la paire conceptuelle du « transpossible » et du « transpassible » d'Henri Maldiney :

Paradoxe, en effet, d'une *Stiftung* qui peut demeurer transpossible par rapport aux possibilités globales de la conscience, mais à laquelle, d'une certaine manière, la conscience demeure transpassible, « en général » dans le cas de la santé, de manière en quelque sorte « affaiblie » ou « sélective » dans les cas des pathologies dans la mesure où,

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5 Winnicott pense que le mot « angoisse » (*anxiety*) n'est pas assez fort ici et emploie donc « agonie » (*agony*) à la place (Winnicott 2000, 208). Jeannine Kalmanovitch et Michel Gribinski ont choisi le syntagme d'« angoisse disséquante » pour traduire l'anglais « *agony* ». Par ailleurs, Roussillon suggère la comparabilité entre le concept d'« agonie primitive » de Winnicott et l'« angoisse sans nom » (*nameless dread*) de Wilfred Bion (Roussillon 1991, 76).

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dans ces derniers, ne subsistent dans la conscience que « la crainte de l'effondrement », ou plutôt les « effets défensifs » contre elle – les psychoses [...]. (Richir 2004, 331.)

Ici, Richir résume la relation complexe entre le traumatisme, la crainte de l'effondrement et la psychose. Étant donné que le traumatisme repose en dehors des « possibilités globales de la conscience », il ne se rapporte à la conscience que négativement – dans le cas pathologique – au travers de la crainte de son retour et de la psychose en tant que défense contre son retour. En d'autres termes, le traumatisme devient phénoménologiquement vérifiable grâce à la crainte de l'effondrement, qui réside dans l'horizon expérientiel (Richir 2004, 332).

Si l'on rappelle que l'expérience culturelle et la folie sont toutes deux des résidus de l'état transitionnel, une différence capitale entre elles réside dans le fait paradoxal que la folie est donnée en dehors du temps, donc de la conscience. À vrai dire, selon Richir, la folie représente une rupture radicale de la conscience temporelle :

107

À travers cette nouvelle contradiction apparente, que Winnicott a le courage de maintenir parce que c'est sa manière à lui d'énoncer le paradoxe, on voit que ce n'est pas la folie elle-même qui a été éprouvée, c'est-à-dire dans nos termes, temporalisée en présence [...] mais la menace (ou l'imminence) de la folie, et ce, non pas à son tour dans une temporalisation en présence qui en ferait un ou des sens, mais « en un instant très bref ». (Richir 2004, 332.)

En conclusion de son commentaire sur « La crainte de l'effondrement », Richir pense que la découverte de Winnicott ouvre une voie royale pour renouveler notre compréhension des psychoses. Cette compréhension renouvelée ne concerne pas seulement la psychopathologie, mais aussi la phénoménologie, car elle contribue à clarifier le « lieu » transcendantal de la rupture inconsciente. D'une part, le traumatisme archaïque est génétiquement antérieur dans la constitution de la réalité partagée. Néanmoins, il est d'autre part en dehors de la genèse, car il représente par nature une rupture de la

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continuité temporelle.<sup>6</sup> Richir établit ainsi une distinction terminologique entre les psychoses réelles en tant que maladies observables et la « psychose transcendante » ou la « folie originaire » qui demeure hors du temps, mais qui rend aussi nos souffrances réelles possibles (Richir 2004, 335).

## V. Conclusion

Si nous sommes autorisés à croiser les terminologies des deux auteurs, à savoir le « proto-espace » de Richir et l'« espace potentiel » de Winnicott, c'est parce qu'ils dévoilent effectivement la même étoffe de la vie humaine. Le proto-espace, qui désigne la base phénoménologique avant toute rencontre explicite avec autrui, contient en lui-même une proto-fissure entre le proto-soi et le proto-autre, dont l'interaction rend possible la spatialisation et la temporalisation. Si l'« expérience bouleversante d'autrui » est possible, cet événement est préparé par la transition archaïque. À cet égard, le premier objet qui initie une telle transition mérite la primauté phénoménologique.

108

Par ailleurs, un autre aspect de ce rapprochement témoigne de la primauté phénoménologique de l'objet transitionnel, à savoir que la vie humaine établie est fondamentalement hantée par la récurrence de l'état transitionnel. L'expérience culturelle et la maladie psychotique se situent toutes les deux dans l'espace potentiel, signe qu'elles se superposent tacitement à l'état de la vie adulte. Alors que l'espace potentiel réapparaît plus tard sous les formes délicates de l'art et de la religion, sa récurrence est la plus dénudée et la plus intense lorsqu'elle prend la forme de la folie. Nous ne nous débarrassons jamais de la menace fondamentale de l'effondrement. La possibilité – ou la transpossibilité – incessante de l'effondrement atteste du fait vivant que la distinction établie entre le soi et l'autre n'est qu'une structure flottante sur des mouvements océaniques. Nous en apprenons davantage sur la complexité de la vie en prenant en compte le phénomène transitionnel qu'étudie Winnicott. La transition vers l'humanité est à la fois joyeuse et traumatisante, à la fois une médiation et une rupture. Et elle ne s'achève jamais complètement.

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<sup>6</sup> Richir mis à part, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis décrit le « paradoxe central » de l'effondrement winnicottien comme quelque chose qui a eu « lieu » sans avoir trouvé son lieu psychique, donc quelque chose qui n'est déposé nulle part (Pontalis 1975, 12).

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Nous sommes maintenant mieux placés pour juger à quel point le travail de Winnicott permet à Richir de sauver la phénoménologie husserlienne de la lecture métaphysique. Si la phénoménologie husserlienne se méfie de la dissolution de l'altérité au profit de l'ipséité, Richir éclaire cette relation d'un jour nouveau en proposant une lecture non métaphysique. Ainsi, ce qui caractérise la primordialité pour le phénoménologue belge consiste en la dynamique paradoxale entre la fusion du proto-soi et du proto-autre et la fissure qui les sépare. Le moi avec une identité fixe n'advient que postérieurement. En outre, la constitution de toute structure fixe du moi dépend fondamentalement d'un environnement facilitant, qui nous nourrit en dissimulant derrière nous l'abîme impensable.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Joëlle Mesnil soupçonne que, d'une part, Richir a mal interprété Winnicott et que, d'autre part, il semble y avoir une « étrange contradiction » entre le récit de Richir et celui de Winnicott sur la genèse du moi. En outre, elle soupçonne que la lecture sympathique que Richir fait de Winnicott dans *Phantasia, imagination, affectivité* détourne les vues habituelles qu'il défend dans ses autres ouvrages antérieurs et postérieurs. Nous gardons à l'esprit ses questions stimulantes qui, bien sûr, appartiennent à une autre histoire à raconter (Mesnil 2016 ; Mesnil 2018).

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# THE SILENT BIOMEDICAL OTHERS

## INTIMACY, COMMUNICATION, AND NEUROLOGICAL QUEERNESS

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*Abstract*

In this essay, I delineate the relationship between movement, thought, and the ability to speak. In neurology, the biomedical view constructs the image of the subaltern, a muted lifeform devoid of personality and whose life is not congruent with the concepts of autonomy and capacity. I propose to name these human beings “biomedical others.” An anomaly, this subaltern, is an underside of the philosophical totalization of subjectivity. In the biomedical framework, others are devoid of speech. Medicine, its

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institutes, and agents in the healthcare system speak to them. However, the lives of biomedical others are based on gestures, facial expressions, and body commands that are enacted as micro-gestures. The urgency to give voice to the biomedical others is the ethical task of this essay. They are namely voiceless and powerless, evoking a different kind of ethics: fragility, minority, and silence.

*Keywords:* biomedical others, disability, neurology, patient, subaltern.

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### **Nemi biomedicinski drugi. Intimnost, komunikacija in nevrološka kvirnost**

#### *Povzetek*

112 V prispevku orišem razmerje med gibanjem, mislijo in zmožnostjo govorjenja. V nevrologiji biomedicinski pogled konstruira podobo podrejenega, utišane življenjske forme brez osebnosti, življenje katere se ne ujema s pojmi avtonomije in sposobnosti. Takšna človeška bitja imenujem »biomedicinski drugi«. Tisto podrejeno je, kot anomalija, spodnja stran filozofske totalizacije subjektivnosti. Znotraj biomedicinskega okvira so drugi brez govornice. Medicina, njene ustanove in dejavniki znotraj zdravstvenega sistema govorijo njim. Vendar življenja biomedicinskih drugih temeljijo na kretnjah, obraznih izrazih in telesnih ukazih, ki se udejanjajo kot mikro-kretnje. Nuja, da damo glas biomedicinskim drugim, predstavlja etično nalogo pričujočega eseja. Kajti oni so brez glasu in brez moči, priklicujejo drugačno vrsto etike: krhkost, manjšinskost in tišino.

*Ključne besede:* biomedicinski drugi, invalidnost, nevrologija, pacient, podrejenost.

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*Hope is a muscle that allows us to connect.*

Björk: “Atopos”

Imagine how your body is located in the space. Are you comfortable? We used to think that the world around us was shapeable, and that the fundamental evolutionary and cultural structures in the human body—the eye and the hand<sup>1</sup>—do not fail. The touching hand performs an initial gesture, uniting humans with other living creatures that are capable of organic animation. Higher cognitive capacities emerge from this power to move, constituting the subject and world around them. Philosophers argue that reality is inexplicably coupled with humans, providing them with various opportunities for action. The stone fits comfortably in the hand to throw it, the stick extends the hand to get fruit, and the cave is ready for the *homo sapiens* to move in and exploit nature’s capabilities and resources (Paolo, Buhrmann, and Barandiaran 2017; Ingold 2000). A subject designed by philosophy is an integrated organism capable of using the crafts required by agrarian, marine, military, and technical inventions under the surveillance and control of intelligence and will (Lingis 1994, 58).

113

Intelligence and will master the body; the “normal” development implies corporeal apprenticeship and learning typical for all humans. By learning and mastering our bodies, we become ready to encounter a variety of sensorimotor contingencies, coping with a plastic gestural repertoire. Humans are supposed to “turn, stretch, walk, crouch, jump, hit, punch, recoil, lunge, shake, tremble, and leap” (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 195).

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1 Here, we can mention several approaches that guide this essay with regard to the questions of the body, gestures, and movement. Marie-José Mondzain, speaking about the vision of the image and the genesis of imagination during hominization, proceeds from the unique role of the transition from touch to vision (Mondzain 2010). Vilém Flusser echoes her in this, tracing the transformation of the “technological imagination” from the skin, ear, eye, and hand to the brain in the process of “total abstraction” of the human body (Flusser 1994). At the same time, there is no rejection of the body, as transhumanism suggests. On the contrary, having become an abstraction that entirely coincides with the philosophical vision of the subject, the body returns in a new quality. One of the scenarios of the lost and returned body may be the cyborgization project that has a history in science, technology, and culture (Kline 2009).

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The coexistence of individuals in the lifeworld presupposes consistency and comprehensibility of experience. To become a full-fledged member of a community of humans, an individual must master certain cognitive, sensorimotor, cultural, and practical patterns of actions and utterances. To “become” a person, one must have a particular bodily mediated experience that others recognize as “normal” and epistemically accessible. We can see a specific refraction of topics inherent to phenomenology turned to medicine: the relations between “normal” and “sick” body, the meaning of pain and suffering at the intersection of individual and collective experience, health and illness in the cross-cultural context, existential aspects of healing, death and dying, violence and power, inequality and injustice (Becker 2004, 126). These topics have been touched upon by phenomenology before—for example, in the perspective of the problem of the balance of normal and pathological in the phenomenology of psychiatry.<sup>2</sup> However, the immanent normativism of classical phenomenology has been reinterpreted repeatedly, testifying to the weakening of the rigid transcendental universalism inherent in Husserl’s project.

114

Cognitive psychology has called such universal possibilities of action *affordances*—structures dispersed in the environment, points of support for motor, symbolic, and social actions. Affordances are directly tied to the apparatus of a particular body; the repertoire of available interactions depends on the number of limbs and their physiological characteristics. The human body (or, more precisely, embodied consciousness) is a set of “I cans”; hence the able-bodiedness as the condition of possibility of being human.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, settling the world means being embodied in an environment characterized by the contexts and situations of practical actions. As cognitive scientists would say, an individual’s life in an environment is based on attunement of sensorimotor structures as well as musculoskeletal and neurophysiological configurations.

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2 Dan Zahavi wrote extensively about normativity “entrenched” into Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity (Parnas and Zahavi 2000; Zahavi 1996; Zahavi 2005, 179–222).

3 S. Kay Toombs notes that the world we inhabit is designed for beings with upright postures. This disfigures the lived experience of “here” and “now,” “distant” and “close” for those who use wheelchairs or other prostheses (Toombs 1995).

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This result is an insoluble coupling with the world in its continuous practical development.

This view inevitably assumes the imprint of normativity: to be a living being/person/subject, one must be able to move, think, speak, and act. In this essay, I trace the connections between movement, thought, and ability to speak. I will begin with a generalized model of the philosophical understanding of the subject as an abstract system of thinking. Subsequently, I will contrast this normative picture with real biomedical cases. The underside of the totalized subject of philosophy is the biomedical other—a subject whose life is not congruent with the concepts of autonomy and capacity. Using illustrations from neurology, I will demonstrate that biomedical others are devoid of speech. Instead, medicine, its institutes, and agents in the healthcare system speak for them. Meanwhile, the lives of biomedical others are based on animations. However, their gestures, facial expressions, and body control are enacted at different levels, that is, at the level of micro-gestures. Micro-gestures require special hermeneutic efforts, which are often discarded in evidence-based medicine. Therefore, I declare giving voice to biomedical others as an ethical task of this essay. The ethics of biomedical others re-establishes the power of the powerless, the voice of the voiceless.

115

### **Portable mind and philosopher's stones**

Philosophers have always avoided bodies. Whether it is a container, a prison, or a grave, incarnation is doomed to be something burdening and hindering the soul. Cartesian anxiety—*anxiety about the interfering body, a lousy mediator between the mind and the world, perishable, sick, decaying—persecutes philosophy.* The severe realization of philosophical intuition about the redundancy and uselessness of the body is the scientific model of the mind, claiming it to be an exhaustive scientific explanation of the soul. The Eastern and Western philosophies alike have not been able to explain for three and a half millennia what has been disenchanting and exposed by positive scientific knowledge. There is no soul; there are only reflexes of the brain, as Ivan Sechenov says. There is no mind, only a distributed system of impersonal

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processes produces unconscious thoughts.<sup>4</sup> *The sciences of the artificial* readily provide metaphors, heuristics, and concepts for this ritual of desacralization of the last fortress of humanity. These secular rituals transform the mind into “a collection of world-structuring abilities which require an anti-individualistic picture” (Negarestani 2018, 163).

116 Meanwhile, questions remain regarding how the soul or its euphemism—cognitive processes—is understood in science and philosophy. What makes an individual human is not human in itself; that is what inhumanism claims. Yes, the human figure is important to us, but what gives her a special status in organic nature does not coincide with her species’ narcissism (Brassier 2007, xi). To determine the point of intersection of abstract cognitive processes of the human species, we must not center them on consciousness and experience, culture, or artifacts. The self dissolves into a set of neurochemical commands that triggers disenchantment. I am a brain that dreams, and the dreamer does not exist; no one is nowhere or nowhen. The subjective experience of being present is predetermined by functional factors, such as the number and accuracy of input and output channels, the ability to modify the virtual environment, and the level of social interactivity—the ability to be recognized by others as a person in the virtual world. The point here is not abnormal encephalization as a condition and the effect of the development of capitalism (Pasquinelli 2016). It does not matter how the brain is designed or how the body is arranged and controlled by the brain. The brain is a command post for human computers. However, abstract computational operations are much

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4 This thesis can summarize the significant part of classical and recent cognitive science. By their nature, cognitive processes—i.e., mental representations—can never be given to individual consciousness in experience; they carry out their work below the threshold of subjective consciousness. Accordingly, the mind is divided into subjective mental states and subpersonal cognitive processes occurring in the brain. This contributed to the transition in the framework of cognitivism from the problem of “mind–body” to the problem of “mind–mind,” i.e., the problem of the correlation of unconscious cognitive processes and subjective consciousness arising as a result of these processes.

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more important, giving birth to an architecture of pure disembodied thinking. Alfonso Lingis remarks:

In order to comprehend the passing patterns as consistent units and to recognize constellations of units that recur, one has to be able to command one's sensory organs to collect sensory perceptions in ordered ways, one has to be able to command one's posture and the forces in one's limbs, and one has to be able to command the moves with which one's body exposes itself to others and faces them. Thought, which finds itself commanded to think, also finds itself commanded to be in command. Thought must command its sensory-motor faculties to collect impressions that it can comprehend with requisite concepts and relate with cogent reasons. Thought must produce representations that function as commands that program the sensibility of the body, its movements among things, and its postures before others. (Lingis 1994, 17.)

Disembodied thinking transforms into a set of norms. One must think, act, and speak in the space of reason (Brassier 2011, 9). It does not matter what kind of body one has, what abilities are sewn into one's genome, or what diseases one suffers from. One can possess a fat, deaf, or blind body, stillborn or old body, and paralyzed or spastic body. Beyond this embodied medium, however, pure and abstract thinking constitutes the true core of subjectivity and agency. This core equalizes diverse forms of life and sense-making plugged in the space of reasons. Nevertheless, this supposedly humanistic view, by utilizing philosophical interfaces and affordances, begins by silencing the voices of those it speaks of and excludes from philosophical discourse.

These subjectivities, "humans by courtesy only" are seen from the standpoint of a detached theorist. This shadowy observer is a bearer of a unique perspective on the world, which allows us to talk about observed objectified subjects. Subjectivism without selfhood, whatever form it takes, objectifies the subject, her experience, corporeality, and affect. In biomedicine, it implies the view of the patient's body as a system of cells, tissues, and organs (Toombs 1992, 79). A static system is arranged according to the pathoanatomical,

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pathophysiological, and microbiological nosology of evidence-based medicine, transparent to scientific manipulation.

Objectification mutes objectified forms of life.<sup>5</sup> It produces the illusion of a silent approval: yes, I, an inhuman, am just like that, and the opportunity to say something apodictic and generally meaningful about me is not available to me; only someone can talk about me who can show me: I am not me; I am something that does not belong to me and is beyond my control; I need someone who can look at me from nowhere and nowhen, with pure eidetics and abstraction. This view can be applied to medicine and healthcare. Medical communication appears to occur in a sterile space.<sup>6</sup> In this case, the patient seems to be “abstracted” from pain. The doctor, accordingly, “abstracts” from the patient’s feelings, not feeling empathy for them, and translates the patient’s complaints into the formal language of medical history. Instead, discourse dominates material and physiological sensations, and autonomy becomes a metaphysical attribute of the rational-psychological self, separated from the body.

118

### **Subalterns, androids, and biomedical others**

In what cases does a loss of autonomy occur? Many people are familiar with the experience when, due to illness, even the most straightforward actions seem impossible when one finds herself temporarily unable to do the usual things. The inability to move one’s body in space makes one feel defective and incomplete. One of the main theses of my paper is that philosophy avoids pathology and silences the voices of those whose existence is predetermined by their body’s pathological, unorthodox, and non-normalized experience.<sup>7</sup>

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5 Eric Cassell emphasizes that functional vision of illness leads the medical gaze away from the patient. He refers to a routine situation in an intensive care unit where the blinking and beeping of medical equipment is perceived as more credible than the patient’s speech. The representation of the heart’s dynamics in a cine-arteriogram is believed to be a truthful image of the heart, eventually substituting the natural heart (Cassell 2004, 21).

6 For a clear example of this kind of bioethical “abstractionism,” see the compendium on the philosophy of medicine by Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh (2015, 123–124).

7 Critical disability studies contest the myth of the pure, autonomous, and self-sufficient body as a unity in space and time. Instead, many thinkers – such as Margrit

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I prefer to focus on medical examples. According to Michel Foucault (1994), modern medicine is the science of individuals with a unique epistemological structure. In the hospital, doctors deal with individuals who, at the same time, are impersonal carriers of the disease. The patient's complaints and expressions are not as important in medicine as cryptograms and ciphers of the disease. This essence arises at the intersection of pathophysiological taxonomy. Illness is hidden in the patient and obscured by their experiences, knowledge, and body interventions. Here, we see the same obsessive abstractionism that ties medicine with philosophy. In a hospital, a patient is the carrier of the disease. In the clinic, the disease ties to this particular body whose functioning refracts and concretizes this abstraction. Consequently, this case is a curious example of pathology in a series of morphogenetic transformations of bodies and life forms. At any point, we are talking about mastering, maybe even colonizing, a sick body whose existence always associates with some supposed norm.

Colonization is a two-fold process. One is the expansion of the scientific image of humans. For example, when we experience a headache, we take nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. Pain or discomfort requires medical expertise and smoothing the psychological acceptance of one's medical condition. Explanations of physiological dysfunctions through experiential, social, or political phenomena are dismissed as unscientific; they are equated with "primitive" beliefs in malicious spirits that non-causally affect the human spirit. The other side is a consequence of the first. The patient's understanding of her experiences gets re-evaluated. It is no longer an immediate experience. It is a theoretical construct based on incorrect concepts that refer to nonexistent entities.

119

Once, the patient-doctor alliance was considered productive, both were equal participants in communication. Doctors were experts in the scientific understanding of medicine. The patient knew about her illness from the inside. Combined, these two images of the disease provided a synoptic vision. With the advent of evidence-based medicine, the role of the patient has decreased.

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Shildrick (2013) – embrace the idea of "originary intercorporeality" as a condition of multifarious lifeforms beyond pathologization. However, these bodies were always muted, hidden from sight and cultural and political representation (Murphy 2001). The varied embodied experiences of "abnormal" subjects require a scrutinized and precise phenomenological analysis (Depraz 2020).

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Compliance forced her to follow the doctor's therapeutic and preventive recommendations. Biologically understood health and normality are essential.

The muteness of embodied existence opens the way for medical procedures and manipulations. A "conspiracy of silence" enables it. The patient is not only denied the right to speak; understanding of her condition is limited from the outside with the help of a "communicative economy." This is a strategy of speaking and keeping silent about the course of the disease and ways of constructing a narrative. On the part of doctors, this is expressed in the regulation of communication: the use of rhetorical tricks, euphemisms, and allegories prevents multiple, overlapping, constantly changing uncertainties associated with the development of illness (Clemente 2015, 3–5).

120 The history of medicine lacks the perspective of a deterritorialized subject excluded from society as a recognizable personality (Casper 2020, 154). Instead, we need to see medicine "from below," from the patient's perspective (Porter 1985, 185). In this sense, she becomes an analogue of the wholly other modern philosophy, the biomedical other, devoid of speech. However, although disaffiliated, she often still has an intact consciousness and intention to manifest herself. The voiceless subject, *biomedical other*, asks for respect and recognition, whether she is a pediatric patient, a paralyzed patient, a quarantined or terminal patient, a patient in the palliative condition, a patient suffering from an inherited or genetic illness, a patient in a coma, a slowly deteriorating condition, or diagnosed with brain death.

They are all *subalterns* of evidence-based medicine and its unmourned victims. They are monsters: hybrids of life and death, born or living for a few days with a non-viable morphology; ugly creatures mixing unnatural forms; abominations violating the biological laws; the unclassifiable entities; "the unorthodox made flesh refusing to be normalized, neutralized, or homogenized" (Garland Thomson 1997, 24). Often, these patients are either non-verbal or do not respond to external stimuli. They have difficulties maintaining a sitting position and have problems with dressing and other daily activities. Patients' lives can induce shame and disgust.<sup>8</sup> They may also sweat or salivate. Due to

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8 As Julia Kristeva says, "it is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions,

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vegetative disorders, their bodies do not control pelvic function. They may need special nutrition supplied through a gastrostomy, if normal feeding is impossible. Many patients require ventilation (tracheostomy), suction, probes, catheters, and coughers. Patients often die from pneumonia or aspiration when pieces of food or water enter the respiratory tract.

A good example is the locked-in syndrome. This condition can be caused by traumatic brain injury, stroke, and neurological and oncological diseases. For example, in the case of an aneurysm of the basilar artery, the nerves responsible for arbitrary movements are affected, except for those responsible for vertical eye movements. The syndrome can also occur with the development of neurodegenerative diseases, such as spinal muscular atrophy or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. In these diseases, progressive damage to the motor neurons is accompanied by paralysis of the four limbs (quadriplegia) and muscle atrophy.

The fact that the “locked” subjects retain consciousness was realized by physicians, when they paid attention to the arbitrary eye movements of motionless bodies. Consciousness, shackled in a broken diving bell, is still capable of awareness, will, and communication, illustrating philosophical abstractionism. Before that, these patients were treated as “vegetables,” being in a vegetative state or diagnosed with brain death, and therefore regarded as objects that can no longer be called humans.

121

Until recently, it was believed that a patient’s life with complete paralysis was doomed to be a short period of painful existence, which would end in death from suffocation or food getting stuck in the throat or respiratory tract. However, since the 1970s, thanks to technologies and incorporations, such as iron lungs, gastrostomy and colostomy bags, artificial ventilation, and hydration devices, it has become possible to support and prolong patients’ lives. Consciousness encapsulated in a motionless body is tormented by an inability to control its fragile shell. Therefore, it might be desirable to get rid of this shell and move the mind into a machine substance that will never get sick or die.

A midpoint scenario is to become a cyborg, a hybrid of humans, animals, and machines. However, these cyborgs do not enjoy beautiful polymorphic

bodies.<sup>9</sup> Yes, their bodies are hybrid and intertwined with technology; however, this is not a creative plexus of the living and the artificial. Technologies support the patient's identity and facilitate their involvement in social interactions. Technology is incorporated into the body rather than reassembling its boundaries. Some suggest interpreting the bodies of such patients as technobiological assemblages<sup>10</sup> connected to the social interfaces and institutions of medical services, the cognitive and sensorimotor capabilities of medical personnel, and social infrastructure. Their condition is caused by the need to maintain vital activities and restore "normal" functioning. Their lives are filled with pain and discomfort, perceived as technologically sustained and clinically prolonged dying. Therefore, they yield either rejection (abjection) or, as François Laruelle (2015, 46) asserts, pity—instead of compassion or empathy—with an alienating attitude. Their hybrid nature contrasts their experiences with the abstract subjects of philosophy; hence, the initial fault of philosophical thought:

122            In place of man, of his real and absolutely singular essence, it [philosophy] employs anthropological, even andrological, images, and quasi-transcendental androids (the Cogito, ens creatum, Spirit, the I think, the Worker, the Unconscious, etc.). These are fictional beings responsible for populating the desert of anthropological screens,

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9 See Siebers 2001. Similar ideas can be found in Drew Leder with his concept of bodily "dys-appearance." It takes place when the body appears to the subject as ill, bad, or disgusting. In normal healthy functioning of the body, it "dis-appears," that is, recedes to the background of daily activity, for example, while accomplishing routine tasks or moving. "Dys-appearance" forces the subject to draw attention to the body parts, which cease functioning or feel pain or inflammation. The task of medicine, then, is to enable "dis-appearance" by softening "dys-appearance," that is, alleviating suffering and increasing patients' quality of life (Leder 1990). Kristin Zeiler adds the aspect of "eu-appearance," which refers to the good, strong, well, and automatic functioning of a healthy body (Zeiler 2010).

10 As Kelly Fritsch says, "disabled people are entangled in multiple assemblages: the human-machine assemblages of wheelchairs, ventilators, or walkers; human-animal assemblages such as assistive animals like guide dogs; or disabled-abled assemblages of the disabled person and care attendant" (Fritsch 2010, 3). See the historical analysis of cyborg technologies in relation to disability and normalization in Mills 2011.

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shadows projected on the steep walls of Ideas, inhabitants of ideal caves.  
(Laruelle 2018, 5–6.)

Instead of living in a philosophical cave that eloquently illustrates philosophical myths, biomedical others are silent and disaffiliated. Their silence speaks more about the inconsistency of the obsessive norm than about many philosophical concepts of agency.

### **Wahaha and Wawawa: The echo of the subject**

In neurology, one can find a strong belief that the gradual degradation of motor functions leads to the loss of autonomy and demise of personality in general. Movement is the basis of upright posture and redistribution of body weight in limbs. Typically, this contributes to the proprioceptive standing of the body in the environment. We do not refer to perceived movements that can be named and analyzed. Each step, according to Stamatiia Portanova, is accompanied by a virtual multiplicity of elusive micro-movements that position the body between gravity and the skillful mastery of the body, flying, and falling (Portanova 2013, 9–10). In a step, each bodily gesture is dispersed into the diffracting heterogeneity of imperceptible microscopic movements of toes, ankles, knees, and legs—i.e., minor gestures, to use Erin Manning’s concept (Manning 2016, 4). We observe primary movements in the bioelectric activity of the brain. For movement of the whole body, it is necessary to transmit signals from the limbs and surfaces of the body to the central nervous system and back (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, 396). In order for the immune system to recognize the body’s boundaries and allow it to distinguish between “self” and “alien,” it must move in the phase space of molecular forms (Varela 1994).

Thus, for a “healthy,” undisturbed bodily movement to occur, it needs the connection of many nameless, unconscious processes that have nothing to do with verbalization and discursive assertion of the subject. Immobilization of the body during paralysis can lead to the demise of cognitive processes and, consequently, death of the self (Casper 2020, 155). The sought-after transcendental, which constitutes a subject in the material-discursive network of meaningful communication, still depends on the body and its location in the world.

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From early childhood onwards, a person's self is formed in interaction with others by imitating gestures and facial expressions, as well as by creating meaningful communication structures. An individual is never left alone with himself, and, as the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott believed, a child is alone only in the presence of others. A newborn needs a mother to maintain its homeostasis. The child's body temperature becomes the object of joint, dyadic regulation, for example, when a newborn is placed on the mother's breast (Tronick et al. 1998). The phenomenologically inspired hypothesis of "participatory sense-making," by Hanne De Jaeger and Ezequiel Di Paolo, states that the psychosocial development of an individual presupposes synchronization and coordination of their actions with others (De Jaeger and Di Paolo 2007). Inculturation, education, and training involve individuals in intersubjective practices and "guide" their life along the "entrenched" ontogenetic pathways.

124 Consequently, as the subject of her actions (*agens*), an individual undergoes what happens to her (*patiens*). Life reveals its dependence on the environment. Even the simplest organism needs nutrients scattered throughout the environment. It forces the lifeform to make minimal distinctions, using its body to transform neutral physical reality into a series of sedimentations. It is the idea of life as a creative process of transforming the system in an enabling environment as if nothing interferes. The system grows and develops, modifies itself and the world, and communicates with other systems.

However, life is only sometimes an unhindered multiplication of forms and ways of using one's body. Life involves fractures and interruptions, breaks and crises; deformed by disease or trauma, aging and dying body is also life. The disease reveals life's fragility and ontological instability: no matter how well-coordinated the system's self-maintenance processes are, they can permanently be disrupted, leading to disintegration. As applied to medicine, this means that we cannot proceed from the assumption of the autonomy and intactness of the patient. Illness entangles the subject with processes and events beyond her control, revealing the pathic/pathological experience<sup>11</sup> paradigm. Two

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11 The most comprehensive approach to the problem of psychological experience can be found in Henri Maldiney (2007, 361). Pathic experience (from Greek πάθος,

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aspects of illness can be distinguished: physiological and lived. While the disease is the subject of medical diagnosis and treatment, illness, by contrast, affects the subjectively lived experience. A simple example is the conflict of interpretations of the experience of illness. The same event can be evaluated “subjectively” from the patient’s point of view and “objectively” from the point of view of biomedicine. If we suppose that the latter reduces the disease to physiological processes, the former initially evaluates it as an existential event directly related to the issues of life, death, and their meaning.

Without a body, there could be no thought. However, the patient’s experience has not been voiced, even in this view. Since paralysis leads to the erosion of the psychological self, is there “someone” in this silent body who can be addressed and needs to speak and enunciate herself? Is there an articulated message to be communicated? According to some neurologists and clinicians, motor paralysis and neurological disability are accompanied by thought paralysis. Since there is no sensorimotor or musculoskeletal movement, there is no communication—the lived distinction between organism and environment vanishes as well as the meaningful interactions between them.

125

Tamara Cheremnova, who has lived most of her life in Soviet and Russian orphanages for disabled children with cerebral palsy, compared herself to an improperly programmed machine. She considers the ability for autonomous movement as the condition for a free, uninterrupted life:

People! Healthy, normal, not crippled, non-masked, able to move on their feet, and control their hands! Breathe freely and rejoice that you are gifted with unimaginable wealth—the ability to independent and controlled movement! Feel yourself happy, as long as you do not depend on anyone! Do you want to think that a healthy self-managing

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“suffering, passion, sensuality, affection”) encompasses non-cognitive, embodied knowledge about the world, irreducible to the theoretical and realized beyond the distinction of subject and object. It is analogous to the receptivity, the “lived sense” of being in the world, and reveals a personal presence, pre-reflexive, but practically realizable knowledge about the world, or, in a broad sense, a sense of attunement to the world—not in the sense of gaining positive knowledge about it, but in a bodily mediated passive sense of being “here and now,” which cannot be controlled by the individual.

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body is happy? Then, at least agree that this is the basis for happiness.  
(Cheremnova 2011; no pagination.)

Life without walkers opens the prospect of a happy life filled with traveling, educating, loving, acceptance, and beauty—life unconfined by the ugly homemade wheelchair. Feelings and effects of embodied life shape spatial and kinesthetic perceptions. Life joyfully moves toward the attractor and fearfully runs from the repeller. Emotional life is congruent with the sensorimotor structure of the body and spreads across a spectrum of differences beyond normalcy and health.

126 Once a subject deviates from the “normal” and “expected” trajectory of ontogenetic development from vulnerability to autonomy and self-sufficiency, her perception by others transitions from psychological to neurological. Devoid of autonomy and the ability to think rationally, with strict separation between the self-enclosed body and the exterior world, biomedical subjects compromise the idea of “healthy” normative embodiment. Hence, they are not perceived as cognitively intact, in control of their stable bodies or capable of impartial thinking. The subject loses human features and becomes an appendage of the disease, a silent witness to her degradation and death. The neurological patient is no longer an active subject—so close and so distant from “healthy” humanity; somebody and nobody; an unrecognizable presence. She is a passive observer who dutifully follows the destiny of her brain, becoming *neomorts* and *faux vivants*, medical curiosities. Who chooses their own physiology?

The ability to speak and articulate oneself is associated with the ability to build a narrative, in which an individual acquires inner unity and accessibility to others. Simultaneously, it provides the ability to understand others. According to the developmental model proposed by Daniel Stern, the feeling of the verbal self emerges in infants aged 15–18 months. It is a subjective organizing position experienced as the self, and the other has a reserve of personal knowledge and experience about the world. This knowledge can be transmitted by using symbols. This part of subjectivity coincides with the acquisition of sense-making abilities. It is verbally shared with others. However, language only reinforces what has already occurred in other sensations of the infant’s self. It only brings logical harmony and linearity to articulate her feelings and

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experiences. In medicalized neurophysiological vision, empathy is reduced to the ability to build a “Theory of Mind, a model of others’ internal motivations, emotions, and thoughts. “Theory of Mind” explains the behavior of others.<sup>12</sup> If one does not have such a model, even more so the ability to create it, one is doomed to perceive others as automatons, robots, or zombies, whose world is devoid of interiority.

Interestingly, this inability to understand and empathize with others is attributed to individuals with an autism spectrum disorder. They allegedly perceive others as soulless automatons who do not speak, but make noise, and do not act, but move in space according to simple algorithms (Grunsven 2020). At the same time, patients are turned into machines whose cognitive patterns can be reformatted, normalized, and disciplined with drugs, pedagogical techniques, and socialization.<sup>13</sup> The machine is a carrier of pathology and a neurological queer, and its vital activity is challenging to fit into the norms of sociality and human community. Such subjects are denied the right to talk about themselves; they are made *invisible*—reduced to a functional breakdown of neural processes and deprived of the right to autonomy due to illness. The one who cannot discursively comprehend the other and present themselves in rational discourse is not a human being.

127

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12 Evan Thompson argues that in experiencing the other as an embodied living being, I perceive her in several dimensions: 1) as an animate lifeform; 2) as enclosed in an embodied existence (growth, development, aging, health and illness, strength and weakness); 3) as expressing subjective experiences; 4) as the center of spatial orientation; 5) as capable of volitional action (Thompson 2001). Therefore, the other is not a mechanism, but an organism living its life. The patient is not a machine with a broken part or impaired functioning, but a living being experiencing pain and suffering. These experiences set the dynamics of growth and development, states of health and illness, strength, infirmity, and dying. See also the phenomenological analysis of social cognition and empathy in clinical cases of schizophrenia and autism in Murakami 2013.

13 The founder of bioethics Van Rensselaer Potter developed a classical account of the human being as a far-from-equilibrium cybernetic machine (Potter 1970). He saw his theoretical project as a substitute for the dying survival instinct; hence, bioethics as a science of human biocybernetic machines is a kind of “prosthesis” grown by culture, society as well as scientific and technological infrastructure. For the history of the transformation of the scientific image of human to machine metaphors with regard to the example of cyberization of the brain, see Dupuy 2009.

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Aya Kitō, a Japanese schoolgirl suffering from spinocerebellar ataxia, wrote in her diary about the difficulties of verbal articulation of speech, motor limitations, and the impossibility of participation in the community, drawing a direct analogy between herself and concentration camp prisoners. The slow progression of the disease in phases, gesture by gesture, micro-movement by micro-movement, takes away her ability to speak:

I can't even talk loud anymore, and can only say one word at a time. I cannot even laugh at Wahahaha, and when I try to, it comes out as Wawawa. [...] If someone says only one or two words a day, can you say that they are really leading a life as a member of society? . . . I am becoming that kind of person. (Kitō 2011, 76.)

128 This holds true for hard cerebral lesions, which create broken and disaffiliated identities of the “new wounded,” as Catherine Malabou calls them: victims of traumatic brain injuries, tumors, patients with encephalitis or meningoencephalitis, degenerative brain diseases, cerebral palsy, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, schizophrenia, and autism (Malabou 2012, 9–10). In part, they are the victims of their biological destiny. They are deprived of philosophical, ethical, and psychological personifications, which embrace the logic of totalization and bring to the identical, always enclosed self, contrasted with alterity and the other.

To be heard is to be seen; plenty of studies point to the multisensorial status of culture.<sup>14</sup> However, who listens? For Jean-Luc Nancy, hearing subjectivity by no means appears to have been pre-given. On the contrary, the listener should always be “on guard,” since listening is the task of achieving the self in resonance, diffracting and returning in the echo of the integrity lost by the subject (Nancy 2007, 9). Nancy plays with the phrase “becoming all ears,” saying that the listener is always just a presence seeking to establish connections with “self”—not with “self” as the “I” of the listening subject or the “Thou” of the heard, but bringing presence to itself. In the hearing experience, “self” turns out to be something absent and cannot become something that the subject can achieve. In

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14 For example, Laura Marks claims that olfaction is closely tied to emotions, affects and “collective memory that remained elusive from images and words” (Marks 2002, 121).

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contrast to the neurological view of a patient with residual subjectivity, hearing is problematic. The evoked hearing companion—physician, nurse, caregiver, sibling—turns out to be a resonance, an “echo of the subject,” and not vice versa.

### **Speechless subjects, vegetative beings**

Diseases reduce individuals to prostheses that mediate the development of pathology and endow a sick subject with the status of a subhuman, a non-place of speech, someone less desirable, less valuable, and less knowledgeable. As Melanie Yergeau says:

Speech, as in words that can be heard coming out of human mouths; writing, as in words that are arranged so as to be read and meaningfully understood by people; intention, as in actions that not only carry a kind of purpose or intentional meaning, but also actions that also work to deduce goals and reflections from other people, all supposedly possessing neurotypical magical superpowers; emotions, imagination and socialization—I could go on. (Yergeau 2018, 14.)

129

Paralyzed lives are often lonely. Researchers have noted the risks of resocialization in patients with locked-in syndrome, which leads to depression and suicidal thoughts. The outline of their lives is formed by complete dependence on others—nurses, family members, and medical technologies—with the possibility of a sufficiently long life in this state. Owing to the complete lack of motor activity, except for saccadic eye movements or residual movements of individual limbs or body parts (one finger, cheek, eyelid), their lifeworld shrinks and becomes routine. They become accustomed to the atmosphere of hospital life with its characteristic nervousness, repetitiveness, and insufficient attention to their needs. Some patients complain that the medical staff treat them as pieces of furniture, objects, or cadavers that do not understand human speech or cannot respond to it.<sup>15</sup>

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15 According to psychological studies, the paralyzed patients complain about being treated like vegetables, as being simple minded, babies, or infants (Nizzi,

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Different countries have different practices of care for paralyzed patients. For example, in Japan, it is customary to keep patients at home because of the services of companies created by professional nurses and caregivers. Nurses support patients' lives. They monitor the functioning of artificial ventilation devices, listen to the patient's microgestural nonverbal signals, take her out for walks, and provide psychological support. The dependence of a paralyzed patient on the help of a nurse and/or family members becomes so deep that it is appropriate to talk about recreating her subjectivity in interactions with others. Moreover, having lost bodily motor control and locked inside it, the subject becomes even more social than before the illness.

In a study based on interviews with professional nurses working with patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, Murakami showed how the patient's subjectivity reemerged in interactions (Murakami 2020). Patient's subjectivity is social and material-discursive. It arises as the disease progresses. The anthropologist Dominique Lestel asks:

130           From what degree of disability or cerebral handicap can we consider a human being no longer a person but rather a purely vegetative lifeform? It is true that, compared to these cases, animals have better communicative social skills than people with disabilities, even though the former do not have psychosocial personalities. (Lestel 2014, 116.)

With paralysis and social deprivation, subjectivity fades simultaneously with the fading ability to move, speak, and express one's emotions. Nevertheless, communication becomes more intense, although it acquires more unusual features for a "healthy" person.

Goricheva, a late Soviet feminist and Eastern Orthodox philosopher, named the figures of transition from the unconscious to the conscious. Neurological disability shifts the boundary between cognitive impairment and unresponsiveness to stimuli. However, she outlines a series of cultural scapegoats: outcasts, criminals, prostitutes, demons, savages, clochards, women, Jews, and homosexuals (Goricheva 2010, 109). The modern figure of

the polymorphic Other is an animal. This silence discloses the unconditional acceptance of the world. Though remaining mute and speechless, a vegetative being completely articulates itself without linguistic mediation and without a recognizable self (Goricheva 2010, 117).

For some cognitive scientists, the world-directedness of embodied activity correspondingly implies a virtual bodily activity, such as in the cases of imperceptible movements and oscillations, covert non-muscular processes. To complete what the paralyzed patient wants to say or express, the nurse learns to read and decipher barely noticeable non-verbal signals in the patient's gaze—minor gestures of the biomedical other. Gradually, as the disease progresses, the immobilized patient loses the possibility of verbal and non-verbal articulation. The nurse knows the patient from when she can speak: her manner, intonation, and emotional repertoire. This establishes continuity between the patient's identity and that of the patient due to paralysis. Psychosocial identity implies the location "wherefrom one is talking" and "to whom one is talking." These places of interiority and exteriority are mutually constituted in *extimate* relationships, where the patient's silent subjectivity is reconstructed in a complex network of material-discursive relationships (Lestel 2014, 121). As Karen Barad claims, there is no absolute "inside" or "outside" except for the exteriority within; not *in*, but *of* the world constituted by the contingent separations and intimacies. The self emerges as an intimate relationship based on minor, silent gestures and movements. True, this is more of a nurse's monologue with herself than a genuine dialogue. However, this involves a high degree of empathy and emotional fusion with patients.

131

The fundamental existential problem faced by the locked-in is communication. Because of isolation within their bodies, it is challenging to say something, since they cannot use the speech apparatus outlined by Yergeau. Techniques for augmented and alternative communications remain to be used. In the classic locked-in syndrome, the arbitrary control of blinking or vertical eye movements is intact. Patients blink to give "yes" and "no" answers to questions or point at letters on alphabet boards for assisted reading (partner-assisted scanning). Alphabet boards are made of transparent material so that the assistant can follow the movements of the patient's eyes and help compile words from individual letters.

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Patients usually want to say more than what they can express through the media available to them. Mediation in such cases intimately connects vital functions and their preservation. The difficulty here is that communication with assisted reading<sup>16</sup> is lengthy: it takes minutes to compose words from letters. In addition, when tracking the patient's eye movements, mistakes often occur and they have to start over. Recently, great hope has been pinned on the brain-computer interface and neuroimplants. For example, with the help of mental commands, the patient can select letters by controlling the cursor on the screen and give commands to a voice synthesizer that speaks "for" the patient as her interlocutor. Technologies do not simply participate in the re-emergence of the immobilized self. These are the prostheses and artificial organs of the constitutive dynamics of the self and its embodied interactions. Prostheses and biomedical technologies invent a condition, in which human bodies are seen as simultaneously disabled and enabled.

### **Coming out of the closet: Narrating medicine from below**

132

We still do not know what it is like to be a patient with locked-in syndrome or how to live an imprisoned life. Only approximately can one guess what they feel and think from the autobiographies and stories of those who were able to overcome depression and suicidal thoughts, almost literally "coming out of the closet." An analogy with the queer coming out is not accidental. One needs to have a remarkable courage to declare themselves to society, to demand not just pity, but also recognition of personality as a full-fledged agent. Disability was not particularly noticeable until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the disability rights movement and activism declared itself. At the time, people with "abnormal" and "non-normalized" experiences of their bodies were deprived of subjectivity; they were not recognized as human beings. Their experience is still not pronounced and has not become available to "healthy" people who are lucky enough to use their bodies skillfully for statements, emotions, and actions. Meanwhile, such experience can teach us something. Since our empathy and communication mechanisms are rooted in recognizing

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16 The "weakened" communication abilities force caregivers to extract meaning from the extremely few words typed with an alphabet board or speech-generating devices.

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the other through her bodily movements and facial expressions, they fail when meeting a motionless and silent body confined to a bed or wheelchair.

Postcolonial theory discusses the oppressed, who has no opportunity to speak—not because she is mute or has nothing to say. Even vegetative organisms can express themselves in connection with others. No, she is silent because none of the media of speech and articulation available belong to her; she, as the other, does not have a native language. The latter is the language of the oppressor, conqueror, and colonizer. Therefore, she may have been unsuited for telling her truth and manifesting her experiences. Similarly, the language of medicine—at least its allopathic version—expresses the point of view of the doctor and the winner of the disease. This version of the Medical Gaze has no place for loss, death, or failure.

Therefore, the stories that medicine tells are stories from the winners' point of view: healers in an alliance with recovering patients. A neurological patient is the loser in this story, because she is not always lucky enough to become a member of the “remission society.”<sup>17</sup> She is close to the subaltern, but cannot speak in connection with her physiological condition. At the same time, she does not give any reasons to exclude her from social life, to make her silent, invisible, and ultimately an inanimate, passive object.

133

A specific repertoire of cognitive abilities refers to having a particular body with a given set of characteristics and articulations of its constituent parts. Therefore, if we had a different body, our perceptions of the world would have been completely different. For example, if we did not have two hands, but three or five hands, or none, our interactions with the world would unfold differently. The habitual “malleability” of things for grasping gestures with our hands would be replaced by something completely different. We would not be monsters or anomalies in the world of compulsory normalcy silenced by its institutions and shared practices. Rather, we would be alternative instantiations of embodied situatedness in the world. It is necessary to recognize different

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17 For Arthur Frank, remission society unites those who recover from cancer, attend cardiac recovery programs, diabetics and other chronic illness patients, those whose allergies and sensitivities require food restrictions and attentive self-monitoring, users of prostheses and artificial organs, and former addicts. In other words, they and their families were lucky to stay well through severe medical conditions (Frank 1995).

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types and varieties of autonomy depending on the neurological and somatic organization of life forms or their interactions. In medicine, the subject's autonomy can turn into its seemingly complete opposite, vulnerability and fragility.

Cicely Saunders, the founding figure of the hospice movement, pointed out that Western societies pursue health, prosperity, security, and pleasures. Hence, questions of illness, suffering, and death should not be asked (Saunders 2006, 38). Terminal illness is considered unfair as a failure in medical knowledge. "Normal," "healthy," and "expected" life is fragile and unstable. However, severe disabilities and biomedical body alterations can enable growth and new possibilities.

134 This vulnerable and contingent life requires articulation, giving it recognition and the *other* autonomy. I conclude with a citation from Rubén Gallego concerning Tamara Cheremnova who had cerebral palsy and was maintained in a psychoneurological orphanage. His book attempts to tell a story from the standpoint of a "compensated debility." The intact "person in the head" is imprisoned by a weakened body. However, this body needs the hands of the other to extend it and provide a reach to the world:

Living without hands is not so hard if you have everything else. Everything else—my body—is even worse developed than my hand. The hands were the main objects. We can say that the main thing in a person is their head. You can even stop speaking. It is clear that the head cannot survive without hand. It does not matter if it's your own hands or someone else's. (Gallego 2018, 145.)

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# MAN AS A BEING OF HYGIENE IN A PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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*Abstract*

The aim of the text is to address the phenomenon of hygiene as that which concerns the transitory boundary of our corporeality (the lived body in the physical body), as an ambiguous and diverse phenomenon, which presents itself in various ways (in the field of expressivity). The study draws on the fruitful cooperation between phenomenology and philosophical anthropology. In the first part, the text analyzes how corporeality is treated in the phenomenological reflection based on Edmund Husserl's conception of

the lived body and in the following phenomenological thematizations of corporeality. Upon the foundation of such an approach, we engage in an elaboration of the problem of hygiene in its anthropological specificity. With the help of an anthropological study of Helmuth Plessner, it is possible, in the subsequent parts of the text, to approach the phenomenon of hygiene in its particular manifestations—as expressions of interaction in society (with examples of diplomacy and good manners) as well as in the field of artistic expressions (with examples of hygienic images in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century). Hygiene thus appears as a phenomenon in the framework of a complex being in the world, and it cannot be derived from the outer (socially construed) or causal-physiological phenomena. This makes hygiene a specific leading clue for the research regarding subjectivity.

*Keywords:* Edmund Husserl, Helmuth Plessner, hygiene, lived body, works of art.

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### **Človek kot bitje higijene s fenomenološkega in antropološkega stališča**

#### *Povzetek*

140

Namen besedila je obravnava fenomena higijene kot tistega, kar zadeva tranzitorno mejo naše telesnosti (živo telo v našem fizičnem telesu), kot dvoumnega in raznolikega fenomena, ki se kaže na mnogotere načine (v polju ekspresivnosti). Študija se sklicuje na plodno sodelovanje med fenomenologijo in filozofsko antropologijo. V prvem delu besedilo analizira, kako o telesnosti razpravlja fenomenološka refleksija, utemeljena na pojmovanju živega telesa pri Edmundu Husserlu in pri nadaljnjih fenomenoloških tematizacijah telesa. Na podlagi takšnega pristopa se spoprimemo z razdelavo problema higijene v njegovi antropološki specifičnosti. S pomočjo antropološkega raziskovanja Helmutha Plessnerja se lahko, v naslednjih delih besedila, približamo partikularnim manifestacijam fenomena higijene ne samo kot izrazov interakcije znotraj družbe (s primeri diplomacije in lepega vedénja), temveč tudi na polju umetniškega izražanja (s primeri higienskih podob v prvi polovici 20. stoletja). Higijena se potemtakem kaže kot fenomen znotraj kompleksnosti prebivanja v svetu in je ni mogoče izpeljevati iz zunanjih (družbeno konstruiranih) ali kavzalno-fizioloških fenomenov. Na takšen način higijena postane posebno vodilo za raziskavo subjektivnosti.

*Ključne besede:* Edmund Husserl, Helmuth Plessner, higijena, živo telo, umetnine.

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The birth of the modern era of medicine is closely linked to the care for personal hygiene and safety during physical contact. At this birth, it was the physician Ignaz Philipp Semmelweis who in 1847 introduced rules for disinfection at a maternity hospital. He saved many lives, mainly the lives of mothers, by obliging the medical personnel to wash their hands regularly, although his approach was not without an initial backlash within the medical community. This event is significant from several points of view. Hygiene is here explicitly thematized, and the reactions to this intervention in hygiene are likewise significant. Hygiene is, moreover, implicitly present in various layers of human experience and expression. Diverse manifestations of hygiene arise; it becomes a truism, a matter of course, a need, or it is questioned.

How shall we situate hygiene as a philosophical problem—and where? Looking back at the history of ideas and sciences, we see that for the Greeks *ὑγίεια* literally meant health, cure, or medicine—for example, as in the saying that “sleep is the best medicine.” *ὑγιεινός* in antiquity thus denotes both a healthy state and the care for such a state—that is, it denotes what is good for health and for staying healthy (see also Tountas 2009). Alcmaeon puts it in the following way:

141

[...] health is tough as long as the various elements, wet–dry, cold–hot, bitter–sweet have equal rights and that diseases come when one of the opposites prevails. The prevalence of either element tells you to be the cause of destruction. Health is the harmonious mix of opposite qualities. (DK 24 B 4.)<sup>1</sup>

Care for health and internal harmony of the elements and components of an organism—such as the equilibrium, which Pythagoras and Hippocrates speak of—was in Greek society closely linked with the development of the skills and

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Diels 1879.

habits of a human being and with his or her relationship with the environment; it was likewise closely linked with the form of the community oriented towards the promotion of health. As a consequence, the issues of health and hygiene entered the field of medicine and related fields. In philosophy, however, the explicit thematization of hygiene has taken a back seat, since the domain of theory is separated from the domain of practice, and since hygiene is linked to corporeality, which has usually only a secondary, derivative function in philosophy, depending on the gnoseological, ontological, and metaphysical presuppositions. An explicit thematization of corporeality in philosophy itself has therefore been rare. This view changed with the growth of the relevance of experience, behavior, and agency, as well as of the notion of man as being in the world. Once this happened, an appropriate approach to corporeality has become the key question. Corporeality thus re-entered philosophy at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and it was made a central issue in phenomenology and related philosophy focused on subjectivity (see Doyon and Wehrle 2020). Moreover, the focus of philosophical anthropology on the point of view of the human being and his or her particular, concrete experience also offers us several notable examples of the phenomenon of hygiene.

142

The relationship towards one's own body at the level of intimacy and cleanliness is crucial, since it is related to the protection of human life itself, as was the case of the maternity hospitals and as is likewise the case in a pandemic. Similarly, under normal conditions, this relationship is naturally related to the functioning of a reasonably healthy corporeality, and a lack or overabundance of hygiene can upset the bodily balance. I will argue that this balance is regained always again and anew according to concrete circumstances of an individual, whereby these particular circumstances can often change. Sometimes, the changes are not that noticeable, but at other times—such as during the pandemic—these changes can be significant. Considering the question of hygiene, though, we at the same time encounter countertendencies, such as prejudices or outright refusal, which hamper the change that is necessary in matters of hygiene. Even in the new millennium, we have been surprised by the elementary protective requirements (hand washing, mask wearing, and social distancing), which the otherwise developed and flexible global community has had difficulties handling. Another example is an exaggerated sanitarianess of

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the environment (e.g., overprotection of children or excessive hand washing), which weakens the immunity and leads to mental disorders.

However, how shall we characterize the phenomenon of hygiene? What do we point towards when we call man a being of hygiene? Hygiene concerns a certain *transitory boundary of our corporeality*, which can be said to have two aspects: it is somewhere between the physical and the lived body, as well as between the personal domain and public contact. Hygiene is not only a matter of intimacy, since it is related to others, but likewise it is not only a matter of the external environment, since personal hygiene is precisely related to mental hygiene, hand washing, masks wearing, as well as to certain domains of subjective corporeality, lived experience, expression, and intersubjectivity. The notion of hygiene proves to be an ambiguous phenomenon, which presents itself in various ways. It can also be a fundamental leading clue for subjectivity or a significant anthropological phenomenon, respectively.

It is an approach of philosophical anthropology where we will follow analyses of Helmuth Plessner, which allow us to address this phenomenon in its particular manifestations and concreteness. The reason why philosophical anthropology can work in this way lies in the fact that it opens a new discourse, which considers the human perspective and takes into account man as being “in” and “according to” concrete situations, in the world and with others, becoming who he or she is in his or her performances and expressions. Man as “excentric positionality”<sup>2</sup> recognizes this situation as a certain conflict, as an impossibility to ground his life from the center. A particular attention is here dedicated to corporeality. How can the anthropological approach work together with phenomenology? The interconnections between these two philosophical approaches, which developed parallelly, have both historical and intra-philosophical roots. The cooperation between them can be accessed from both sides, which results in a thematically variable approach.<sup>3</sup> The first-person

143

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2 In accordance with the latest translation of Plessner's *Levels of Organic Life and the Human* (2019), I use the English term “excentric” as translation of the German term “exzentrisch.”

3 As far as the methodological questions are concerned, the confusion is surely not unavoidable, which is confirmed by multiple analyses; see: Brudzińska 2018; Wehrle 2013; Vydrová 2021.

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approach, the view of subjective corporeality from within, and the eschewing of dualism and causal interpretations allow one to see these phenomena within the “*anthropology of experience from the point of view of lived inner perspective*” (Brudzińska 2018, 16 f.) or, as Plessner puts it, within the “configuration of conditions specific to human behavior” (Plessner 2016c, 418).

I will therefore specify two contexts, in which hygiene is analyzed by Plessner (in corporeal schemas concerning diplomacy and good manners); then I will investigate the manifestations of human expressiveness, in particular in the domain of art in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (hygienic image). Hygiene, and all matters hygienic, will not be treated as exclusive problems of somatics, physiology, and medicine, but as issues, which concern the human being as an intersubjective and creative being, and which especially concern the human being as an embodied being. Such an approach gained relevance in the philosophy of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries thanks also to the way, in which the question of corporeality has been formulated by phenomenology.<sup>4</sup> This will be the basis for further analyses of hygiene and its possible forms in the life of man. I want to trace or relate, respectively, the individual manifestations of hygiene, which we can meet, precisely to this source. The phenomenon of hygiene will then be ultimately disclosed as a form of a balancing act, whereby both corporeality and environment partake in this balancing, although each in a peculiar, unique way. In the first part of this study, I will thus analyze how the body is treated in the phenomenological reflection—though the analysis will be understandably limited for the purposes of the topic at hand.

### **The phenomenological treatment of corporeality**

There exists a crucial characterization in phenomenology of the physical body (*Körper*) and the lived body (*Leib*). This distinction is based on the phenomenological investigation of corporeality in connection with the perception of things and the experience of the other (alien experience, intersubjectivity). Corporeality is intimately connected with the beginning and the end of my life, which would not be possible without a body. Together

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4 For the phenomenological approach to medicine, see Svenaues 2001.

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with others, corporeality is a founding layer intertwined with transcendental subjectivity.<sup>5</sup> Phenomenology situates the problem of corporeality in such a way, in order to tackle the problems of the objectification of the body and dualism, which affect our perception of the body in multiple domains. Maurice Merleau-Ponty analyzed corporeality as the basis of our perception, situatedness, and behavior. Many direct or derived analyses of corporeality, which thus became a crucial phenomenological topic, followed. Functional aspects of subjective corporeality were investigated by Husserl in *Ideen II* and also in manuscripts, which are focused on the genetic analysis, passive synthesis, or analysis of perception. Some of these thematizations occur in the manuscripts collected in *Hua-Mat VIII* (Husserl 2006), and the following text is based on them.

Specific aspects of our own corporeality are disclosed there by means of examples, such as touching hands, touching another person, bodily feelings (such as pain, tickling, cold), various forms of movement during interaction with the world and others (walking, working out, dancing, playing a musical instrument). The body is here subjective, feeling, and lived. Here belong even situations, in which the body is physiologically tired or in which the body reacts unwittingly, too. Moreover, this also holds true for cases of bodily phenomena, which I am not aware of or which I do not control (sneezing, blushing, as well as also crying and laughing). The terms *Leib-Körperlichkeit* or *Körper-Leiblichkeit* express the interconnectedness of both facets—the physical body and the lived body—forming the manifestation of corporeality as a whole.

145

Corporeality involves various levels of activity and passivity, which are linked both to its lived and physiological facets, to various levels of experiencing, feeling, or attenuation (fatigue, sleep, the interconnection of the body of the mother and the child in the prenatal period). It can be said that,

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5 “The transcendental subjectivity inevitably has to understand itself as world being, if it wants to constitute the objective world, whereby the objectivity can be constituted only concerning the subject, which is bodily as well as social.” (Zahavi 2009, 96.) In the book *Edmund Husserls Phänomenologie der Instinkte*, Nam-In Lee (1993) points out that transcendental phenomenology entails both idealistic and realistic, rationalistic and voluntaristic tendencies, and is a theory of knowledge, but at the same time also transcends the theory of knowledge.

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on the one hand, the limits of our corporeality cannot be transcended, but, on the other hand, it is precisely the body schema, upon which our relationships with the world and others stand (or to use Merleau-Ponty's language, we are chiasmatically woven into the world). Even in the cases of limit forms of passive corporeality, reflective reactions, or instincts, the phenomenological analysis avoids straightforward causal explanations. There are practical examples in Husserl's texts, stemming from everyday existence, which disclose how subjective corporeality is constituted even at the lowest levels as the present I. Let us look at Husserl's examples: the first example concerns the first movements of a newborn child, and the second concerns various forms of movement of a hand.

146 The I is a center of affects and actions; it is the constituting and acting I. The I is in the world as projecting within the horizon of experiences, interests, directions, and attitudes; it is in the world as an embodied I. What happens in the instance of the very first experience, though, where there is not a matter of some structured goal-directed movement or of an action fulfilling a certain intention? What happens in the case of that very first movement, with which a person finds the limits and possibilities of his or her own corporeality? We can look to a newborn sucking its mother's milk after birth, for example. Whereas in Husserl's earlier texts a static analysis of the "intention-fulfilment" structure of intentionality were dominant, here Husserl is focused on pre-intentionality and instinctive intentionality. The instinctive directedness of a newborn and its sucking reflex are accompanied by the kinesthetic experiencing, to which other experiences are connected. The body with its organs is then a sedimentation of the "I can" in certain typical forms of action (Husserl 2006, text No. 79)—firstly as pre-modes [*Vormodi*] of will.<sup>6</sup> Husserl introduced the example of the sucking of milk by the newborn in the following way:

What is purely I-like in kinesthesia? Nothing other than the affection aroused in the I by deceiving perceptions (smell, etc.). Does

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6 "Der Leib mit seinen abgegliederten Organen ist eine Sedimentierung von Vermögen des in solchen und solchen typischen Formen Tun-Könnens." (Husserl 2006, 345.) The following translations of German texts, if not stated otherwise, are mine.

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it not come to drink as soon as it is there? For example, the smell alone awakens something else, an empty apperception, so to speak, which has no “conscious” goal. If contact then occurs, the way to fulfillment is, however, even more so a continuing instinctive drive, which is unfulfilled intention. Then in the fulfillment swallowing movements, etc., [themselves] appear as fulfillment, as revealing the instinctive drive. These are modes of desire, modes of will, so to speak: pre-modes [which are], however, associated with them, [that is,] with the sensation complexes belonging to the disclosure of this fulfillment. (Husserl 2006, 326.)

Thanks to self-experiencing, these movements are more and more refined, and complex motor skills are developed on their basis. The exploration of the world also proceeds as the development continues.<sup>7</sup> The movements cease when the baby is fed, and after an intermission they are renewed with a renewed need. The baby practices the movements of the mouth even without actual sucking, and we could call these practices an initial form of play. This leads to habitualization and related new experiences. At the later stage, the infant gets to know the object through the mouth. More and more, an infant is capable of inserting things into the mouth with its hands, and its hands subsequently take over the function of the mouth in its exploration of the world.

147

Another significant example, which we encounter at another place in the text, but which is relevant here, is the description of the movements of a hand in its developed forms. Intentional action stems from the intertwining of the physical and the lived facets of the body:

As a worldly I, I have formed my lived body as a lived body, I have got to know its organs as controllable and learned this control in general: it

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<sup>7</sup> In this connection, we can mention the principal phenomenological investigations of the child world, like for example those by Merleau-Ponty, who considers the world of the child as complete in its own way and therefore different in comparison with the world of adults, contrary to Piaget, for whom the world of the child is regarded as similar to the adult’s world, but as incomplete, deficient form of the adult’s world. See also note 16 in Lipták 2021, 262.

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is now my organ—for my living and working in the world. In my worldly life, I learn to master nature practically through the lived body and putting the lived body into play in the various directions of striving and achieving, I train it or myself in special ways—as a carpenter, locksmith, etc., I learn the “hand movements,” that is, my hand refines itself as an organ in certain directions, and so does the whole lived body in different directions of activity. I continue to gain “strength” physically, and I can and could do more and more. But this physical [*körperliche*] force is more precisely called bodily-mental [*leiblich-seelische*], especially since I am also the one who directs the development of forces, who drafts the plans for the external world practice [...]. (Husserl 2006, 156.)

148

Husserl states that the body manifests itself in its mental form as an expression of a bodily action, whereby the hand is a significant example (see Husserl 2006, 399). Individuation in the world is linked not only to the bodily needs and the refining of motor skills, but also to the more complex and more goal-directed endeavors, activity, and practice, which lead to the creation of the personal, societal, and communicative milieu. Corporeality in its expressive facet thus manifests itself in various directions. The body here functions as an original organ or as “the original object [*Urobjekt*] with expression and as participating in all expression” (Husserl 2006, 401), respectively. Corporeality also operates in the mental domain (transcendental domain), and the body here always forms a basic reference to the original core, the primordial world or nature, with which we are already connected in the constitution of the corporeality. Husserl writes that corporeality is “the system of organs, the first ‘mental’ object [*geistige Objekt*]” (Husserl 2006, 402). The hand under discussion expresses vividly this connection of the primordial base and transcendental sphere, which is manifested and developed in the life of a person within the lifeworld. To put it from the perspective of philosophical anthropology: this concerns the link between the biological and the cultural, which is expressed in the form of a sense-making, existential attitude.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The action of the hand is a complex phenomenon imbued with multiple meanings:

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This inquiry into the phenomenological consideration of corporeality enables us to open the question of the human being as hygienic being. Hygiene is part of the body schema; in its asymptomatic presence, it produces a balance or harmony between me and the environment. This balancing, this setting of equilibrium, is vulnerable and can be violated. In case of movements or work of the hand, its injury or its lack of strength act not only upon “physical organs for external world practice, but also ‘mental’ [*geistiger*] strengths” (Husserl 2006, 156). In the same way, the lack or excess, respectively, of hygiene can cause not only somatic or mental illnesses, but also social distance, remoteness, or other excessive manifestations and expressions—as will be clear from the following text. However, what phenomenology of corporeality teaches us up to this point is that relationship to corporeality is the original way of understanding the phenomenon of hygiene, which in this relationship is grasped in its relation to healthiness, that is, it is seen as the condition of realization of my full physical and mental strengths—of realization of my goals. This original understanding is always present, despite the fact that it is insufficient. We will get to this in the next section. But now we still need to corroborate the intertwining of hygiene with the body schema exactly in the way, in which it stems from the lived body and physical body.

149

The layers of the constitution of corporeality as well as the various levels of activity and passivity against the background of activity and affectivity of the I can be expressed through the dual view, as formulated by Wehrle (2013): it concerns a horizontality of the corporeality, which expresses the being of a body (whereby we are the body), and a verticality, which investigates how we have a physical body. “While *being a body* refers to both being a lived and material body, *having a body* represents the fact that we can address ourselves as Körper.” (Wehrle 2020, 501.) We can see this in the philosophical-

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for example, grasping [*Greifen*] or pointing [*Zeigen*] are two different actions, but in the first case it is a spontaneous, immediate action, whereas in the latter case it is an action, which is at the same time abstract (see Wehrle 2013; Wehrle follows Merleau-Ponty and Goldstein in the analysis of a pathological patient who was capable of grasping objects, but could not point to them). The hand expresses different kinds of gestures and in creative activity it is linked to our thinking—J. Pallasmaa (see 2009, 19, 21–22, 70 ff.) investigates the connection between hand, eye, and mind, as well as different meanings of hand.

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anthropological approach of Helmuth Plessner, who focuses on particular examples of *Leibkörperlichkeit* and *Körperleiblichkeit* body schemas, such as limit expressions of laughter and crying (Plessner 1970), our performance in the public domain in roles, but also, for example, expressions linked to artistic production. Our investigation of corporeality is thus enriched by a new dimension:

The body thus appears not only as a medium and border of concrete intersubjective encounters, but at the same time as the subject and object of the cultural and normative constitution of the image of the normal or pathological, healthy or sick, as well as the beautiful or ugly body. (Wehrle 2013, 220.)

In such a configuration, we can look at the body and related forms of hygiene—or sanitariness.

150

### **The public domain and the hygiene of the soul**

If we introduce phenomenological understanding of corporeality into the anthropological context, we can present some of its manifestations in greater detail as well as trace these manifestations back to their original grounding in the body. Viewed anthropologically, a human being is an excentric positionality; that is, a human being does not have a fixed center, but is defined by its situatedness and by the ways, in which it tackles this situatedness. One of the basic manifestations of life, where we can point out the anthropological difference—that is, the way, in which a man differs from the plant and animal sphere,<sup>9</sup> in which a man is de-centered or ex-centrally present—, is *corporeality*. The fact that we both are a body and have a body is a cause of the continuous balancing of physical body and lived body, and therefore a reason for constituting oneself in life. A human being is also a social and historical being. In other words, the excentric positionality concerns all domains of the life of a human being—corporeality (I am a body and I have a body), social

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<sup>9</sup> This distinction is reflected in the way the positionality, the being of an organism in the environment, and relation of an organism to this environment, are configured.

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roles (I am always in a certain role and at the same time I create this role), historicity (I am always in a certain historical situation, which I am somehow aware of). How do we encounter hygiene in this context?

It is not by chance that the issue of hygiene appears in Plessner in relation with the human being in society, when he investigates societal movements and changes. Hygiene does not appear here primarily as a physiological need or as a protection of the health of the somatic body, but it concerns societal expression and communication. But, as we will see, hygiene in these cases is not primarily an issue of outer construction or social convention, but it stems precisely from corporeality. In the following part, we will thus investigate how this social appearance of hygiene is grounded in the phenomenon of corporeality and how both the physical body and the lived body are expressed in it.

In the text, “Grenzen der Gemeinschaft. Eine Kritik des sozialen Radikalismus” (1924), hygiene is analyzed in relation to the issues of *diplomacy* and *good manners*. These phenomena include schemes of behavior, which are situational and individual, but which are also subordinated to certain principles. They represent the duality of our corporeality, which is constituted as lived corporeality in the spontaneity of its expressivity and, at the same time, is a means, a bearer of the outer features, which manifest our behavior outwardly. A human being co-creates these phenomena by establishing them, animating them, even transgressing them (subversions can likewise be functional).<sup>10</sup> To put it differently, they express both what is spontaneous in the human being and what is schematized, formalized. Therefore, the protective layer of a human being is produced through diplomacy and manners, and at the same time its vulnerability is recognized by it. Diplomacy supplies the means, which make communication possible and which balance the tensions and forces that affect the human being. At the same time, these tensions and forces neutralize behavior and can strip it of unpredictable liveliness. Various factors are operative here,<sup>11</sup> and they lead to an eventual broadening of what we can do (the power), on the one hand, and our protection, on the other.

151

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<sup>10</sup> Constitutive elements of this sphere are also taboo, transgression, forbidden forms of behavior, alienation, but also personal protection.

<sup>11</sup> “The play of threat and intimidation, cunning and persuasion, action and negotiation.” (Plessner 1981, 99.)

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The schema of public behavior—what I do and how I do it—is thus connected with gestures, symbols, signs, public expressions, roles, and masks. In the spontaneity of intersubjective situation, we, for example, see facial expressions of the other as facial expressions, but at the same time they are immediate bearers of sense (Husserl 1952, 235). Corporeal expressivity represents the visible expressions, which function for both communication and hiding what we cannot or do not want to express publicly. Corporeality here both reveals and hides. Being a body and having a body, which are constantly shifting here, means that in the public domain we take up roles—we are always in some role linked to certain expressions.<sup>12</sup> In other words, *a specific configuration of being a lived body in the physical body appears*. We create a ceremonial level, which preserves an “order” of our life as we understand it; we feel acceptable within the framework of this order. This order is supposed to be a healthy environment, a domain free of all that is improper, free of all the suspect “junk” (*Plunder*; Plessner 1981, 87). This order is thus linked to respective hygienic measures and regulations instituted, in order to protect us and maintain a healthy environment.

152 Plessner observes that the public domain also allows for such a “hygiene of the soul,” which is related to the balancing of the tensions concentrated in the personal, intimate domain. Hygiene contributes to resilience. Living in tensions and conflicts with oneself can be unbearable, and therefore the tension is released and relieved by entering the public domain—a person, for example, takes up a role in the workplace or in the community, identifies with a certain social task, and so on. This provides her or him with functioning behavioral frameworks, which need not be constantly confronted with their interiority. Plessner states in connection with this:

For the Westerner, there is a new compulsion to defend all that is ceremonial for reasons of hygiene of the soul. Its evaluation—which entails perhaps an overestimation of the personality—consequently leads to the development of an increased protection of the psyche from exposure, injury, and humiliation in public. (Plessner 1981, 87.)

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12 There can be quite ostensible situations, such as when we wear masks, which can, under certain conditions, become an armor-plate. See Fischer 2002.

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As a certain compensation, society creates and strengthens the ceremonial domain pursuant to the degree, in which the individuals comprising such a society are individualistically, socially, or community-oriented, as well as the degree, in which the society is open or closed, and to which it feels threatened or free.

A stable space for the human being can be secured here. This happens, for example, when one's gesture in the public domain is accepted with understanding, and one can express oneself in a free way. However, a deviation concerning the understanding of a healthy environment—allowing for the protection and, therefore, the hygiene of the soul—can also take place here; hygiene is then changed in a negative manner. Pursuant to Plessner's diagnosis from the 1930s, the issue here is whether we are more concerned with *Gemeinschaft*—a community—or *Gesellschaft*—a society. Undue emphasis on one's own interiority and on narrow, personal, or "blood" relations can lead to cold rationalization when protecting this interiority or relations, or it can lead to irrational excesses. In this manner, a social radicalism can arise. Plessner also pays attention to certain symbols (for example, clothing), gestures, and expressions in public.<sup>13</sup> A century later, another example is at hand: wearing masks during a pandemic. At the primary level, this concerns the protection of health. This means, however, other things as well: it expresses a social or political position, solidarity with the endangered groups, or one's own vulnerability. We can locate all these meanings within dual corporeality (*Leibkörperlichkeit* and *Körperlichkeit*); that is, we can define them as ultimately a corporeal phenomenon.

153

We see, however, that the original understanding of hygiene from the position of phenomenology of corporeality has gotten more complex, complicated, and in a certain way contradictory. Institutes of hygiene can be insufficient for the purposes of the realization of my physical and mental strengths. Public domain on the other hand can impose hygienic demands, which may be seen as excessive, too; exceeding what is sufficient for my goal-directed action, for the realization of my physical and mental strengths as perceived on the basis of my original understanding of my corporeality, which,

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<sup>13</sup> Also, for example, what it means when we strip someone of them.

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as we have seen, is always somehow present. However, once we introduce the point of view of philosophical anthropology, it is clear that this realization, this successful goal-directed action, presupposes others, presupposes community or society, and therefore this public domain—together with its seemingly excessive hygienic demands—is outlined by the very same corporeality. In a way, the body takes part in the production of what is alien to it. The balancing act becomes much more difficult—not only because it is difficult for a man to achieve an equilibrium between body and environment, but because the dividing line between them becomes blurry, because they start to melt into each other. The conflicts become harder to resolve because it becomes more difficult to determine what is in conflict. Rather than being the final instance for the resolution of conflicts, the original relationship to body—as disclosed by phenomenology of corporeality—serves only as a constant reminder and even a source of conflicts. Rather than resolving these conflicts, we will look in the next sections at how they manifest themselves, firstly, in social practices and, then, in the artistic production.

154 To conclude, the basis of this thinking is that subjectivity is corporeality variously articulated in its unity (see Husserl 1952, 241–242). It can be manifested in the peculiar “having” a body, whereby the body, which “we are,” is objectified in how we “have” a body in particular. The outer features of corporeality are linked to the fact that I always “am” a corporeal being, realizing my corporeality, which involves both becoming familiar with a given role in its realization and the spontaneous performance of gestures:

Being a body must be characterized by an inherent pre-reflective self-awareness, whereas having a body refers to the realm of object perception or thematic reflection that, in turn, is founded on the former, more primary form of intention and self-awareness. (Wehrle 2020, 506.)

### **Hygiene in art: Images of the hygienic body**

Helmuth Plessner leads us further in the investigation of the topic of hygiene. Hygiene is a phenomenon of our corporeality, which concerns both the personal and the public domain, and its influence in the life of a human

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being is multidirectional and can be seen in various facets of our action and experience. It can be seen in the domain of culture as well. Let us look now into this domain, which is related to expressivity, to a human as a cultural being; in particular, let us look at the situation of an artist. In art, the question of hygiene is posed as a novel issue; it is explicitly thematized, for example, in the fine arts and literature.

In 1965, Helmuth Plessner (2016b) wrote a text on the occasion of the 80<sup>th</sup> birthday of Ernst Bloch entitled “Über die gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen der modernen Malerei.” Plessner here looks more closely into the relationship between art and the political system, and he does so both in the case of art in a totalitarian society and art, which is not explicitly subject to a totalitarian regime, but which “is in” the society and reacts to its conditions and possibilities. Being “in” the situation, being “according to” the situation and taking part in its unfolding, reacting to it and co-determining it—which all expresses the excentric positionality as a basic determination of a human being—, therefore, in this case concerns an artist.

To put it differently, the questions of “what” is worth depicting and “how” it should be depicted concerns a human being’s understanding, whereby a human being is an intersubjective, social, and historical being always interconnected and situated in the environment, which is likewise co-created by him. Every formalized and externalized scheme concerns not only the framework images of a human being and configurations set from the outside, but also particular, concrete forms of our experiencing and behavior, that is, it concerns corporeality. What does this mean in the life of a human being in particular?

155

Industrialism is the form of communication, expressionism is art, social radicalism is the ethics of tactlessness. The call for physical hygiene, which is already satisfied with the skylight and tiled walls, aligns perfectly with an art that rushes straight into the essentials, with a morality of ruthless sincerity and the principled harming of yourself and others. (Plessner 1981, 110.)<sup>14</sup>

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14 This observation is not accidental; it appears also during the thematization and

Such tendencies in society, culture, medicine, and art (the fine arts, literature, theatre, architecture, and so on) are intertwined. Good examples can be found in the works of Slovak and Czech artists from the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, where hygiene also appears in their works of art.

We find here an exalting of hygiene, the image of a hygienically clean, sanitized body, but also a broader perception of hygiene in certain coldness in or disregard for relationships. We can say that this is related to a loss of the nearness of the other person and a certain stiffness, curtness in action; Plessner pointed to similar phenomena. Hygiene can contribute to a healthy and safe environment, but the sterility strips it of vitality and viability. Exaggerated bodily sterility, which accompanies physical distancing and the experiencing of one's own corporeality by sterility, can lead to an emotional distancing or a damaged relationship to one's own body. Hygienic claims thus appear at different levels of life of a human being and culture—from hygienic living, work hygiene, and hygienic city even to hygienic love.

156 The literary scholar Fedor Matejov notices a passage in a prose text by Charles Louis Philippe (1874–1909), *Bubu de Montparnasse*, concerning a “hygienic matter” (*une chose hygiénique*).<sup>15</sup> He then proceeds to pursue this theme in the works of the Slovak writer Dominik Tatarka (1913–1989).

One does not have to thoroughly consult Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*, in order to say that we are not here in the domain of an emphasis of corporeality as weakness, fragility, temptation, sin, redemption, or damnation, but in the domain of the bodily condition, “live-lihood,” way

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criticism of the artistic production on the part of the artists, too. In the text “Súčasná situácia maľby [Current Situation of Painting],” Zdeněk Rykr, whom we will speak about later, states: “If the Renaissance has a symbol of a lion, the Gothic a symbol of a dragon, decadence a symbol of an orchid, post-war Cubism a symbol of a herring, then let us have a bathtub in our coat of arms. It is almost amusing how people dislike that water. Especially for artists, eau de cologne and ‘only’ dipping suffice for them if it helps to avoid a real shower.” (Quoted in: Lahoda 2016, 146.)

15 “She kissed him on the mouth. It's a good hygienic matter between a man and his wife, which entertains you for fifteen minutes before you fall asleep [Elle l'embrassa à pleine bouche. C'est une chose hygiénique et bonne entre un homme et sa femme, qui vous amuse un petit quart d'heure avant de vous endormir].” (Philippe 1905, 39.)

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of living, passing time [...] of course, the emphasis matches the particular period—we are talking about the end of the 19th century or the beginning of the 20th—, and it is venereal. (Matejov 2020, 34.)

The image of the body is here projected into the state of the human being, its condition and perception of its own corporeality. The body expresses itself in such a way that it avoids unpredictable emotions, passion, and warmth in form of a physical contact, all of which can disrupt this condition. There appears in works of art a symptomatic type of an impersonal interior, in which a person is situated: a bathroom, a hotel room, a hall, a canteen. As an archetype, the impersonal interior permeates the image of other habitable rooms and the perception of spaces and people in them. The interior is cold, because a human being does not expect the experience of the nearness of the other body there, or this experience is transferred to the spaces linked with the domain of hygiene, respectively. Modern living has been clean not only, insofar as its forms and shapes are concerned, but also insofar as individual pieces of equipment are concerned; Peter Zajac enumerates, for example, “canalization, showers, running water, bath, central heating, fume hood, flush toilet, and sometimes even bidet” (Zajac and Vydra 2018, 114) among them.<sup>16</sup>

157

On the one hand, there is a type of schematized contact in the public, which lacks enough personal relationships, and, on the other hand, there is even a personal and corporeal domain, which is likewise permeated by impersonality. The bathroom and the boudoir are places of intimacy, privacy, secrecy, but at the same time they involve the coldness of ceramic tiles, metal accessories, cold touches of naked parts of the body. Here, we find an image of corporeality as “boudoir corporeality” as well as an image of the human being of hygiene. Zajac<sup>17</sup> states the following in his analysis of the Slovak town Bánovce nad Bebravou:

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16 In *Farská republika* (*The Clerical Republic*; 1948), we read: “He went to the bathroom and opened the tap fully several times. He was on fire as the water sprayed all over the white porcelain sink.” (Tatarka 1948, 95.) I thank F. Matejov for the references to this text as well as for the 1948 edition.

17 “As P. Zajac sees it, the contemporary context of [boudoir corporeality] lies in Surrealism with Baroque-Rococo reminiscences.” (Matejov 2020.) At the same time, Bánovce nad Bebravou is a town where the priest and president of the Slovak State during Second World War—Jozef Tiso (1887–1947)—worked.

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The human being of *hygiene* in Bánovce is likewise new. This is because in the 1930s Bánovce was becoming a modern, hygienic town. “Hygiene” in a novel is as unique and crucial a word as “modern” or “new.” However, the ideology [of the hygiene] plays a peculiar role. (Zajac 2020, 133.)

158 Which corporeality is thus influenced by the demands of hygiene? The key layer here is not the lived corporeality, but more a condition of the body, images of healthy corporeality—that is, corporeality in the third person. Here, we can turn to Plessner’s analyses of various domains of human experiencing and expression. The disanimation of the body and sterility of the body schema manifest themselves, for example, in direct addressing of our body during play as a prominent phenomenon of cultural production, or, in particular, in sport, where we no longer perform as a living organism spontaneously manifesting our corporeality, but instrumentality, planning, and competitiveness (competing either with myself or with others) prevail. An insufficient or inappropriate position towards one’s own body produces a need to return back to it somehow. This “new” or “modern” return is, however, problematic on multiple counts. Let us mention one of them, where Plessner refers to Scheler and his critique of “*Körperkultur*”:

Since sport is a resublimation, that is, restitution of a measure of the drive energies that were previously excessively directed toward thinking, work of the body and physical culture, in an artificially regulated form, and indeed [this measure] wants to be explicit, are not a pure, beautiful expression and higher formation of the well-formed body like the Greek gymnasium, but rather a reflection and artificial renewed care of an intrinsic value of the physical existence that has been neglected for centuries. (Cited in: Plessner 2016a, 150.)

It seems that the effort to reach a *well-formed body* is a complex phenomenon, which stems from the care of self in form of a care of soul. A *body in good condition*, a well-maintained body, does not necessarily reach it, if it is oriented on the “thematization” of body-object and if it is obsessed

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by its measurement, condition, hygiene, and so on; this is a limited view of corporeality.<sup>18</sup>

### The creative work of a hand and hygienic painting

We can now turn around this optics of corporeality—where the physical facet, translating itself to certain “modern” hygienic image of body, prevailed—and look at what happens, in this case in a painting, if we return to the intimate link between expressivity and the body schema from the point of view of lived corporeality. In this way, we can also follow phenomenologically-inspired analyses of Juhani Pallasmaa who points to examples of crafts or works of art produced by hand, and shows that on the basis of creative activity there is an essential connection between hand, eye, and mind. One could connect these descriptions with the description of the body schema developed above on the basis of Husserl’s texts. Creative activity is based, on the one hand, on training, practice, a refining of skills, and the condition of a hand and its physical state [*körperliche Leiblichkeit*], and, on the other hand, on spontaneity, try-and-fail, and bodily-mental possibilities [*leiblich-seelische*]. Moreover, not everything in the creative attitude is subordinated to intentional skill. Such a skill often takes a backseat in favor of free sketching by hand; the hand makes way for the matter itself, playing the instrument makes room for rhythm and melody; such an action captures the shapes and proceeds towards the thing itself or the depicted landscape. Invention, uncertainty of the result, and experimentation—all of which makes the project an open activity—enter the creative work of an artist or a craftsman. How does hygiene appear in art in connection with all this? We need not be led towards the image of the body seen from the position of the third person—on the contrary, we can be motivated to cope with our own feelings of corporeality and sensuality, which are “a question of composition and organization of an image as well” (Lahoda 2000, 74).

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18 One could say that subjective motivational contexts make way for natural-causal relations, which means that we leave the attitude focused on subjectivity (which Husserl also calls “personalistic”) and we view our own corporeality differently, through differently objectifying optics (Husserl 1952, 210).

Since hygiene has a tendency to schematize corporeality in certain body image, we are usually led in the opposite direction. Hygiene—as found in works of art and in the outer features of the seriousness of our social coexistence in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century—is manifested in the treatment of the theme of social contact (often in form of depersonalization) and in the search for a suitable form (aligning oneself, for example, with formalism, schematism, or instrumentalism). We have seen this in the previous part, when discussing the images of the hygienic body. We can meet them in the New Objectivity movement, in the case of purism in art and in a radical form in tendencies of Futurism, where war is considered a hygiene, a cleaning of the world. Reactions to this situation can be, however, expressed in the opposite way. This is the main interest for us now—as an endeavor to reach the original phenomenon of hygiene. These expressions can be more or less functional, trying different forms of depiction, in order to address this question without succumbing to it. The Czech painter Zdeněk Rykr (1900–1940) tackles these issues in a peculiar way. The term “hygienic painting” is linked precisely to his oeuvre (Lahoda 2016, 13).

160 Rykr was a unique artist. He was literally trying different themes and genres, in order not to get stuck in a single style or single position. In his oeuvre, we can find “a unique relationship between a modern artist and an advertisement [...] so that this livelihood permeated Rykr’s intentional work and vice versa” (Lahoda 2016, 11). Rykr was a talented artist with a mastery of multiple artistic techniques, but he is also an author of the famous logo of the Orion chocolate. This approach resonates with Plessner’s thinking about form in art. It is a central topic of his text “Wiedergeburt der Form im technischen Zeitalter” (1932). Under the rubric of “form,” Plessner understands measure or equilibrium. Plessner is not a superficial critic of modern technology, but he looks for possibilities concerning how a society or an individual can cope with it (literally, to achieve equilibrium). When looking for a form in new artistic conditions in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was necessary to transcend the schema of new against the old, which can be seen in reactions against tradition. On the contrary, this means the reconciliation with the situation, in which we live, an openness towards it—and this situation is created precisely by the turn towards technology. Rykr could be precisely the artist whom Plessner is looking for when seeking the new form. Various features of Rykr’s work bear

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witness to this: “a rejection of static categories,” an openness “towards various graphic media,” “a dissolution of a single individual style in parallel currents” (as disclosed by: Lahoda 2016, 11), “a freedom of ‘interplay’ with the product,” “a joyful interplay between the viewer and the product,” an interplay between the material and the environment, and forms, which are open towards new possibilities (as described by: Plessner 2002, 55 and elsewhere).

In what particular way is Rykr’s painting “hygienic”? Hygiene here has a two-fold form. In the first case, it is related to the outer, public domain and to the visual surroundings of a human being.

[Rykr] sought certain hygiene of the public domain where aesthetics should operate, and the impacts of widespread kitsch and tastelessness hurt him a lot; he felt almost physical pain. His engagement in advertisement can be understood as a response to the crisis of public taste. (Lahoda 2016, 13.)

Here, hygiene has a positive function of healing the visual surroundings, cleaning these surroundings, and expulsing what does not belong there. The second case, which is more significant for us, can be seen in his final, remarkable series of paintings titled *Koupelna* (*Bathroom*), for example, the painting *Žena v koupelně* (*A Woman in a Bathroom*) from 1939 or in the earlier painting *Schodiště* (*Staircase*) from 1928. These paintings no longer concern the outer domain, but we can see here an artist coping with the experience of one’s own corporeality, sensuality, and relationship to another person. Rykr finds himself at the limits of sensualism and tries to proceed towards pure perception in his own artistic production. Hygiene is considered a challenge for the artistic production when the artist tries to achieve an equilibrium in the elements of the image, as found already in Cézanne or Picasso.<sup>19</sup> Artistic expression is an expression of an artist’s contact with the canvas, of this touch as a gesture of a basic corporeal experience, which is free of stylization and

161

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19 Lahoda (2000, 69, 78) states that this concerned the “purification of the means of expression and the exclusion of the inessential; in the first case, the experience and tradition given by the hygienic purification of Cubism, and in the second case, given by the new impulse of the ‘pure painting’ of Impressionism.”

ornamentation, that is, which is linked directly to the corporeal experience of the artist. An artist can thus reach actual form as original and pure form of expression. Rykr proceeds from the possibility of capturing the human body in its particular shape towards the dissolution of its shape. The shapelessness of a female body, presented as body in its organic originality or basis,<sup>20</sup> stands in contrast to the geometrically arranged bathroom tiles.

To conclude, although this is an example of the hygienic painting, there is no objectification of the body in the form of a hygienic body image or body viewed from the third person; on the contrary, Rykr's paintings lead us towards original layers of lived, subjective corporeality—that we are the body, and how we are the body. He calls for the purity in art, but by that he means purity in the sense of purification, which leads to the original contact of the artist and the painting, to the original sensing of oneself.

162 What is important for us in these works of art is neither some social critique nor some artistic or political statements for or against hygiene. Rather, what should interest us here are the very tensions they presuppose and point towards. As argued above, phenomenology of corporeality in cooperation with philosophical anthropology allows us to describe these tensions in some detail: my lived body outlines my possibilities in the realization of my strengths; but, in doing so, it also outlines the relationship with others and constitutes the public sphere, which however comes back with demands upon my lived body that may seem alien. The analyzed works of art do not resolve these tensions, but they are a valuable confirmation of these philosophical insights. And these philosophical insights, in turn, protect these works of art against reductive interpretations or even political misuses.

### **Hygiene today?**

We have questioned hygiene as an ambiguous and diverse phenomenon in the framework of a human being's complex being in the world and with others;

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20 Concerning "organic matter," see Lahoda 2000, 187 ff. This dissolution of corporeality is linked with the rooms, which are connected with purification, and the beginning and end of life as a place of frequent suicide. After finishing this cycle, Rykr killed himself on the railroad tracks.

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that is, of a human being as a corporeal and social being viewed in changes of her or his expressivity. This keeps the phenomenon of hygiene in close relationship with the life of subjectivity and the subjective perspective of experience. This led us to a significant conclusion that hygiene cannot be originally derived from the outer (socially construed) or causal-physiological phenomena. This does not mean, however, that it cannot appear in inappropriate, derived, or limited forms. In order to develop these investigations, we have followed Plessner's texts, which tackle the issue of hygiene and pregnant examples of its manifestations, and we have connected them with the phenomenological analyses of corporeality as a lived body and a physical body. This grounding in the phenomenology of corporeality allowed us to follow anthropological observations: hygiene thus concerns the being of our lived corporeality as well as the forms of body expression.<sup>21</sup>

Since we connected these analyses to the philosophical-anthropological investigations, we were able to follow the changes of the expression of hygiene in art and in social relations. Where the theme of hygiene appears in relation with the body schema, we can say—following Plessner—that through this phenomenon a human being is confronted with who it is and who it is becoming. The human being is confronted with its situation of contingency, uprootedness, rupture, and the instability of the world, in which it lives. Hygiene does not appear from beginning onwards as either a wholly positive or a wholly negative matter, but in particular manifestations it can take on the form of pure expression (Rykr's paintings), the hygienic body, or hygienic relations (in the public domain of diplomacy and good manners). As Husserl reminds us, the body is my original organ, through which I realize my actions; it is an organ of my will. At the same time, I establish myself and a body becomes the lived body through experiencing, sensation (see Husserl 1952, 151–152). We also have the physical body, *Körper*, in view. Maren Wehrle discloses the possibility of this view—of this focus—in the following way:

163

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21 We follow the original “connection with the body” (e.g. see Husserl 1952, 247), which as subjectively motivated is both an expression of a spiritual life and a “part of nature”.

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Having a body as explicit corporeality and temporality is not merely a default mode of embodiment [...] While it certainly can be alienating, it also implies the capacity for one to take a distance towards their immediate actions and feelings, and thus gain a sense of distance and control, makes it possible to reflect on and evaluate one's bodily behavior. The body as object thus mustn't be necessarily a burden but could also be a blessing (dependent on the respective circumstances). (Wehrle 2020, 518.)

Since corporeality appears at the center of phenomenological analyses, we can reach through it to the question of human nature:

164

Above all, however, the bodily determination of human subjectivity offers a new, methodically reflected possibility to approach the question of human nature in such a way that it transcends reductionist misinterpretations. Phenomenologically, the lived body does not show itself as an objective nature which, as if remote-controlled, operates as a chain of causes and effects [...] Experienced from within, the lived body—and thus human nature—present themselves rather as a context of sense-realization (*Sinnleistungszusammenhang*). (Brudzińska 2018, 16.)

We have begun with describing how corporeality entered the view of philosophy thanks to phenomenological approach, which considers the body as an intertwining of lived and physical body. Thanks to this, the original absence of philosophical consideration of hygiene turned into a continuous discovering of its presence in the life of man at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century. This has confirmed our assumption that hygiene can be one of the leading clues in the research of subjectivity. However, the following question arises: what is actual and still relevant in the examples of the permeation of art and our life by hygiene? We can answer that we should recognize the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon. Hygiene in its exposed form can manifest itself in a deficient, inadequate way, but it can also be an appropriate reaction to the actual situation, too. In both adequate and inadequate forms, this is a balancing

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act between man and environment, a coping with the situation. This does not concern only the limiting of our social contacts or social proximity during a pandemic. Sterility, impersonal contactlessness, imagology, or visual pollution have been present in our lives before, and so also have been the reactions to them. The situatedness of a human being (in relationships or in art) can lead to both appropriate and cold or pathetic attitudes. For Plessner, a human being is an open question. As in art, the equilibrium is not in our hands in advance, since it is a balancing act of coping with the essentially unstable world.

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# BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE

## FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL'S CONCEPT OF ROMANTIC IRONY IN *FRAGMENTS* AND IN *LUCINDE*

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*Abstract*

The concept of romantic irony developed by Friedrich Schlegel is one of the most powerful and productive elements of the Jena Romanticism, which, to this day, stirs interest among the researchers of the German culture of the turn of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. In thus-oriented studies, however, most scholars emphasize the *Fragments* published by the philosopher in the years 1797–1800, while relegating *Lucinde*—Schlegel's controversial novel written in 1799—to the margins of their reflection.

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Although underappreciated by the academia, *Lucinde*, in its fundamental assumptions, was supposed to be an exercise in both the theory and the practice of irony. Bearing this in mind, in the present article I attempt to reconstruct Schlegel's groundbreaking concept by taking into account both these sources. In the analysis, I focus on the notions of *dissimulation*, *dialectics*, and *reflection*: three descriptive categories, which ultimately account for the innovative character of Schlegelian vision of irony.

*Keywords*: romantic irony, dissimulation, dialectics, reflection.

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### **Med filozofijo in literaturo. Pojem romantične ironije v *Fragmentih* in v *Lucinde* Friedricha Schlegla**

*Povzetek*

170 Pojem romantične ironije, kakor ga je razgrnil Friedrich Schlegel, je eden izmed najvplivnejših in najproduktivnejših elementov jenske romantike, ki vse do dandanašnji zbuja zanimanje raziskovalcev nemške kulture na prelomu 18. in 19. stoletja. Znotraj tovrstnih študij večina strokovnjakov poudarja *Fragmente*, ki jih je filozof objavljaj med letoma 1797 in 1800, medtem ko Schleglov kontroverzni roman *Lucinde* iz leta 1799 potiskajo na obrobje svojih refleksij. Čeprav akademska sfera *Lucinde* ne ceni dovolj, naj bi roman, po svojih temeljnih predpostavkah, predstavljal vajo tako v teoriji kakor v praksi ironije. Glede na to skušam v pričujočem članku Schleglov prelomni pojem rekonstruirati tako, da upoštevam oba navedena vira. Znotraj analize se osredotočam na ideje *pretvarjanja*, *dialektike* in *refleksije*: gre za tri deskriptivne kategorije, ki navsezadnje utemeljujejo inovativni značaj schleglovskega videnja ironije.

*Ključne besede*: romantična ironija, pretvarjanje, dialektika, refleksija.

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## Introduction

Beyond doubt, one of the most original achievements of early Romantic philosophy is the concept of irony, as it was formulated by Friedrich Schlegel in the *Fragments* published in the years 1797–1800, initially in the *Lyceum der schönen Künste* edited by Johann Reichardt, and then in the *Athenaeum*. The latter journal, which the writer founded together with his brother August Wilhelm in 1798, attracted the leading figures of the so-called Jena circle, including Novalis (Georg Philipp von Hardenberg) or Friedrich Schleiermacher. The novelty of Schlegel's concept of irony consisted in his departure from the traditional approach to the phenomenon in question—which would inscribe it in the scope of rhetoric—in favor of granting irony a philosophical dimension. Although in doing so the German author seems to be returning to the ancient lineage of irony (dating back to Socrates and his philosophical activity), the inspiration for his innovative revision of the concept of irony should in fact be sought in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in whose lectures Schlegel participated when he arrived in Jena in 1796, and of whose views expressed in the *Science of Knowledge* he quickly became an ardent enthusiast. It is the influence of Fichtean thought on the fundamentals of the young author's standpoint that led to his groundbreaking revision of the sense of the notion of irony, which, for Schlegel, is not “in the first instance, a literary device or trope; it is a general, transcendently mandated property of a work or a philosophical position” (Rush 2006, 180). The perspective of transcendental philosophy allowed him to set his own concept apart from the notion prevailingly adopted in rhetorical interpretations to date. It also constituted the basis for his delineation of the concept's altogether new variant: “with him irony became open, dialectical, paradoxical, or ‘Romantic’” (Muecke 1970, 23). As a consequence, the irony we call “Romantic” today (in contrast with its ancient prototype), propelled the emergence of a brand-new form of expression. Just as the features of Socratic irony surface in Plato's dialogues, so does Schlegelian irony's *Romantic* character materialize most fully in novels, the “Socratic dialogues of our time” (Schlegel 1971b, 145). Hence, “wherever philosophy appears in oral or written dialogues—and is not simply confined into rigid systems—there irony should be asked for and provided”

(Schlegel 1971b, 148). Following this premise, the theory of irony formulated in the *Fragments* could only acquire its proper shape—and become manifest in its full complexity—in *Lucinde*, Schlegel's only semi-autobiographical novel, published in 1799 in the atmosphere of a moral scandal. Because the two perspectives (that of the *Fragments* and that of *Lucinde*) illuminate and complement each other, we will pose the thesis that the elements of the theory of Romantic irony that we can identify within the *Lyceum* and *Athenaeum* are reflected not only in the content of Schlegel's novel, but also in its plot solutions and in the manner of narration that he chose to adopt. Nevertheless, it should be noted that an attempt to reconstruct the theory of irony, even on the basis of both these sources, is problematic due to the fragmentary nature of Schlegel's writing, which characterizes not only his publications in the *Lyceum* and *Athenaeum* but also *Lucinde*. The novel itself remains a fragment, insofar as the book known to us today, in the never-realized intention of the German author, was supposed to be only the first of the four novels that were to make up his *opus magnum*. Taking this difficulty into account, in our analyses we will move within a space mapped out with reference to the three categories, which define the concept of Romantic irony: *dissimulation*, *dialectics*, and *reflection*. We will proceed from the description of the irony's external form (as inspired by the Socratic method) down to the exploration of its innermost dimension, as determined by the assumptions of Fichte's transcendental philosophy. In the light of the adopted thesis, we will study the functioning of dissimulation, dialectics, and reflection in the *Fragments*, where these categories appear for the first time, and shall then seek to find them in *Lucinde*. Such a procedure will allow us to reconstruct a more complete vision of Schlegel's theory of irony, and to place it in the perspective of his idea of the synthesis of art and philosophy.

### **Irony as dissimulation**

Although today Schlegel is considered to be the author of the concept of Romantic irony, in his writings, published during his lifetime, he himself never used the term, apparently founding his critical position upon the basis of the common belief that “the central fact about the history of irony in Greek use is

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its inseparability from Socrates' personality and influence" (Knox 1961, 3). In the light of Garnett Sedgewick's research on the history of the concept, Socratic irony is an intermediary form, bridging the first (pre-modern) stages of its development with its modern incarnations, "for on the one hand it brings us close to the earliest extant uses of the word in Greek, and on the other it is the matrix of all the ironies which the Romantics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries developed" (1948, 10). Formulating the most general definition of Socratic irony as "the only involuntary and yet completely deliberate dissimulation" (Schlegel 1971b, 155), Schlegel alludes to the initial phase of the development of the ancient *eironeia*, which has its origins in the formula of an early Greek comedy, in which Eiron, representing the type of a hero aware of his weaknesses, but, at the same time, clever and cunning, who, having mastered the art of pretense to perfection, always prevails over the stupid and overly self-confident Alazon. The mode of action distinctive to the personae of the ancient Greek stage recurs in Plato's dialogues, in which Socrates, pretending ignorance, always plays the role of Eiron, exposing the misconceptions and prejudices shared by prominent Athenian Alazons. According to Aristotle, as Norman Knox demonstrates, the formula of the dialogue adopted from Greek comedy and then attributed to Socrates contains the distinction between two antagonistic strategies of dissimulation—"the one extreme of Alazony or boastful exaggeration, and the other of Eirony or self-depreciating concealment of one's possessions and powers" (1961, 4)—, both of which, despite different valuations, always stand in opposition to the truth. The difference between these strategies, however, is not exhausted in the space of ethical decisions alone; it also lies in the attitude of distance towards the world and with respect to oneself, which Schlegel's definition of irony emphasizes. Such an attitude, typical of Eiron—and later also Socrates—is as alien to Alazon as it is to the opponents of the Athenian sage, who populate Platonic dialogues. In its foundations, *eironeia* is therefore based on the awareness of the difference between truth and fiction, which is why "the basic feature of every irony is a contrast between a reality and an appearance" (Chevalier 1932, 42). This trait, perhaps, may reveal itself only in "the attitude of mind held by a philosophic observer when he abstracts himself from the contradictions of life and views them all impartially, himself perhaps included in the ironic vision"

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(Sedgwick 1948, 13). Consequently, this means that irony is not a universal disposition of the human mind; rather, it is an aptitude characterizing a specific type of person. It is precisely within this conceptual frame that Schlegel locates his notion of irony, claiming that “it is equally impossible to feign it or divulge it. To a person who hasn’t got it, it will remain a riddle even after it is openly confessed.” (1971b, 155.) Linking the concept of irony to the subject’s attitude or to the disposition of the human mind, Schlegel seems to adopt the historical fact that “*eironeia*, as the Periclean Greeks conceived it, was not so much a mode of speech as a *general mode of behavior*” (Sedgwick 1948, 6).

174 In the Socratic dialogue of modern times that *Lucinde* was meant to be, dissimulation—as the basic, most general term defining irony—first manifests itself at the foundation of the relationship between the title of Schlegel’s novel and its content. The fact that a woman’s name features prominently in the novel’s title notwithstanding, *Lucinde* is, above all, a narrative about Julius, who undoubtedly stands out as its main, if not the only, protagonist. The story of his love for Lucinde, which is the central literary theme of the book, turns out to be but an excuse to portray the process of Julius’s personality formation in the light of his fantasies, desires, and ideals. The novel, thereby, deceives the readers with its title, “pretending” to offer them an account of the fortunes of the central character’s beloved. We find direct confirmation of this intuition in the dialogue “Yearning and Peace,” in which Lucinde addresses her beloved thus: “I am not, my Julius, the sanctified person you describe [...]. You are that person. When the turmoil has died down and nothing mean or common distracts your noble soul, then you see reflected in me—in me who am forever yours—the marvelous flower of your imagination.” (Schlegel 1971c, 126.) Thus, in Schlegel’s novel, the ironic dissimulation takes on a meaning somewhat different from that typical of Greek comedy or characterizing the dialogues featuring Socrates. The asymmetric relationship between the protagonists, presenting Lucinde as a product of Julius’s imagination, with the latter transferring his own personality, desires, and goals onto her character, can no longer be reduced to the clash of Alazon’s audacity with Eiron’s cleverness, or to the confrontation of Socrates’s knowledge with the ignorance of his opponents. Rather, it is an expression of the character’s Fichtean self-knowledge, who, in the image of his beloved, sees—and knows—only himself. Peter Firchow

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emphasizes this aspect of the relationship between the two characters referring to the etymology of Lucinde's name. Deriving from the word *lux* (Latin for light), the name of Julius's love allows the scholar to put forth the thesis that Lucinde "is Julius's illumination" (Firchow 1971, 24). We may interpret this statement in a twofold fashion: on the one hand, Lucinde "illuminates" the figure of Julius, rendering his own image fuller and more perfect; on the other hand, the luminous name may also be read as symbolizing the male protagonist's inner "enlightenment," experienced under the influence of his love for a woman. Yet, however we approach her, Lucinde admittedly performs a particular function in relation to Julius's character, serving as his female *alter ego*. Consequently, as noted by Søren Kierkegaard, the relationship between Julius and Lucinde is devoid of content and lacks its own history, which is evidenced by the very fact that "their diversions can be only the same *en deux* as Julius thought were the best to use in his solitude" (1989, 300). Likewise, it is not difficult to notice that in the last sections of the book the person of Lucinde—the priestess of the "the holy fire of divine voluptuousness," "the best symbol of the Godhead," or even "the Holy Virgin of the Immaculate Conception" (Schlegel 1971c, 58, 61, 110)—ceases to command Julius's attention. Seen in such a perspective, Lucinde is no more than a phantom figure, whose ostensible nature Schlegel ironically confronts with the fictional "actuality" of Julius's life, at the same time emphasizing her role in the latter's vast effort to know himself.

175

The contrast of reality and appearance inherent in every irony is revealed in yet another essential aspect of *Lucinde*, which is the novel's partially autobiographical character. It leaves little doubt that the plot of the novel echoes Schlegel's romance with the wife of the Berlin banker Simon Weit, Dorothea, who became Lucinde's prototype. Although she was several years older than the writer himself, their encounter in Henriette Herz's salon in 1797 ignited mutual love at first sight, which ultimately led to the demise of the Weit marriage. Soon thereafter, Dorothea married Friedrich, at whose side she remained until his death in 1829. Inspired by these events, and replete with recognizable allusions to some of the most personal and intimate aspects of the couple's relations, *Lucinde*, inevitably, caused a scandal among the Berlin intellectuals. We can therefore say that Julius, wearing the camouflage of the title character of *Lucinde*, is himself a mask worn by Schlegel—his literary *alter*

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176 *ego*. The introduction of an autobiographical thread to the plot of the novel may thus be understood as an exercise of a modern strategy of *dissimulation*, which consists in *simulating* oneself in a literary work. In this context, irony understood in this way plays an important role, because, as Włodzimierz Szturc rightly notes, it is specifically thanks to irony that it becomes possible to “transform a biography into a work of art and to reflect on it” (1992, 70). Nevertheless, *Lucinde* resonates not only with Friedrich’s youthful personal experiences, but also with his literary practice, offering insights into his biography as an author. In his initial letter to Lucinde, Julius, who (as we later learn in the chapter on “Apprenticeship for Manhood”) is an artist painter, describes himself as “an educated lover and writer” (Schlegel 1971c, 45), which formula, rather than his own person, matches Schlegel’s. This is but one of the many examples of the author “leaning out” of the pages of the novel and emphasizing his constant presence, which testifies to Schlegel’s experimentation with the ancient concept of the *persona*, from which, as has been shown, the original notion of irony derives. As Firchow points out, “Schlegel traced the technique of the *persona* to what he believed were its origins in ancient Greek comedy, specifically to the device of the ‘*parabasis*,’ that is, a speech in the name of the poet delivered to the audience in the middle of the play” (1971, 29). In *Lucinde*, the *parabasis* technique is manifest in the *direct* relationship between the protagonist (narrator) and the novel’s author (on whose behalf the former speaks); at the same time, however, it defines the *indirect* relationship between the author and his readers.

### **Irony and dialectics**

In one of the fragments published in the *Lyceum*, Schlegel emphasizes that it is not rhetoric, but “philosophy [that] is the real homeland of irony” (1971b, 148). Thus, he distinguishes irony conceived as a philosophical category from a particular mode of speaking, which, “compared to the sublime urbanity of the Socratic muse [is] like the pomp of the most splendid oration set over against the noble style of an ancient tragedy” (ibid.). In this same fragment, the German author defines irony as “logical beauty” (ibid.). The claim that irony is logical beauty should be considered in the light of Schlegel’s postulate

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of the Romantic synthesis of art and philosophy, according to which “poetry and philosophy should be made one” (1971b, 157). Ernst Behler points out that the technical counterpart of “logical beauty” is the term “dialectics,” which applies to “a particular philosophical type of argumentation practiced by Socrates and developed as a form of art by Plato” (1993, 147). In that case, the notion of “logical beauty” defines the specific “art of thinking,” in which the contradiction of two thoughts is a *sine qua non* condition for the constant progress of reflection. Nevertheless, we must take into account that the sources of the dialectical interpretation of irony have no solid historical justification. As evidenced by Knox’s findings, “neither Socrates nor his friends ever used the word in a serious way to describe the Socratic method, and [...] the idealizations of Socratic dialectic which modern writers have embodied in ‘Socratic irony’ were never attached to the word irony in classical Greek and Latin” (1961, 3). The dialectical interpretation of Romantic irony seems to have a different genesis in Schlegel that is revealed in one of the later fragments published in *Athenaeum*, in which irony is construed as “an absolute synthesis of absolute antitheses, the continual self-creating interchange of two conflicting thoughts” (1971a, 176). In fact, as follows, Schlegel does not take his concept of the art of thinking over from Socrates or Plato, but looks at their idea of dialectics through the lens of modernity, investing into it something that, in essence, it does not contain. The assumption that irony consists in a dialectical movement that finds its realization in a constant transition from the thesis to the antithesis, which flux in itself makes the synthesis possible, comes from the *Science of Knowledge*. In this work, Fichte describes a logical form of thinking, within which “the antithesis is impossible without synthesis, for otherwise the posited would be abolished by the antithesis, so that the latter would be no antithesis, but itself a thesis” (1970, 186). The dialectic pattern reflects the opposition of “I” and “non-I” central to Fichtean idealism, and then—through Schelling’s metaphysics that introduces the concept of the Absolute transcending the opposition of self and nature—it comes to reverberate in the thought of Hegel, who adapts the Romantic notion of dialectics as the foundation of his system. Each of these landmarks on the map of the development of the idealistic German thought abides by same fundamental principle, according to which “the philosophical system is itself conceived as an immanently propelled and

ever evolving process of oppositions, reconciliations, and renewed oppositions” (Abrams 1971, 173). And although, clearly, Schlegel does not build a coherent philosophical system, the theory of Romantic irony as dialectic inscribes itself into the tradition of German idealism, insofar as, on the one hand, it draws inspiration from it (Fichte), and, on the other hand, it becomes a stimulus for its further development (Hegel).

178 Dialectically understood, however, Romantic irony is not reducible to the “logical beauty” alone: it is also expressed in continuous fluctuation “between self-creation and self-destruction” (Schlegel 1971a, 167), which defines the essence of every creative process, and corresponds, at the same time, to the fundamental structure of the “art of thinking.” Schlegel introduces this terminology in one of the early fragments published in the *Lyceum*, which emphasizes the category of self-restriction defined as a “result of self-creation and self-destruction” (1971b, 145). In an act of self-restriction, the creator adopts a perspective of an external observer, and is therefore able to rise above the conditions of his own creative process, which constantly oscillates between the creation and destruction of its own products. However, Schlegel’s concern is not about a particular object born as a result of an artist’s activity, but about a conscious act of will focused on shaping one’s own existence. This, in his view, is the loftiest achievement an authentic artist may attain and, at the same time, the fundament upon which all other external results of his or her artistic activity rest. In this way, to use Frederick Beiser’s phrasing, “the ironist creates forever anew because he always puts forward a new perspective, a richer concept, a clearer formulation; but he also destroys himself because he is forever critical of his own efforts” (2002, 448). In turn, Szturc describes this constant exchange of self-creation for self-destruction as “artistic dialectics” (1992, 70), indirectly pointing to the correspondence between the process of thinking and creative activity, characterizing the Romantic concept of irony. The relation between these two polar extremes corresponds to what Schlegel calls “the continual self-creating interchange of two conflicting thoughts.” Both types of exchange are undoubtedly paradoxical, which in itself emphasizes one of the distinctive traits of Romantic irony: after all, according to Schlegel, irony is also “the form of paradox” (1971b, 149). The notion of paradox itself is closely related to the category of logical beauty, as the very etymology of

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the concept, traditionally falling within the scope of logic and denoting an internally contradictory theorem, suggests. It is precisely such a contradiction that is the source of logical beauty, which is realized in the constant flux of values from the thesis to the antithesis. Furthermore, “if every creative process consists in the interplay between the *distance from creation* and one’s *awareness of creation*—even though it is used to tear down what has been built—then creativity is a paradox” (Szturc 1992, 70; my emphasis). Thus, resorting to the concept of the paradox, in his theory of irony Schlegel equates two types of human activity, construing thinking as a form of creativity and defining creation as a fully conscious thought, determined by a strictly delineated project of shaping one’s own existence.

Dialectics as the basic manifestation of Romantic irony occupies an extremely important place in Schlegel’s only novel, establishing the project of the synthesis of art and philosophy in the optics of the idea of life. Life, as aptly defined by Meyer H. Abrams, is “the generator of the controlling categories of Romantic thought,” and, simultaneously, “the premise and paradigm for what is most innovative and distinctive in Romantic thinkers” (1971, 431). In *Lucinde*, Schlegel resorts to this analogy first to describe the process of thinking, in which the exchange of the thesis for the antithesis, known from the *Fragments*, is replaced by the dialectic of distancing oneself from that which is near and approaching that which is far away: “every idea and whatever else is formed within us seems perfect in itself, as unique and indivisible as a person. One idea supplants the other and what just now seemed near and immediate soon vanishes again into obscurity.” (1971c, 48.) By equating the *idea* (the result of thinking) to a *person* (the product of life), the German author points to the unity of these two processes, in which “the metaphorical translation into the categories and norms of intellection of the attributes of a growing thing” (Abrams 1971, 432), typical of Romantic philosophy, manifests itself clearly. In turn, the idea of the analogy of life and art appears in the chapter “Allegory of Impudence,” which assumes the form of a scene from a comedy, thus alluding to the ancient Greek sources of Romantic irony. In the chapter, Schlegel introduces four young men—begotten by Fantasy and Wit—serving as allegories of the respective novels, of which *Lucinde* was supposed to be composed. Fantasy’s symptomatic words—“destruction and creation; one and

all; and so may the eternal spirit hover forever over the eternal stream of time and life, and observe each bold wave before it ebbs away” (1971c, 57)—allow us to argue that in Schlegel’s view every instance of human creativity has its origins in the dynamism of life, which in itself is understood as a metaphysical process. In its course, individual forms eternally emerge and disappear, which fluctuation corresponds directly to, and manifests itself in, the dialectical structure of irony as the exchange of self-creation for self-destruction, described already in the *Fragments*. In *Lucinde*, this view is documented in the section titled “Two Letters.” The subject of the first of Julius’s letters to Lucinde is an encomium on the creative power of life. Exhilarated by the news that he will soon be a father, the protagonist finds himself eager to reflect on the universal meaning of the affirmation of the eternal cycle of becoming: “In the endless succession of new forms, creative time weaves the wreath of eternity, and the man who is touched by the joy of fruitfulness and health is blessed.” (Schlegel 1971c, 107.) The second letter, however, addressing a destructive power of life, concerns the news about Lucinde’s serious illness. Sensing that the disease may pose a mortal threat to his beloved, Julius comes to recognize the fact that “every single atom of eternal time can contain a world of joy but can also reveal a bottomless pit of sorrows and horror” (Schlegel 1971c, 115). Ultimately, therefore, to an extent much greater than the *Fragments*, *Lucinde* allows us to notice that the project of the synthesis revealed in the notion of irony comprises not two, but three essential components: art, philosophy, and life. For this reason, as Rush notes, Schlegel not only “expands his early credo that all poetry must be philosophical to include its converse: that all philosophy must be poetic” (2006, 181), but also adopts and develops an organic perspective of understanding both these elements. Within such a vision, all authentic art must begin with the artistry of a creative life, while true philosophy cannot be reduced to mere multiplications of fossilized and abstract systems of theorems: it must consist in the living, and thus constantly developing, progressively more and more in-depth reflection on the meaning and course of one’s own existence.

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## Irony, or reflection

Defining Romantic irony in terms of dialectics, however, will not exhaust the essence of Schlegel's project, unless we juxtapose it with the perspective of its transcendental determinants and the notion of reflection, closely related to the latter. In fragment number 42, printed in the *Lyceum*, Schlegel calls irony "transcendental buffoonery" (1971b, 148), thus resorting to the term that first appears in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, in which it signifies "all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects" (Kant 2007, 59). Although Kant himself was aware of the groundbreaking nature of his position, he did recognize that its weakness lied in its failure to prove the existence of the common foundation of the receptive power of sensory cognition and the spontaneous activity of the intellect, the search for which basis determined the further development of transcendental philosophy—initially in the writings of Karl Leonhard Reinhold, and then in Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*. Reinhold saw this supreme principle (*Grundsatz*) in the power of representation (*Vorstellung*) as the primal faculty of human consciousness, which conditions all cognition. To Schlegel, however, it is not Reinhold, but only Fichte who is "a Kant raised to the second power," because it is in Fichte's philosophy that the assumption that "the theory of the determining ability and the system of determined affective impressions should be intimately united [...], like object and idea, in a pre-stabilized harmony" (1971a, 202), manifests itself in its entirety. While, according to Reinhold, the representation structure of consciousness is the primary fact and thus the starting point for transcendental reflection, Fichte goes one step further, proposing that, like any fact, it must be conditioned by action, or, in other words, by the original act of the human spirit, which "lies at the basis of all consciousness, and alone makes it possible" (Fichte 1970, 93). Thus, the sought-for supreme principle is based on the transcendental understanding of subjectivity itself, according to which subjectivity is pure action tantamount to the primary and absolute "I," establishing itself in opposition to the "non-I." It is out of this opposition that Schlegel fashioned the core of his concept of irony. In the phrase "transcendental buffoonery," the first term refers to "the mood that surveys everything and rises infinitely above all limitations, even above

its own art, virtue, or genius” (Schlegel 1971b, 148). It is the innermost aspect of irony, revealing its essential attachment to the realm of the pure activity of the Fichtean “I,” which precedes and conditions any conscious action. The transcendental mood, communicating the insurmountable difference between the primary “I” and consciousness, “contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative” (ibid.), which, in human cognition, experience, and fantasy translates into the antagonism between thought and thing, spirit and nature, freedom and necessity, infinity and finitude, or, in other words, between that which is ideal and that which is real. As Zygmunt Łempicki notes, it is irony that “is the most powerful stylistic trope to express this split, and, at the same time, it is the disposition and mood that sets the tone of the epoch and becomes the subject of the philosophical debate” (1966, 416). If, according to Schlegel, “transcendental is precisely whatever relates to the joining or separating of the ideal and the real” (1971a, 164), then irony as transcendental buffoonery is tantamount to the interplay between the idea and the reality, the external manifestation of which is “the mimic style of an averagely gifted Italian *buffo*” (1971b, 148) that has inherited all the essential features of ancient Greek comedy.

The consideration of irony in terms of its transcendental determinants makes the concept of reflection its most fundamental element. The close relationship between irony and reflection in the vision of the author of *Lucinde* is emphasized by Novalis—his close friend and co-initiator of the Jena circle’s activity. According to the poet, “what Schlegel so sharply characterizes as irony is [...] nothing other—than the result, the character of true reflection—the true presence of the spirit” (Novalis 1997, 29). In terms of Fichtean philosophy, the transcendental “I” as pure activity of the human spirit does not belong to the sphere of empirical facts of consciousness, which means that it is not subject to direct cognition either; we reach it only indirectly, through reflection operating in two modes: “in the first instance, there is simple reflection upon the phenomenon—that of the observer; in the second, there is reflection upon this reflection—that of the philosopher upon the nature of the observation” (Fichte 1970, 151–2). Since the ultimate goal of the author of the *Science of Knowledge* is not to study the representation structure of consciousness, but to explore the basic activity of the human spirit, upon which the latter is founded,

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the truly transcendental power is the second mode of reflection. It is in this mode that the primal activity of the absolute "I" is revealed, like in the mirror, in the facts of consciousness. The meaning that Fichte bestows on the concept of reflection thus flows from the etymology of the term, which "in both Greek and Latin philosophy [...] has optic connotations, in that it refers to the action by mirroring surfaces of throwing back light, and in particular a mirror's exhibition or reproduction of objects in the form of images" (Gasché 1997, 16). It is precisely this mode of reflection's "mirroring" action that Schlegel adapts in his concept of transcendental poetry, which he defines as "simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry" (1971a, 195), paralleling the idea of the *Science of Knowledge* as "always simultaneously philosophy and philosophy of philosophy" (1971a, 202). It is into the concept of transcendental poetry that Romantic irony is centrally inscribed as its fundamental means of expression. Their genetic link is evidenced by the fact that irony as "buffoonery" about ideas and reality reflects the essential structure of transcendental poetry, the essence of which "lies in the relation between ideal and real," and which finds its expression in "the artistic reflection and beautiful self-mirroring" (1971a, 195). In another fragment published in the *Athenaeum*, Schlegel defines this genre of literary art as "Romantic poetry" and as "progressive, universal poetry," which "can [...] hover at the midpoint between the portrayed and the portrayer, [...] on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise that reflection again and again to a higher power, can multiply it in an endless succession of mirrors" (1971a, 175). Like Fichte, in his meditation on reflection, Schlegel uses an optical metaphor that compares it to the process of the multiplication of an image observed in mirrors set opposite each other. The adjective "poetic" he attributes to "reflection," however, proves that the German author does not apply his metaphor only to the sphere of cognition, but understands it in a much broader sense, inscribing it into his project of the synthesis of art and philosophy. Thus, if, for Fichte, thinking, at its source, is an action, for Schlegel, this action signifies the primal type of activity, canceling out the difference between the act of thinking and the creative act. This allows us to conclude that it is specifically reflection that determines the dialectical structure of irony as logical beauty that binds art and philosophy together. Rising above the conditioning of all art, and thus energizing the interplay between the ideal

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and the real, like a looking glass, it mirrors the primordial creative activity. Hence, inevitably, it is a poetic reflection or, in other words, as Ernst Behler emphasizes, it “is virtually identical with that self-reflective style of poetry that became accentuated during early German Romanticism” (1993, 141).

In accordance with the assumptions of Schlegel’s theory, the transcendental sources of irony, which we can reconstruct from the *Fragments*, were to be fully expounded only in the genre of the novel. As John William Scholl emphasizes, “it is not necessary to prove the reflective character of *Lucinde*” (1906, 150), which is clearly evidenced by the fact that among its first readers was Fichte—one of the few advocates for Schlegel’s book—who considered it a work of genius: a work worthy of a thorough reading, to which one should return many a time. The transcendental dimension of irony surfaces already at the level of *Lucinde*’s literary form, and is clearly recognizable in the narrative devices used by the author. In this context, George Pattison aptly describes the novel, addressing it as “kaleidoscopic work,” in which the “text is an apparent chaos of narrative, letters, dialogue, myth and fantasy” (2004, 117). It is worth 184 noting, however, that in Pattison’s interpretation the “chaos” in question is only “apparent.” In fact, the form of Schlegel’s novel is a derivative of a fully conscious intention of the author, aimed at showing the insurmountable opposition between the ideal reality and the actual world, and “the variety of literary genres which he employs is thus intended to illuminate this ideal reality from a number of different perspectives, whilst preventing us from confusing it with any of the forms in which and through which it is mediated” (*ibid.*). The juxtaposition of Pattison’s interpretation with the transcendental view of irony as manifest in the interplay between the ideal and the real (expounded in the *Fragments*), suggests that it is possible to consider the very form of *Lucinde* as a direct outcome of the implementation of the Romantic irony’s central principle within a literary work. Another important formal aspect of Schlegel’s novel allowing one to recognize its thoroughly ironic character is its self-reflexive distance; *Lucinde*, as is now clear, does not only tell the main character’s story playing out in the liminal space between the actual world and his fantasies, but is also an account of its own creation. It is already in the first chapter that we meet Julius as he attempts to describe the story of his love and his relationship with Lucinde—and the motif of self-reflexivity

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recurs throughout subsequent sections of the book. The themes relating to the planning of the narrative, to the process of its creation, to consultations and questions about the shape of individual passages, as well as to the conjectures concerning the novel's future fate and the reactions of its potential readers, reappear on numerous occasions throughout the text. All these self-reflexive elements support Firchow's statement that "*Lucinde* is a novel which is very much aware of itself, so much so in fact that at times it makes criticisms of itself and its structure" (1971, 28). Undoubtedly, it would be difficult to overlook the analogy between the scholar's observation and the category of the "reflection on reflection" coined in *Science of Knowledge*, which Schlegel later adapted while developing his own concept of irony: in Fichte, the category refers to intentionally and critically self-oriented thinking; in *Lucinde*—similarly—the "reflection on reflection" assumes the form of "writing about writing," which transfers the transcendental activity of thinking into the space of literary practice, which thus acquires a philosophical dimension.

The concept of irony as "transcendental buffoonery," cannot, obviously, be reduced to the form of *Lucinde* alone, as it also defines its essential content. The whole novel follows the principle of the infinite interplay of the ideal and the real, represented in the novel by the contrast of male and female elements. Schlegel introduces this motif in two interrelated chapters: "A Dithyrambic Fantasy on the Loveliest Situation in the World" and "A Character Sketch of Little Wilhelmine." The first one offers a description of an erotic game, in which the lovers swap their roles, imitating each other and then comparing the effects of such an exchange—whose essence is to resolve the issue of "whether [Lucinde is] better at imitating the protective intensity of the man, or [Julius] the appealing devotion of the woman" (Schlegel 1971c, 49). Schlegel, identifying femininity with passivity (nature), and masculinity with activity (spirit, reflection), thus resorts to the Fichtean pair of concepts establishing an internal relationship at the heart of the central opposition fundamental to the *Science of Knowledge*, within which "all activity in the self [I] determines a passivity in the not-self [non-I] (allows us to infer such a passivity) and *vice versa*" (Fichte 1970, 142). This dynamics also happens to correspond to the rules of the love game played by Julius and Lucinde. The scene outlined in "A Dithyrambic Fantasy" is, in fact, an apt illustration of the transcendental

principle, upon which Romantic irony operates. By that principle, the exchange between the ideal and the real, reified, as Schlegel describes it, in the process of their combination and separation, indicates the ephemeral nature of the relationship between the two elements. In this perspective, the irony presents itself as a “response which consciousness of the relativity of each relationship and fixation receives” (Frank 2004, 181). Its transcendental nature is also determined by distance that excludes the possibility of a direct union of the lovers in the sexual act: while playing the game, their attention focuses on observing each other, in order to determine who of them is better suited for the role of the other. As such, the act does not bear any signs of authenticity; rather, it corresponds to the Fichtean reflection, in the lens of which “this sweet game still has quite other attractions [...] than its own” (Schlegel 1971c, 49). Schlegel, however, goes one step further, because, as Julius reports in the last sentences of “A Dithyrambic Fantasy,” it is not Lucinde, but the little Wilhelmine mentioned in the memoir, who is “a lady whom he loves most dearly” (1971c, 50). Wilhelmine—a care-free girl, playfully swinging her legs, singing songs, or reciting her favorite poems, who “has a great deal of the buffoon in her and a great feeling for buffoonery” (1971c, 51)—is, in fact, a personification of Romantic irony. The close affinity between the chapters “A Dithyrambic Fantasy” and “A Character Sketch of Little Wilhelmine” was undoubtedly one of those elements of the novel that its first readers found most scandalizing; even though Julius’s recollection concerns playing with a little girl, in their general structure these games are based on the very principles determining the intimate role play with his lover, portrayed earlier in the novel. Nevertheless, there is one fundamental difference, which, contrary to appearances, does not chiefly lie in the elimination of the erotic context, dominating the scene described in “A Dithyrambic Fantasy,” but in the amplification of the process of mutual imitation: “If I imitate her gestures, she immediately copies my imitations of her, and in this way we’ve invented for ourselves a language of mimicry and communicate with each other by means of the hieroglyphics of the theater.” (Ibid.) Rather than play adopted roles, unlike Lucinde and her lover do in their own relationship, Julius and Wilhelmine intensify the very process of the exchange between the real and the ideal, thus emphasizing its infinite character. In fact, Julius’s and Wilhelmine’s imitation games resemble

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the phenomenon of *mise-en-abyme*—the multiplication of an image in the mirrors set opposite each other, typical of poetic reflection, which, in its essence, is tantamount to irony.

Schlegel returns to the motif of the interplay of both opposing elements again in the chapter titled “A Reflection,” in which the female passivity symbolizes the *undefined*, while the male activity represents all that is *defined* and *defining*. This may be inferred from Schlegel’s stylistic choices, because the German author ironically uses ambiguous terminology, applying both to sexuality and to the activity of the human mind, to which the former is “simplest and most universal antithesis” (1971c, 120). The dynamic opposition of the *defined* and the *undefined*, which, “with eternally immutable symmetry [...] strive in opposite directions toward the infinite and away from it,” corresponds to the conflict between *the unconditioned* and *the conditioned*, finding its expression in irony. The first of these elements represents nature, which is subject to the transcendental process of idealization, since, as in *Lucinde*, “the colorful ideal of witty sensuality blossoms forth out of a striving toward the absolute” (*ibid.*). The second is an attribute of the mental activity of man. This, in turn, according to the Fichtean principle of reflection, “is continually defining [the mind] anew for himself, for that is precisely his whole destiny, to be defined and to define” (Schlegel 1971c, 119), striving to grasp that which is unconditioned and eluding all representation. On the one hand, therefore, in “A Reflection,” the interplay of both elements indicates that, as Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert observes, “irony is a tool that puts us on the trail of the Absolute, helping us to approximate it” (2007, 173). On the other hand, it must contain the awareness of the inevitable failure of this project, because, after all, “the ironist feels a conflict between the unconditioned and conditioned because any attempt to know the unconditioned would falsify it and make it conditioned” (Beiser 2002, 448). The Romantic vindication of nature, elevated to the rank of the Absolute, recognized as the basis of all conscious human activity, and construed as “an allegorical miniature of the warp and woof of ever flowing creation” (Schlegel 1971c, 120), is in fact one of the first attempts to overcome the radical nature of Fichtean idealism founded upon the theses that “all reality is posited in the self [I],” and that “there is no reality at all in the not-self [non-I], but only sheer negation” (Fichte 1970, 128). The absolutization of nature must, however,

entail the relativization of the activity of the human spirit, which, in itself, is an ironic reversal of Fichte's principle. It is thus only in "A Reflection" that Schlegel brings out the full sense of Julius's and Lucinde's role play described in "A Dithyrambic Fantasy," which exchange reflects the final synthesis of two conflicting extremes. Such a synthesis consists in energizing ("spiritualizing") the passive nature, and, simultaneously, in locating the moment of passivity in the orbit of the human spirit ("naturalizing" it).

### **Towards a conclusion**

188 On the basis of our inquiry into Schlegel's theory of irony as it was formulated in the *Fragments* and then transferred onto the pages of *Lucinde*, we can say that the categories of dissimulation, dialectics, and reflection describe its most characteristic features. These three categories seem particularly important, because they link the irony to the ideas of individuality and subjectivity that are at the heart of Jena Romanticism. The idea of Romantic individuality reveals itself both in the comedic/Socratic attitude adopted by the subject (of which only select individuals are capable) as well as in the novelist's focus on getting to know himself and on his unique existential experience. Simultaneously, Schlegel links his concept of individuality with the ironic dialectics of life itself, which, in its infinite becoming "wills that every individual should be perfect in himself, unique and new" (1971c, 120). Finally, it has its roots in irony understood as a poetic reflection, which, like a mirror, reflects the primal activity of Fichte's "I." In turn, the category of subjectivity relates, like irony itself, to the attitude and personality of Socrates, with whom, as Kierkegaard points out, "subjectivity asserts its rights in world history for the first time" (1989, 242). Still, it is only in Fichte's philosophy that it attains its proper form by becoming "subjectivity raised to the second power, a subjectivity's subjectivity, which corresponds to reflection's reflection" (ibid.). In other words, the close connection between Romantic ideas of individuality and subjectivity and dissimulation, dialectic, and reflection—distinguished in the present essay as the main categories defining Schlegel's notion of irony—situate his project within the horizon of transcendental philosophy, bestowing upon it a thoroughly modern form. In this context, Socrates, to whom Schlegel would allude so often, seems to play

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little more than a symbolic role. Insofar as irony, regardless of its historical form, will always remain irony, the Athenian philosopher remains, at best, a source of the German author's intuitive inspiration.

*Translated by Paweł Jędrzejko*

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# BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE WORD ABOUT THE INEFFABLE

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*Abstract*

Paul Ricoeur's engagement with biblical hermeneutics and his critique of Rudolf Bultmann's existential hermeneutics shed light on the complex relationship between language, meaning, and religious experience. Following Ricoeur, it is necessary to distinguish two layers of understanding: the ideal layer of the text and the layer of signification, which is the moment when meaning is resumed for the reader and becomes effective in existence. The semantic moment must precede the objective and

existential understanding, as well as action. Exegesis, therefore, involves two moments of understanding. If the text lacks objective meaning, it says nothing, and without existential appropriation, the Word is dead.

*Keywords:* hermeneutics, ineffable, sacred, *Bible*, revelation.

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### **Biblična hermenevtika in beseda o neizgovorljivem**

#### *Povzetek*

Spoprijem Paula Ricoeurja z biblično hermenevtiko in njegova kritika eksistencialne hermenevtike pri Rudolfu Bultmannu osvetlujeta kompleksno razmerje med govorico, pomenom in religioznim izkustvom. Po Ricoeurjevem mnenju je potrebno razlikovati med dvema ravnema razumevanja: idealno plastjo teksta in plastjo opomenjanja, ki predstavlja trenutek, ko se pomen znova utelesi za bralca in učinkuje v eksistenci. Semantični moment je predhoden tako objektivnemu kot eksistencialnemu razumevanju in tudi delovanju. Eksegeza potemtakem vključuje dva momenta razumevanja. Če tekst nima objektivnega pomena, ne pove ničesar, toda brez eksistencialne prisvojitve je Beseda mrtva.

*Ključne besede:* hermenevtika, neizgovorljivo, sveto, *Biblija*, razodetje.

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## Introduction

Paul Ricoeur's engagement with biblical hermeneutics and his critique of Rudolf Bultmann's existential hermeneutics shed light on the complex relationship between language, meaning, and religious experience.

From the perspective of the text-world, the existential truth is shown to be secondary and even marginal. It is only when a method reveals the truth of the text that it implies the truth of God and its specific possibilities. In other words, God's imagination is grounded in the truth of being, and it possesses the power, according to Ricoeur, to manifest God's existence. Ricoeur draws on Bultmann's reading of the concept of *syneisis* in St. Paul, where Bultmann places Pauline consciousness among anthropological concepts that are a part of the formal structure of humanity before the intervention of faith. In the text referred to by Ricoeur, Bultmann defines *syneisis* as "man's phenomenon in general" and "man's knowledge of his own conduct" (Bultmann 2007, 217–218).

In his exploration, Ricoeur emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach to biblical interpretation that encompasses both objective meaning and existential components. He highlights the importance of maintaining the distance between the text, the author, and the reader, challenging the idea of a direct and unmediated religious experience. Additionally, Ricoeur's analysis of parables as poetry and metaphorical processes reveals their capacity to convey profound meanings and redescribe existence. His insights invite scholars, theologians, and readers to engage with the biblical text in a way that embraces its multi-layered meanings and fosters a dialogue between faith and reason.

193

### 1. The anthropological path

An important passage by Ricoeur, extracted from the preface to the French edition of Bultmann's book *Jesus*, illustrates the point made earlier:

The third root of the hermeneutic problem in Christianity was not fully recognized and understood until the moderns—until the critical methods borrowed from the secular sciences of history and philology had been applied to the Bible as a whole. [...] The kerygma is not first of

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all the interpretation of a text; it is the announcement of a person. In this sense, the word of God is, not the Bible, but Jesus Christ. But a problem arises continually from the fact that this kerygma is itself expressed in a witness, in the stories, and soon after in the texts that contain the very first confession of faith of the community. These texts conceal a first level of interpretation. (Ricoeur 2004, 381–382.)

Ricoeur's statement marks the beginning of exegesis, highlighting the distance arising from the polarity between sense and signification. It is true, Ricoeur writes, that:

[...] the text accomplishes its meaning only in personal appropriation, in the "historical" decision (and this I believe strongly with Bultmann against all the current philosophies of a discourse without subject), this appropriation is only the final stage, the last threshold of an understanding which has first been uprooted and moved into another meaning. The moment of exegesis is not that of existential decision but that of "meaning," which, as Frege and Husserl have said, is an objective and even an "ideal" moment (ideal in that meaning has no place in reality, not even in psychic reality). (Ibid., 392.)

194

In this way, it is necessary to distinguish, following Ricoeur, two layers in understanding: that of the text, which is ideal, and that of meaning, which is the instant of resumption of meaning for the reader, of its effectiveness in existence. In other words, there exists the need for the semantic moment to precede that of the objective and existential understanding, as well as of action. Thus, exegesis necessarily has two moments of understanding, if the text has no objective meaning, it says nothing, and without existential appropriation the Word is dead.

When Bultmann delivered his radical critique of research regarding the historical Jesus and emphasized the significance of the Church's proclamation of faith as the primary statement about him, it caused a considerable shock in biblical studies. How can one refer to the gospels in a different way than as accounts of Jesus's life? It is true that Bultmann was constrained by a certain

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historical positivism that prevented him from finding an alternative approach. While the gospels had long been regarded as “true” narratives of Jesus, Bultmann’s demythologization of the Scriptures revealed that the elaboration of sacred texts involved elements beyond strict historicity (cf. Manzatto 2016, 19–20).

Nonetheless, Bultmann maintains that the faith of the Church is established upon the affirmation of the Risen Christ. In this regard, we encounter a foundational principle of Protestant theology, which also resonates with Ricoeur’s thinking: the crucial aspect is for every Christian to personally define their relationship with the crucified one, professing Jesus as their Savior. As stated in the *Bible*: “If you confess with your mouth, ‘Jesus is Lord,’ and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.” (Rom. 10:9.)

When the French philosopher presents his critique considering Bultmann’s theology in the late 1960s, he does so from two distinct perspectives. Firstly, in terms of exegesis, Bultmann would benefit from a more robust integration between explanation and understanding. The gap between the text and the method of textual analysis becomes relevant in the process of existential appropriation. Hence, it becomes necessary for the semantic moment—that of objective meaning—to precede the existential moment—that of personal decision—: “In this respect the problem Bultmann posed is the exact inverse of the problem which contemporary structuralist theories pose.” (Ricoeur 2004, 393.)

195

## 2. Metaphor and the unconditioned

Secondly, Ricoeur warns that for something to have a subsequent effect on humanity, it must be radically extrinsic to humanity itself. It is the ideal meaning of the text that determines its effectiveness, without being consumed by it. Within this primacy of the ideal sense, the essence of the text, the truth of being, and the gift of God are situated. Ricoeur argues that neither Bultmann nor Ebeling have fully done justice to this aspect. According to Ricoeur, Bultmann did not satisfactorily follow Heidegger’s path, focusing solely on the existential question, without delving into the question of being.

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The primacy of the non-existential referent appears to be a consistent theme in Ricoeur's thought. This primacy is evident in his early philosophy of symbols as well as in his later explorations of the logic of superabundance that governs the economy of the gift. However, during the period of his extensive examination of the paths of meaning, this primacy becomes less evident due to the necessary emphasis on structural analysis. Nevertheless, even during this period, the truth of "the essence of the text" underlies the existential reference.

Moreover, it is the role of theology to align the experience articulated by the biblical text with human experience on a larger scale and as a whole. The key argument is that the former cannot disregard the latter, because it is not sufficient for the outsider. This polarity is required by the very nature of religious experience and discourse, as it aims to describe or redescribe all human experiences of every individual.

196 Bultmann, through his project of demythologizing the *Bible*, attempts to clarify the *kerygma* hidden by mythological language. In a subsequent phase, he utilizes existentialist thought to convey this message to the modern human being. Behind the mythological perspective of the New Testament, there are existential viewpoints that require elucidation. Thus, religious language serves as an allegorical form that the early Christians used to comprehend existence and the *kerygma*.

The term "*kerygma*" originates from the Greek verb "*kerysso*," meaning "to proclaim by a herald," and refers to a decree authorized by the sovereign that demands to be carried out. The Word of God, also referred to as the Word of Christ, the Word of the Lord, or simply the Word, is *kerygma*. It is a word that challenges and addresses not curiosity or interest but the conscience of individuals, silencing their own questions. It is a pure appeal that does not offer justification, convey a theory, or communicate timeless truths about God and humanity, but rather places individuals in a state of decision. It is a decisive appeal, and those who hear it arrive at the truth of their existence (cf. Gibellini 2002, 40).

Through the influence of Bultmann's thought, Ricoeur seeks to integrate symbolism into reflective philosophical thought. The central proposal of Ricoeur is to recognize the diverse meanings that mythological language offers, without being limited to a single form of interpretation. In this way, the symbol

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can provoke thought. Later, Ricoeur's perspective on symbols underwent an important change, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, especially in his work *The Conflict of Interpretations* (*Le Conflit des interprétations*; 1969). At that point, Ricoeur acknowledges that the strength of symbols lies in their non-semantic aspect. Although they take different paths, Bultmann and Ricoeur arrive at the same destination. In both, the symbol (in the mythological dimension) is understood as referring to existential "truths" that can be deciphered and transformed into important statements. In this sense, Friedrich Schelling is exceptional in pointing out that mythology in general should not be understood allegorically, but symbolically. Thus, mythology requires not that its symbols signify ideas that arouse only our thought, but that they be significant beings in their own right and also address our senses. It is important to emphasize that the allegory is not in opposition to the symbolic, but is incorporated by it. Undoubtedly, the richness of mythology lies in the fact that it also contains allegorical meaning as a possibility, but not as a limit. What differentiates the sign from the symbol is that the latter has the capacity to be and to signify simultaneously. However, the apocalyptic use of symbols and metaphorical language is a strong corrective to all kinds of literary interpretations of the *Bible*. If symbols "give you to think," as Ricoeur claims, then the symbolic language of the apocalyptic literature of the *Bible* is irreducible and so important that it cannot be neglected by theological constructions.

197

At this point, Ricoeur distances himself from Bultmann's existential hermeneutics, which he sees as limited to a kerygmatic theology without mythology. Ricoeur criticizes Bultmann's naive distinction between mythical expressions and non-mythical formulations of Christian proclamation. He argues that Bultmann does not present any theory of interpretation, as his approach is based solely on the existential decision. Ricoeur subjects existential language to criticism as an interpretive mode of the speech act itself, precisely because it does not respect the distance between the text, the author, and the reader. According to Ricoeur, the written text stands apart from the author's intention, and what is found in the realm of writing does not necessarily coincide with the author's original meaning. Thus, the text takes on its own trajectory. Understanding, therefore, is not necessarily situated in the author's contemporary context, but rather emerges from a distance. Biblical

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interpretation, for instance, goes beyond existential components and aims to communicate something, offering a new horizon of being. It engages the reader in a narrative of desire, narrating the desire itself. Through exegesis, the reader is better equipped to enter the hermeneutic field. In this way, the *Bible* is seen as a collection of “sayings” from the God of Israel to His people over an extended period. The biblical text is not simply a compilation of answers about God, humanity, or the world; rather, it invites the reader to contemplate the mystery and position oneself before it.

Regarding metaphor and the unconditioned, Ricoeur highlights the fundamental conflict between objective and metaphorical interpretations, and maintains a similar conflict in the language of religious advent, specifically between the objective claim to knowledge and the poetic presentation of the unconditioned. This language functions as a limiting concept and a figurative representation of the unconditioned, allowing it to approach even borderline themes.

198 Ricoeur confesses to deviating not only from the dominant interpretation of narratives related to the resurrection, but also from the remaining consensus, at least among dogmatic theologians. He believes that the sheer narrative weight of stories, describing the discovery of the empty tomb and the appearance of the risen Christ, obscures the theological significance of the resurrection as the victory over death. The proclamation “The Lord has truly been raised” (Luke 24:34) appears to him to affirm this victory with vigor, surpassing the imaginative investment of faith.

However, Ricoeur does not entirely abandon Bultmann’s thought, particularly the idea that the *kerygma* must contain the past of Jesus in the present tense of Christ. He warns against the risk of falling into a gnostic interpretation. Religion, in Ricoeur’s view, becomes a language that simultaneously offers an opening to the religious and imposes limitations on it. Therefore, no religious tradition can directly capture the religious experience, as mediation always imposes limitations. For example, in approaching death, it is possible to transcend the inherent limitations of religions. The terminally ill, for instance, have an experience that goes beyond confessional particularities and is nevertheless religious.

Furthermore, Ricoeur applies the method of general hermeneutics to biblical hermeneutics, in order to avoid common errors in interpretation and, most importantly, to move away from existential categories of understanding

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(a criticism directed at Bultmann). General hermeneutics emphasizes the need to explain the world of the text through a balance of structural explanation and self-understanding. It prioritizes the implicit world within the biblical narrative over interpretations based solely on the reader's subjective feelings and self (cf. Gross 1999, 48).

Ricoeur's philosophy also acknowledges a form of transcendence, but it pertains to the transcendence of symbols and, ultimately, their language—not the transcendence of God. Ricoeur highlights the necessity to reexamine symbols and narratives, clarifying that conscience is no longer tied to the need to listen to the word that comes from God, but rather to the proposal of understanding human reality.

### 3. Biblical hermeneutics

Biblical hermeneutics can be seen as one of the variations and possibilities within general hermeneutics. However, there exists a strict relationship between the two, as we have previously discussed and demonstrated by accentuating some common issues.

199

Treating theological hermeneutics as an application of hermeneutics specifically to biblical texts reveals an inverse relationship between the two. Theological hermeneutics possesses unique characteristics that progressively subordinate it to philosophical hermeneutics as its own organon. Despite the reduced presence of theological terms in the evolution of Ricoeur's thought, he never abandons the project of thinking, through language, expressions that reveal human consciousness. Ricoeur does not, however, privilege religious symbols. Hermeneutic philosophy, rooted in language, extends to the realms of action and ethics, as is evident in Ricoeur's work *Oneself as Another* (cf. 1994), which sets the question of religious symbols aside. In Ricoeur's work, biblical hermeneutics constitutes a distinct domain.

The term "God" is employed differently in various narratives, prophecies, prescriptions, wisdom writings, and hymns. It cannot be understood as a philosophical concept, not even as "Being" in the sense of medieval philosophy or Heidegger. The word "God" encompasses more than the word "Being," because it presupposes the entire context of accounts, prophecies, laws,

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wisdom writings, etc. Its significance for the problematic of the Self can be understood in two ways. Firstly, the referent “God” is the convergence point of all these partial discourses, expressing the circulation of meaning across all forms of discourse, where God is named. Secondly, the referent “God” signifies the incompleteness of all faith discourses marked by the limits of human understanding. Thus, God is the common target of all these discourses and the external vanishing point for each one of them (cf. Ricoeur 1986, 132).

According to Ricoeur, parables are understood as “poetry,” because the entire text reveals itself as a bearer of meaning. Parables function as a process of constructing fictions that carry meaning and redescribe existence.

Ricoeur’s interpretation of the meanings and referents of parables, along with his philosophical analysis of metaphor, has attracted the attention of many New Testament scholars and theologians. Ricoeur’s complex position regarding the metaphor, as presented in *The Rule of Metaphor (La Métaphore vive; 1975)* and specifically applied to parables, represents an emerging consensus in New Testament scholarship. Regardless of the particularities of Ricoeur’s position, the exegete must employ a theory of tension or interaction, rather than substitution, in order to fully comprehend what the Kingdom of God is like (cf. Tracy 1994, 102).

In this way, the parable is understood as a synthesis of the narrative form and the metaphorical process that allows for its convergence with other forms of discourse in expressing the “Kingdom of God.” Extravagance cannot be understood in isolation, but in relation to the expression, as they both contribute to the common horizon. In other words, the parables must be considered. The inter-signification between this *corpus* and the Word of Jesus leads to a convergence of meaning between the words understood as a greater “corpus” and Jesus’s actions. The form of the gospel allows for significant inter-signification among different types of discourse and the harmonization of meaning between Jesus’s actions and words.

## Conclusion

In conclusion it can be said that Ricoeur’s exploration of biblical hermeneutics as well as his engagement with the theological and philosophical

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dimensions of interpretation provide valuable insights into understanding the relationship between language, meaning, and religious experience. He recognizes the distinctiveness of theological hermeneutics within the broader field of interpretation, while also emphasizing the need for a robust integration of language, action, and ethics.

Ricoeur's critique of Bultmann's existential hermeneutics reveals the limitations of reducing interpretation solely to existential decision, and highlights the importance of maintaining the distance between the text, the author, and the reader. He advocates for a comprehensive approach to biblical interpretation that goes beyond existential components and encompasses the objective meaning as well as the intention of the text.

Furthermore, Ricoeur's examination of parables as poetry and metaphorical processes demonstrates their capacity to convey profound meanings and redescribe existence. His perspective on the "Kingdom of God" and the interplay between different forms of discourse offers a nuanced understanding of the richness and complexity of biblical texts. Throughout his work, Ricoeur emphasizes the primacy of the ideal sense and the transcendent nature of religious symbols. He challenges the notion of a direct and unmediated religious experience, highlighting the importance of mediation and the limitations imposed by religious traditions.

201

Overall, Ricoeur's contributions to biblical hermeneutics underscore the intricate relationship between language, interpretation, and religious understanding. His insights invite scholars, theologians, and readers to engage with the biblical text in a way that embraces its multi-layered meanings, acknowledges its historical and cultural contexts, and fosters a dialogue between faith and reason.

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# IS CAUSALITY ADMISSIBLE IN PHENOMENOLOGY?

## A CORRECTIVE TO EDMUND HUSSERL'S IDEA

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*Abstract*

The article rejects the traditional limitation of causality in phenomenology and attempts to demonstrate the mistakes in Edmund Husserl's arguments for such an understanding, which limited natural causality to the empirical world and confused both natural as well as motivational causality with logical and psychological connections. The specificity of causality is stressed, in order to clarify the main structures of pure consciousness—thought, feeling, and will—as well as to elucidate the mutual

irreducibility of connections and interactions between them. Thus, phenomenology altogether can be outlined as being compatible with scientific discipline.

*Keywords:* phenomenology, causality, science, difference between thought and feeling.

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### **Je v fenomenologiji kavzalnost sprejemljiva? Korektiv k Husserlovi ideji**

#### *Povzetek*

Članek zavrne tradicionalno omejevanje kavzalnosti v fenomenologiji in skuša pokazati napake v argumentih za takšno razumevanje pri Edmundu Husserlu, ki so naravno kavzalnost omejili na empirični svet in so zamenjali tako naravno kot motivacijsko kavzalnost z logičnimi in psihološkimi povezavami. Poudariti želimo specifičnost kavzalnosti, zato da bi lahko razjasnili pogloblitve strukture čiste zavesti – misel, občutje in voljo – in obenem razgrnili medsebojno nereduktibilnost povezav in interakcij med njimi. Fenomenologijo nasploh potemtakem lahko orišemo kot združljivo z znanstveno disciplino.

204

*Ključne besede:* fenomenologija, kavzalnost, znanost, razlika med mislijo in občutjem.

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## The limitation of causality by Husserl

Husserl clearly locates causality within the empirical world, pointing it out as “the external” (Husserl 1901, 369; cf. Husserl 2001c, 108). The acknowledgment of causality in constructing the thing of pure consciousness—“the substantial-causal thing” (Husserl 1976b, 352)—or the acknowledgment of causality in the periphery of the life-world (Husserl 1976a, 221–222) are, to my mind, no more than rhetorical; causality is by no means combined with the very mechanism of pure consciousness or the life-world. “The substantial-causal thing” is presented as constitutively connected with the experience of the subject and his ideal multiform perceptions (Husserl 1976b, 352) rather than through causality. What can be considered, at first glance, as an example of causality—the subject’s influence on his consciousness or, as in the case of the life-world, on his body—is comprehended instead through constituting, ruling (holding-sway), or radiating (Husserl 1976a, 208–209, 220; cf. Husserl 1970, 204–205, 217; Husserl 1976b, 281–282), which have nothing in common, to my mind, with causality; the first refers chiefly to the intentional-correlative and the other refers to a certain primordial spontaneity of the transcendental I (ego). How such connections come in touch with causality is unclear; although they evidently appear in the sense of the reconsideration of causality (Husserl 1976a, 221–222; Husserl 1970, 218–219), the continuity from the natural causality to the presupposed new causality as well as the boundaries of these causalities are not delineated distinctly enough. The latter one is differentiable from the natural causality by the sphere of its realization (in psychics) and by its elements as not having “persistent properties”—to the extent that it may even not be denoted as causality at all (cf. Husserl 1989, 140). Accordingly, the arguments for limiting causality in phenomenology as they might be extracted from Husserl’s conception are as follows: (1) as it is inseparable from the time-space structure of the empirical world, causality should be considered only within the empirical world; as it differs and is incompatible (2) with the intentional-correlative and (3) with the subject’s wholeness and his internal influences, natural causality should essentially not be considered within the pure consciousness or the life-world.

## Husserl's understanding of causality and its origins

(1) That causality is based on time-space does not mean its localization in the empirical experience; as providing such experience, time-space itself is not reduced to it. Causality as such means the necessary difference and changes from the cause to its consequences, irrespective of any things or their qualities (cf. Kant 1998, 222–223; Kant 1922, 70); thus, the localization of causality is impossible. Time-space gives this specification to causality, but, as it is indifferent to any content, gives no content to causality. Whether inside the thing or not, the specificity of causality as causality is unchangeable; differences are permissible only in the character of its integration in various connections or qualities. Finally, as they possess their own specificity and have a certain relationship—as the condition and the construction above it—, the time-space structure and causality are certainly separable from each other, and causality can be constructed even in spheres indirectly connected with time-space.

206 My objection can also be formulated briefly in another way: as time-space and causality are transcendental, they are not limited within the empirical.

Therefore, there are no grounds for the distinction between natural and motivational causality—*there can only be one causality, for its quality is not determined by the content of this distinction*. The distinction only conceals the quality of causality, presupposing in it properties that do not concern it. The distinction between the empirical world and psychics means no more than a gap in unfolding causality (rather than a difference in quality). Thus, there is no problem in combining the notions of causality in one common notion or in replacing one notion by the other; natural causality coincides fully with causality as such—to additionally multiply this essence, is irrelevant. My following arguments confirm this point of view.

(2) The difference between causality and the intentional-correlative does not mean the impossibility of causality among these connections. A view of the kettle in a shop and a reminiscence about the kettle with boiling water on a stove are certainly combined in one representation without any incompatibility with causality; indeed, a view of the kettle can cause the excitation of a reminiscence about boiling water, and there is no need to admit here only an associative connection of different acts. Combined acts can be simultaneously causal-

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consequential by their origin. Making a distinction among these objects as the empirical and as the content of acts does not diminish causality; instead of considering the real kettle or boiling water as influencing the subject from the outside, they would be considered here examples of different states of the same subject, that is, when one excites the other, the quality of the connection as the necessary succession remains the same in both cases. Or, taking Husserl's example (Husserl 2001c, 108–109), even if the landscape is not the external object and the pleasure in it relates to how this landscape appears to me, the landscape can excite the pleasure as its consequence—my new state—parallelly to the complex act of thought embracing both the pleasure and the landscape. When pleasure is considered as a structure qualitatively different from thought (as stream rather than an act), the compatibility of different connections becomes clearer: no combination of the pleasure and the landscape in one thought can exclude or principally change their causal relation, for their representation in thought should be differentiated from the experience of the pleasure as feeling. Interpreting feeling after the pattern of thought (Husserl 1976b, 220, 279–280; cf. Husserl 2001c, 108), Husserl obviously understands this representation and experience as shades of a single (thoughtful) process, which, as supposing nothing but the intentional-correlative, only means “the motivational causality.”

207

The fact that Husserl does not see the manner of combining (natural) causality with the intentional-correlative can be illustrated at the very beginning of his construction of phenomenology with the help of the following note:

Closer consideration shows it to be absurd in principle, here or in like cases [in the original: hier und überhaupt; I. K.], to treat an intentional as a causal relation, to give it the sense of an empirical, substantial-causal case of necessary connection. For the intentional object, here thought of as “provocative,” is only in question as an intentional, not as an external reality, which really and psycho-physically determines my mental life. (Husserl 2001b, 108–109; cf. Husserl 1968, 391.)

It is also curious that in discussing causality related to the psychical, Husserl means only material-psychical interactions and does not mention causal

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connections within the psychical as such, even when their consideration in a detailed review of rational psychology seems very appropriate (Husserl 1980, 14–15; cf. 33–39). Insofar as “the motivational causality” exclusively works in psychics, causal connections as belonging to nature are here excluded.

208 On the other hand, Husserl’s understanding of “the motivational causality” through the intentional-correlative (cf. Husserl 1989, 231) does not clarify it *as still causality*—as the necessary one-directed succession. It remains unclear how such succession would be possible on the basis of subject–object interactions, which “refer back and forth” (Husserl 1989, 236, 237): “I am occupied with [the object], it stimulates me to occupy myself with it [...]” (Husserl 1989, 228.) The same can be said about the syntheticism of this “causality”; Husserl does not show how the new (which was not at the entry of this process) occurs within transition of causality to its consequences. Husserl evidently sees the new (being “unknown”) as independent of any determination (Husserl 1989, 146, cf. Husserl 2001a, 233)—through the intentional-correlative as a reserved unity a possibility of syntheticism is quite obscure. And even when Husserl admits the new within this causality, he considers it through the time grounded by the intentional-correlative and thereby does not denote the new distinctly. The succession of time is formed through “the objectlike” formation and in submergence of future in the past (Husserl 2001a, 237–238)—this bilateral process, reproducing subject–object interactions, shows the unity between time and this causality (additionally stressed in describing inductivity) rather than asymmetry of both as unfinished and non-logical. The understanding of structures of consciousness as being more or less homogenous—the intentional-correlative—only aggravates this view. Thus, Husserl’s argument that the given in psychics can necessarily stimulate consequences in it would prove the intentional-correlative as the basis for “the motivational causality” (cf. Husserl 1989, 227–228, 239, 243) only if the properties of this causality could be understood through the intentional-correlative, and if the intentional-correlative itself would have undoubtedly embraced the whole pure consciousness. Otherwise, this argument only demonstrates coincidences of the intentional-correlative elements with this causality—and nothing more.

(3) Also, there is insufficient grounds to depict the subject’s activity outside causality, even if such an activity is primordial to any experience and to time-

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space. A certain difference between the subject and his activity or among any forms of transcendentalty would be impossible without the time-space structure; the intentional-correlative could not provide such a difference independently of time-space—as it is evident in the example of the bodily in pure consciousness with its kinetics from “here” to “there” (cf. Husserl 1950, 128). Husserl’s depiction of the subject’s self-determination in view of “the motivational causality” shows no possibility for the subject’s change from one state to the other (in the sense of non-logical differences and of something new occurring). Such determination, as well as the whole “motivational causality,” seems deductive rather than synthetic, for the intentional-correlative as a reserved unity evidently provides a deduction/induction through its mutual penetrating elements; “the motivational causality” of reason is not occasionally depicted mainly as logic, and this sense of the causality is called “the most authentic” (Husserl 1989, 232).

Thus, the distinction between causalities distorts the understanding of causality as such, not only in pure consciousness, but—as I attempt to demonstrate now—in the empirical world as well.

209

At first sight, Husserl rightly describes (natural) causality as bringing “something forth that could have existed independently” (2001c, 108). But in comparing this causality with the motivational one he repeatedly stresses the separation of spatial elements involved in this (natural) causality (cf. Husserl 1989, 140–141, 144) rather than the synthesis of this transition in time (a synthesis can be even missed in discussing time-consciousness and motivation; Husserl 1989, 239, 143). That is, synthetic connection of causality remains in any case concealed or overlooked. The natural causality, as well as the motivational one, is considered in a mixture with logical connection, especially, as this causality, together with all the logical-objective, has been displaced to the periphery of phenomenological discourse as not concerning the essence of the life-world (Husserl 1976a, 144).

Indeed, Husserl interprets the natural causality as a unity, first of all, by reducing the time-space relations of the whole and the parts to the logical, the deductive. He uses for this interpretation the possibility of understanding everything in the empirical by its notions, abstracting from its empirical reality, insofar as it has already been understood in view of this reality. However, this

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twofold understanding in no way indicates the surpassing of one by the other. The “house,” taking Husserl’s example (Husserl 1901, 248; cf. Husserl 2001c, 21), contains no parts, unless they have already been discovered or supposed in it in accordance with the time-space structure. If considered only by their notions, irrespectively of their empirical reality, neither the “house” nor the “roof,” nor the “walls,” nor anything else could be understood as whole or parts and presuppose each other. In view of the empirical, these notions have no logical connection; they should clearly be comprehended in a generic-specific correlation—the notion of roof should be contained in the notion of house as its gender, in order to realize such a connection. But Husserl misses this distinction between time-space and logic with their attendant contexts, representing the judgment “the existence of this house includes that of its roof, its walls, and other parts” as analytic rather than synthetic and empirical, as if the word “includes” denotes the logical transition from the “house” to the “roof” and their generic unity rather than simply the temporal-spatial combination of the empirical, and as if the disappearance of the pronouns in this judgment as reformulated in the sense of the pure analytic law would not distort this judgment. He states that the analytic formula of the whole and parts works here, thus ignoring the specificity of the time-space structure as such and of the empirical world, as he interprets the whole and parts only logically and considers logic as the specificity of the empirical world itself.

Accordingly, Husserl interprets the qualitative difference between the analytic and the synthetic “laws” from the point of view of formalization of their notions—“Each pure law, which includes material concepts, so as not to permit a formalization of these concepts [...] is a *synthetic a priori* law” (Husserl 2001c, 21)—, thereby missing that this criterion is invalid, because it is independent of the new knowledge, by which this difference has been determined. Any law *a priori*, whether synthetic or not, more or less succumbs to formalization, if it has already been included and re-comprehended in correlation with the system of knowledge. Otherwise, as it is incompatible with the system, the law cannot be formalized at all—even if it does not denote anything new or anything material, empirical, etc. Although designed to make a new distinction (despite Kant) between the analytic and synthetic *a priori*, the formalization criterion loses both and the synthetic *a posteriori* as

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well. In view of formalization, all these spheres appear to be the same, further predisposing them to logic. The use of the expression “analytic law” instead of “analytic judgment” further conceals the difference, creating an impression of obtaining something new analytically (as if logic could really obtain the new).

Accordingly, Husserl speaks about the natural laws and their results as the deductive link—“[...] the naturalist deduces from the laws of a lever, from the law of gravitation and so on the manner in which a certain machine works [...]” (Husserl 1901, 94; cf. Husserl 2001c, 226)—, as if this link would not be only the logical reasoning of the researcher about previously acquired knowledge, but the principle of acquiring the new. By confusing the synthetic and analytic, Husserl *thus loses the difference between logic and causality, because the synthetic judgments, through which new knowledge is acquired, are directly connected with causality that always produces something new, because it does not include its consequences.*

As causality seems to be logical, its understanding as combining the multiform concretes of the same form that are constantly transiting into each other in unity (Husserl 1901, 248) or in a unity, in which all things are so bound together that “[...] with only the one thing coming out, series of changes of others are at once modified, and [...] it is completely impossible to dismember the whole group into several groups indifferent to each other [...]” (Husserl 1901, 250; my translation), is not surprising. Husserl may doubt the possibility of such an understanding—when writing about the need to expand the notion of the whole as including successions rather than simply unities and links, he takes into account the difficulties this understanding of causality could encounter (Husserl 1901, 251)—, but later he decisively declares:

[...] through a *universal causal regulation, all that is together in the world has a universal immediate or mediate way of belonging together; through this the world is not merely a totality [Allheit] but an all-encompassing unity [Alleinheit], a whole (even though it is infinite).* (Husserl 1970, 31.)

Nothing interferes in considering the notion of fire as including the notion of boiling water and thus interpreting the judgment “fire is the cause of boiling

water” as being deductive. But if the judgment is considered relevantly causal, on no account would it be deductive; fire and water do not combine in any unity, nor can their notions, insofar as they describe this empirical as combined. Clearly, the succession of the world does not coincide with the way of thought, although the world can be demonstrated in thought by the use of thought instruments. But the demonstration of succession from fire to the changes in water as the logical necessity is not interpretable as causality; otherwise, the described would be perverted in the judgment. One may blend logic with the world and speak about “non-logical behavior,” “the lack of logic in events,” etc., distinguishing them practically, even without understanding their difference. However, to understand the differences between the world and thought, and between causality and logic, such wide uncertainties of everyday talk should be overcome.<sup>1</sup>

212 As it is only the necessary succession of entities, causality is not formulated in terms of typological rows, groups, and their modifications; such typologies do not touch causality, but only the elements involved. With all changes of boiling water under the influence of fire, hot sand, the sun, etc., the very specificity of the influence (as necessary, successive, and synthetic) remains the same.

Husserl strengthens his idea of (natural) causality as unity and mutual belonging through contemplation that gathers all things of experience—clearly using here the idea of time-space as general form of contemplation (*Anschauung*):

Such types of relatedness between bodily occurrences are themselves moments of everyday experiencing intuition [in the original: *Anschauung*; I. K.]. They are experienced as that which gives the character of *belonging together* to bodies which *exist together* simultaneously and successively, i.e., as that which *binds* their being [*Sein*] to their being-such [*Sosein*]. [...] Thus our empirically intuited [anschauliche; I. K.] surrounding world has an *empirical over-all style*. [...] we necessarily

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<sup>1</sup> Leonid V. Maximov wrote most plainly about this, but on other material; cf. Maximov 1986, 59–62.

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represent it according to the style in which we have, and up to now have had, the world. [...] we can make into a subject of investigation the invariant general style which this intuitive world [anschauliche Welt; I. K.], in the flow of total experience, persistently maintains. Precisely in this way we see that, universally, things and their occurrences do not arbitrarily appear and run their course but are *bound* a priori by this style, by the invariant form of the intuitable world [der anschaulichen Welt; I. K.]. (Husserl 1970, 30–31; cf. Husserl 1976a, 28–29.)

But this approximation of causality to contemplation through time-space as its mediator can by no means, despite Husserl, bring them together. No contemplation representing the kettle with boiling water on fire can tie them in any way, but psychologically; its complex act occurs relatively independently of its content. One can change his attention to these things, representing them in different ways, but their causal connection or their understanding in logical propositions will not change. Similarly, absolutely unconnected things, bound together by one view, will certainly still remain unconnected, even if they are considered as only the content of this view rather than in the world, and “the motivational causality” would be here no less irrelevant than the natural one. Husserl himself undertakes great efforts to differentiate logic from psychics (and we must suppose something similar), but in the cited reasoning evidently confuses or conflates psychics with causality (and probably indirectly—through the logical-causal confusion—even with logic), similar to his prescription of the correlative to causality. As independent of its consequences in all senses—fire can be whether there is boiling water or not; *modus tollens* plays no role here—the cause does not stand in correlation with the consequences; there is no necessary reverse connection. The one-sided extra-logical correlation from the cause to its consequences is qualitatively different from the mutual correlative in terms of unity, mutual belonging, etc. The interpretation of that approximation as a constitutive dependence of causality on psychics or even only as a correlative link between them does not prevent their confusion; that is, it would show neither how the one generates the other, their transition into each other, nor their resemblance or grounds for correlativity. This psychical-causal mixture further aggravates the logical-

214

causal confusion by reproducing similar notions and properties. As it has already been noticed, the same mixtures can be observed also in admitting “the motivational causality” as considered through the intentional-correlative—losing its causal specificity as such. This wide tendency of mixtures *originates in the general construction of pure consciousness with its transcendental I as the origin of all these connections*. Because these connections are different in their totality from the I and reduced to pure consciousness, they may become more confused with each other. A portion of the mechanism of this confusion can be observed using another example of the search for correlates among causality, logic, and psychics. When “A summons B into consciousness,” they assume “mutual pertinence” and build “intentional unities” through the work of associative function; both are felt in “mutual belongingness” (Husserl 2001c, 187; cf. Husserl 1901, 29–30). Thus, Husserl understands causality from the perspective of psychical connections and confuses it with logic; in view of this “felt mutual belongingness,” causality is interpreted in terms of unity, belonging together, etc., and finally brought together with psychics itself (there is a tendency among researchers, by the way, not to see these confusions, for they understand causality without discussing its differences from the point of view of its syntheticism and its principal quality as such; Walsh 2013, 74; Spano 2022, 673–674). Causality, logic, and psychics are differentiated chiefly *through the difference between acts of pure consciousness and their content (noesis and noema in general) rather than through the differences among peculiarities of these connections as such*. Husserl refers the natural causality and logic to special spheres (the empirical or objective), distinguishing them as belonging to the act’s content, whereas psychics concerns the acts and their unities with content (what is “felt” and that by which it is “felt” are obviously differentiable here in the act-content unities). Indeed, there is no other manner, in which to differentiate among these connections, using the acts-content difference and conjugation, except to locate these connections in different spheres. That is, not only “the motivational causality,” but causality as such is represented on the basis of the intentional-correlative or activity of the transcendental I in its totality—in the single thoughtful process without special distinctions between the cognitive and non-cognitive.

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## A re-comprehension of Husserl's understanding

At the beginning of phenomenology, all of these mixtures by Husserl were useful—by simplifying the structures of pure consciousness, they showed its quality more clearly. Now, they have become an obstacle in distinguishing structures and in determining the correlation between pure consciousness and the world.

Understood in its specificity, irrespectively of its localization, causality can be discovered in any sphere of pure consciousness, clarifying the irreducible quality of the structures of this consciousness. The necessary influence of one act on another is no longer blended with their intentional-correlative interconnections, associative dependences, etc., not because such influence is impossible among acts, but because of its other qualities. The boundary between the causal and the psychical connections of acts would be clearer, that is, the cause–consequence transition from the view of landscape to the feeling of pleasure in it versus the representation of the landscape and the pleasure in one complex thought. This causal-psychical difference promotes the understanding of the qualitative difference between thought and feeling (as act and stream; my arguments for this distinction are formulated in: Kirsberg 2018, 263– 265; cf. Kirsberg 2019, 159–160), thereby preventing the mixture of the experience of the feeling with its representation and, accordingly, the mixture of the experience of the pleasure as the consequence of the landscape with its representation together with the landscape (as mentioned above). Like causality, by its specificity, logic is distinguishable from the psychical: any structures of pure consciousness are representable logically, but are irreducible to logic in their experience. Against the background of the differences of these connections, the distinctions among the structures of pure consciousness may be continued further; it is possible to clarify the specificity of will, including what properties it has or even whether it exists as a single structure and is not only the effect of interactions of thought and feeling. The differences also show the irreducibility of causality not only to the concrete connections, but also to pure consciousness altogether, stimulating a new comprehension of the genesis of these connections within pure consciousness—in view of their interactions, rather than by extending the thoughtful noesis–noema synthesis

to all pure consciousness with corresponding mixtures of these connections and structures. Such irreducibility may also be one of the signs of the general irreducibility of the world to pure consciousness, thereby promoting searches to limit the reduction, *epoché*, eidetic vision, and other traditional phenomenological methods, in order to finally combine phenomenology with scientific criteria (using for that also the irreducible qualities of thought and feeling as the ground for strictly distinguishing between knowledge and value.<sup>2</sup>

216 The perception of consciousness structures as more or less cognitive has still not been overcome in psychology, as is made clear by the widespread interpretation of emotion (attempts to differentiate it from feeling are not considered here) as containing certain cognitive components by its nature (Vekker 1981, 120–121; Kenny 2003, 36–52). Even if emotion is interpreted as not giving “any information about the external world” (Kenny 2003, 38), it preserves nevertheless a direction to objects as a thought-like structure: “[...] it is not possible to be ashamed without being ashamed of anything in particular [...] it is not possible to be delighted without knowing what is delighting one” (Kenny 2003, 41). On the contrary, to my mind, such examples demonstrate certain, probably causal connections rather than any direction: an object in thought excites this or that emotion. Indeed, if emotion informs nothing about the external world, it remains unclear how emotion can be directed to objects, given that the underlying mechanism of such direction requires cognitivity. By comparison, the transition from thought to emotion in terms of causality seems quite distinct: the difference between thought and emotion as cognitive and non-cognitive is additionally fixed in the cause–consequence relation. A possible objection that thought as neutral by its nature cannot excite emotion as always possessing a determined sign (this argument may be extracted from the reasoning about the correlation between representation and will: Müller-Freienfels 1924, 229, 237) is declined, if such an excitement is interpreted as activation rather than generation of emotion. Questions like “What are

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2 The general reconsideration of phenomenology, using materials of religion and phenomenology of religion, is undertaken in my book: Kirsberg 2016a; see also my article: Kirsberg 2019, 145–151. For an example of the use of this reconsidered phenomenology concerning early Christianity, cf. Kirsberg 2016b, 339–348; cf. also: Kirsberg 2019, 151–153.

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you afraid of?” or “What is embarrassing you?” (cf. Kenny 2003, 51) are not comparable, to my mind, to questions such as: “What do you see?” In the last question, we ask about an object *per se*, in order to understand through its peculiarities the specificity of our sight—whether we see, for example, something in perception or in representation, attempting to recognize, if an object is not an illusion, etc. Thus, this question presupposes a certain isolation of an object in the act of sight and therefore unity of the object and sight in the intentional-correlative connection. Nothing of the kind is presupposed in the first two questions, which do not clarify an object, but rather look for the source of fear or embarrassment or for something that is realized in emotion as its material. In the last case, the question “What are you afraid of?” could be, strictly speaking, reformulated as: “How do you fear this or that thing?” It is unclear how the knowledge of a certain object permits the specification of emotion: the same emotions can be experienced through different objects (abstract, illusory, or from the empirical world), whereas emotions when experiencing the same object can be very different. Unlike the case of mental content and acts, there is no necessary connection between object and emotion. Therefore, there is no intentional-correlative relation in emotion; emotion is not, to my mind, specified by its object as such (despite cf. Kenny 2003, 42, 44, 50–51). The marks of some emotions are reconstructed, strictly speaking, only through the experience of objects as emotions (which are evidently no longer objects). How and with what intensity and expressiveness all this is experienced and in what measure it is adapted to be experienced—this is what specifies emotions. In any case, a re-comprehension of causality in pure consciousness would stimulate studies of not only different connections in consciousness, but also of the specificity of its structures: in order to answer the questions, whether emotions do contain intentional-correlative connections and whether the other structures (will) can be partly reconstructed under the pattern of thought or at least function with some signs of cognitivity.<sup>3</sup>

217

Thus, regardless of Husserl’s attempts to limit (natural) causality in phenomenology, representing it in the periphery of pure consciousness or the life-world within the empirical world (which is not always comprehended

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3 Cf. Störing 1922, 134; Erismann 1924, 108; Rohracher 1971, 497–498.

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inside this consciousness in his early works), separating it from the motivational causality or confusing in any case causality as such with logic or even with psychics, a new perspective of phenomenology emerges, and the shortcomings of these attempts are elucidated in this light.

We can summarize our contemplations as follows:

1) The limitation and, after all, perversion of causality in phenomenology is explained by Husserl's simplification of pure consciousness as only thoughtful-cognitive and pure.

2) The specificity of causality admits its possibility in any sphere of phenomenology, without any need for splitting its quality.

3) Finally, the use of causality in phenomenology would clarify the differences of the main structures of pure consciousness as irreducible to each other as well as the genesis of their connections, and promote the reconsideration of phenomenology as a strict cognitive discipline.

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218

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# O DVEH FIZIKAH

## UTELEŠENA FORMALNOST MATEMATIČNIH ZNANOSTI

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### *Povzetek*

V prispevku kritično ovrednotim osnovne predpostavke fenomenološke interpretacije znanstvene revolucije v delih Edmunda Husserla in Martina Heideggra. Ob razkritju nasprotij med intelektualnimi vodili antične teorije števil in mešanih znanosti, na eni strani, ter novoveške algebre in mehanike, na drugi strani, izpostavim vlogo novonastalega simbolnega mišljenja, ki jo omenjena fenomenologa zanemarjata kot posledico, in ne kot vzrok, znanstvene revolucije. Z mislijo Jacoba Kleina nato

oblikujem alternativno razumevanje znanstvenega mišljenja, ki v ospredje postavi t. i. *simbolno delujočo abstrakcijo* matematično-fizikalnih pojmov. Ti se ob zaprtju v lastne strukturne odnose oddaljijo od neposrednih materialnih interpretacij in s tem omogočijo kompleksnejše mišljenje izvora znanstvenih idealizacij. Slednje izpeljem v tesni navezavi na pojem simbolnega vedênja pri Mauriceu Merleau-Pontyju in obenem izoblikujem nastavek za teorijo utelešene znanstvene zaznave.

*Ključne besede:* fenomenologija znanosti, Jacob Klein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, idealizacija, simbolizacija.

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## **On Two Kinds of Physics. The Embodied Formality of Mathematical Sciences**

### *Abstract*

222 The article challenges the core ideas that underlie the interpretation of the scientific revolution as presented by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. By examining the ancient Greek number theory and mixed sciences alongside modern algebra and mechanics, the paper highlights the significance of symbolization, which was overlooked by the two mentioned modern philosophers. Drawing upon the ideas of Jacob Klein, the paper presents a fresh approach to the comprehension of scientific idealizations, closely linked with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of symbolic behavior.

*Keywords:* phenomenology of science, Jacob Klein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, idealization, symbolization.

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## »ZAKON I

*Vsako telo vztraja v svojem stanju mirovanja ali enakomernega premočrtnega gibanja, dokler nanj ne deluje sila, ki bi ga primorala to stanje spremeniti.«*

(Newton 2020, 53; prevod delno spremenjen.)

## Uvod

Leta 1971 je ameriški astronaut David Scott na luni primerjal padec kladiva s padcem peresa. Zaključil je, da je imel Galileo Galilej prav: oba sta na tleh pristala istočasno (Allen 1972, 2–11).<sup>1</sup> Zdi se, da je to zgolj še ena izmed stopničk, po katerih stopa neustrašna tradicija matematične fizike, odkar si je nekaj stoletij nazaj mukotrpno utrla pot na svobodo. Vendar s tako hvalnico eksperimentu sodobna znanost pogosto pozablja, da njenih temeljnih pojmov *v principu* ne moremo izkusiti. Kljub temu da je Galilejev slavniti poskus z različno obteženima kroglama po štiristo letih končno dosegel zadovoljivo izvedbo, pojem *vztrajnosti (gibanja)*<sup>2</sup> denimo take razrešitve ne bo dočakal nikoli – sistemi, v katerih bi predmet zaradi odsotnosti vplivov drugih sil vztrajal »*v svojem stanju mirovanja ali enakomernega premočrtnega gibanja*« (Newton 2020, 53), obstajajo le v naši domišljiji.

223

Kako lahko potemtakem govorimo o *fenomenologiji znanosti*? Zdi se, da smo med proučevanjem izkušnje matematičnega fizika izpostavljeni svojevrstni dinamiki, ki v sebi zajema *neizkustveni moment formalnih pojmov*, katerih pomen – čeprav sodi v središče sodobne fizike – izkusimo šele *posredno*, in sicer prek eksperimentalne izpolnitve hipotez, ki smo jih sprva izpeljali zgolj formalno. Isaac Newton svoje formalno izhodišče recimo zakoliči s slavnimi tremi zakoni gibanja (ibid.), med katere sodi tudi zgoraj navedeni prvi zakon, s katerim Newton natančno opredeli vztrajnostno gibanje. Skozi celotno zgodovino klasične mehanike lahko opazujemo, kako od svoje geneze

<sup>1</sup> Posnetek dogodka je dostopen na: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVfhztmK9zI&ab\\_channel=NASAVideo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVfhztmK9zI&ab_channel=NASAVideo).

<sup>2</sup> Definicijo vztrajnostnega gibanja bralec lahko najde v uvodnem citatu.

v Galilejevih pionirskih podvigih in vse tja do Einsteinove posebne teorije relativnosti oblikuje fizikalno misel. Predvsem pa lahko z njim izrišemo eno izmed razlik, ki so sholastično znanost ločile od moderne, bolj matematične fizike.

Kot je danes dobro znano, je fenomenologija svojo kritiko pogosto usmerila prav zoper *neizkustveno dinamično matematično-fizikalnega formalnega pojma*. To nas napeljuje na misel, da je fenomenologija znanosti nenazadnje oksimoron: ob bok filozofski šoli, ki si je naprtila težko nalogo deformalizacije (filozofskega) mišljenja, postavlja znanost, edinstveni primerek formalizirane misli. To bi seveda držalo, kolikor bi obtičali v teoretskem okviru Husserlovega ali Heideggrovega pristopa k proučevanju znanosti. Mi se bomo, nasprotno, oprli na Merleau-Pontyjevega pojem simbolnega vedenja in ga povezali z raziskavami o simbolizaciji števila, ki jih je spisal Jacob Klein. S tem bomo znanstveno revolucijo poskušali prikazati kot strukturno preobrazbo odnosa med eksperimentom in teorijo. Formalnih pojmov ne bomo razumeli kot eksplicitno izraženih filozofskih pojmov, *temveč kot razširitve fenomenalnega telesa oziroma telesne sheme*; izhajajoč iz Merleau-Pontyjevega utelešenega pogleda na zaznavo bomo izoblikovali teorijo *formalno utelešene izkušnje*.

### **Fenomenologija in idealizirana znanost**

Antagonizem med nazorno izkušnjo in formalnim pojmom stopi v ospredje predvsem med branjem antičnih znanstvenih del, saj so nam ta zaradi našega sodobnega formaliziranega pogleda na svet tako rekoč nedosegljiva. Kar sodobno izkušnjo narave razlikuje od antične, je eksperimentalno nasičen matematični pojem oziroma metoda, ki nam v svoji tehnološki uspešnosti zastira naravno izkušnjo in otežuje razumevanje antičnih, nematematičnih znanosti. Vprašanje je seveda, ali je matematična »preobleka« v zgodovino vstopila postopoma ali v eni sami mišljenjski revoluciji; jasno pa je, da je zdaj tu in gospoduje nad sodobnimi znanstvenimi raziskavami. Zato je premostiti razliko med sodobnim in antičnim kriterijem resnice zahtevna naloga. Zgodovina znanosti zahteva tako pristno razumevanje sodobnih znanstvenih pojmov kot tudi obširen vpogled v njihovo zgodovinsko genezo. Nenazadnje se prav razkrivanje *matematizirane narave* odvija že slabo stoletje in bi ga lahko

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celo razumeli kot prvi resni korak nasproti zgodovini znanosti kot samostojni stroki (prim. Cohen 2016).

Eden prvih mislecev, ki so v znanstveni revoluciji 16. in 17. stoletja videli poglobitveni izvor problemov sodobne filozofije, je bil fenomenolog Edmund Husserl. Prepričan je bil, da so – fenomenološko gledano – matematični pojmi smiselni le, kolikor lahko v izkustvenem življenju najdemo njihov nazorni pomen »evidentnosti uspelega udejanjanja« (Husserl 1998, 10). To pomeni, da znamo za dani pojem najti vsakdanjo nematematično izkušnjo, iz katere pojem izvira (za pojem števila bi bilo to recimo štetje vsakdanjih predmetov).<sup>3</sup>

Taka nazornost evidence se seveda s formalizacijo misli pogosto izgubi: matematični pojmi se namreč prestrukturirajo že s tem, ko mislec svoja dognanja deli z drugimi (ibid., 12), nato pa jih z zapisom posreduje še tistim, s katerimi neposredni stik ni mogoč (recimo kasnejšim generacijam) (ibid., 14). V zapisu sprva povsem minljivi, nazorno razumljeni pojmi pridobijo status »nenehne-biti« (ibid., 14). To jim omogoča, da obstajajo, »čeprav jih ni nihče udejanjil v evidentnosti« (ibid.).

Vendar ta preobrazba s seboj prinese vrsto fenomenoloških preglavic. Zapisano namreč najpogosteje razumemo *pasivno*, tj. zgolj z asociativnim sledenjem zaporedju sklepanj, veljavnosti katerih ne preizprašamo ali preizkusimo aktivno (ibid., 14); torej *brez udejanjenega uvida* privzemamo konsistentnost in pravilnost zapisanega.<sup>4</sup> V izvornem kontekstu nekega pojma lahko njegovo izvorno evidenco brez problema reaktiviramo (tj. udejanjimo), saj je ta del vsakdanjega mišljenjskega okolja (ibid., 20). Tekom zgodovine se

225

3 Claire Ortiz Hill (2010) izpostavlja, da je Husserlov odnos do treh »tradicionalnih« filozofij matematike – formalizma, intuicionizma in logicizma – zapleten in nejasen, in previdno zaključí, da je Husserlova pozicija presenetljivo najbližje Hilbertovemu formalizmu. Zanimivo je, da se Husserl z opredelitvijo čiste teorije števil kot analize (vsakdanjega) vprašanja »koliko? [wie viel?]  
« izmakne nekaterim težkim problemom omenjenih treh filozofij matematike (ibid., 68).

4 Pomislimo na aksiome Peanove aritmetike, s katerimi štetje – in z njim odgovor na vprašanje »koliko« – zvedemo na sledenje zaporedni aplikaciji funkcije naslednika. Čeprav tako razumevanje števil morda vključuje vse formalne karakteristike štetja, aktivno udejanjenje smisla v vsakdanjih izkušnjah ni samoumevno, temveč zahteva reaktivacijo. Peano namreč naravna števila definira z začetnim številom 0 in funkcijo naslednika  $suc(x)$ .  $1+2=3$  lahko nato definiramo  $suc(x)+suc(suc(x))=suc(suc(suc(x)))$ , če  $x=0$ . Malokdo bi števili 1 in 2 v okviru vsakdanjosti seštel na takšen način.

želja po evidentnosti počasi sprevrže v brezupno sanjarijo, saj je evidentno preizkušanje neke eksponentno razvijajoče se discipline nemogoče (ibid., 16). Kljub temu znanstveni napredek ni nujno izgubljen: izpeljavo pravilnosti in konsistentnosti pasivno sprejetih pojmov Husserl prepusti logiki, ki služi kot vodilo pri oblikovanju zaključene pojmovne celote. S tem utemelji zaupanje v pravilnost in konsistentnost velikih znanstvenih sistemov, ki so sicer izgubili neposredni stik z udejanjeno evidenco vsakega izmed členov v dolgi zgodovinski verigi znanstvenih dognanj (ibid.). Če kljub pomanjkanju nazornega pomena nekaterih členov vseeno nastane konsistentna pojmovna struktura, to nakazuje na skupno apodiktično strukturo sicer faktično različnih mišljenjskih okolij – skupno *formalno ontologijo* (ibid., 28). Proces, v katerem se pojem s pomočjo pisave na ta način idealizira, Husserl poimenuje *sedimentacija*. Z njo pojmi po eni strani zadobijo svojo idealno bit in s tem kot zgodovinska tradicija navežejo stik z drugačnimi faktičnimi okolji, po drugi strani pa se izpostavijo nevarnostim pasivnega razumevanja, ki svojo prepričljivost črpa iz »neznanske, čeprav nerazumljene praktične koristnosti« (ibid., 19). Ob slednji se na spoznanje evidentnosti preprosto pozabi (ibid.).

226

Z izpostavitvijo tega dvojnega značaja sedimentacije Husserl po eni strani strne zgodovino matematike, po drugi strani pa analizira tudi novoveško matematizacijo narave. Meni, da novoveški znanstveniki s pomočjo merilne tehnike naravo samo spremenijo v nekaj povsem pasivno privzetega. Ali natančneje: merilna tehnika, ki je izvorno vezana na meritve stvari vsakdanjega življenjskega sveta, z napredkom postopoma izboljšuje t. i. *mejne oblike* (*Limesgestalten*) oziroma empirične približke matematičnim pojmom (Husserl 2005, 41 isl.; Garrison 1986, 330). V tovrstnem tehničnem približevanju se znanstvenik – v Husserlovih besedilih to mesto povečini zaseda Galileo Galilej – spozabi, saj se mu zazdi, da je narava v resnici le živega smisla izpraznjena razsežnost, ki jo kot fizik nadomesti s sedimentiranimi pojmi matematičnih teorij (Husserl 2005, 71 isl.). Ob tem na izvorni, vsakdanji odnos s svetom, ki mu je raziskovanje sploh omogočil, preprosto pozabi.

Husserl Galileja označi kot dvojnega genija: po eni strani nam je *razkril* metodo, s katero prepoznamo »*kavzalni zakon* [in] ,apriorno‘ formo ,*pravega*‘ (idealiziranega in matematiziranega) sveta« (ibid., 73), po drugi strani pa je *zakril* vse tiste načine oblikovanja odnosa z naravo, ki svojo prepričljivost

prejmejo iz pomenskega, nazornega odnosa z vsakdanjim življenjskim svetom (ibid.). Husserl možnost formalizacije, s katero moderna znanost spremeni izkušnjo narave, najde v eksperimentalni tehniki, ki z napredkom tehničnih priprav omogoča vse prepričljivejše redukcije empiričnih pojavov na izoblikovane pojme evklidske geometrije. Slednja služi kot »sorazmerno razvita geometrija« (Husserl 2012, 29), s katero Galilej formalizira in na ta način zakriva izkustveno bogate naravne pojave. Rečemo lahko, da *Husserl matematizacijo narave razume kot preoblačenje predmetov v matematično preobleko, stvano z naprednimi tehničnimi postopki*: znanstvenik vsakdanji predmet *preoblikuje* v matematični pojem in ga s tem idealizira. Po končani preobrazbi se čista razsežnost preprosto privzame za metafizični temelj sveta; vse ostalo so le obstranske, nebistvene akcidence.

Drugi fenomenolog, ki se je ukvarjal s tem vprašanjem, je bil Martin Heidegger, ki nasprotno meni, da matematični značaj sodobne znanosti ne zakrije izkustvene dinamike vsakdanjih predmetov, temveč »razkrije področje vprašanj in eksperimentov, zakonov in novih regij biti« (Heidegger 2011, 203). To se do neke mere sicer sklada s Husserlovo oznako Galileja kot dvojnega genija, a se od opisanega odnosa med eksperimentalno tehniko in matematično teorijo tudi bistveno oddalji. Husserl namreč vodilno vlogo nameni *tehničnemu napredku*, ki v naravi izoblikuje mejne oblike, in matematično interpretacijo narave razume kot *posledico* napredka tehničnih naprav. Heidegger odnos obrne: oblikovanje eksperimentalno preverljivih hipotez (tj. približkov znanstvenih pojmov) je popolnoma nezamisljivo brez vpetosti v nov način interpretacije sveta – hermenevtične vpetosti v *matematični zasnutek* (*mathematischer Entwurf*).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Pojem *Entwurf*, ki ga uporabljata tako Heidegger kot Merleau-Ponty, bomo prevajali z »zasnutek«, saj gre za ustaljeni prevod, uporabljen že v slovenski različici *Biti in časa* (Heidegger 2005, 559). »Gibalni načrt« (Merleau-Ponty 2006, 127), ki se v slovenskem prevodu *Fenomenologije zaznave* uporablja kot prevod za *Bewegungsentwurf*, se nam zdi neprimeren, saj namiguje na jasno izoblikovani načrt. Kot morebitno alternativo bi lahko morda uporabili še »očrt«, saj ta – podobno kot »zasnutek« (tudi »zasnutje«)

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S temi tremi značilnostmi moderne znanosti – faktičnost, eksperimentalnost, merljivost – zgrešimo njen temeljni značaj. Njena bistvena značilnost sestoji iz tega, kar usmerja in določa temeljno gibanje znanosti same. Ta značilnost zajema način rokovanja s stvarmi in metafizični zasnutek predmetnosti predmetov. (Ibid., 188.)

Heidegger bistveno karakteristiko moderne znanosti vidi v vnaprej vzpostavljeni aksiomatski shemi, po kateri se zgleduje raziskovalec. Zasnutek interpretativnega ustroja znanstvenega pristopa vnaprej predpiše relevantne lastnosti, ki jih bo znanstvenik z eksperimenti nato poskušal fiksirati. Temu Heidegger pravi *matematični značaj* moderne znanosti:

*Matematično* označuje temeljno naravnost pristopa k stvarem, zaradi katere stvari razumemo, kot da bi bile že vnaprej dane, kot morajo in bi morale biti dane. Matematično je torej temeljna predpostavka vednosti o stvareh. (Ibid.)

228

Šele na podlagi vnaprej določenih matematičnih predpostavk, ki določajo *pravilno* predmetnost preiskovanih pojavov, lahko izoblikujemo eksperiment, ki te pojave karseda dobro uprizori: *tehnični napredek potrebuje matematizacijo kriterija znanstveno sprejemljivih izkušenj*. Razmerje med vzrokom in učinkom je torej obratno kot pri Husserlu: »Na temelju matematičnega *experientia* nastane moderni eksperiment. Moderna znanost je eksperimentalna zaradi matematičnega zasnutka.« (Ibid., 202.) To je seveda obratno kot pri Husserlu, kjer je moderna znanost matematična zaradi eksperimentalne praktičnosti mejnih oblik.

Rečemo lahko, da Heidegger matematizacijo narave razume kot izvirni hermenevtični odnos z vsakdanjim svetom, ki temelji na zasnutku dinamike

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– izpostavlja nepopolno izoblikovan pomen tega, kar načrtujemo. Povedano drugače, pri zasnutku (oziroma načrtu) gre za moment rojevanja in udejanjanja pomena (v implicitnem smislu), ne za izpopolnjeni in jasno artikulirani pomen (v eksplicitnem smislu). S prevodom »zasnutek« bomo potegnili tudi vzporednice z Oresmovim diagramom, saj je Galilej z njim – kot z *zasnutkom* integralnega računa – udejanjal *rojevajoči* se pomen integralnega računa. Pojem zasnutka je tako pri Heideggru kot pri Merleau-Pontyju tesno povezan s pojmom »projekcije«. Ta označuje preobrazbo okolnega izkustvenega sveta, ki se ravna po dinamikah novega zasnutka.

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aksiomatskih izhodišč, šele ta izhodišča pa v predmetu razkrijejo lastnosti, za katere znanstvenik poskuša oblikovati čim natančnejše eksperimente: matematični fizik najprej v vsakdanjem predmetu *razkrije* lastnosti, ki si jih predmet deli z matematičnim pojmom, in jih šele nato poskuša z eksperimentom karseda dobro prikazati.

Najstrnemo: če Husserl torej pravi, da je treba naravne predmete zgolj tehnično *obleči*, Heidegger odvrne, da jih je sprva potrebno hermenevitično *razkriti*,<sup>6</sup> oba pa od znanstvenih pojmov *pred* kakršnokoli aplikacijo zahtevata *idealizacijo* – fizik naj bi zmeraj posegal po izoblikovani geometriji ali aksiomatskem zasnutku, s katerim naj bi pred oblačenjem ali razkrivanjem vzpostavil koherentno mrežo aplikativnih pojmov. Te skupne predpostavke se bomo v nadaljevanju lotili mi. Husserl Galileju očita, da se še ne giblje v simbolni znanosti in se torej še ni ločil od nazorne predstavitve matematičnih dognanj (Husserl 2005, 24). Tudi Heidegger opozarja, da so novi matematični postopki protoanalize nastali kot posledica in ne vzporedno z novim načinom interpretacije sveta (Heidegger 2008, 203). Oba fenomenologa torej vodi razumevanje, ki v osrčje matematične fizike postavlja aplikacijo enostavno podedovane antične matematike. V naslednjem razdelku bomo izpostavili, da geneze matematične fizike ne moremo preprosto zreducirati na občasne evklidske izpeljave Galileja ali serijo sklepanj, ki jih je objavil Newton. Razlika med evklidsko geometrijo in matematično analizo nam bo razprla problematiko odnosa med antično in moderno matematiko, ki se bo izkazala za ključni moment naših razmislekov.

229

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6 Garrison (1986) lepo opiše, kako je Galilej prispel do zaključkov o vztrajnostnem gibanju: z valjenjem krogle po vse bolj gladkih površinah je počasi izoblikoval to, čemur bi Husserl rekel limitna oblika vztrajnostnega gibanja. S heideggrovskega stališča lahko Garrisonu oporekamo, češ da s takšnim instrumentalnim pristopom zanemarja obrat miselnega ustroja raziskovalcev. Tako bi Husserlova empirično izoblikovana limitna oblika svojo eksperimentalno aplikacijo prehitela kot ena izmed privzetih osnovnih predpostavk. V tem drugem smislu vztrajnost, čeprav je ne moremo izkusiti, služi kot aksiom (Heidegger ima v mislih kar Newtonov prvi zakon gibanja), iz katerega fizik izpelje znanstvene razlage empiričnih pojavov. Heidegger bi prostorsko dekompozicijo hitrosti izstrelka izvedel s pomočjo predpostavljene vztrajnosti gibanja, medtem ko mora Husserl posamično komponento zmeraj eksperimentalno izolirati.

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## O dveh fizikah

V samem rojstvu sodobne znanosti opazimo nekakšno dvojnost v uporabi matematike pri raziskovanju fizikalnih pojavov. Po eni strani so si novoveški znanstveniki z evklidsko geometrijo prizadevali za širšo razumljivost *izdelanih* teorij, po drugi strani pa so si raziskovalno pot utirali z *aksiomatsko neutemeljenimi* postopki nastajajoče matematične analize (Kaplan 2018, 458).<sup>7</sup> Predvsem s postopno izpostavitvijo vloge, ki jo je v znanstveni revoluciji odigrala analiza, bomo v privzeti idealizaciji znanstvenih pojmov opazili resen interpretativni problem. Videli bomo, da Husserl in Heidegger spregledata razvojni pomen *neidealiziranih* postopkov matematične analize, saj svojo teorijo matematične znanosti osnujeta predvsem okoli aplikativnih dinamik evklidske geometrije.

Lep primer omenjene dvojnosti lahko zasledimo prav v delu Isaaca Newtona, ki nasprotje med *analizo* in *evklidsko geometrijo* v svojem najslavnejšem delu razreši v prid slednji – predvsem zavoljo laične razumljivosti fizikalnih teorij.

230 S Kaplanovimi besedami:

Newton se je [z uporabo evklidske geometrije] izognil nerazumljivosti zahtevnih znanstvenih dognanj. S prikritjem analize je znanstveni tekst oblikoval v na prvi pogled demonstrativno sklepanje. Le matematično izobraženi bralci – tisti, ki so Newtonove dokaze dobro razumeli – so v tekstu lahko prepoznali pomanjkljivosti. (Kaplan 2018, 458.)

Kot je razvidno iz citata, Newtonovo delo *Principia* prežemajo ideje – fluksije, limita, integralni račun –, ki bi jih danes pripisali analizi in v

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<sup>7</sup> Matematična analiza je veda, ki proučuje (realne) funkcije. Ukvarja se predvsem z odvajanjem ter integriranjem in zato predvsem za odvod zahteva *zveznost*. Zveznost je bila formalno utemeljena šele na podlagi Cauchyjeve t. i.  $\epsilon$ - $\delta$  definicije limite: če obstaja sprememba vrednosti  $x$ , za katero velja, da je manjša od *poljubno majhnega* števila  $\epsilon$ , obstaja tudi sprememba vrednosti  $f(x)$ , za katero velja, da je manjša od *poljubno majhnega* števila  $\delta$ . Oziroma:  $|a-x| < \epsilon \Rightarrow |f(a)-f(x)| < \delta$ . Iz takšne definicije očitno sledi formalna utemeljitev spremembe vrednosti v trenutku, tj. odvod oziroma Newtonova fluksija spremenljivke.



strogem smislu niso zvedljive na misel, zajeto v Evklidovih *Elementih*.<sup>8</sup> Kljub temu jih je Newton v želji po oblikovanju fantazme o popolni eksaktnosti vseeno skrnil v niz demonstrativnih evklidskih sklepanj. Pri iskanju notranjih silnic matematične fizike se zato ne smemo opirati na filozofsko podobo, ki jo je ta kazala navzven, temveč se moramo vprašati po njenih notranjih dinamikah; z drugimi besedami: znanstveniku moramo pustiti, da se nam daje v svojem naravnem, *znanstvenem* okolju – to pa je okolje, ki je bilo (in še vedno je) skoraj povsem prežeto s postopki matematične analize.

Na podlagi dvoumnosti fizikalnega pojma, ki preskakuje med evklidsko geometrijo in analizo, lahko fenomenološkemu razumevanju matematizacije narave postavimo naslednje vprašanje: ali znanstveno revolucijo res lahko razumemo s pomočjo izpopolnjenega in idealiziranega aksiomatskega sistema, kakršen je evklidska geometrija? Tako Husserl kot Heidegger svoja opažanja utemeljujeta s sklicevanjem na *formalno vlogo matematike*, ki – bodisi kot sedimentirani matematični pojem bodisi kot princip izpeljevanja aksiomatske skice – v znanstvene raziskave uvede *neempirično*, tj. *idealno* pojmovno strukturo. Da jo znanstvenik lahko prepričljivo aplicira, mora biti zadovoljivo razvita. A kot vemo, je trdna aksiomska podlaga analitičnih postopkov novoveškim matematikom umanjala (Stillwell 2019, 60). Newtonovo metodo fluksij je npr. Berkeley zmerjal kot »prikazen (pre)minulih lastnosti [*ghosts of departed qualities*]« funkcij (Berkeley 2007, 81), saj je infinitezimalne spremembe s pojmom limite in zveznosti formalno ekspliciral šele Augustin-Louis Cauchy dve stoletji kasneje. (Kasneje bomo v Galilejevem delu našli podoben način preseganja antične matematike s protointegralnim računom Oresmovega diagrama, ki je morda nekoliko bližje Leibnizevemu infinitezimalnemu računu.) Evklidska geometrija je bila v novem veku torej edini zadovoljivo razvit matematični sistem, s katerim so znanstveniki sicer lahko aksiomatsko izpeljevali svoja dognanja, a so s tem hkrati zakrivali nastajajoče postopke matematične analize.

231

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<sup>8</sup> Za več o uporabi in skrivanju analize glej Guicciardini 2009, 259–308.

## Antični *arithmos*

V čem je torej glavna razlika med antično in moderno matematiko, med evklidsko geometrijo in analizo? Odgovor bomo našli v delu Jacoba Kleina: *simbolizacija števila*. Izkazalo se bo, da simbolizacije ne moremo razumeti kot samoumevnega prehoda na višjo stopnjo abstrakcije, temveč le *kot preobrazbo najosnovnejših vodil matematičnega sklepanja*. Tako razumljena simbolizacija bo omogočila drugačno interpretacijo geneze matematične fizike, ki bo segala onkraj anahronističnih predstav o evklidski geometriji.

232 Teorija množic, ki je služila kot izhodišče celotni filozofiji matematike od konca 19. stoletja naprej, antičnim matematikom ni bila na voljo, zato so rešitve filozofskih vprašanj o naravi števil iskali drugje. Posvetili se bomo predvsem eksplicaciji vodila, skritega temelja, iz katerega so ti matematiki izpeljevali svoje premisleke o matematiki. Temu vodilu, ki od matematičnih razmislekov pričakuje nazornost, bomo rekli *srečljivost*, glede na kontekst pa ga bomo občasno preimenovali v paradigmo *števnosti* (teorija števil).<sup>9</sup> Na kaj merimo s tem? Antična števila so zmeraj števila z jasno opredeljeno enoto in določenim številom enot, torej so prilastki množev predmetov oziroma enot – število tega in onega, »*a number of ...*«, kot pravi Klein (1968, 48). Povedano drugače, matematične in znanstvene predmete je zmeraj mogoče nazorno in/ali empirično *srečati* oziroma *prešteti*: vsako število je množstvo jabolk, hrušk ali v skrajnem primeru čistih miselnih enot.

Klein temu primerno nemalokrat opozori, da je grški pojem števila *arithmos* tesno povezan s preštevanjem štetih reči (ibid., 46). Platon v *Državi* omenja, npr., »števila, ki so jim lastna vidna in otipljiva telesa« (525d), kar Klein posploši v misel, da antični Grki ob štetju konjev, psov ali ovac zapopadejo »konjska-, pasja- ali ovčja-števila« (Klein 1968, 47). Pri presojanju enakosti števil se antični matematik ne poslužuje bijektivnosti obravnavanih množic,<sup>10</sup> temveč sledi spoznanju soudeležnosti množev v skupnem *eidosu* števila.

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<sup>9</sup> S tema pojmom bomo izpostavljali enostavno zahtevo, da antični Grki formalne matematike in znanosti niso poznali – za vsak pojem ali simbol je bil zmeraj vnaprej previden tudi interpretativni model.

<sup>10</sup> Preslikava iz množice A v množico B je bijektivna, če vsakemu elementu iz B ustreza natančno en element iz A.

Skupni *eidos* jih opredeli kot množstva, ki so si enaka v številu: »Prav zato, ker je *arithmos* mnogoter in ne eden, je njegova določitev v določenem primeru mogoča le z *eidosom*, ki bo zajel primerno mnogoterost.« (Ibid., 56.) Čredi konjev in ovac, ki štejeta po deset osebkov, sta si zato – čeprav sta si sami na sebi različni – enaki v številu. Prav tako sta si enakokraki in enakostranični trikotnik enaka v tem, da sta oba trikotnika. Klein vse skupaj povzame takole:

Tukaj je število deset analogno pojmu trikotnika: tako kot ne obstaja trikotnik, ki ni niti enakostraničen niti raznostraničen, tako tudi ne obstaja število deset, ki ne bi označevalo deset teh ali onih jasno določenih stvari. Trikotnik je zmeraj določen trikotnik, bodisi enakokrak, enakostraničen ali raznostraničen. Število deset je zmeraj določeno število določenih stvari, bodisi jabolk bodisi psov, živine ali – v skrajnem primeru – čistih enot, dostopnih samo mislim; kljub razliki med skrajnim primerom čistih enot in vsemi ostalimi, se značaj *arithmosa* kot »določenega števila ... [*a number of* ...]« ohrani povsod. [...] To nadalje pomeni, da je število zmeraj nerazdružljivo zvezano s tistim, česar število je. (Ibid. 48; moj poudarek.)

233

Pojem, ki število nerazdružljivo poveže s preštetim množtvom, je *enota* (ibid.); štetje predpostavlja opredelitev enote, s katero štejemo. Tudi Aristotel, denimo, ki se je najbolj približal sodobnemu pojmovanju števila, paradigme števnosti kot osrednjega vodila antične teorije števil ne opusti – zanj so števila abstrakcije *preštetih* množtev: »Število je namreč z enim [oziroma enoto] odmerjeno množstvo.« (*Metafizika*, I 6, 1057a3.)<sup>11</sup> Torej tudi antični matematiki, ki motrijo čista števila in za svoje enote ne

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<sup>11</sup> Enota izbrane predmete obravnava kot diskretne elemente, ki se v aktu štetja – navkljub materialni različnosti – glede na enoto štetja ne razlikujejo: jabolka štejemo kot jabolka, hruške kot hruške, oboje skupaj pa kot sadje. Tako lahko trdimo, da je ducat jabolk po številu sicer enak ducatu hrušk, čeprav sta si ducata kot taka različna, saj v prvem štejemo z jabolkom, v drugem s hruško. Enote štetja so si navzven, tj. v različno preštetih številih, sicer lahko različne, medtem ko moramo znotraj akta štetja enakost enot štetega števila predpostaviti. V primeru enote, ki bi med štetjem sadja poljubno preskakovala med jabolkom in hruško, bi pravilno preštevto košaro težko oklicali za kaj več kot srečno naključje.

jemljejo materialnih predmetov, potrebujejo jasno opredeljeno enoto, s katero števila štejejo. Prav v kontekstu te potrebe moramo razumeti znameniti spor med Platonom in Aristotelom o metafizičnem statusu čistih enot štetja. Kot je dobro znano, je Platon zagovarjal popolno neodvisnost čistih enot štetja od materialnega sveta, medtem ko je Aristotelov princip abstrakcije zmeraj ohranjal stik s predmeti, od katerih je abstrahiral zgolj dozdevno neodvisne enote. Zastopala sta torej različni mnenji, a sta se oba gibala v enakem mišljenjskem horizontu (tj. v dojemanju narave števila kot množstva enot).

234 Iz te slavne debate o ontološkem pomenu miselne enote nematerialnih števil sledi subtilna razlika med antičnim in sodobnim razumevanjem števila. Husserl, ki je bil recimo po temeljni izobrazbi matematik, se v svojih spisih sicer sooča z vprašanjem enote, a zanjo zmeraj *predpostavi*, da je v pravem, tj. čistem matematičnem smislu izpraznjena vsakršne vsebine. Po svojem bistvu zato ni zavezana *določenemu* množstvu preštetih idealnih enot ter z njim jasno opredeljeni enoti štetja (Husserl svoji formalizirani enoti namreč pravi *Etwas überhaupt*; Husserl 1939, 18) (Hopkins 2011, 357). Nasprotno je, kot smo omenili v prejšnjem razdelku, iz spora med Platonom in Aristotelom še kako očitno, da antičnim matematikom predpostavka o pomenski izpraznjenosti enote štetja ni dostopna. Medtem ko mora Husserl zgolj eksplicirati fenomenološko genezo čiste formalne enote, katere nedoločen, algebrski način biti je že *vnaprej* formalno privzet, je v antični filozofiji iskanje določenega pomena čistih matematičnih enot v resnici glavni vir matematične problematike.<sup>12</sup> Antični matematik v svojih teoretičnih podvigih proučuje števila in njihove relacije, vendar se števila sama ne odrečejo jasno razvidnim – tudi čisto miselnim – enotam, prek katerih jih motri. V antiki vprašanje o metafizičnem statusu *enote* štetja ostane še kako relevantno.

Antični *arithmos* potemtakem ni bil ekvivalenten izpraznjeni množici enot, ki bi zahtevala zgolj in samo *potencialnost* bijektivne preslikave na množstvo predmetov. Rečeno drugače, antični matematiki števila niso znali

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12 Več o tem, kako so filozofska prepričanja usmerjala matematično prakso predvsem praočeta algebre Diofanta, Klein razdela v desetem poglavju knjige *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra* (Klein 1968, 126–149). Natančnejša predstavitev za nas na tem mestu ni potrebna.

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ločiti od prešteti enot, s katerimi so ga nazorno zapopadli (Hopkins 2011, 528). Vprašanje, ki razkriva predstavljeno razliko, je leta 1621 bralcem postavil prvi urednik spisov Diofanta, praočeta algebre. Takole zapiše: »Mar obstaja kdo, ki si, ko sliši ‚število 6‘, ne bi obenem predstavljal šestih enot? Zakaj je potem potrebno reči ‚šest enot‘, ko bi vendar zadostovalo reči ‚šest‘?« (Ibid.) Enota štetja torej po uvedbi algebrskih simbolov (*p*) ostane neizrečena, saj je dojeta v svoji nedoločenosti in formalizirani razobličeni, tj. *algebrski simbolizaciji*: algebrske operacije s simboli nadomestijo dejansko izvedene računske operacije. Ali drugače: *število, zapisano s simbolom, nadomesti jasno opredeljeno enoto štetja* (ibid., 534 isl.). Lahko bi rekli, da števil ne štejemo več, saj z algebro vprašanje o metafiziki enote štetja zdrkne v pozabo. Matematika v svojo misel uvede novo strukturno dinamiko, silnice katere bomo v preostanku sestavka počasi razkrivali in izpeljevali njihov vpliv na zgodovino matematizacije narave. Pred tem naj še opozorimo, da se vodilo srečljivosti odraža tudi v antičnih *mešanih znanostih*.

### Matematični *qua* naravnih pojavov

235

Znanstvenik pojav matematizira tako, da zanj *vnajprej* predpiše shemo postulatov (tj. definicij in aksiomov), iz katere izpelje vse nadaljnje sklepe. Arhimed iz Sirakuz denimo v svojih delih *Oravnotežju ravnin ali o težiščih ravnin in Plavajoča telesa* stori prav to: znanstveni pojav (vzvod oziroma hidrostatično) vnajprej opredeli z naborom aksiomov, iz katerih nato z geometrično dedukcijo izpelje relevantne pojave (Archimedes 2002, 189–220 in 253–300).<sup>13</sup> Ta način se sklada tako s Husserlovim pristopom, ki matematizacijo razume kot »oblačenje« predmetov v (evklidsko) geometrijo (Husserl 2012, 24 isl.), kot tudi s Heideggrovimi pojmovanji, ki zasnutek matematičnih predmetov utemeljijo z izpeljevanjem vzpostavljenih aksiomatskih trditev (Heidegger 2011, 202). Razlike med Arhimedom in moderno znanostjo zato ne bomo našli v postopku samem, marveč v *načinu njegove uporabe*.

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<sup>13</sup> Bralec lahko strnjen pregled Arhimedove protomatematične fizike najde v *A History of Mechanics* francoskega zgodovinarja Renéja Dugasa (1988, 24–31).

Arhimed je bil glavni predstavnik antičnih mešanih znanosti.<sup>14</sup> Mešane znanosti so na zamejenih eksperimentalnih področjih povezovale abstraktne matematične pojme in empirične predmete. Področja so zamejena zato, ker predmeti antičnih mešanih znanosti zahtevajo matematične pojme, ki naravi predmeta sledijo. Aristotel o »dokazovanju harmonskih <atributov> s pomočjo aritmetike« pravi naslednje:

[...] dokazano dejstvo je predmet ene znanosti [harmonike] [...]; vzrok za dejstvo pa je predmet višje znanosti [aritmetike], za katero veljajo značilnosti same po sebi. Tudi iz te razprave je jasno, da je vsak <atribut> mogoče v polnem smislu dokazati samo na osnovi njegovih lastnih počel. V zadnjem primeru pa imata počeli nekaj skupnega. (*Druga analitika*, I, 76a10–15.)

236 Zadnji stavek izraža zahtevo po nazorni in neposredni srečljivosti<sup>15</sup> aritmetičnih počel v harmoničnem dejstvu, saj je sicer prečenje znanstvenih disciplin – »npr. da bi dokazali geometrijsko <dejstvo> s pomočjo aritmetike« – strogo prepovedano (*ibid.*, I, 74a39–75b20). Peter Distelzweig bistvo prepleta antične matematike s fiziko izpostavi s t. i. *dvojnim qua operatorjem*: »Glasba [harmonika] obravnava svoje polje raziskovanja (1) *qua* glas in (2) *qua* število; optika obravnava svoje polje raziskovanja (1) *qua* vid in (2) *qua* črto.« Z drugimi besedami, mešane znanosti »matematične pojme [objects] obravnavajo (1) kot [*qua*] naravne predmete, naravne predmete pa obravnavajo (2) kot [*qua*] matematične pojme« (Distelzweig 2013, 93).

V antičnem prepletu matematičnega pojma s fizikalnim predmetom se razjasni posebnost sodobnega matematiziranja pojavov: matematizacija (kot jo razume fenomenologija) naravne predmete *preskakuje* in jim ne sledi

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14 Aristotel jih v *Fiziki* označi kot »bolj naravne [oziroma fizikalne] izmed matematičnih znanosti« (Aristotel, *Fizika* 2, 194b), in sicer bi jim lahko rekli podrejene znanosti, saj jih v *Drugi analitiki* podredi višjim (matematičnim) znanostim, s katerimi si delijo nekatere lastnosti. Sam izraz »mešane znanosti« (*scientia media*) sicer izhaja iz srednjega veka.

15 S sodobnim besednjakom bi lahko temu rekli *zahteva po jasno opredeljenem modelu aritmetike*.

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(Heidegger 2011, 202).<sup>16</sup> Po mnenju fenomenologije sodobna matematizacija brezobzirno grabi po sebi neprimernih situacijah in jih s pomočjo eksperimentov tlači v zelo ozek formalni okvir. Pri tem naivno pozablja, da je dejanskost raziskovanih pojavov pogosto bogatejša od nabranih matematičnih dejstev. Arhimed se brez težav izmakne tem očitkom oblačenja narave, saj si takega posega v razumevanje narave predmetov enostavno ne dovoli: med raziskovanjem fizikalnih sistemov sledi njihovim *srečljivim* matematičnim oblikam. Skratka, matematizacije obsojena novoveška znanost se ravna po »enojnem *qua* operatorju«: vse obravnava kot matematični pojem.

Idealizirana podoba enojnega *qua* operatorja pri proučevanju narave izkazuje dvojnost fenomenološkega pojma matematizacije: po eni strani enojni *qua* operator znanstvenika vodi s pomočjo izpopolnjenih in idealiziranih pojmov, ki v svoji transhistoričnosti izgubijo neposredni nazorni pomen; po drugi strani pa matematična interpretacija pojavov ni izkustveno samoumevna. Kot smo že omenili, Husserl drugi zahtevi poskuša zadostiti s sklicevanjem na tehnični napredek, ki v svoji natančnosti omogoči dosledno aplikacijo matematičnih pojmov (Husserl 2012, 45 isl.). Heidegger sicer opazi, da je treba upoštevati hermenevtično izrisan prostor aksiomatskega sistema, ki Husserlovo razmerje med življenjskim svetom in njegovo matematizacijo tako rekoč obrne. A skupna predpostavka glede tega, da je znanstvena revolucija *prvenstveno* metafizična reinterpretacija sveta, ostaja ista. Simbolizacijo matematike fenomenologija razume kot zgolj obstransko posledico potrebe po novi metafizični interpretaciji sveta. Tukaj se pojavi problem: antična fizika v svetu srečuje pojave, ki so si z matematičnimi pojmi nazorno enaki, prav zaradi tega pa ji umanjka eksperimentalna težnja enojnega *qua* operatorja po brezobzirni matematizaciji. Fenomenologija sicer eksperimentalno težnjo in brezobzirno matematizacijo novoveške znanosti obsodi, a hkrati spregleda, da antična matematika brez temeljne preobrazbe tej ni sposobna slediti – vztrajno se namreč drži tega, čemur pravimo vodilo srečljivosti. Iz tega je razvidno, da fenomenologija simbolizacijo matematične misli, ki zgodovinsko gledano

237

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<sup>16</sup> Peter Machamer (1978) je prepričan, da je Galilej dedič arhimedovske tradicije mešanih znanosti. Kljub temu se vzdrži razlage, kako je Galilej uspel preseči zamejenost dvojnega *qua* operatorja (117). Glede tega je seveda zelo zgovorna fenomenologija.

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matematiki omogoči preseganje okvira mešanih znanosti, tematizira na napačen način.

Opisano dilemo bomo rešili z uvedbo simbolizacije fizikalnih pojmov, ki bodo svoj pomen tvorili izključno na podlagi funkcionalnih odnosov z ostalimi pojmi v matematični strukturi in s tem izgubili materialno podlago. Kot bomo videli v nadaljevanju, je najboljši primer opisane preobrazbe sprememba v razumevanju gravitacije, saj moderni pristop v primerjavi z antičnim ne razlikuje med nebesnimi in zemeljskimi telesi. Pojem gibajočega se predmeta se povsem izprazni in obstane kot funkcijski odnos spremenljivk, s katerimi ga znanstvenik opisuje. Razlika med potjo topovske krogle in orbito planeta na ta način postane formalna, tj. neodvisna od materialne podstati raziskovanega predmeta.

### **Platon, Galilej in urejenost vesolja**

238 Poglejmo si primer, v katerem razliko med antično materialno srečljivostjo in novoveško formalno simbolnostjo srečamo na ravni splošne kozmologije. Že na prvih straneh *Dialoga o dveh glavnih sistemih sveta* Galilej predstavi naslednjo interpretacijo Platonove teorije o nastanku vesolja:

Narava [si] nekaj časa in na neki razdalji pomaga s premim gibanjem, zato da gibljivemu telesu, ki je bilo prvotno postavljeno v mirovanje, podeli neko določeno hitrost. Upošteva je to razlago, si predstavljamo, da je bog ustvaril npr. telo Jupiter in sklenil, da mu podeli neko hitrost, ki jo mora odtlej nenehoma enakomerno vzdrževati; s Platonom lahko porečemo, da ga je najprej pognal v premo in pospešujoče gibanje, ko pa je Jupiter dosegel zadano stopnjo hitrosti, je njegovo premo gibanje spremenil v krožno, ki mu nato po naravi pripada enakomerna hitrost. (Galilei 2009, 27.)

V Platonovem *Timaju*, ki je temu navedku najbližje (predvsem 38b–39b), pravkar navedene teorije ne bomo našli. Nenazadnje je dobro znano, da se je novoveška znanost navdihovala z besedili antičnih piscev, a jih je pogosto interpretirala v luči anahronističnih predpostavk, ki so se porodile iz sporov s sholastično znanostjo (Klein 1992, 120). V *Timaju* pa vseeno najdemo teorijo

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o nastanku vesolja, ki za razmejitev urejene narave od izvornega kaosa poseže po matematični teoriji razmerij:

Tako je bog postavil vodo in zrak na sredo med ogenj in zemljo ter je med njimi izdelal kolikor mogoče skladno sorazmerje: zrak je v razmerju do vode to, kar je ogenj v razmerju do zraka, in voda je v razmerju do zemlje to, kar je zrak v razmerju do vode. [...] Iz teh ter takšnih (prvin), štirih po številu, je bilo porojeno telo sveta, ki se je uskladilo prek sorazmerja. (Platon, *Timaj*, 32b–c.)

Gibanje posameznega predmeta, ki sestoji iz teh štirih proporcev, je seveda določeno z ozirom na njegovo naravno mesto mirovanja. Predmet miruje, če je v ravnotežju (tj. določenem sorazmerju) s svojo okolico, v nasprotnem primeru se giblje proti mestu mirovanja: »mirovanje je vselej povezano z izravnanoostjo, gibanje pa z neizravnanoostjo« (ibid., 58a). Zopet opazimo, da je antična misel za kakršnokoli matematično razlago narave zahtevala nazorno srečljivost počel, ki jih je z matematiko eksplicirala.

239

Pri Galilejevi opredelitvi gibanja je seveda nekoliko drugače. Videli smo, da nastanka vesolja (oziroma Sončevega sistema) ne opredeli z izpostavitvijo materialnih lastnosti, ki jih je bog vtisnil temeljnim gradnikom. Veliko bolj ga zanima oblika gibanja in kako jo je bog ustvaril. Kot zapiše Klein: »Telesa sama na sebi niso izpostavljena primerjavi, razumemo jih namreč prek njihovega *modusa biti*, natančneje prek njihovega gibanja.« (Klein 1985, 31.) Na takšen način jih simboliziramo, tj. spremenimo v abstraktna točkasta telesa. Vendar simbolizacija gibanja po Kleinu zahteva uvedbo *nove dimenzije* proporcionalnih razmerij – *čas* (ibid., 34). Toda Klein v uvedbi dimenzije časa spregleda zametke novih matematičnih orodij, zato bomo manjkajočo povezavo izpeljali mi.


### Oresmov diagram, mehanika in vztrajnost

Zgodovini disciplin matematične analize in klasične mehanike sta si presenetljivo blizu. Zgodovino prve se pogosto povezuje z reševanjem geometrijskih problemov, vendar so poleg vprašanj o volumnu, ploščini in tangenth pomembno vlogo v njenem razvoju odigrali tudi mehanski

problemi (Stillwell 2010, 244). Na temelju njune medsebojne spetosti bomo v nadaljevanju raziskali tesno razmerje med osnovnimi idejami matematične analize in formaliziranim pogledom na gibanje. Pokazali bomo, da so matematična sklepanja pogosto ostala utemeljena zgolj in samo praktično ter so šele čez čas vzbudila željo po natančni aksiomatski utemeljitvi.

Temeljna ideja, ki že v Galilejevem delu povezuje obravnavani disciplini, je kvazi-inverzni odnos, ki ga med seboj oblikujeta strmina grafa in ploščina, ki jo ta izriše: »Razdalja je enaka površini pod grafom hitrosti (v odvisnosti od časa). Hitrost je strmina grafa poti (v odvisnosti od časa).« (Galilei 2009, 247.) Zаметke te ideje najdemo v delu srednjeveškega misleca iz 14. stoletja, Nikolaja Oresma (Oresme 1968, 409). Oresmov diagram (slika 1) omogoča primerjavo enakomerno pospešenega gibanja in enakomernega (nepospešenega) gibanja: ploščina trapeza, ki simbolizira enakomerno pospešeno gibanje, je enaka ploščini pravokotnika, ki simbolizira enakomerno (nepospešeno) gibanje.

240



**Slika 1:**  
Oresmov diagram.

Izpostavili smo že izrazito nesoizmerljivost antičnega in sodobnega razumevanja števil, pri čemer je prvo nerazdružljivo zavezano določeni enoti štetja, drugo pa se z uvedbo algebrskih simbolizacij slednje otrese. Poleg razlike v razumevanju naravnih števil algebrske simbolizacije pred nas postavijo tudi nazorno nesmiselna števila, ki obstajajo le kot simboli in je njihova nazorna interpretacija – vsaj v konvencionalnem smislu

opredelitve količine – nemogoča. Število se – recimo – izmika količinski interpretaciji, saj bi ta zahtevala negativni kvadrat števila.<sup>17</sup> Descartes kot prvi mislec, ki poskuša utemeljiti imaginarne korene polinomov, opredeli njihov metafizični status glede na celotni simbolni sistem algebre: imaginarni koreni obstajajo le kot zamišljene [*conceived*] entitete, predvsem kolikor izpolnjujejo zahteve osnovnega izreka algebre (Descartes 1954, 175).<sup>18</sup> To je mogoče zato, ker je simbol sam nosilec pomena števila in tvori smisel le v odnosu do drugih simbolov: »Material [tj. način biti enot štetja] je zdaj konstituiran s – ,števili', katerih obstoj ni več problematičen, saj jih kot produkte simbolno delujoče abstrakcije zapopademo neposredno v zapisu.« (Klein 1992, 224.)

Ali lahko podobno dinamiko zasledimo tudi v Oresmovem diagramu? To bi pomenilo, da bi novoveški pojem gibanja razumeli samo, če bi izhajali iz strukturnih dinamik zarisane Oresmova diagrama. Interpretacija gibanja nekega poljubnega predmeta bi bila samo posamezni primer še abstraktnejše splošnosti gibanja. Kot smo opozorili že v primeru Newtonove metode fluksij, je bilo novoveško razumevanje metod integriranja in odvajanja vse prej kot jasno in razločno. Enako velja tudi za Galilejevo razumevanje Oresmova diagrama; slednjega namreč celo eksplicitno loči od tega, čemur vseskozi pravimo srečljive matematične interpretacije. Pri utemeljitvi se namreč sklicuje na nedeljive trenutke, v katerih gibajoče se telo poseduje količine hitrosti, ki se tekom gibanja seštejejo v ploščino diagrama (Galilei 1954, 215; Galilei 2009, 218f). To v kontekstu evklidske geometrije, kjer je črta, ki pri Galileju simbolizira specifično hitrost, po drugem aksiomu Evklidovih *Elementov* brez širine, seveda nima prav nobenega smisla. Kako naj bi se črte brez širine seštele v končno širino ter posledično v ploščino lika?

241

<sup>17</sup> Krasen pregled postopne simbolizacije algebre lahko bralec najde v Stedall (2011); glede recepcije algebre v Angliji pa je še posebej zanimiva Pycior (1997).

<sup>18</sup> Osnovni izrek algebre pravi, da je število korenov polinoma zmeraj enako njegovi stopnji.




Fig. 5

**Slika 2:**

*Rota Aristotelis* (Galilei 1954, 21).

Zgoraj: pravilna večkotnika, sestavljena iz končnega števila deljivih količin;  
spodaj: kroga, ki sestojita iz neskončnega števila nedeljivih količin.

242

Galilej se nesmislov, do katerih nas pripelje razmišljanje o neskončnosti, v vsej polnosti zaveda. Iz t. i. problema *Rota Aristotelis* (glej sliko 2), ki se sprašuje, kako lahko večji in manjši krog ob vrtenju izrišeta isto dolžino, izpelje nasprotje med *deljivimi* in *nedeljivimi* količinami (Galilei 1954, 49–52). Prve izhajajo iz konteksta že vzpostavljene matematike, v kateri lahko poljubno dolžino delimo v nedogled; druge predstavljajo še nejasno izoblikovan pojem, ki odpira nove dimenzije mišljenja neskončnosti. Galilej je prepričan, da je neskončnost s pomočjo te druge vrste pojmov povsem enostavno doseči; zahteva edino, da neskončno majhne točke, na katere razdelimo daljico, *niso srečljive*:

Napočil je čas, da odgovorimo na Simplicijevo vprašanje in mu pokažemo, da ne le, da črte ni nemogoče spremeniti v neskončno število točk, temveč da to ni nič zahtevnejše kot razdeliti jo v končno število delov. To bomo storili pod pogojem, glede katerega sem prepričan, Simplicio, da mi ne boš oporekal, namreč *da od mene ne boš zahteval, da*

*eno točko razločim od druge in da ti vsako posebej pokažem tu na papirju; kajti prepričan sem, da [...] boš lahko označil razdelitve daljice s tem, da jo zložiš v kvadrat ali šesterokotnik: te delitve boš zagotovo imel za jasne in dejansko opravljene. (Ibid., 47.)*

Pod tem pogojem nesrečljivosti Galilej črto najprej »zloži« v kvadrat, nato v petero-, šesterokotnik itd., dokler z »neskončnokotnikom« – krogom – ne pokaže limite procesa kot celote: »Ko sem ravno črto zložil v večkotnik z neskončno stranicami, tj. v krog, sem v dejanskosti udejanjil prej omenjeno neskončnost delov.« (Ibid.) Vendar so nedeljivi deli, tj. točke, ki jih s tem udejanjimo, dostopni le skozi strukturo celotnega postopka in ne sami na sebi; skratka: niso srečljivi. S prikazanim postopkom torej oblikujemo pojem, ki preseže antičnogrško matematiko, a je ta novi način biti matematičnih pojmov hkrati le nakazan in nepreciziran. Z drugimi besedami, pri Galileju je pojem nedeljive količine še nezadostno idealiziran.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Bascelli glede Galilejevih infinitezimalnih nedeljivih količin pravi: »Medtem ko je bila [Galilejeva] rešitev zadovoljiva za naravno filozofijo, ni bila za matematiko, saj je bil nivo idealizacije nezadosten za oblikovanje prave aritmetike [nedeljivih količin].« (2014, 135.)

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Galilejeva rešitev problema *Rota Aristotelis* je za nas tukaj nepomembna, zanima nas predvsem, kako je Galilej ta novi tip matematičnih pojmov razširil na svojo različico Oresmovega diagrama. Kljub matematični nejasnosti imajo nedeljive količine, ki v Galilejevi različici Oresmovega diagrama (slika 3) simbolizirajo posamične hitrosti gibajočega se predmeta, izrazito fizikalen pomen. Vendar pri tem ne gre za srečljivi pomen antičnih znanosti, temveč za prenesen formalni pomen, ki svoj smisel prejme skozi *diagramsko delujočo simbolno abstrakcijo* Oresmovega diagrama. O tem priča znamenita zmotna, ki je Galileju sprva preprečevala oblikovanje pravilnega zakona prostega pada, saj je diagram razumel preveč arhimedovsko in je vertikalno dimenzijo tolmačil prostorsko. To pomeni, da je bil zanj pospešek najprej odvisen od prepotovane poti, kar je diagram (pre)tesno prepletlo z raziskovanim eksperimentalnim sistemom: parametre pospeška je Galilej srečeval v utoru, po katerem je spuščal kroglice in raziskoval njihov pospešek (Palmerino 2010, 420). To zmotno prepričanje preseže, ko v diagramu jasno loči prepotovano pot (daljica CD) in čas gibanja (daljica AB) (ibid., 437).

Empirični primeri nedeljivih količin – recimo materialni atomi – so razumljivi le skozi matematično skico in ne sami na sebi. Zato jih, četudi bi jih iskali, po Galilejevem mnenju ne bi našli, tj. *srečali*: deljenje trdnih snovi na manjše delce zmeraj privede do deljivih količin, ki jih lahko zberemo na kup; po drugi strani tekočin ne moremo deliti na enak način, saj se deli v kupu zlijejo v eno. Temu je tako, ker so tekočine razpršene [dissolve] »v svoje temeljne, neskončno majhne in nedeljive gradnike« (Galilei 1954, 41). Z drugimi besedami, nedeljive količine *v principu* niso enostavno dostopne




Fig. 47

**Slika 3:**  
Galilejeva navpična različica  
Oresmovega diagrama  
(Galilei 1954, 173).

empiričnim raziskovalnim metodam, njihov eksperimentalni dokaz pa zato zahteva praktično iznajdljivost (Galilei 2009, 199). Prav na takšen način moramo razumeti tudi strukturno vlogo, ki jo v formalnem diagramu protointegrala igra hitrost: enakomerno gibanje je *zlitje* vseh količin hitrosti v celotno ploščino diagrama. Hitrosti so uravnotežene, če je gibanje enakomerno, za neenakomerna gibanja pa lahko proučimo, kako se razlikujejo od idealiziranega enakomernega gibanja. Prav to stori Galilej, ko v *Dialogih* izenači prepotovano pot enakomerno pospešenega gibanja in enakomernega gibanja, ki se enako dolgo giblje s povprečno hitrostjo prvega gibanja (Galilei 1954, 173).

Čeprav je eden izmed operatorjev *qua* zgrešil natančnega empiričnega referenta (nedeljiv trenutek *qua* nedeljiva količina hitrosti), smo z drugim naš formalni diagram vseeno uspeli aplicirati (enakost oziroma neenakost količin hitrosti *qua* enakomerno oziroma neenakomerno gibanje). Prav z uvedbo t. i. enojnega *qua* operatorja smo matematiko izmaknili samoumevnemu prepletanju mešanih znanosti. Lahko bi rekli, da so posamične količine hitrosti ekvivalentne številu v algebri, saj prav tako obstajajo izven antičnih matematično-fizikalnih interpretacij pojmov in prejmejo smisel šele z vključitvijo v celotno strukturo simbolnega sistema: *nedeljive količine hitrosti obstajajo le v celoti diagrama, v katerega se zlijejo*.

245

## Simbolno vedénje

V uvodu smo omenili, da bomo s pomočjo filozofije Mauricea Merleau-Pontyja oblikovali posebno obliko fenomenologije znanosti. Zato se bomo v zadnjih dveh odsekih obrnili k njegovi fenomenologiji telesa, s Heideggrovim pojmom *matematičnega zasnutka* povezali pojem *motoričnega zasnutka* ter ponudili izomorfnu vzporednico med utelešeno simbolizacijo vedénja in matematično simbolizacijo pojmov. Pri slednji se bo Husserlovo razumevanje tehničnega napredka izkazalo za nujni, a ne zadostni pogoj simbolizacije.

Kot smo lahko prebrali v uvodni predstavitvi Heideggrove interpretacije matematične znanosti, ima zanj pojem matematičnega zasnutka, ki na naravo projicira aksiomatsko shemo, ključni pomen: matematični zasnutek znanstveniku izriše horizont možnega znanstvenega napredka, tj. nadaljnje

matematizacije narave. Tudi Merleau-Ponty govori o projekciji, le da je ta utelešena projekcija »motoričnega zasnutka« [*Bewegungsentwurf*] (Merleau-Ponty 2006, 127). Podobno kot pri Heideggru tudi pri Merleau-Pontyju projiciranje zasnutka subjektu razkrije svet še nepopolno konstituiranih predmetov. Gibom omogoči, da so »sredobežni« in se dogajajo »v možnem ali ne-bitu«, saj »subjekt gibanja pred seboj razporedi neodvisen prostor, v katerem vse, kar v resnici ne obstaja, lahko prevzame podobo bivanja« (Merleau-Ponty 2006, 128). A za razliko od Heideggra Merleau-Ponty »funkcijo projekcije« (ibid.) pojmovno loči od motoričnega zasnutka in si tako omogoči raziskovanje nastanka tako projekcije same kot tudi motoričnega zasnutka.

246 Merleau-Ponty s funkcijo projekcije povzame kvalitativno razliko med *konkretnimi* in *abstraktnimi gibi*. Razliko med enimi in drugimi bomo povzeli z naslednjim navedkom, v katerem Merleau-Ponty ponazori temeljno težavo znamenitega bolnika Schneiderja: »[I]sti subjekt, ki na ukaz ni sposoben [a] s prstom pokazati na del svojega telesa, se v trenutku [b] dotakne mesta, kamor ga je pičil komar« (Merleau-Ponty 2006, 120).<sup>20</sup> V čem je razlika? Podlaga *konkretnemu* gibu (b) je »dani svet« (ibid., 113), zato je gib zgolj sredstvo za preganjanje komarjev. V *abstraktnem* gibu (a) pa se telo iz »gonila gibanja« preoblikuje v »cilj [gibanja]«, v katerem je isti gib le »vrsta gest na sebi« (ibid., 127). Abstraktni gib torej izvedemo *neodvisno* od realizacije namena v danem svetu, z opravljenim konkretnim gibom pa v danem svetu *srečamo* njegov cilj – komarja. Razumevanje gibov samih na sebi (tj. abstraktno vedenje) seveda ni mogoče brez že omenjenega motoričnega zasnutka, ki tvori *konstruirano podlago* abstraktnih gibov in Schneiderju preprosto umanjka (ibid., 127).

Motorični zasnutek je na prvi pogled ekvivalenten Heideggrovemu matematičnemu zasnutku, le da mu Merleau-Ponty pripiše bolj *utelešen*, »gibalni pomen« (ibid., 126). Heideggrovski znanstvenik je pravzaprav bližje pacientu, o katerem govori Merleau-Ponty in za katerega imajo abstraktni gibi

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20 Merleau-Ponty je svoje razumevanje telesa v veliki meri utemeljil s sklicevanjem na študije, ki sta jih v dvajsetih letih 20. stoletja opravila Adhemar Geld in Kurt Goldstein. Raziskovala sta predvsem oblike vedenja pri pacientu Johannu Schneiderju, ki je med prvo svetovno vojno utrpel poškodbo okcipitalnega režnja. Goldstein je dognanja kasneje sintetiziral v holistični pogled na (psihološka) obolenja in biološke organizme nasploh.

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*intelektualni pomen* (ibid.), kar pomeni, da »misli o gibanju ne more nikoli razviti v dejansko gibanje«, saj »premišljuje o idealni formuli gibanja, [...] medtem ko je pri normalnem človeku vsako gibanje hkrati gibanje in zavest o gibanju« (ibid., 127). Skratka, zdrav človek telo obvlada *strukturno*, tj. *neodvisno od praktičnih pomenov*; a hkrati svoje motorične skice (navadno) ne zna teoretično eksplicirati. Normalni človek se torej giblje na ravni *predteoretskega* variiranja<sup>21</sup> motoričnega zasnutka, s katerim na predmete projicira abstraktne gibe, ki mu omogočajo raziskovanje novih perspektiv in načinov delovanja. V motorični projekciji in motorični skici torej najdemo utelešena ekvivalenta *predteoretske različice* Heideggrovega matematičnega zasnutka. Ker smo matematični in motorični zasnutek zblížali, bomo zdaj na določen način lažje izpostavili pogoje, pod katerimi se matematični zasnutek sploh lahko oblikuje.

Na srečo Merleau-Ponty o konstituciji telesa kot nove avtonomne strukture motoričnega razmisleka piše že v svojem prvem delu *Struktura vedenja* (1963). Opredeli jo s pomočjo razlike med *odstranljivim* in *simbolnim* vedenjem, za katero se zdi, da služi kot ekvivalent razliki med konkretnimi in abstraktnimi gibi. S tema oblikama vedenja Merleau-Ponty razloči med strukturami vedenja ostalih primatov in strukturami vedenja človeka. V enem izmed primerov opiše opico, postavljeno pred škatlo, v kateri se nahaja banana. Banano opica lahko doseže le tako, da jo s palico porine *stran od sebe* in s tem skozi odprtino na zadnji stranici škatle. Če ji uspe, banana brez težav z vleče okoli škatle in do sebe (ibid., 117). Kljub temu da je opica, če ji je to dovoljeno, škatlo sposobna s celotnim telesom zaobiti, tj. se sprehoditi do zadnje strani škatle in banana neposredno prijete, giba z roko in palico, ki bi dosegel isti rezultat, a brez spreminjanja telesne lege, ni sposobna izvesti (ibid.). Hoje okoli škatle, ki je za opico nedvomno in *neposredno* smiselna, tako ni sposobna nadomestiti – tj. *simbolizirati* – z gibom roke, ki smisel tvori šele *posredno*. Vedenjski vzorec giba roke opici ni dosegljiv, saj porivanje banane skozi odprtino (torej *stran od nje same*) neposredno zanika potrebo po hrani. Nasprotno pa človeška simbolizacija gibanja omogoča nadomestitev enega giba (*neposredno* smiselna hoja okoli škatle) z drugim (*posredno* smiselna uporaba orodja). Pri tem sicer ohranimo pomen in izid prvega, a uporabimo pravila telesnega vedenja

247

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21 Pravzaprav *utelešenega mišljenja*.

drugega; prav tako kot algebra ponudi simbolno manipulacijo spremenljivk, ki zgolj posredno označujejo nabor specifičnih numeričnih vrednosti.

Iz sposobnosti simbolizacije vedenja lahko izpeljemo *refleksivni obrat* (nekakšna *epoche* praktičnega namena), ki omogoča problematizacijo pravilnosti oziroma nepravilnosti lastnih gibalnih vzorcev:

Žival se ne more postaviti na mesto premične reči in same sebe videti kot cilj [tj. same sebe kot kinestetični fenomen oz. gib]. Ne more imeti različnih perspektiv, prav tako kot ne more razumeti, da je stvar, videna z različnih perspektiv, ista stvar. (Ibid., 118.)

Po drugi strani človek ciljno stvar pogosto ohrani nespremenjeno in variira vedenjske vzorce, po katerih dostopa do nje. Obrat omogoča odprtost strukturne dinamike človeških gibov, saj je ta deloma neodvisna od cilja, ki ga želi doseči: v prid (zanimivejši) *posredni* izpolnitvi vzgiba želje je zmožna izvesti njeno *neposredno* zanikanje. Refleksivni obrat – »utelešena *epoche*« – je torej posledica zavrtja neposredne izpolnitve želje, ki jo s simbolnim vedenjem postavimo v oklepaj. S tem v ospredje stopijo raznoliki vedenjski vzorci doseganja izbranega cilja in medsebojni odnosi, v katere vstopajo. Fenomenalno telo na podlagi razlik med vedenjskimi vzorci oblikuje strukturno dinamiko, s katero posamični gibi delujejo v medsebojni relaciji motorične skice in lahko zato občasno zanemarijo zunajtelesno referenco. Prav te vedenjske vzorce Merleau-Ponty poimenuje abstraktno vedenje: *zasnutek in z njim funkcija projekcije sledi iz simbolizacije predmetov z gibi*.

Iz tega sledi, da je neposredna izpolnitev pogojev *materialne enakosti* dveh predmetov zanemarljiva v prid *funkcionalne enakosti* glede na strukturo vedenja uporabe. Takega enačenja pri opici denimo ne bomo našli, saj jo sicer lahko naučimo neko nalogo reševati s palico, a je kasneje z vejo posušenega grma ne bo izvedla (ibid., 114). Gib, s katerim doseže cilj, je zaprt v napotilni sklop določenih materialnih predmetov. Podobno je pri konkretnem vedenju, saj je v tem primeru vedenje prav tako zavezano k opravljanju določenih danih opravil. Nasprotno je zdravo človeško vedenje simbolizirano, abstrahirano in zato »osvobojeno«: človek se je sposoben prilagoditi različnim predmetom, ki imajo skupno strukturo (so funkcionalno ekvivalentni), zaradi česar lahko s

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podobnimi gibi pride do istega cilja. Pred nami je izrisan horizont potencialnih gibalnih vzorcev, s katerimi lahko pristopamo do raznolikih predmetov. Tako palica kot tudi posušena veja lahko služita kot podaljška roke, pomembno je le, da obvladamo *motorični zasnutek podaljška roke*.

Na tem mestu lahko sklenemo kritiko Heideggrove fenomenologije znanosti in mu poočitamo, da z matematičnim zasnutkom opiše le obliko in še ne pojasni geneze matematizirane znanosti. Slednja namreč zahteva *simbolizacijo členov (matematičnega) zasnutka* – kreacijo pojmov, ki so smiselni le v kontekstu celote simbolnega sistema. Prav tako mu lahko očitamo, da so tovrstni pojmi pogosto predteoretske narave, saj njihova idealizacija še ni izpopolnjena. Seveda se lahko ozremo tudi na Husserla, ki zasnutek zanemari v prid tehničnega napredka. Vidimo lahko, da je simbolni reflektivni obrat izvedljiv le, kolikor je predmet, ki ga med simboliziranjem ohranjamo konstantnega, *sam po sebi stabilen*. Prav v tej zahtevi srečamo vzporednico s Husserlovim razumevanjem tehnike, saj je simbolizacija mogoča šele na podlagi dobro izoblikovanih tehnik eksperimentiranja, ki jih lahko ob simboliziranju pojmov *ohranimo nespremenjene in stabilne*. Očitek o pretirani idealizaciji znanstvenih pojmov ostaja enak kot pri Heideggru.

249

### **Za zaključek: simbolno védenje**

Ker smo jasno pokazali, da sta (a) eksperimentalna tehnika in (b) matematični zasnutek vzporedna z (a) nujnimi predpogoji in (b) zasnutkom abstraktnih gibov, lahko tudi obrat novoveške znanosti razumemo kot uvedbo *nove simbolne osvoboditve* matematičnih pojmov. Videli smo, da se je moderna teorija števil otresla zahteve po jasno opredeljeni enoti štetja, moderna mehanika pa zahteve po materialni določitvi predmeta raziskovanja. Obe spremembi sta mogoči le na podlagi simbolnega zasnutka, s katerim lahko izvedemo reflektivni obrat v matematične pojme in posledično preizprašamo njihove najbolj nazorne interpretacije. (Obrat nam prav tako omogoči tvorbo *zgolj* simbolnih pojmov, ki nazorne interpretacije ne premorejo.) Simboliziramo takrat, ko z variiranjem simbolnega zasnutka k pojavu pristopamo na različne načine. S tem predvsem lažje opazimo strukturo funkcionalnosti, ki raznolike materialne predmete zbere pod isti *simbolizirani* pojem.

Husserlu in Heideggru smo očitali, da simbolni značaj novoveške znanosti spregledata. Posledično jima razlaga prehoda iz antične znanosti v sodobno, simbolno znanost ni uspela. Njuno togo razumevanje znanosti lahko dopolnimo z gibkostjo *predteoretskega matematičnega zasnutka*,<sup>22</sup> ki v simbolni naravi moderne znanosti razkrije *praktično znanstveno inteligenco* in s tem prenese nenatančno posplošitev mešanih znanosti:

250 Res bi bilo nekaj novega, če računi in sorazmerja, dobljeni z abstraktnimi števili, potem ne bi ustrezali dejanskim zlatnikom, srebrnikom in trgovskemu blagu. Pa veste, gospod Simplacij, kaj se dogaja? Tako kot mora računar, če hoče, da se mu računi o sladkorju, svili in volni izidejo, upoštevati odbitke zaradi zabojev, ovitkov in druge ovojnine, tako mora tudi filozof geometer, kadar hoče v konkretnosti preverjati abstraktno dokazane učinke, odstraniti snovne motnje, in če bo to znal storiti, vam zagotavljam, da se ne bodo zadeve izkazale nič manj natančne od aritmetičnih izračunov. *Napake torej ne ležijo ne v abstraktnosti ne v konkretnosti, ne v geometriji ne v fiziki, marveč v računarju, ki ne zna pravilno računati.* (Galilei 2009, 199; moj poudarek.)

Matematični fizik zato od pojavov nikoli ne pričakuje, da se bodo *popolnoma* prilegali matematičnim pojmom. A s tem ni prav nič narobe. Nasprotno: to mu omogoča, da toliko lažje razume aplikativne dinamike matematično-fizikalnih teorij. Vztrajnostno gibanje je torej simbolizirano gibanje, ki služi kot referenčni okvir za razmišljanje o kakršnemkoli gibanju nasploh. Prav tako kot opica ne more pomisliti, da lahko palico zamenja s posušeno vejo za enak učinek, si tudi Arhimed ni mogel zamisliti, da so planeti v svojem gibanju pravzaprav izstrelki.

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# ARISTOTEL IN DESCARTES O ZMOŽNOSTIH DUŠE

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## *Povzetek*

Namen prispevka je osvetliti Aristotelovo in Descartesovo razumevanje zmožnosti duše. Takšno razumevanje nam odpira pot v širši razmislek o Aristotelovi in Descartesovi filozofski antropologiji. Besedilo je potemtakem zastavljeno tako, da najprej sledimo Aristotelovemu razumevanju zmožnosti duše. Ob bok temu postavljamo Descartesovo razumevanje, in sicer vedno z ozirom na posamezno duševno zmožnost, ki smo jo izpostavili pri Aristotelu. Zmožnosti duše, ki jih v

prispevku obravnavamo, sledijo Aristotelovi delitvi duše na vegetativne, čutno zaznavne in razumske zmožnosti. Izhodišče prispevka je vprašanje povezanosti duše in telesa v Aristotelovi in Descartesovi filozofiji.

*Ključne besede:* Aristotel, Descartes, filozofska antropologija, duša, čutno zaznavanje.

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### **Aristotle and Descartes on the Capacities of the Soul**

#### *Abstract*

256 The purpose of this paper is to illuminate Aristotle's and Descartes's understanding of the capacities of the soul. This understanding, however, paves the way for a broader reflection on Aristotle's and Descartes's philosophical anthropology. Accordingly, the text is conceived in such a way that we first follow Aristotle's understanding of the capacities of the soul. Alongside, we discuss Descartes's understanding, always with regard to the individual capacity of the soul highlighted in Aristotle. The capacities of the soul, which we discuss in this paper, follow Aristotle's division of the soul into vegetative, sensory, and rational capacity. The starting point of the paper is the question of the connection of soul and body in Aristotle's and Descartes's philosophy.

*Keywords:* Aristotle, Descartes, philosophical anthropology, soul, sense perception.

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## Uvod

V prispevku se lotevamo Aristotelovega in Descartesovega razumevanja duše.<sup>1</sup> Pri Descartesu je jasno, da gre za človeško dušo. Kaj pa Aristotel? V njegovem spisu *O duši* (Aristotel 2002a), v katerem je problematika duše najbolj eksplicitno obravnavana, ni govora zgolj o človeški duši. Duša je tu mišljena najprej kot duša vsega živega, nato kot duša živali in šele na koncu kot človeška duša. Kljub temu da Aristotel razume dušo v širšem smislu kot Descartes, nas bo zanimalo predvsem njegovo razumevanje človeške duše. V človeku kot posebni vrsti živali pa ostajata, poleg razumskega dela duše, dejavno navzoča še čutno zaznavni in vegetativni del. Razumevanja duše, kakor ga najdemo v Aristotelovi in Descartesovi filozofiji, se ne lotevamo z namenom, da bi razumeli dušo kot tako; kar želimo razgrniti, je niz duševnih zmožnosti,<sup>2</sup> ki jih pripišeta duši.

Prvi namen prispevka je torej prikazati Aristotelovo in Descartesovo razumevanje zmožnosti duše. Ta prikaz tvori izhodišče, na katerega se navezuje drugi namen prispevka, ki je: s pomočjo Aristotelovega in Descartesovega različnega razumevanja (zmožnosti) duše razpreti njuno različno razumevanje človeka. S tem se problematika, ki jo v prispevku naslavljamo, dotika področja filozofske antropologije,<sup>3</sup> vendar ne v pomenu celovite obravnave Aristotelove in Descartesove antropologije, saj se osredotočamo le na njuno razumevanje duše.

Iz nakazanega je mogoče razbrati, da se gibljemo na dveh ravneh. Konkretno govorimo o Aristotelovem in Descartesovem razumevanju duševnih zmožnosti, s čimer pa obenem razpiramo širši vidik njunih različnih antropologij. Ko tematiziramo njuno različno razumevanje zmožnosti

257

1 V prispevku ne gre za poljubno primerjavo dveh mislecev. Descartes kot utemeljitelj moderne filozofije si za svojo nalogo zada, da bi filozofijo postavil na nova izhodišča, kar seveda pomeni prekiniti z aristotelovsko tradicijo (glej Cottingham 2009, 177).

2 O tem, da je moč Aristotelovo razumevanje duše brati kot govorjenje o različnih duševnih zmožnostih, glej Sorabji 1974, 64–65.

3 Kot samostojna filozofska disciplina se filozofska antropologija vzpostavi relativno pozno. Eden od njenih odločilnih utemeljiteljev je Max Scheler. V slovenskem jeziku nam je dostopno njegovo delo *Položaj človeka v kozmosu*. Naj na tem mestu opozorimo zlasti na razdelek, ki meri na Descartesovo antropološko zastavitev (glej Scheler 1998, 64–73), katere osnova je delitev substanc na »misleče« in »razsežne«.

duše, s tem že nakazujemo določen bistven element njune antropologije, saj predpostavljamo, da človeka v najbolj temeljnem smislu določajo ravno njegove duševne zmožnosti. S tem ko Aristotel in Descartes pripišeta duši različne zmožnosti, obenem tudi različno razumeta človeka. Če namreč človeku (človeški duši), kot to stori Descartes, pripišemo manj zmožnosti, se s tem pravzaprav spremeni tudi razumevanje človeka.

Kar se njunega različnega razumevanja človeka tiče, velja uvodoma pripomniti sedeče: Aristotelova antropologija gradi na razumevanju človeka kot posebne vrste živali. Da bi pokazal na posebnost človeka glede na živali, mora Aristotel pokazati razlike med človekom in živaljo. Descartesova antropologija gradi na popolnoma drugačnem izhodišču: tu je človek razumljen predvsem v razliki do Boga. V tem oziru je tudi duša (človeka) mišljena z radikalno drugačnega izhodišča.

258 Z ozirom na oba namena je prispevek metodološko zastavljen na način primerjalne študije Aristotelove in Descartesove misli. Izhodišče obravnave predstavlja Aristotelovo in Descartesovo razumevanje odnosa med dušo in telesom, saj menimo, da ravno sopripadnost (Aristotel) oz. ločenost (Descartes) duše in telesa botruje različnemu razumevanju duševnih zmožnosti. Da bi prikazali to njuno različno razumevanje duševnih zmožnosti, bomo najprej sledili Aristotelovi obravnavi vegetativnih, čutnih in razumskih zmožnosti duše. Ob bok temu postavljamo Descartesovo razumevanje zmožnosti duše, in sicer vedno z ozirom na posamezno duševno zmožnost, ki smo jo izpostavili pri Aristotelu. Na takšen način se plastično izrišejo razlike njunega razumevanja. Prvi del primerjalne študije, ki je daljši in bolj poglobljen, nam nudi nastavke za krajšo primerjalno študijo Aristotelovega in Descartesovega razumevanja človeka. Premik od Aristotelove k Descartesovi antropologiji obenem tvori izhodišče za številna moderna razumevanja človeka, ki jih omogoči ravno Descartesova misel.

### **Izhodišče: Aristotelovo in Descartesovo razumevanje odnosa med dušo in telesom**

Vstop v razumevanje razlik med Aristotelovim in Descartesovim opredeljevanjem duševnih zmožnosti predstavlja njuno različno razumevanje

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odnosa med dušo in telesom.<sup>4</sup> Ker Aristotel in Descartes različno razumeta odnos med dušo in telesom, duši pripišeta drugačne zmožnosti. Zato je potrebno najprej v obrisu začrtati Aristotelovo in Descartesovo razumevanje odnosa med dušo in telesom.

Aristotel začne razpravo o duši na sledeč način: »[K]aj je duša in kaj bi mogla biti njena najsplošnejša razlaga in definicija« (Aristotel 2002a, 111). Vprašanje je zastavljeno z ozirom na to, kako so dušo razumeli njegovi predhodniki (Platon, Demokrit, Ksenokrat ...), ki, tako lahko sklepamo, niso zadovoljivo odgovorili na vprašanje. Aristotelov odgovor, ki je podan v obliki definicije duše, ni enoznačen. V spisu namreč srečamo več različnih poskusov opredelitve duše. Prva opredelitev se glasi: »duša je bitnost kot oblika naravnega telesa« (Aristotel 2002a, 112). Temu sledi definicija duše s pomočjo pojma dovršenosti (entelehija): »duša je prva entelehija naravnega telesa, ki ima po možnosti življenje« (Aristotel 2002a, 113). Sklepna definicija, ki je »skupna za vsake vrste duš«, pa se glasi: »duša je prva dovršenost naravnega telesa, ki ima organe« (Aristotel 2002a, 113).<sup>5</sup>

Na tem mestu nas zanima tisto skupno vsem navedenim definicijam, in sicer: duša je vsakič opredeljena z ozirom na telo. Enkrat je določena kot oblika, drugič kot dovršenost, tretjič kot bistvena bit telesa. Ti načini opredeljevanja jasno kažejo na Aristotelovo obravnavo duše, ki poteka v navezavi na telo, kateremu pripada. Ko pa rečemo »pripada«, s tem ni mišljeno pripadati na naključen način, kot bi duša lahko pripadala ali ne pripadala določenemu naravnemu telesu. Duša kot oblika, dovršenost in bistvena bit je v telesu kot snovni podlagi, tako da skupaj tvorita nekaj enovitega. Zato, pravi Aristotel, se je nesmiselno vprašati, ali sta duša in telo eno, prav kakor se je nesmiselno vprašati, ali sta eno snov posamičnega bivajočega in bivajoče, kateremu snov pripada.

Aristotelovo izhodišče obravnave duše je živo naravno bitje, ki je neločljiv sestav duše in telesa: »duša in telo skupaj [sta] živo bitje« (Aristotel 2002a,

259

<sup>4</sup> Glede Aristotelovega razumevanja odnosa med dušo in telesom glej Sorabji 1974 in Bos 1999, glede Descartesovega pa Remnant 1979 in Seager 1988.

<sup>5</sup> Na tem mestu velja navesti še eno pomembno opredelitev, glasi se: duša je »bistvena bit za telo takšne vrste« (Aristotel 2002a, 114). Za natančnejšo analizo Aristotelovega razumevanja duše glej Miller 1999.

115). Če pa sta duša in telo skupaj živo bitje, bi morala biti duša neločljiva od telesa. Izkaže se, da je vegetativna in čutno zaznavna duša res neločljiva. Kaj pa umni del duše? Glede tega, kar Aristotel imenuje teoretične zmožnosti duše, pravi, da je to »neka drugačna vrsta duše in samo ta dopušča ločeno bivanje, prav kakor večno more biti ločeno od minljivega« (Aristotel 2002a, 120). V nadaljevanju se izkaže, da je ločljiv pravzaprav le dejavni um, za katerega pravi: »te vrste um je ločljiv in samostojen« (Aristotel 2002a, 211). Kljub posebnosti in morebitni ločljivosti tega dela duše menimo, da je najustreznejše izhodišče obravnave duševnih zmožnosti prav Aristotelova teza o neločljivosti duše in telesa.

260 Descartesovo izhodišče je popolnoma drugačno. Tu ne gre za obravnavo živega naravnega bitja, ampak za nekakšno obravnavo duše same po sebi. Njuno radikalno različno izhodišče se še jasneje izriše na točki Descartesovega govorjenja o ločenosti duše in telesa. Za Descartesa sta duša (*anima*)<sup>6</sup> in telo dve »realno različni substanci« (Descartes 2004, 46).<sup>7</sup> Telo je substanca, duša pa »čista substanca« (Descartes 2004, 47). Kot realno različni substanci spadata duša in telo v dve različni regiji bivajočega; telo je minljiva substanca, duša pa je po naravi neumrljiva.<sup>8</sup> Poleg tega je razlika »med duhom in telesom v tem, da je telo po svoji naravi zmeraj deljivo, duh pa popolnoma nedeljiv« (Descartes 2004, 114). Duša kot popolnoma nedeljiva je misleča substanca, telo kot zmeraj deljivo pa razsežna substanca.<sup>9</sup> Telo, kot od duše različna substanca, je za

6 Na tem mestu je potrebno opozoriti na to, da Descartes v *Meditacijah* uporablja tako pojem duša (*anima*) kakor tudi duh (*mens*). Slovenski prevod *Meditacij* se tega dosledno drži. Tako denimo Descartes govori enkrat o tem, da sta duša in telo nekaj različnega, drugič o tem, da sta duh in telo nekaj različnega (glej, denimo, Descartes 2004, 41, 46). Iz same vsebine *Meditacij* ni mogoče razbrati jasne razlike med enim in drugim govorom. Na ključnem mestu Descartes pravzaprav to dvoje izenači, ko pravi: »sem tedaj zgolj misleča stvar, se pravi duša ali duh ali um ali razum« (Descartes 2004, 58). V spisu *Strasti duše* Descartes ves čas uporablja izraz duša. Enako velja za spis *Razprava o metodi*.

7 O razliki med dušo in telesom zelo nazorno govori tudi to mesto iz *Razprave o metodi*: »Potemtakem je ta jaz, namreč duša, po kateri sem, kar sem, popolnoma različna od telesa in jo je celo lažje spoznati kakor pa telo; in četudi telesa ne bi bilo, ne bi prenehala biti vse tisto, kar je.« (Descartes 2007, 51–53.)

8 Glej Descartes 2004, 47.

9 Glej Descartes 2004, 75, in Descartes 2009, 208.

Descartesa nekakšen stroj.<sup>10</sup> Na podlagi takšnega ontološkega ločevanja duše in telesa sledijo številna nova in drugačna razumevanja duševnih zmožnosti.<sup>11</sup>

### *Vegetativne zmožnosti duše*

V Aristotelovih spisih pogosto srečamo govorjenje o različnih delih duše. Kaj hoče Aristotel razkriti z različnimi delitvami duše in kakšne te delitve, o katerih govori, sploh so? Osrednja delitev, ki jo najdemo v spisu *O duši*, je delitev na vegetativni, čutni in razumski del. Toda to niso vse možne delitve, saj je, kot govori na nekem drugem mestu, teh delitev lahko še več: »tukaj neposredno nastopa problem, na kakšen način je treba govoriti o delih duše ter o koliko delov duše. Saj se na nek način zdi, da je število takšnih delov neskončno [...]« (Aristotel 202, 228). V *Nikomahovi etiki* poteka poglavitna delitev duše na razumsko (λόγῳν ἔχῳν) in nerazumsko (ἄλογῳν).<sup>12</sup> Toda ta dva dela deli še naprej, razumskega denimo na znanstveni (ἐπιστημονικόν) in preudarno ocenjevalni del (λογιστικόν).<sup>13</sup> Možne delitve, ki jih Aristotel poda v različnih delih, so številne in pogosto precej različne. Kako sploh razumeti Aristotelovo govorjenje o delih duše? Je to dejanska delitev duše? Je to zgolj mišljenjska delitev? Kaj mu to vztrajanje na delih duše sploh omogoča? Za Aristotela duša v dejanskosti ni deljiva, saj je ena. Torej je delitev zgolj pojmovna. Kaj pridobi Aristotel s tem, da vseeno govori o delih duše? Naša teza je, da si Aristotel s tem odpira prostor za govorjenje o različnih *duševnih zmožnostih*. Kadar deli dušo na vegetativni, čutni in razumski del, služi to razmejevanju različnih duševnih

261

10 V *Traktatu o človeku (Treatise on Man)* Descartes (1998) ves čas govori o človeškem telesu kot o stroju, in tudi opis delovanja človeškega telesa je čisto mehanski. V spisu *Strasti duše* (Descartes 2021) je ves čas govora o »stroju našega telesa«. O opisovanju človeškega telesa kot stroja glej tudi Descartes 2004, 112–113, in Descartes 2007, 83.

11 O tem, da se Descartesovo razumevanje duše »radikalno razlikuje« od Aristotelovega, glej Tracy 1986. Popolnoma nasprotno mnenje je moč srečati pri Ansteyu (2000), ki meni, da je med Aristotelovim in Descartesovim razumevanjem duše mnogo sorodnosti, oziroma celo trdi, da je Descartesovo razumevanje duše pravzaprav »neprekinjeno nadaljevanje« Aristotelovega razumevanja (glej Anstey 2000, 255). Zanimiva je tudi primerjava med Platonovim in Descartesovim razumevanjem duše in telesa; glej Broadie 2001.

12 Glej denimo EN 1102a, 28 in naprej, in EN 1139a, 4 in naprej.

13 Glej EN 1139a, 4–14.

zmožnosti. Zmožnosti, ki so prisotne v vsakem živem bitju, so del vegetativne duše. Temeljne zmožnosti, ki se nahajajo v čutno zaznavnem delu, pripadajo vsem živalim. Deljenje razumskega dela duše na preudarno-ocenjevalni in znanstveni del pa Aristotelu omogoči, da spregovori o dveh različnih vrstah zmožnosti mišljenja.

Začnimo z vegetativnimi zmožnostmi duše. Temeljni vegetativni zmožnosti sta prehranjevalna (θρεπτική) in razmnoževalna (γεννητική) zmožnost. Osnovna naloga vegetativne duše je: »ploditev ter uporabljanje oz. uživanje hrane« (Aristotel 2002a, 128).<sup>14</sup> Čeprav sta to dejansko dve različni nalogi, saj razmnoževanje ni isto kot uživanje hrane, spadata v isti del duše in nekako tvorita isto zmožnost: »ista zmožnost duše je tista, ki je prehranjevalna in ploditvena« (Aristotel 2002a, 132),<sup>15</sup> obe pripadata duši, ki jo Aristotel imenuje »prvotna duša« (Aristotel 2002a, 135).<sup>16</sup> Kot pripadajoči prvotni duši sta obe zmožnosti neločljivi, čeprav različni. Kar pomeni: živemu bitju nujno pripadata obe, ni živega bitja, ki bi se zgolj prehranjevalo, ne pa razmnoževalo, ali zgolj razmnoževalo, ne pa prehranjevalo.

262 Prva od nalog prvotne duše je prehranjevanje. Duša je tista, ki s hrano hrani prehranjevano bitje. Z zmožnostjo prehranjevanja je neločljivo povezana rast. Za rastline velja, da je duša »povzročiteljica rasti in prehranjevanja« (Aristotel 2002a, 134). Prehranjevalna zmožnost duše *ohranja* posamično živo bitje pri življenju, saj »neko bitje obstaja toliko časa, dokler se hrani« (Aristotel 2002a, 134).

Druga temeljna naloga prvotne duše je ploditev oz. razmnoževanje. Smoter naravnega bitja oziroma, natančneje rečeno, njegov še docela naravni smoter je reprodukcija vrste: »smoter je zaploditi bitje, ki je enako kakor ono samo, prvotna duša je tista, ki je zmožna zaploditi bitje, ki je enako kakor ono samo« (Aristotel 2002a, 135),<sup>17</sup> zato je razmnoževanje najbolj naravna naloga duše. Z razmnoževanjem pa je naravno bitje »deležno večnega in božanskega« (Aristotel 2002a, 128). Večina smrtnih bitij je namreč udeležena v večnem in

14 »γεννήσαι καὶ τροφή χρῆσθαι« (de An. 415a, 26).

15 »ἢ αὐτῆ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς θρεπτικῆ καὶ γεννητικῆ« (de An. 416a, 19–20).

16 »ἢ πρώτη ψυχῆ« (de An. 416b, 23).

17 »τέλος δὲ τὸ γεννήσαι οἷον αὐτό, εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχῆ γεννητικῆ οἷον αὐτό« (de An. 416b, 24–25).



božanskem zgolj kot vrsta, z reprodukcijo, s katero se prenaša oblika živega bitja. Z razmnoževanjem se *ohranja* vrsta, prav tako kakor se s prehranjevanjem *ohranja* posamično živo bitje.

Sedaj je te zmožnosti potrebno pojasniti z ozirom na telo. Prehranjevanje kot uživanje hrane je nekaj telesnega, saj poteka s pomočjo telesa (celo skozi telo). Snovna hrana, ki jo uživamo, povzroča rast telesa, odsotnost hrane pa postopen propad in na koncu razkroj telesa. Prehranjevanje ohranja telo pri življenju, kar pomeni, da obenem s tem ohranja dušo. Toda čeprav poteka prehranjevanje s pomočjo telesa, je tisto, kar povzroča prehranjevanje, vegetativna duša. Brez duše, kar v tem primeru pomeni brez življenja, se bitja ne prehranjujejo več – nič mrtvega se ne prehranjuje. Vegetativno-prehranjevalna zmožnost duše je popolnoma neločljiva od telesa.

Razmnoževanje je druga osnovna naloga vegetativne duše, in tudi razmnoževanje je nekaj telesnega. S tem namreč nastane novo (telesno) bitje. Vrsta se tako ohranja prek vedno novih bitij iste vrste. Z razmnoževanjem nastajajo vedno nova telesna bitja, ki imajo v sebi ponovno ta dva temeljna principa življenja: prehranjevanje in razmnoževanje. Tudi vegetativno-rzmnoževalna zmožnost duše je popolnoma neločljiva od telesa.

263

Descartes v *Razpravi o metodi* (Descartes 2007) mestoma še govori o delih duše, saj omenja delitev duše na razumsko, čutno in vegetativno.<sup>18</sup> V *Razpravi* celo zasledimo govor o živalski duši.<sup>19</sup> V poznejših *Meditacijah* (Descartes 2004) ne bomo več srečali te »stare«, platonsko-aristotelске razlage duše.<sup>20</sup> Tu ni več govora o različnih dušah ali o delitvi duše, saj je »duh popolnoma nedeljiv« (Descartes 2004, 114). Kolikor velja, da je govorjenje o delih duše pravzaprav govorjenje o različnih duševnih zmožnostih, mora ta Descartesova ne-delitev duše odsevati tudi na ravni govorjenja o duševnih zmožnostih.

Začeli smo s tem, kar Aristotel imenuje vegetativne zmožnosti duše. Sedaj moramo pokazati, kako se teh vprašanj loteva Descartes. Toda,

18 Glej Descartes 2007, 69. Tudi v zgodnejši razpravi, ki je bila sicer objavljena postumno, *Treatise on Man (L'Homme)*, govori Descartes o delih duše, saj tam eksplicitno govori o »razumski duši« (Descartes 1998, 107).

19 Glej Descartes 2007, 87.

20 Za prikaz Descartesovega razumevanja duše prav z ozirom na Platonovo in Aristotelovo delitev duše glej Wagner 1984.

ali Descartes sploh govori o teh najbolj temeljnih zmožnostih duše, o zmožnostih prehranjevanja in razmnoževanja? Odgovor je negativen, Descartes se teh vprašanj sploh ne loteva. Toda zakaj, kakšen bi lahko bil razlog?

Naša izhodiščna teza je bila, da Aristotel in Descartes različno razumeta odnos med dušo in telesom, zaradi česar duši pripišeta drugačne zmožnosti. Descartes razume dušo kot drugačno in telesu celo nasprotno substanco. Ko si zastavi nalogo, da si ustvari pojem duše, pravi, da mora le-ta biti: »kar najbolj razviden, od vsakršnega pojma o telesu popolnoma različen pojem« (Descartes 2004, 46). Iz tega radikalnega ločevanja duše od telesa sledi, da zmožnosti duše, ki so pri Aristotelu neločljivo vezane na telo (prehranjevanje telesa, rast telesa, razmnoževanje bitja), pri Descartesu sploh niso obravnavane kot duševne zmožnosti.<sup>21</sup> Razlog za to je ravno v tej dualnosti duše in telesa. Če je duša od telesa ločljiva in docela različna substanca, potem zmožnosti, ki so neločljive od telesa, ne morejo pripadati duši.

264 Drugi razlog je povezan s prvim in s temeljno nalogo vegetativnega dela duše, z *ohranitvijo* tako posamičnega bitja kot tudi vrste bitij. Naloga prehranjevanja je *ohraniti življenje* posamičnega bitja. Le kolikor se živo bitje prehranjuje, se lahko ohrani pri življenju. Druga naloga vegetativnega dela duše je razmnoževanje, torej nastanek novega bitja iste vrste, s čimer je zagotovljena *ohranitev vrste*. Obe temeljni zmožnosti duše se (za Aristotela) uresničujeta s pomočjo telesa in sta od njega neločljivi. V Descartesovi filozofiji ti temeljni zmožnosti duše prevzame Bog. Bitja, pravzaprav vse bivajoče, je ustvarjeno: »Z imenom ‚Bog‘ mislim neko neskončno, nadvse umno, nadvse mogočno substanco, od katere sem bil ustvarjen tako jaz sam kakor vse drugo bivajoče, če kaj drugega biva.« (Descartes 2004, 75.) S tem naloga ohranitve vrste pripade Bogu, to ni več imanentna duševna zmožnost posamičnega bitja. Razmnoževanje bitij je sedaj ustvarjanje bivajočega. Kaj pa ohranitev posamičnega živega bitja? Descartes pravi:

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21 Byers (2006) argumentira, da je v ozadju tega nerazumevanja temeljne naloge duše, ki zadeva osnovne vegetativne funkcije in ki v tem oziru pomeni življenje, Descartesovo napačno razumevanje Aristotelovega koncepta gibanja oz. gibanja, ki nastaja v živalih samih in ni odvisno od zunanjih vzrokov.

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Ves svoj življenjski čas lahko namreč razdelim na nešteto delov, katerih sleherni nikakor ni odvisen od ostalih delov, in zato iz tega, da sem bil malo prej, ne sledi, da zdajle moram biti, razen če me neki vzrok tako rekoč spet ustvari za ta trenutek, se pravi, me ohrani. Kdor bo opazoval naravo časa, bo namreč razvidel, da je potrebna taista sila in dejavnost za ohranitev katere koli stvari, ki naj bi trajala v posameznih trenutkih, kakor za novo stvarjenje te stvari, če še ni bivala. Da se ohranjanje razlikuje od stvarjenja samo po drugačnem vidiku, je potemtakem tudi ena izmed tistih misli, ki so razvidne po naravni luči. (Descartes 2004, 79.)<sup>22</sup>

Ta »vzrok«, ki posamično bitje ohranja, kar je za Descartesa pravzaprav le drugačen vidik stvarjenja, je ponovno Bog.<sup>23</sup> S tem postaneta obe temeljni nalogi prvotne duše (Aristotel) nekaj, kar v temelju ne pripada več duši, ampak zunanjemu vzroku – položeni sta v Boga.

### *Čutno zaznavne zmožnosti duše*

265

Drugi niz zmožnosti duše, ki jih obravnava Aristotel, so te, ki bi jih lahko imenovali čutno zaznavne, saj izvirajo iz zmožnosti čutnega zaznavanja. Vegetativne zmožnosti pripadajo vsem živim bitjem, čutno zaznavne pa živalim in ljudem kot vrsti živali. Čutno zaznavni del duše je mesto čutno zaznavnih zmožnosti: zmožnosti tipa, okusa, vonja, sluha in vida.

Prva in najbolj temeljna čutno zaznavna zmožnost je tip, ki nujno pripada vsaki živali. Nujnost tipa se kaže v njegovi osnovni opredelitvi, »saj je tip čut za hrano« (Aristotel 2002a, 124).<sup>24</sup> Kot zmožnost za zaznavo hrane služi tip najprej

22 O pojmu ohranjanja v Descartesovi filozofiji glej tudi Hassing 2011.

23 Če povzamemo *Meditacije*, lahko rečemo, da je Bog poslednji vzrok, »ki me je nekoč rodil« in »me ohranja v zdajšnjem času« (Descartes 2004, 80). O vlogi Boga, ki ohranja človeško eksistenco, glej tudi Descartes 2009, 200.

24 Ker gre za pomembno opredelitev tipa, navajamo celotno mesto: »Ἐτι δὲ τῆς τροφῆς αἰσθησιν ἔχουσιν· ἢ γὰρ ἀφή τῆς τροφῆς αἰσθησις· ξηροῖς γὰρ καὶ ὑγροῖς καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς τρέφεται τὰ ζῶντα πάντα, τούτων δ' αἰσθησις ἀφή, τῶν δ' ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός« (de An. 414b, 7–10). »Nadalje imajo živali zaznavo hrane, saj je tip čut za hrano: vse živali se namreč hranijo s tem, kar je suho in vlažno ter toplo in hladno, zaznava za to pa je tip. Ostale čutno zaznavne predmete pa zaznava tip samo naključno.«

in predvsem ohranitvi posamične živali. Vegetativna zmožnost prehranjevanja, kot bitju notranja možnost, je tista, katere naloga je absorpcija hrane. Tip je, po drugi strani, usmerjen navzven, v naravni svet. Tip, in skupaj z njim okus, za katerega Aristotel pogosto pravi, da je zgolj posebna vrsta tipa,<sup>25</sup> sta najprej namenjena zaznavi hrane; njuna osnovna naloga je priskrbeti hrano.

Za ostale čute velja podobno, njihova prva in najbolj naravna naloga je zaznava hrane.<sup>26</sup> Druga, prav tako temeljna naloga je zaznava nevarnega in škodljivega.<sup>27</sup> Čuti se, v tej svoji prvi in še popolnoma naravni vlogi, približujejo vegetativnim zmožnostim duše, njihov poglavitni smoter je *ohranitev živali*. Ohranitev živali pomeni ohranitev vegetativnega dela duše in s tem življenja. Pri rastlini, da bi se ohranila pri življenju, vegetativni del duše ne potrebuje drugih, »višjih« zmožnosti, kot to velja za živali. Razlog je v načinu prehranjevanja in razmnoževanja rastlin, za katera ni potrebno prostorsko gibanje. Za razliko od rastlin se živali gibljejo; šele s pomočjo gibanja opravljajo nalogi prehranjevanja in razmnoževanja. Gibanje pa je najtesneje povezano s čuti.

266 Iz zmožnosti čutnih zaznav izpelje Aristotel še nekatere druge temeljne zmožnosti duše. Iz tipa izhaja, kot prvo, zaznava prijetnega oz. užitka (ήδονή) in neprijetnega oz. bolečine (λύπη). Ti zaznavi sta najtesneje povezani z zmožnostjo tipa; s tem ko živali pripada zaznava tipa, ji pripada tudi zaznava užitka in bolečine.<sup>28</sup> Zaznava užitka in bolečine pa je nujna za ohranitev živali

25 Gre za povezanost okusa in tipa s hrano: »ή γεῦσις ἐστὶν ὡσπερ ἀφή τις· τροφής γάρ ἐστιν, ἢ δὲ τροφή τὸ σῶμα ἀπτόν« (de An. 434b, 16–19), »okus je nekakšen tip, saj se nanaša na hrano, hrana pa je otipljivo telo«.

26 Bodimo pozorni na to, da ne gre zgolj za tip, ampak za čutno zaznavanje, torej tudi za druge čute: »εἰ οὖν πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικόν, μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν, φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ εἰς τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι, ὅ ἐστι φύσεως ἔργον· πῶς γὰρ θρέψεται; (de An. 434a, 34–434b, 2). »Vsako telo, ki je zmožno prostorskega gibanja, bi brez čutnega zaznavanja propadlo, saj ne bi doseglo smotra, ki je delo narave; kako se bo namreč prehranjevalo?«

27 V zvezi s tem pravi Aristotel: »αἰ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐξωθεν αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἷον ὄσφρησις καὶ ἀκοή καὶ ὄψις, πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι σωτηρίας ἔνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωσι τε προαισθανόμενα τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ φεύγωσι« (Sens. 436b, 18–22). »Čuti, ki zaznavajo preko zunanjega medija, kot recimo vonj, sluh in vid, pripadajo živalim, ki se gibljejo. Vsem živalim, ki imajo te čute, jim pripadajo zaradi ohranitve [σωτηρίας ἔνεκεν], da bi zaznale hrano, preden jo zasledujejo, in da bi se izognile slabemu in uničujočemu.«

28 »τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντῃ ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἀφήν· ᾧ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν« (de An. 414b, 3–5), »vse živali

v njeni celovitosti in nepoškodovanosti. V tem primeru namreč ne gre zgolj za zaznavanje bivajočega, ampak za zaznavanje bivajočega na poseben način, kot prijetnega ali neprijetnega in s tem potencialno škodljivega ali pa koristnega. Kar je zaznavno kot prijetno, naj bi bilo obenem ugodno in žival ohranjajoče, kar je zaznano kot boleče, pa neugodno in žival uničujoče. Torej je prva naloga čutov *ohranitev živali*.

Iz zmožnosti tipa neposredno izhaja zaznava užitka in bolečine, obenem z zaznavo prijetnega (užitka) pa živali nujno pripada želja (ὄρεξις).<sup>29</sup> Želja je skupno ime za tri različne vrste želj: poželenje (ἐπιθυμία), strast (θυμός) in hotenje (βούλησις). Neposredno iz čutnega zaznavanja, natančneje iz zmožnosti tipa, izvira poželenje (ἐπιθυμία).<sup>30</sup> Iz zmožnosti čutnih zaznav, ki sodijo v čutno zaznavni del duše, torej izvirajo tudi nekatere druge zmožnosti, zmožnost zaznave prijetnega in neprijetnega ter želelna zmožnost. Slednja ne sodi več v čutno zaznavni del duše, ampak v želelni, ki pa je tesno povezan s čutnim.

Še ena temeljna zmožnost duše, ki jo Aristotel umešča v čutni in z njim tesno povezani želelni del duše, je zmožnost prostorskega gibanja. Iz spisa *O duši* je razvidno, da je za prostorsko gibanje živali potrebno troje: želelna zmožnost, domišljija in zaželeno (zaželen predmet). Vse troje je tesno povezano z zmožnostjo čutnega zaznavanja. Videli smo, da Aristotel izpelje željo iz čutne zaznave prijetnega, še več, čutna in želelna zmožnost sta zanj ista zmožnost, čeprav je njuna bit različna. Domišljija je ponovno povezana s čutnim zaznavanjem, saj je prvotna oblika, pravzaprav izvor domišljije, čutno zaznavna domišljija.<sup>31</sup> Zaželeno je v tem izvornem, prvotnem smislu (kot ga tematizira Aristotel) neko določeno čutno zaznavno bivajoče. Tudi tu igrajo

267

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imajo vsaj eno čutno zaznavo, tip; čemur pripada to čutno zaznavanje, temu pripada tudi užitek in bolečina ter prijetno in neprijetno.«

29 »ὄτι τῶν ζώντων τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἀφῆν καὶ ὄρεξις ὑπάρχει« (de An. 414b, 16), »živalim, ki imajo tip, pripada tudi želja«.

30 »ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἰσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία« (de An. 413b, 24–25). »Kjer je čutno zaznavanje, tam sta tudi bolečina in užitek, kjer sta ta dva, tam je po nujnosti tudi poželenje.«

31 Podobno kot v primeru čutno zaznavne in želelne zmožnosti, ki sta ista zmožnost, čeprav je njuna bit različna, velja v primeru čutno zaznavne in domišljijske zmožnosti. Gre za isto zmožnost, njuna bit pa ni ista (glej Ins. 459a, 16–18).

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čuti osrednjo vlogo, saj zaznavajo neko bivajoče kot prijetno in posledično zaželeno. Šele obstoj takšnega bivajočega sproža prostorsko gibanje, s tem da postane nekaj zaželenega. Preplet teh različnih duševnih zmožnosti na eni strani in nečesa dejansko bivajočega na drugi pa povzroča prostorsko gibanje živali.

Zmožnost čutnega zaznavanja se ne dovrši le v teh elementarnih nujnostih. S pomočjo čutov spoznavamo, saj so prvotni način zaznavanja in prek tega spoznavanja. Dela duše (in s tem duševni zmožnosti), ki sta edina zmožna spoznavanja, sta umni in čutni del duše.<sup>32</sup> Kar se spoznavanja zunanjega sveta tiče, so umne zmožnosti spoznavanja docela odvisne od čutov, saj »um brez čutnega zaznavanja ne more misliti zunanjega bivajočega«.<sup>33</sup>

268

Descartesovo razumevanje duševnih zmožnosti, ki se pri Aristotelu vežejo na čutno zaznavanje, je potrebno misliti iz smeri Descartesovega *radikalnega dvoma v čute*. Ta dvom je zastavljen že na začetku prve meditacije, kjer pravi, da je treba »nekoč v življenju do tal podreti vse in začeti znova od prvih temeljev« (Descartes 2004, 49). To podiranje do tal, do temelja, in celo podiranje temelja samega, meri na čute, za katere pravi: »Vse, kar sem namreč doslej dopuščal kot najbolj resnično, sem dobil od čutov ali po čutih.« (Descartes 2004, 50.) Skozi celotne *Meditacije*, praktično do zadnje, kjer se dvom omili, lahko srečujemo Descartesov »napad« na čute,<sup>34</sup> ki se mestoma stopnjuje celo do dvoma v obstoj čutnih zaznav. Dvom v čute tvori izhodišče, ki nam omogoča razumeti premike v Descartesovem razumevanju duševnih zmožnosti, vezanih na vlogo čutov. Kaj sledi iz tega dvoma?

Prva in poglavitna naloga čutov je za Aristotela *ohranitev* živali, saj služijo, kot prvo, zaznavi hrane in, kot drugo, zaznavi nevarnega in škodljivega.<sup>35</sup> Že pri vegetativnih zmožnostih duše smo videli, da prevzame pri Descartesu nalogo ohranjanja Bog. Kolikor je prvotni smoter čutov ohranitev živali, je

32 O umnem (νοητικοῦ) in čutno zaznavnem (αἰσθητικοῦ) delu duše pravi Aristotel: »τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν γνωρίζομεν τι« (Ins. 458b, 2–3), »to sta edina v nas, s katerima spoznavamo«.

33 »οὐδὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς τὰ ἐκτὸς μὴ μετ' αἰσθήσεως« (Sens. 445b, 17).

34 V svojem poznem delu *Strasti duše* (Descartes 2021) Descartes to radikalno držo nekoliko omili.

35 O tej primarni, nujni vlogi čutov v Aristotelovi filozofiji glej Turk 2018.

razumljivo, da Descartes teh zmožnosti ne obravnava v takšnem pomenu, kot jih Aristotel. Razlog je v tem, da v njegovi filozofiji ohranjanje ni več naloga čutov, ampak Boga. Od dvojne naloge ohranjanja – ohranitve živali pri življenju ter ohranitve celovitosti in nepoškodovanosti telesa živali – najdemo pri Descartesu le še drugo. Pravzaprav je to edina prava naloga čutov, ki jo vrne v šesti meditaciji, kjer so naloge čutov skrčene samo še na: »ohraniti človeka zdravega«; pomagati »ohraniti [človekovo] telo«; pokazati tisto, »kar je dobro za telo«. <sup>36</sup>

Ko se Descartes nameni podreti »temelj vsega«, torej čutno zaznavanje, s tem nujno padejo številne zmožnosti duše, ki so bile pri Aristotelu izpeljane iz zmožnosti čutnega zaznavanja. Zmožnost zaznavanja prijetnega oz. užitka in neprijetnega oz. bolečine je pri Descartesu ravno tako podvržena dvomu. <sup>37</sup> Iz dvoma v čute, dvoma v zaznavo užitka in bolečine, sledi tudi dvom v želelno zmožnost. Ta dvom je usmerjen v vprašanje, ali je želelna zmožnost imanentna, človeku pripadajoča v skladu z njegovo (živalsko) naravo. Videli smo, da izpelje Aristotel željo iz zmožnosti čutnih zaznav; želja pripada človeku (kot vrsti živali) skupaj z zmožnostjo čutnega zaznavanja. Ko Descartes enkrat podre čute, ki so pri Aristotelu temelj želje, mora na novo postaviti tudi to zmožnost duše. Volja, ki pri Descartesu zasede mesto Aristotelove želje, ni več zmožnost duše v pravem pomenu, ampak je to zmožnost, ki je bila človeku podeljena od Boga. <sup>38</sup>

269

V Aristotelovi filozofiji je ena temeljnih zmožnosti duše ta, da povzroča prostorsko gibanje živali. Kaj pa pri Descartesu? Kolikor v Descartesovi filozofiji velja, da živali nimajo duše, sama duša (ali, natančneje, določene

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<sup>36</sup> Glej Descartes 2004, 115–117.

<sup>37</sup> »Dognal sem, da se sodba vnanjih čutov moti pri neštetihih takih stvareh. A ne le pri vnanjih, tudi notranjih, kajti kaj je lahko bolj znotraj kakor bolečina? Kljub temu sem nekoč slišal od ljudi, ki so jim odrezali nogo ali roko, da jih včasih še boli tisti del telesa, ki ga nimajo, tako da se tudi meni ni zdelo gotovo, da me kak ud zares boli, čeprav sem v njem čutil bolečino.« (Descartes 2004, 105–106.)

<sup>38</sup> »Ne smem se tudi pritoževati, da od Boga nisem prejel dovolj velike in popolne volje ali svobode odločanja, saj na samem sebi skusim, da je ne omejujejo nikakršne meje.« (Descartes 2004, 87.) Volja ali svoboda odločanja je to, »po čemer umem, da sem podoba Boga in Bogu sličen« (Descartes 2004, 87). O pomenu božje volje v Descartesovih delih in tudi o Descartesovem razumevanju človeka glej Sorell 2000.

duševne zmožnosti) ne more več biti vzrok prostorskega gibanja. Torej mora biti vzrok za gibanje nekaj drugega oziroma mora ležati drugje, zunaj duševnih zmožnosti. Počelo gibanja živih bitij je v Descartesovi filozofiji vezano na telo, na »stroj našega telesa« (Descartes 2021, 7). To je jasno razvidno iz spisa *Strasti duše* (Descartes 2021), kjer že v četrtem in petem členu pravi, da »toplota in gibanje udov izhajata iz telesa (Descartes 2021, 6), da »vse gibanje [...] pripada izključno telesu« (Descartes 2021, 7) in, seveda, da je zmotno mnenje, »da duša daje telesu toploto in gibanje« (Descartes 2021, 7).<sup>39</sup>

Kar se spoznavanja tiče, je to pri Descartesu izpeljano v odmiku od čutnega zaznavanja, ki pri Aristotelu tvori eno od dveh zmožnosti spoznavanja. Če Descartes razglasi čute za varljive, celo lažnive, še več, če se odloči podreti temelj, na katerem je do tedaj gradil, ta temelj pa so čuti sami, je razumljivo, da spoznanja, kot zanj pravzaprav najvišje duševne zmožnosti, ne more pripisati čutnim zaznavam.

270 Do sedaj obravnavane zmožnosti duše, ki pri Aristotelu najdejo mesto v vegetativnem in čutno zaznavnem delu duše, so v njegovi filozofiji najtesneje vezane na telo. To so zmožnosti duše, ki jih ne moremo ločiti od telesa, saj so brez soudeležnosti telesa pravzaprav neobstoječe. Ker po drugi strani razume Descartes dušo kot nekaj od telesa različnega, celo kot telesu nasprotno substanco, izhajajo iz tega številne premestitve zmožnosti duše. Od zmožnosti, ki jih obravnava Aristotel, Descartes nekaterih sploh ne tematizira (tistih, ki so neločljive od minljivega telesa in torej ne morejo spadati v sfero nesmrtno duše), nekatere druge sicer tematizira, vendar jim pripiše popolnoma drugačne vzroke (denimo zmožnost ohranitve, zmožnost prostorskega premikanja, železna zmožnost).

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39 Na tovrstno razumevanje zmožnosti gibanja kaže tudi mesto v *Meditacijah*, kjer Descartes primerja človeško telo z dobro oz. slabo izdelano uro, tam namreč pravi: »[...] tako je tudi s človeškim telesom, če ga opazujemo kot nekakšen stroj, ki je tako sestavljen iz kosti, kit, mišic, žil, krvi in kože, da bi, tudi če bi v njem ne bilo duha, izvajal vse tiste gibe, ki jih izvaja samodejno brez ukaza volje in ki ne izvirajo iz duha, temveč preprosto iz razporeditve njegovih organov« (Descartes 2004, 112–113).

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### *Razumske zmožnosti duše*

Zadnji sklop zmožnosti, ki jih tematizira Aristotel, se veže na razumski del duše (λόγον ἔχον),<sup>40</sup> ki je specifično človeški in pripada le človeku kot posebni vrsti živali. Podobno kot je veljalo za vegetativne in čutno zaznavne zmožnosti, velja tudi za razumske – gre za niz različnih zmožnosti, ki pa vse sodijo v ta del duše. Temeljna Aristotelova delitev razumskih zmožnosti duše, je delitev na zmožnosti, ki sodijo v preudarno-ocenjevalni (λογιστικόν) in v znanstveni (ἐπιστημονικόν) del.

Poglavitna razlika med preudarno-ocenjevalnimi in znanstvenimi zmožnostmi duše je vezana na Aristotelovo delitev bivajočega na dva rodova. To delitev srečamo v šesti knjigi *Nikomahove etike*, kjer je bivajoče razdeljeno na spremenljivo in nespremenljivo.<sup>41</sup> Različnima rodovoma bivajočega ustrezata različna rodova razumskega dela duše. Vsak od dveh delov duše, in s tem vsak sklop rodovno različnih razumskih zmožnosti, meri na sebi-lastno področje bivajočega.

En sklop zmožnosti sodi v preudarno-ocenjevalni del duše. Vse te zmožnosti merijo na spremenljivo bivajoče. Ker je spremenljivo bivajoče večplastno, so takšne tudi zmožnosti duše, ki so v Aristotelovi filozofiji odraz

271

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40 Gre torej za del duše, ki ga Aristotel imenuje λόγον ἔχον. Običajno se prevaja kot razumski del. Zaradi jasnosti in razumljivosti bomo prevod ohranili. Ob tem pa velja pripomniti, da je poimenovanje preozko, saj so tu zaobjete vse tiste zmožnosti, ki se vežejo na *lógos*, kar seveda ni zgolj razum. Posebno vprašanje, ki ga tu ne naslavljamo, je razmerje med »razumskim delom« duše in »umnim delom« (»νοητικῶν μορίων«, glej EN 1139b, 12). Iz Aristotelovih spisov je težko določiti, kakšno je natančno mesto umnega dela duše v delitvi duše. Jasno je, da gre za del, ki pripada le človeku. Iz delitve razumskega dela duše na dva (znanstveni in preudarno-ocenjevalni) ter iz delitve umnega dela, ki je prav tako razdeljen na dva dela (teoretični in praktični um, glej de An. 433a, 14–15), lahko sklepamo o določeni sorodnosti med enim in drugim delom. Dodatno težavo predstavlja še Aristotelovo govorjenje o praktičnem in teoretičnem mišljenju (glej EN 1139a, 27). Tem delitvam je skupna dvojna tematizacija bivajočega oz. delitev bivajočega na spremenljivo in nespremenljivo bivajoče; njej odgovarjajo Aristotelove delitve duše. Natančnejša določitev razmerja med razumskim, umskim in mišljenjskim delom je nekaj, kar presega okvire tega besedila. V nadaljevanju se bomo držali le najbolj jasne Aristotelove delitve, in sicer delitve razumskega dela duše na znanstveni in preudarno-ocenjevalni.

41 Glej EN 1139a, 6–8.

bivajočega. Kadar govorimo o zmožnostih preudarno-ocenjevalnega dela duše, je tisto temeljno, kar jih razlikuje od čutno zaznavnih in predvsem od vegetativnih zmožnosti, to, da niso dane po naravi. Po naravi<sup>42</sup> so dane res le gole možnosti: da bi postale dejanske zmožnosti v smislu udejanjenja, si jih moramo najprej pridobiti. Tako je denimo vsakomur dana možnost, da bi lahko pravično deloval. Da bi lahko dejansko pravično deloval, pa si mora to golo, po naravi dano možnost, najprej pridobiti s tem, da se udejestvuje. Ker gre v tem primeru za drugačen tip zmožnosti, jih Aristotel tudi drugače poimenuje, to so zadržanja (ἔξις)<sup>43</sup> in ne le možnosti (δύναμις).

Temeljni zadržanji preudarno-ocenjevalnega dela duše sta pametnost (φρόνησις)<sup>44</sup> in veščina (τέχνη). Obe merita na spremenljivo bivajoče, toda ne na isto spremenljivo bivajoče. Pametnost kot »praktično zadržanje«<sup>45</sup> je nekaj, kar se udejanja v odnosu do drugih ljudi. Pametnost je tista vrлина, ki omogoča nastanek ostalih etičnih vrlin. Preplet pametnosti in etičnih vrlin nam omogoča sobivanje z ljudmi na način etičnega in političnega delovanja.

272 Veščino opredeli Aristotel kot »ustvarjalno zadržanje«.<sup>46</sup> Gre za tip zadržanja, ki se udejanja v dejavnosti ustvarjanja, za razliko od pametnosti, ki se udejanja v dejavnosti delovanja. Veščina kot ustvarjalno zadržanje, kot posebna zmožnost preudarno-ocenjevalnega dela duše, meri izvorno na predmetno-stvarno bivajoče. In tudi to bivajoče je spremenljivo, saj ga spreminja človek sam, s svojo dejavnostjo ustvarjanja.

Drugi niz zmožnosti, ki so zbrane v znanstvenem delu duše, meri na nespremenljivo bivajoče. Tudi te zmožnosti so nekaj, kar si je potrebno pridobiti. Tako denimo za modre veljajo predvsem starejši, saj je modrost

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42 Za etične vrline kot vrste zadržanj pravi Aristotel: »vrline niso dane po naravi, pa tudi ne v nasprotju z naravo« (Aristotel 2002b, 75).

43 Za natančnejši prikaz Aristotelovega razumevanja zadržanj glej Rodrigo 2011 in Turk 2015.

44 Pri obravnavi vegetativnih in čutno zaznavnih zmožnosti smo videli, da so neločljive od telesa. Toda tudi pri razumskih zmožnostih, ki merijo na spremenljivo bivajoče, je vidik povezanosti duševnih zmožnosti s telesom za Aristotela še kako pomemben. Pametnost in z njo neločljivo povezane etične vrline, zmožnost razsojanja, odločanja itd.: vse to je tesno povezano tudi s čustvenimi razpoloženji, ki so tudi nekaj telesnega.

45 ἔξις πρακτική (EN 1140a, 4; 1140b, 20–21).

46 ἔξις ποιητική (EN 1140a, 4–5; 1140a, 20–21).

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nekaj, kar nastane le postopoma in je zanjo potrebno dosti časa. Tri poglavitne zmožnosti tega dela duše so: znanost (ἐπιστήμη), modrost (σοφία) in um(nost) (νοῦς). Na tem mestu ne bomo pojasnjevali, kako se znanost razlikuje od modrosti in ta od umnosti. Kar smo želeli pokazati, je le to, da Aristotel v ta del duše, ki ga imenuje razumski in ki pripada le človeku, umesti različne zmožnosti, kakršne v najbolj temeljnem smislu pripadajo človeku. Lahko bi dejali, da človeka kot takega določa ta del duše, kar pa *ne pomeni le ena* od zmožnosti, ampak različne zmožnosti. Da se bo nemara človek udeležal, razvijal in udeleževal predvsem v eni od zmožnosti, v ničemer ne spremeni dejstva, da so mu dane tudi druge zmožnosti, ki bi jih lahko razvijal. Prav tako nič ne spremeni to, da so v filozofiji te zmožnosti običajno razvrščene v hierarhijo bolj ali manj popolnih, boljših ali slabših – človeka kot takega določajo vse te zmožnosti.

Pri Descartesu ne bomo našli tovrstnih delitev bivajočega, ki bi razlikovala spremenljivo in nespremenljivo bivajoče. Posledično Descartes tudi ne tematizira delitve razumskih zmožnosti, ki bi merile na različna področja bivajočega. Z ozirom na Aristotela bi lahko dejali, da ohrani Descartes tiste zmožnosti duše, ki merijo na nespremenljivo bivajoče. V ospredju so rigorozni principi znanstvene drže, matematično-geometrični principi. V *Meditacijah* pravi, da so tam dokazi »enaki geometričnim« (Descartes 2004, 40) in da se je ravnal po pravilih, ki so »običajna pri geometriji« (Descartes 2004, 46).<sup>47</sup>

273

Kolikor velja, da Descartes ohrani le najbolj stroge in apodiktično-deduktivne zmožnosti duše, se zastavi vprašanje, kako obravnava področje spremenljivega bivajočega, torej področje človeških zadev, in katere zmožnosti duše, ki merijo na to področje, ohrani. To področje, razen v drobnih zametkih, pri Descartesu ni zares tematizirano. V njegovih delih ne bomo našli resnih razprav o politiki, ekonomiji, etiki,<sup>48</sup> retoriki ... Vse, kar najdemo, so občasne

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47 Kaj pomeni takšna drža za zmožnosti, ki merijo na področje spremenljivega bivajočega, je razvidno v *Razpravi o metodi*, kjer so ob bok gotovosti matematičnih veččin postavljeni »na pesku in blatu« zidani antični spisi o morali (glej Descartes 2007, 17).

48 Precej neprepričljiv poskus govora o »kartezijski etiki« najdemo v spremi študiji k Descartesovemu spisu *Strasti duše* (glej Marek 2021). Če Descartes *omenja* etiko in moralo (denimo Descartes 2009, 186), to še ne pomeni, da gre za kakršnokoli razpravo o teh vprašanjih.

omembe morale, kot je denimo omemba v *Razpravi*, kjer je rečeno, da so spisi o morali antičnih poganov sicer primerljivi z veličastnimi in sijajnimi palačami, a so »zgrajeni zgolj na pesku in blatu« (Descartes 2007, 17). Če so antični spisi o morali zgrajeni na »pesku in blatu«, to pomeni, da jim manjka ravno *temelj*, da niso utemeljeni. Zato si je, kot pravi, »izoblikoval začasno moralo« (Descartes 2007, 39).

Podobno držo najdemo v *Meditacijah*, tudi tukaj so zmožnosti, ki pri Aristotelu sodijo v preudarno-ocenjevalni del duše, obravnavane le obrobno. Še najbližje tovrstnim zmožnostim je Descartesova obravnava volje in odločanja. Fenomen »svobodnega odločanja«, kot to imenuje, Descartes izenači z voljo.<sup>49</sup> Kako je v Descartesovi filozofiji utemeljena volja, smo že videli. Osrednje vprašanje v zvezi z voljo oz. svobodnim odločanjem, ki ga zastavi Descartes, je vprašanje razmerja med voljo in umom. Ker volja »sega širše kakor um« (Descartes 2004, 88), izvirajo iz tega človeške zmote. Umovanje je »brez dvoma pravilno«, pri tem se »ne more zgoditi, da bi se motil,« pravi Descartes (2004, 88), volja pa sega širše kakor um in zato nastajajo zmote.

274 Kaj torej ostane, kakšne razumske zmožnosti duše ohrani Descartes? Ohrani to, kar je jedro druge meditacije, kjer se vpraša:

Kaj pa tisto, kar sem pripisal duši: da jem ali hodim? Če že nimam telesa, je tudi to zgolj umišljeno. Pa čutenje? Tudi čutenja ni brez telesa [...]. Kaj pa mišljenje (*cogitare*)? Tu najdem trdno točko: samo mišljenja ni mogoče odtrgati od mene. (Descartes 2004, 58.)

Mišljenje je tista ena zmožnost duše, ki jo ohrani, zato je zanj človek »misleča stvar« (Descartes 2004, 59). Ta ena zmožnost se v sebi deli v številne druge zmožnosti, ki pa so vse zgolj različni vidiki tega enega. Gre torej, lahko bi rekli, za različne načine mišljenja, katerim je skupno to, da jih Descartes združi v eno zmožnost duše. Tako za Descartesa biti »misleča stvar« pomeni: »Stvar, ki dvomi, ume, zatrjuje, zanikuje, hoče, noče, si tudi predstavlja in čuti.« (Descartes 2004, 59.)<sup>50</sup> S tem so različne zmožnosti duše, ki so pri Aristotelu

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49 Glej Descartes 2004, 86–87.

50 Naj posebej izpostavimo zmožnost čutnega zaznavanja, ki je ena osrednjih

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tudi razločene, v pomenu, da sodijo v različne dele duše in merijo na različne sfere bivajočega, združene v eno zmožnost mišljenja.

### **Sklep: Kaj nam Aristotelovo in Descartesovo razumevanje duše pove o njuni antropologiji?**

Spomočjo analize različnega Aristotelovega in Descartesovega razumevanja odnosa med dušo in telesom in predvsem njunega različnega razumevanja zmožnosti duše smo razprli pomemben element Aristotelove in Descartesove antropološke misli.<sup>51</sup> To seveda ni celovit prikaz radikalno različne filozofske antropologije enega in drugega, saj so nakazane le nekatere temeljne razlike. Da bi te razlike pokazali karseda jasno, smo izbrali pot primerjave njunega različnega razumevanja zmožnosti duše.

Aristotel deli zmožnosti duše v tri večje sklope, ki odsevajo tri področja živega naravno bivajočega. Vsa tri področja, in skupaj s tem vsi trije sklopi duševnih zmožnosti, odsevajo v Aristotelovi antropološki zastavitvi.<sup>52</sup> Vegetativne zmožnosti duše združujejo človekove vegetativno-rastlinske principe, ki so skupni vsemu živemu. V tem oziru se človek nahaja na ravni zgolj živega, saj je princip življenja skupen človeku, živali in rastlini. To, kar je v Aristotelovi filozofiji zaobjeto pod vegetativno-rastlinskimi principi in kar je skupno vsemu živemu, je prehranjevanje, razmnoževanje, rast in minevanje. Ti najbolj temeljni naravni principi določajo človeka v njegovi živosti, pripadajo mu kot živemu naravnemu telesu. Vprašanj človeškega vidika teh principov,

275

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zmožnosti, ki jo Descartes v *Meditacijah* podvrže dvomu. Ta dvom se izteče v to, da postane čutno zaznavanje zgolj ena od vrst mišljenja. Čutenje, kot ga imenuje, zanj »ni nič drugega kakor mišljenje« (Descartes 2004, 60). Podobno velja za številne druge zmožnosti, ki so pri Aristotelu neločljivo povezane s čutnim zaznavanjem, kot denimo zmožnost predstavljanja, ki je za Descartesa ponovno le »modus mišljenja« (Descartes 2004, 102). Podobno držo najdemo v *Principih filozofije*, kjer pravi, da je potrebno mišljenje izenačiti z razumevanjem, hotenjem, predstavljanjem in celo čutnim zaznavanjem (Descartes 2009, 195).

51 O tem, da je na osnovi Aristotelovega in Descartesovega različnega razumevanja duše, mogoče govoriti tudi o dveh »različnih modelih človeške narave«, kar pomeni o dveh različnih antropologijah, glej tudi Tracy 1986, 264.

52 Precej aristotelovsko obarvano razlago filozofske antropologije, vsaj v prvi polovici dela, najdemo v Lombo in Russo 2015.

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torej človeško obarvanih vidikov prehranjevanja, razmnoževanja, rasti in minevanja, tu sploh nismo obravnavali. Odgovore na ta vprašanja je namreč treba iskati v drugih Aristotelovih spisih.<sup>53</sup>

Čutno zaznavne zmožnosti ne pripadajo človeku kot živemu bivajočemu, ampak kot *vrsti živali*. Po notranjem principu razvoja ene zmožnosti v drugo, po tej medsebojni soodvisnosti in pogojenosti ene duševne zmožnosti z drugo, razvije Aristotel ključne principe »živalskosti«. Ti principi pripadajo človeku ravno tako nujno kot principi živega, saj je za Aristotela človek vrsta živali. Najbolj elementarno in vsako žival določujoče je čutno zaznavanje. Prva in vsaki živali nujno pripadajoča čutna zaznava je tip. Iz zmožnosti tipa Aristotel neposredno razvije zaznavo užitka in bolečine, ki tvorita izhodišče tega, kar imenuje težnja oziroma pritegnitev (δῶκω) in odklanjanje oziroma odtegnitev (φεύγω). To dvojje pa tvori samo osnovo želje, prvotna oblika katere je poželenje. Gibanje, tu seveda zgolj v pomenu prostorskega gibanja, je v Aristotelovi filozofiji nekaj, kar pripada živalim. Počelo in vzrok prostorskega gibanja sta položena v poseben del duše, to je ena izmed temeljnih zmožnosti duše.<sup>54</sup>

276 Kar pripada človeku kot človeku, je zaobjeto v zmožnostih duše, ki sodijo v razumski del oziroma v tisti del, kjer domuje *lógos*. Te zmožnosti so tiste,

53 Če bi hoteli pokazati, kakšen je človeški odnos do teh vprašanj, bi morali seči predvsem po Aristotelovi *Nikomahovi etiki* (Aristotel 2002b) in *Politiki* (Aristotel 2010). Tu lahko samo grobo nakažemo, kaj imamo v mislih, ko govorimo o človeškem odnosu do teh vprašanj. Ljudje se morajo, tako kot vse živo, prehranjevati, da bi preživeli, toda kako in s čim pridobiti za življenje nujne stvari, ni več le vprašanje narave, kot to velja za rastline in živali. S temi vprašanji se ukvarja »veščina upravljanja hišnega gospodarstva« (glej Aristotel 2010, 117–151). To, kar je v naravnem smislu dejstvo razmnoževanja živih bitij, postane v človeškem vprašanju etičnih zadržanj in vrlin, vprašanje, kakršna so: poželenje, sla, razbrzdanost, umirjenost ... Rast, vendar ne več v pomenu zgolj naravne rasti telesa, ampak rast kot razvoj človeških zmožnosti in zadržanj je nekaj, kar ponovno sodi na področje etike. Podobno velja za ne več zgolj naravni fenomen minevanja, torej za staranje in smrt, kar je tudi vprašanje etike.

54 Tudi v tem primeru nismo obravnavali človeškega vidika teh fenomenov, saj to presega okvire prispevka. Ponovno lahko samo nakažemo, kaj izhaja iz teh, človeku kot vrsti živali pripadajočih zmožnosti. Zaznava užitka in bolečine tvori samo jedro Aristotelove etike. Različne vrste želj se odražajo, med drugim, tudi v različnih načinih življenja (denimo razlika med uživaškim in političnim življenjem; prvo je povezano s poželenjem, drugo s hotenjem). Podobno velja za številne druge vidike, ki so razviti še le v *Nikomahovi etiki* in *Politiki*.

ki so tipično človeške in tvorijo za Aristotela temeljno antropološko razliko med človekom kot posebno vrsto živali in rodом živali. Dva temeljna sklopa razumskih zmožnosti sta zaobjeta v preudarno-ocenjevalnem in v znanstvenem delu duše.

Aristotelova antropološka misel se torej razteza od najbolj elementarne tematizacije človeka kot nečesa živega, prek tematizacije človekove rodovne določitve (vrsta živali), do tematizacije zmožnosti, ki pripadajo človeku kot človeku in ki, kot take, tvorijo to, kar je bilo pozneje pogosto označeno kot bistvo človeka.

Z ozirom na Aristotela je Descartesova antropološka zastavitev postavljena na popolnoma novo izhodišče. V širšem smislu narava in v ožjem rod živali, ki tvorita podstat Aristotelovega antropološkega izhodišča, sta pri Descartesu nadomeščena z novo podstatjo. Nova podstat je sedaj Bog, človek pa je božja kreacija. Zato so pri Descartesu razlikovanja in utemeljitve človeka izpeljane iz smeri te nove podstati, iz razlike do Boga.

Ta nova antropološka naravnost odseva tudi v drugačnem razumevanju (človeške) duše in temeljnih duševnih zmožnosti.<sup>55</sup> Kot prvo velja izpostaviti ločitev duše in telesa v dve različni substanci. Ta ločitev zrcali ravno novo antropološko izhodišče, ki človeka razdeli na tisto večno in nesmrtno (duša) ter na minljivo (telo). Iz te izhodiščne zastavitve izhaja novo razumevanje zmožnosti duše, razumevanje, ki predstavlja, z ozirom na Aristotela, popolnoma novo antropologijo. Večina zmožnosti duše, ki so za Aristotela neločljive od telesa, postanejo pri Descartesu zmožnosti telesa (prehranjevanje, razmnoževanje, gibanje ...). Nekatere druge, ki v Aristotelovi filozofiji izhajajo neposredno iz človekove živalske narave (recimo zmožnost želenja), sedaj človeku pripadajo kot božji kreaciji. Zmožnosti duše, ki jih Descartes ohranja kot tiste, ki edine zares pripadajo duši, so te, ki se v Aristotelovi filozofiji vežejo na razumski del duše. Vendar se v tej »ohranitvi«<sup>55</sup> pripeti to, da so vse te različne zmožnosti sedaj združene v *eno zmožnost* mišljenja. Za Descartesa je človek misleča stvar, in pod zmožnost mišljenja zapadejo številne zmožnosti, ki jih je Aristotel strogo ločeval.

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55 O vplivu Descartesa na vzpostavitev moderne znanstvene psihologije glej Reed 1982.

Po poti prikaza Aristotelovega in Descartesovega razumevanja zmožnosti duše smo torej hoteli nakazati bistven premik v njunem razumevanju človeka, v njuni filozofski antropologiji.<sup>56</sup> Ta premik ima seveda globoke in daljnosežne posledice, ki jih lahko na tem mestu le nakažemo.

Posledica Descartesovega radikalnega ločevanja duše in telesa v dve različni substanci je, da v moderni filozofiji od Descartesa in vse do Nietzscheja človek ni zares mišljen kot telesno bitje. Njegova telesnost in vse, kar se veže na telo, postane nekaj obrobnega. Temu ustrezne so tudi antropološke zastavitve, v katerih je človek predvsem duševno, duhovno in umsko bitje. Kaj pa pomeni (v fenomenološkem smislu) razumeti človeka kot telesno bitje, s čimer je neločljivo povezano tudi (čutno) zaznavanje, lahko razberemo v Merleau-Pontyjevem delu *Fenomenologija zaznave* (Merleau-Ponty 2006).

278 V prehodu iz Aristotelove v Descartesovo antropološko zastavitvev postane človek »misleča stvar«, »subjekt«, odrezan od svoje naravne in svetne podstati. S tem človek ni več dojet kot svetno bitje, ni več mišljen in dojet iz sveta, kot »bit-v-svetu«.<sup>57</sup> Novi horizont mišljenja človeka, ki se odpre z Descartesom in ki predstavlja radikalen odmik od Aristotelovega razumevanja človeka kot bivajočega v svetu, pomeni izhodišče za antropologije, ki človeka ne razumejo več v njegovi svetni »pogojenosti«.<sup>58</sup> S tem ko je človek dojet iz smeri Boga, iz smeri njegovih umskih zmožnosti ali iz smeri družbe, smo seveda soočeni z drugačnimi antropološkimi zastavitvami.

Tudi premik iz Aristotelove antropološke pozicije človekove gotovosti v svetu, ki se prvotno kaže v gotovosti in resničnosti čutnih zaznav kot primarnega načina bivanja človeka v svetu, v Descartesovo pozicijo radikalnega dvoma, najprej seveda dvoma v gotovost in resničnost čutnih zaznav, pomeni novo izhodišče, s katerim se sooča poznejša filozofija.<sup>59</sup> Če vzamemo, na primer, Kantovo

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56 Relevantnost proučevanja filozofske antropologije iz smeri razumevanja duše je lepo vidna tudi v Schelerjevem postumno izdanem delu *On the Constitution of the Human Being*, kjer je eden od odločilnih načinov obravnave »konstitucije človeka« ravno razumevanje duše. Glej poglavje z naslovom »On the Constitution of the Human Being: Developmental Stages of the Soul« (Scheler 2008, 129–202).

57 To razumevanje ponovno vrne šele Heideggrovo fenomenološko razumevanje sveta in »človekove« biti v svetu (glej Heidegger 1997).

58 O pogojenosti človeka in o tem, da je človek pogojeno bitje, glej Arendt 1996.

59 Za Schelerja je Descartes v poznejše razumevanje človeka vpeljal celo vrsto



(praktično) filozofijo, lahko rečemo, da se umešča v polje problematičnosti vsega empirično-čutnega, kar je problematičnost, kakršno ob rojstvu moderne filozofije vzpostavi ravno Descartes. Kantova npravna filozofija, ki hoče biti očiščena vsega antropološkega, vseeno izhaja iz določene antropološke predpostavke človeka kot *umnega bitja*, predpostavke, ki je dosti bližje Descartesu<sup>60</sup> kot Aristotelu. Tako je npravna filozofija izpeljana iz (čistega) praktičnega uma in je kot taka »popolnoma očiščena od vsega, kar je le empirično in kar sodi k antropologiji« (Kant 2005, 5). To, kar sodi k empiričnemu in antropološkemu, se pri Kantu izrazito veže na čute. Tako izpeljana npravna filozofija je blizu Descartesovemu izhodišču in je seveda daleč stran od Aristotelove empirično-antropološko močno pogojene npravne filozofije.<sup>61</sup>

V širšem smislu rečeno se s prehodom od Aristotelovega razumevanja človeka k Descartesovemu zgodi prelom v vpetosti človeka v naravni svet. Človek sedaj ni več naravno »bitje«, ni več vrsta živali in ni mišljen iz smeri njegovih naravnih določitev. V tem oziru v moderni filozofiji številna razumevanja človeka kot naravnega »bitja«, kot vrste živali, preprosto odpadejo ali pa so preinterpretirana.<sup>62</sup> Tako se na novo vzpostavi razumevanje človeškega hotenja oziroma volje, ki mora biti na novo utemeljena (denimo pri Kantu). Številni človekovi instinktivni, nagonski, »animalični« vidiki pa niso, vse do Nietzscheja, več predmet stroge filozofske obravnave.

279

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»zablod«: »S tem, da je vse substance razdelil na ‚misleče‘ in ‚razsežne‘ ter učil, da je človek edini med vsemi bitji, ki je sestavljen iz obeh substanc, ki sta v vzajemno učinkujočem odnosu, je Descartes v zahodno zavest – glede človekove narave – vpeljal celo vrsto zablod najtežje vrste.« (Scheler 1998, 64.)

60 V zvezi s tem pravi Heidegger, da pri Kantu izostane »tematska ontologija tubiti«, »ontološka analitika subjektivitete subjekta,« tako da »Kant kljub vsem bistvenim izpolnitvam dogmatsko prevzame *Descartesovo* pozicijo« (Heidegger 1997, 47). O tem, kako ostaja celotna moderna filozofija obremenjena z Descartesovim »cogitom«, ki je seveda jedro njegove antropološke zastavitve, glej Weimin in Wei 2007.

61 Na tem mestu velja pripomniti, da je z ozirom na razumevanje duše kot nečesa, kar ne pripada zgolj ljudem, ampak vsemu živemu, Kant bližje Aristotelu kot Descartesu (glej Baumeister 2022, 15), kar pa ne spremeni bistveno nove antropološke usmeritve.

62 To seveda ne velja za vse mislece: za Schelerja je, na primer, človek žival (glej denimo Scheler 1997). Kljub temu je zastavitev človeka kot bitja in ne več vrste živali, nekaj odločilnega za številne moderne filozofe.

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Translation  
Prevodno besedilo

# TRANSLATION | PREVOD

UDC: 641.5:17

Adriano Fabris

## ETIKA UŽIVANJA HRANE HRANA IN MI: VPRAŠANJE NEKEGA ODNOSA

### Uživanje hrane kot neizpolnjeni odnos

#### 1. *Problem*

Slabo jemo. Ne zato, ker ne bi vedeli, kaj je za naše zdravje dobro ali kaj preprečuje naše dobro počutje. Slabo se prehranjujemo, ker ne vemo, kaj pomeni »dobro« in »slabo« v našem odnosu do hrane.

Za to gre. Ni nam jasno, da gre pri hranjenju za dejanje, ki je mogoče samo v odnosu z drugim (in z drugimi). Hranjenje predvideva specifične odnose in hkrati vzpostavlja nove. Zato je uživanje hrane, tako kot vsako človekovo dejanje, etično dejanje; in sicer prav zato, ker je relacijsko dejanje, dejanje v

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V pričujoči številki revije *Phainomena* objavljamo prvo poglavje knjige italijanskega filozofa Adriana Fabrisa *Etica del mangiare. Cibo e relazione* (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2019), ki bo v slovenskem prevodu kmalu izšla pri Inštitutu Nove revije, zavodu za humanistiko. *Op. ur.*

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odnosu. Zato ker tega ne dojamemo in se potemtakem nevedno vedemo, se slabo prehranjujemo in s tem slabo ravnamo do sebe in do drugih.<sup>1</sup>

Vprašanje se torej nanaša na način, kako s hranjenjem udeležamo prehranjevalni odnos. To je tisto, kar naš odnos do hrane naredi za etični odnos. Imamo dobre odnose in odnose, ki nikakor niso dobri. Zato moramo razumeti, katere odnose vzpostavljamo takrat, ko jemo. Preučiti moramo naš odnos do hrane, odnos do tega, s čimer se hranimo, odnos do tistih, ki z njimi delimo naše prehranjevanje, in odnos do nas samih kot subjektov, ki se moramo za preživetje hraniti. Podrobneje moramo preučiti vse to, pri tem pa izhajati iz nekega kriterija, ki nas bo vodil pri določanju, kaj je dobro in kaj je slabo, da bi lahko izbrali najboljši način.

To moramo storiti, ker sta danes v našem odnosu do hrane »dobro« in »slabo« vrednostni kategoriji, ki ju uporabljamo pretežno enostransko, saj se pri tem nanašamo le na eno stran odnosa. Najsi gre za človeka, ki se zaradi določene vrste prehranjevanja počuti »dobro« ali »slabo« (glede na psihofizično zadovoljitev), ali za značilnost hrane, po kateri se jo šteje za »dobro« ali »slabo«, »dopustno« ali »prepovedano«, »moralno« ali »nemoralno«. A pri tem zanemarjamo, da tako hrano kot človeka lahko sodimo »dobro« ali »slabo« le ob upoštevanju odnosa, ki ju veže, ob globalnosti konteksta, v katerega se umeščata, in ob vlogi, ki ju v tem kontekstu imata, tudi glede na ostale elemente, ki kontekst sestavljajo.

Odnos je torej osrednja tema tudi etike uživanja hrane, tako kot je premišljevanje o dobroti kateregakoli človeškega ravnanja. Hranjenje je odnos. Če to dodobra razmislimo, lahko pridemo do širše korenite prenove našega načina bivanja na svetu.

## 2. *Primat okusa*

Splošno razširjeni pogled je drugačen. Hrano v glavnem sodimo kot »dobro« in »slabo« po njenem okusu. Predvsem od tod je odvisna vrednost tega, kar jemo, in od tod izhaja pomen, ki ga ima v naših življenjih, saj vemo, da obstajajo ljudje, ki ne jejo, da bi živeli, temveč živijo, da bi jedli.

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1 Prim. B. Balsamo, *Il cibo come relazione. Identità, affetto, forma, gusto, cultura, convivio*, Effatà Editrice, Catalupa (TO) 2015.

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Miza je namreč kraljestvo okusov. Kvečjemu bi lahko med petimi čuti dodali še vlogo vida oziroma izgleda (v predstavitvi krožnika, ki se ji danes daje vse večji pomen) in vonja (kot dodatni kanal povečanja mamljivosti določenega izdelka). Zato je uživanje hrane celovita izkušnja. Še več: med vsemi človeškimi izkušnjami je danes uživanje hrane vse bolj privilegirana izkušnja.<sup>2</sup>

Med vsemi čuti pri hranjenju prevladuje okus. Ravno okus določa vrednostno sodbo pri dejanju hranjenja; in ravno tu se začenjajo pojavljati določena vprašanja.

Okus je subjektiven čut. Odvisen je od osebnih preferenc, od osebne zgodbe, od posameznikove vzgoje, od njegove naklonjenosti do sprememb in njegove pripravljenosti za preizkušanje samega sebe. Samo če razširimo perspektivo, je okus odvisen tudi od kulture določene države in ljudstva.<sup>3</sup> Italijan čuti določen odpor do uživanja suhih mravelj, ki jih prodajajo v Bucaramangi (Kolumbija). Vendar se moda hranjenja s kobilicami in drugimi žuželkami počasi širi tudi k nam.<sup>4</sup>

Da bi rešili to specifično subjektivno značilnost, je filozofija poskušala določiti neko splošno sprejeto oziroma vsaj za vse sprejemljivo »pravilo okusa« ali pa je poskusila upravičiti vrednostno sodbo tako, da je ni utemeljevala na okusu posameznega subjekta, temveč na sposobnosti, ki naj bi jo imela vsa racionalna bitja. Hume in Kant sta najbolj pomembna predstavnika teh dveh pristopov.<sup>5</sup>

285

Oba pristopa sta enostranska. Oba zavezuje vedno in samo subjektova stran, najsi bo individualna, družbena ali transcendentalna. Še več, subjekt je določen na osnovi njegove sposobnosti okušanja. Vendar je okus vedno relativen čut, sorazmeren je s tem, kolikor je kdo sposoben kaj okušati. V prehranjevalnem odnosu se zato ne moremo izogniti dejstvu, da so, ob drugem, vrednostne

2 Prim. N. Perullo, *Il cibo come esperienza. Saggio di filosofia ed estetica del cibo*, Slow Food, Bra (CN) 2016.

3 Prim. M. Montanari, *Il cibo come cultura*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2006.

4 Ravno podatek, da se danes širijo gastronomske ponudbe, ki niso vezane na tradicijo okoliša, je dovolil nekaterim raziskovalcem, da podvomijo v idejo o hrani kot kulturnem dejavniku. O tem glej: F. La Cecla, *Babel food. Contro il cibo cultura*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2016.

5 Prim. D. Hume, *Of the Standard of Taste*, 1760, in I. Kant, *Kritika razsodne moči*, Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, Ljubljana 1999.

sodbe o tem, kar se je in kako se to je, pogojene od tistega (ali tiste), ki je in okuša.

Na podlage tega sledi, da je v vsakem primeru v središču tega odnosa subjekt. To je edino pomembno. Vse se namreč navezuje na subjekt in iz subjekta pridobiva red in smisel. Gre za način mišljenja, značilen za moderni čas, ki izhaja predvsem iz Descartesovega osnovanja vsakega odnosa z drugim na (domnevno izvornem) odnosu do samih sebe. Z edinim dodatkom, da ima v tem primeru kartezijanski *ego* – ki je raztelesen – usta, jezik in želodec.

To ni vse, kar se zgodi. Z zasnovanjem prehranjevalnega odnosa na okusu pridemo do tega, da absolutiziramo okus sam. Postavljanje okusa, najsi bo posameznikov ali kolektiven, kot edinega merila prehranjevalnih procesov nas prepričuje, naj tega merila ne soočimo z merili drugih, posameznikovih ali kolektivnih, subjektov in da imajo naposled naše preference vedno zadnjo besedo. To pomeni, da nismo pripravljeni na možnost soočenja ali mediacije. V dobi, kakršna je naša, ki je samo navidezno tolerantna, ni naključje, da vse 286 bolj velja rek: *de gustibus non est disputandum*. Če nekoliko razširimo pogled in se ozremo, na primer, na socialna omrežja, ni slučajno, da se naše sodbe vse bolj krčijo na skromna »všeč mi je« ali »ni mi všeč«.

### 3. Užitek hrane

Za to gre. Skoraj nevede z omejevanjem vrednostne sodbe o določeni hrani na posameznikov okus pridemo do tega, da dojemamo hrano kot dobro ali ne, samo če ustreza našemu okusu. Posledično izraza »dobro« in »slabo« postaneta samo podaljšek »prijetnega« in »neprijetnega«. Ne gre samo za simptom estetizacije morale, temveč gre predvsem za način, kako danes ravnamo z etiko, kako jo pripravimo oziroma »serviramo«.

Težava je v tem, da ni vedno jasno, kako se užitek oblikuje. Velja vse: lahko je kulturno pogojen ali se veže na našo telesnost; lahko ga pojmuje kot nekaj, kar se da vzgojiti, ali ga ohranimo v stanju hipne, nagonske surovosti. Pravzaprav je zadnja rešitev danes kar razširjena: na primer, ko se starš odreče vzgajanju okusa otrok in jim dovoli, da jedo, kar želijo (kar je skoraj vedno čips). V vsakem primeru je domnevna »naravnost« užitka, nagonskost, ki jo

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izraža, to, kar privlači tiste teorije, ki postavljajo užitek okusa za osnovo vsake sodbe, najsi bo estetične ali etične.

Nekaj je vendar gotovo. Če prevladujoče mnenje temelji na takšni zastavitvi, potem je vodilno merilo pri naših izbirah o hrani, merilo etike uživanja hrane, naposled nič drugega kot merilo koristi. Navsezadnje, če je to, kar šteje, užitek, je korist razločevalno načelo vsake izbire. To bomo bolje videli pri analizi stališč Petra Singerja. Kaj pa zares je ta korist in komu je v prid? Katere so meje njenega zasledovanja za posameznika in ali je lahko zares od vseh sprejeta? Ravno to ni jasno. Oziroma, bolje, ravno od tu, od individualnega samoopolnomočenja, h kateremu stremimo v naši zahtevi po pravici do zadovoljitve lastnega okusa, se lahko začne boj vseh proti vsem za najbolj okusno oziroma bolje oglaševano uživanje jedi.

#### 4. Fast food *in* slow food

To smer so ubrale različne raziskave, tako filozofske kot druge, ki jim je predmet uživanje hrane. V središču je posameznik in njegov užitek. Osrednji cilj je povečati užitek, ga izvabiti in gnati z različnimi sredstvi, z laskanjem in potenciranjem subjektivnega okusa do mere, da se subjekt povsem zaveda svojih možnosti, ter si tako pridobiti njegovo zvestobo do izbranih izdelkov. Najsi gre za preprosto »prvi požirek piva«, ki ga lahko zvrnemo vase,<sup>6</sup> ali za to, kar predlaga renomirani kuharski mojster kot rezultat bolj ali manj genialne posebne priprave, cilj je vedno isti: doseči, da je naša sposobnost okušanja, in z njo sposobnost ostalih čutov, eksaltirana. Še več: poveljučana.

Prav zato se množijo nasveti strokovnjakov, ki spodbujajo in večajo to sposobnost. Časopisi so v ustreznih rubrikah o tem polni člankov. Nastajajo in uspevajo vodiči po dobrem hranjenju in pitju. Okoliše in njihov turizem (ki se s tem okorišča) je mogoče pod tem profilom promovirati, in sicer z očitnim ekonomskim prilivom.

Od tod dobi svojo upravičenost filozofija *slow fooda*. Proti globalno že uveljavljeni rutini *fast fooda*, *slow food* temelji na vrednotenju lokalnega, tipičnega in posebnega. Kot vemo, gre za kulturno gibanje, ki se je rodilo v

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<sup>6</sup> Prim. Ph. Delerm, *La première gorgée de bière et autres plaisirs minuscules*, Gallimard, Paris 1997.

mestecu Bra leta 1986 in ki je nekaj let pozneje (1989) oblikovalo *Mednarodno gibanje za zaščito in pravico do užitka*. Med svoje cilje si gibanje zastavlja promocijo drugačne kvalitete življenja, ob spoštovanju tempa naravnega časa rasti in obnavljanja, okolja ter zdravja potrošnikov in ob uporabi tistih proizvodov, ki najbolj izražajo določen okoliš.<sup>7</sup> Vendar se mimo prvotnega vtisa pristopa *fast* in *slow fooda* bistveno ne razlikujeta, vsaj ne v dojetanju našega odnosa do hrane. V obeh primerih odnos temelji na načelu koristi, četudi korist razumeta in dosejata na drugačen način.

288 *Fast food* je hrana tistega, ki se mu mudi, tistega, ki išče rahle in, tako rekoč, »prežvečene« občitke, za kar je pripravljen predati svoje prehranjevanje v standardizirani postopek – malodane prehranjevalno montažno verigo – proizvodnje in potrošnje. *Slow food* je jed tistega, ki mu čas (in denar) ponuja možnost, da si poišče najboljšo kuho, da se odpelje do restavracije ali gostilne, ki jo pripravlja, in brez hitenja uživa v njihovih večkratnih hodih. *Fast food* je enak, ali se vsaj pretvarja, da to je po celem svetu: ko vstopamo v poslovalnico določene verige, se počutimo doma tako v New Yorku kot v Tokiu, povsod plačamo bolj ali manj isto ceno in jemo iste reči. *Slow food* se sklicuje na specifično »kulturo« določenega kraja in pričakuje od osebe, ki želi okušati njegove proizvode, da deli ne samo enako kulturo, ki mu (ali ji) omogoča okušanje v njegovi polnosti, temveč tudi pripravljenost, da to sprejme, in finančna sredstva, ki to omogočajo. *Fast food* nas vodi v zamenjevanje enakosti z uniformiranjem. *Slow food* je uživanje hrane tistega, ki hoče docela doživeti specifičnost in različnost. V prvem primeru gre za prijetno zadovoljevanje potrebe, v drugem gre za kulturni element, ki ga lahko uživa samo, kdor to kulturo ima. V obeh primerih tisti, kdor se hrani, išče in doseže lastno zadovoljitev ter postavlja sebe v središče prehranjevalnega odnosa.

### 5. Prehranjevanje in hranjenje

Naj ponovim: vse to je rezultat enostranskega pogleda. Dejanje uživanja hrane kot kulturno dejanje, in ne le kot zadovoljevanje potrebe, je funkcionalno

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7 O projektu glej: C. Petrini in G. Padovani, *Slow food. Storia di un'utopia possibile*, Slow Food, Bra (CN) 2017. O »ideologiji slow fooda« prim. L. Simonetti, *Mangi chi può. Meglio, meno e piano*, Mauro Pagliai, Firenze 2010.

prilagojeno subjektu in njegovim preferencam. Z gledišča danes široko sprejete morale koristi se naravna potreba spremeni v užitek.<sup>8</sup> Posameznik je do take mere upravičen, da se zapre v svoja občutja, da le nase osredotočen doživlja in podoživlja določene kulinarične izkušnje, da se lahko naposled izgubi v gojenju lastnega okusa.

Tako nikomur ne škodi. Ali pač, kakor bomo pozneje videli. Vendar vprašanje ostaja isto: vrednost in smisel uživanja hrane sta naposled odvisni od subjektivne izbire. Sledenje postane dejanje, ki se navezuje na voljo tistega, ki to stori. Vse bolj osamljena degustacija določene hrane ali pijače je samo predvidljiv zaključek te zamisli. Gre za način, kako v miru uživati tovrstno samoto.

Vendar, kakšna je posledica takega rezultata? Nedvomno se človek, tako kot žival, *mora* hraniti. Seveda, sicer umre. Zato je lačen, je žejen. Ko je pojedel in se odžejal, doživlja občutek polnosti in užitka. Gre za užitek dovršenosti, ki pa hitro izgine in vnovično prepusti prostor tesnobi pred lakoto.

Vse to je seveda res, če upoštevamo vedno in samo stran tistega, ki se hrani. Če nadaljujemo po isti poti, lahko z gotovostjo razlikujemo ta užitek – užitek *hranjenja* – od potrebe po *prehranjevanju*. Gre za užitek, ki ga je mogoče celo posebej gojiti. To je bilo že razvidno, ko smo pokazali, da jesti ni le zadovoljevanje potrebe, temveč je kulturno dejanje, ki ga je mogoče skozi čas izpiliti. Tudi tako se je človeška kultura razvijala.

V procesu, ki ga tu zarisujem, je kuha bistvena prelomnica. Ne gre samo za aliteracijo kuha/kultura, kultura in kuha sta notranje povezani. Kuhanje je dejanje transformacije: gre za spreminjanje predhodno preproste in neposredne – zverinske – asimilacije, hkrati je brez njega takšna asimilacija največkrat težje uresničljiva. S kuhanjem vključujemo med nami in tem, kar vemo, da je užitno, nekaj posrednega: drugo dejanje ali pripravo. V nekaterih primerih ima kuhanje celo »čarobno« moč, da spremeni neužitno v užitno. Je eden izmed načinov, kako obdržati pod nadzorom moč ognja in ga izkoristiti za svoje cilje.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Za podrobnejši pregled različnih oblik utilitarizma glej: M. Reichlin, *L'utilitarismo*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2013.

<sup>9</sup> Prim. Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le cru et le cuit*, Plon, Paris 1964.

Toda kuhanje zahteva čas. Ne samo spretnosti, predvsem čas. Čas potrebuje osebe, ki ga imajo in ga lahko uporabljajo za doseg zastavljenega cilja. Te osebe prevzemajo nase skrb za določene naloge zato, da so ostali lahko teh nalog prosti in se lahko posvečajo drugim. Družbeni odnosi se torej še dodatno razpredajo. Kar se ponovno ponavlja, je navezava na čas. Kuhanje ohranja in tako prepozna pomen preteklega: konzerviranje postane nujno iz previdnosti, previdnost pa priča o odnosu s prihodnostjo.

Kuha torej omogoča kulturo. V tem smislu se lahko vrnemo k Feuerbachovemu reku, da »človek je, kar jé«, in ga sedaj razumemo nekoliko drugače, mimo banalne materialistične razlage.<sup>10</sup> Možnost brezinteresne refleksije je namreč dana, ko je zagotovljeno dobro počutje. Še več: je mogoča, ko so nekateri z delom drugih varni pred prikaznijo lakote.<sup>11</sup>

Tudi tu moramo biti pozorni. Še za nekaj drugega gre. Uživanje hrane lahko razumemo kot izključno kulturno dejanje: hrane ne zaužijemo zato, da bi se hranili, temveč samo zato da bi ob zauživanju izkusili okus, ki je sam sebi namen in sam sebi merilo. Toda, če je temu tako, potem ni omejitev v pretiravanju. Pojedina pri Trimalhionu v Petronijevem *Satirikonu* je v tem pogledu poučen primer.<sup>12</sup>

## 6. Ambivalenca volje

Ponavljam, prehranjevanje je človekova naravna potreba. Hranjenje pa je kulturno dejanje. Zato lahko iščemo v hrani užitek in okus privzgojimo, treniramo in ga stimuliramo. Z različnim ciljem se tako lahko razvijajo vede, kakršna je nutricionistika, namen katere je določiti in ponovno vzpostaviti tiste hranilne učinkovine, ki v določeni hrani blagodejno učinkujejo na človekovo zdravje tako, da kljubujejo neizbežnemu propadanju organizma.

Toda tovrstni kulturni vidik lahko privede tudi do ločitve užitka do hrane od gole potrebe po prehranjevanju. Cilj prehranjevanja je polnost, celovitost, zadovoljitev potrebe s pomočjo asimilacije. Ta užitek se veže na sitost. Dejanje hranjenja pa se lahko nadaljuje tudi po občutku sitosti, kar ni posledica potrebe, temveč želje.

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10 Prim. L. Feuerbach, »Das Geheimnis des Opfers oder der Mensch ist was er isst (1862)«, v: *Gesammelte Werke*, ur. C. H. Beck, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1972.

11 Prim. Aristotel, *Metafizika A*, 2, 983a 20-23.

12 O tem glej: F. Rigotti, *Gola*, Il Mulino, Bologna 2008.

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Odnos do hrane, ki se je začetno vezal na voljo človeka, je naposled odvisen od nagnjenja in kompulzije, ki jima individualna volja ne more več kljubovati.

Kdor ljubi okušanje, tvega požrešnost. Požrešnež zlahka pade v kompulzivno prenažedanje. Kompulzivni jedec je sedaj žrtev svojih želja in na koncu zapade v debelost. Za povračilo pa se debeluh znajde pred nezdravim modelom vitkosti: modelom anoreksije.

Drugače povedano, če je akt hranjenja odvisen samo od človekovega okusa, če se ta okus veže na posamično individualnost in če je subjektivnost dojeta kot sposobnost volje (ali nezmožnost ne želei), potem lahko pridemo do točke, ko nimamo več nadzora nad hrano. Užiti je hrane se loči od potrebe po hranjenju, od odnosa med tem, kar je dobro in slabo za naše zdravje, in od tega, kar potrebujemo za preživetje. Odvisno je od dejanja volje. Vendar nad posameznikovo voljo pogosto prevladajo drugi subjektivni nagibi, ki jih sam ne nadzoruje. Kot pravi Schopenhauer, nisem namreč jaz tisti, ki hoče. To, kar hočem, je nekaj, kar prebiva v meni in česar ne morem obvladati. Zgodi se, na primer, v specifičnem slučaju prehranjevanja, da *fast food* – hitra, rahla in nasitna hrana (pod pogojem, da jo takoj zaužijemo) – lahko zadovolji bulimičnega človeka in spodbuja debelost, kot je na lastni koži pokazal Morgan Spurlock v dokumentarcu *Super veliki jaz* (*Super Size Me*, 2004). Zgodi se, da je druga plat (enaka in nasprotna reakcija) *slow fooda* anoreksija.

291

## 7. Pogoltniti svet

Bulimik jé, da bi se napolnil.<sup>13</sup> Zanj hrana nima več okusa, postane le priložnost absorpcije oziroma pripajanja. V tem primeru je edini užitek

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<sup>13</sup> Izraz uporabljam v moški obliki, tako kot storim v nadaljevanju tudi za ónega, kdor boleha za anoreksijo, ne da bi zato pri tem dodajal posebne spolne konotacije. Sicer je pri anoreksiji znano, da gre za patologijo, ki prizadene predvsem osebe ženskega spola. Pogosto sta v strokovni literaturi patologiji anoreksije in bulimije obravnavani skupaj. Glej, na primer: M. Recalcati, *L'ultima cena: anoressia e bulimia*, Bruno Mondadori, Milano 2007. Tu ju bom obravnaval iz izključno filozofskega zornega kota. Za vpogled v splošno sliko o bulimiji glej: A. Piccinni, *Drogati di cibo. Quando mangiare crea dipendenza*, Giunti, Firenze 2016. Podoben pristop mojemu, ki obravnava nekatere vidike religiozne narave (pri katerih se bom zaustavil v drugem poglavju), je mogoče najti v: E. Bianchi, *Ingordigia. Il rapporto deformato con il cibo*, San Paolo, Cinisello Balsamo (MI) 2013.

občutek polnosti, za doseg tega cilja pa postane primerna kakršnakoli hrana: dovolj je, da jo enostavno pogoltne.

Za bulimika je svet nekaj, česar se moramo znebiti. Eden od načinov, kako poskuša to doseči, je hranjenje, to je dejanje, ki mu zagotavlja, da prehrano sprejme vase, jo prebavi in asimilira. S tega vidika se zdi, da je vse užitno ali da je vse vsaj mogoče pogoltniti. Vendar gre za napor, ki je obenem junaški in brezuspešen.

Vprašanje je, zakaj so za nekoga reči v svetu in sam svet zgolj nekaj, kar moramo absorbirati. Enostavno zato, ker človek ne prepoznava več njihovega pomena, novosti in vrednosti. Če dojemamo svet samo s stališča možnosti njegovega požiranja, razlik med rečmi več ni in vse je zamenljivo in enakovredno.<sup>14</sup> Različnost okusov, različni načini priprave in predstavitve hrane nimajo več nikakršnega pomena. Edino, kar šteje, je to, česar se lahko polastimo. Toda s tem ne postane zanemarljivo le to, kar goltamo, nepomemben za tistega, ki golta, postane sam pomen tega dejanja. Nazadnje samo goltanje izgubi pomen. Zato lahko to, kar goltamo, tudi izločimo: s trudom, z bolečino in z občutkom osramočenosti.

292

### *8. In ga nato prisilno izločiti*

Načrt bulimika je zapisan neuspehu. Usojen mu je neuspeh, ker gre za nihilistični projekt. Njegov cilj je izničenje sveta s tem, da ga absorbira, zato da bi na koncu potrdil sebe. Toda za takšen junaški podvig večja ali manjša junaška volja ne zadošča. Ni dovolj, da poskusimo: poskus zahteva spreminjanje našega vsebnika (sveta) v vsebino (v hrano) zato, da bi ga naposled obvladovali. Tudi ni dovolj, da se prepričamo, kako je vse užitno (to pomeni, vse, kar je namenjeno asimilaciji) ali vsaj kako je vse mogoče pogoltniti. Uničujoča nihilistična namera je kužna, saj se obrne proti temu, ki si jo prilašča, in pripelje do točke, da je naposled izničen, kdor je želel izničevati.

Kako se to konkretno zgodi? Obstaja težava, ki priplava na površje, ne glede na trud bulimika, da bi nanjo pozabil. Izničenje sveta, ki se je sedaj spremenil v hrano, ne bo nikoli docela uresničeno. Ohranijo se ostanki: taki, ki jih ni

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14 O različnih, tudi pozitivnih, pomenih enakovrednosti v izkustvu hrane glej tretje poglavje dela Nicole Perulla *Il gusto come esperienza* (cit.).

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mogoče absorbirati, in drugi, ki jih ni mogoče zadržati v sebi. Gre za ostanke procesa asimilacije, ki jih je bulimik nazadnje primoran izločiti.

Zato je njegov projekt zapisan porazu. Bulimik ne more vsega asimilirati, ne more v del sebe spremeniti vsega tega, kar ni on. Ker ne more izničiti sveta, se ne more afirmirati kot to, kar bi želel. Izničiti mora svoje lastne zahteve. Bulimik je prisiljen potrditi, da od njegovega poskusa – poskusa, ki karakterizira njegovo osebnost – ne ostane nič.

Do tega pride, ker bulimik ni sposoben upravljati odnosov. Ponovno: hoče izničiti odnose, hoče absorbirati to, do česar bi šele moral stopiti v odnos. Vedno je prisotno še nekaj drugega; nekaj, kar moramo zavrniti, kar je ogabno, kar moramo izbrisati takoj, ko se pojavi kot proizvod. Kar naprej se vrača, ne glede na naš poskus zanikanja njegovega obstoja in vrednosti. Vztrajnost in obstojnost ostankov oziroma izločenih odpadkov je dokaz neuresničljivosti njegovega načrta, da bi vse asimiliriral. Na splošno predstavljajo poraz ideje o subjektu, ki naj bi bil sposoben vladati svetu in ga podrediti svojim potrebam. Vedno nekaj ostane, nekaj, kar proizvaja sam subjekt v njegovem poskusu manipuliranja, spreminjanja in izničenja. Sedanje ekološke izredne razmere so rezultat pozabljanja te plati.<sup>15</sup>

293

Vendar tako vedénje ne priča samo o zanikovanju človekovih relacijskih sposobnosti. Obstaja še drug vidik, ki kaže na vso omejenost asimilatorskega subjekta. O tem sem že govoril: gre za protislovje prav tiste volje, ki jo bi želel bulimik uresničiti na absoluten način. Na koncu se izkaže, da nisem jaz tisti, ki želi jesti, želi asimilirati in vse absorbirati. Obstaja nekaj v meni, kar me žene onstran samega sebe. Ko sam hočem ali si domišljam, da hočem, obstaja v meni nekaj, kar hoče. Gre za vzgib, za prisilo k ponavljanju, ki me onstran vsake razumne namere potisne prek mojih meja.

Bulimija potemtakem uteleša heterogenezo ciljev volje do nadzora, ki se udejanja v subjektu in ga prigovarja, naj okuša, če bi to le bilo mogoče, vse v svetu in sam svet. V tem poskusu pripajanja vsega, prav obratno, izgubi sam okus. Volja po prevladi nad resničnostjo, po njenem asimiliranju in prebavi, proizvaja ne samo ostanke in odpadke, s katerimi se moramo soočiti, s svojim

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15 F. Duque je skoz novo branje Hegla razvil »filozofijo ostanka«. Glej predvsem njegovi deli *Hegel. La especulación de la indigencia*, Juan Granica, Barcelona 1990, in *Residuos de lo sagrado: tiempo y escatología*, Abada, Madrid 2010.

delovanjem nam hkrati razkrije, da še sama sebe ni sposobna obvladovati. Od tod njeni destruktivni in samodestruktivni rezultati, obenem pa tudi, paradoksalno, njena dejansko nemoč v doseganju tega, kar želi. Ko bi ta paradoks razumeli Nietzschejevi privrženci, bi si morda prizanesli dobršen del nasilja in trpljenja iz dogodkov preteklega stoletja.

### 9. *Misticizem anoreksije*

Nekaj podobnega, čeprav obratnega, se dogaja tistemu, kdor na lastni koži doživlja izkušnjo anoreksije. Če hoče požreti vse, če želi v sebi vsebovati svojo vsebino, mora bulimik narediti prostor za to, kar hoče vsesati. Mora se sprazniti, da bi se lahko napolnil z novim. Anoreksik to izpraznjenje privede do skrajnih posledic, pri njem postane absolutna gesta, saj smoter tega dejanja ni več v ponovnem polnjenju. Rezultat takšne geste postane model sam po sebi: kot primeren in dober cilj, ki ga je vredno zasledovati. Postane celo čaščen, kakor se dogaja na raznih pro-Ana blogih.<sup>16</sup>

294

Kdor boleha za anoreksijo, se mu svet gabi. Če bi lahko, bi iz sebe izločil vsakršno njegovo sled. Če bi lahko, bi iz sebe izločil samega (ali sám) sebe, saj je kljub vsemu tudi sam del sveta in od sveta je na določen način kontaminiran. V primeru anoreksika mora biti vsebnik čist in osvobojen kakršenkoli vsebine. Zato, ker to ni, kdor je žrtev anoreksija, mora najti način, kako se prečistiti. Mora pravzaprav najti način, kako se očistiti tudi sebe.

Če ničesar ne vsebuje, potem sam vsebnik ni več vsebnik. Če se jaz osvobodim vsakršne odvisnosti, se s tem potrjuje v svoji moči. S tem se potrди samega sebe ravno s svojim izničenjem. To je paradoks anoreksije, to je način, kako se loči od sveta: izniči svet z izničenjem samega sebe; vendar se naposled ravno s to gesto samopotrjuje.

Ponovno, kot v primeru bulimije, naletimo na nihilistično značilnost. Toda tu imamo še en vidik, zaradi katerega nanašanje na nič in dejanje izničenja

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16 Poleg obširne literature, ki anoreksijo obravnava s pomočjo zdravstvenih, psiholoških ali psihološko-analitičnih pristopov, je mogoče poglobiti kulture vidike tega pojava, splošno razširjeno mišljenje, ki ga pojav razkriva, in odnos, ki ga sproža med reči in ljudmi. O naštetih vidikih sta povedni predvsem deli: R. M. Bell, *Holy Anorexia*, University of Chicago Press, London 1985, in R. Girard, *Anorexie et désir mimétique*, L'Herne, Parution 2008.

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pridobita drugačno vrednost. V vsem tem je nekaj mističnega. Nisem po naključju uporabil ključnega izraza mistike, tako renske kot španske mistike *sigla de oro*, namreč izraza »izpraznjenje«. Gre za tisti moment ločitve od sveta, izničenja vsakršne navezanosti na reči, ki vodi – v radikalni obliki – do dela na sebi, to pomeni k izničenju ne samo vsakršne podobe o svetu, temveč tudi razlogov za kakršnokoli zanimanje za svet sam.

Toda mistično izpraznjenje pripravi človeka, ki to izvede, da se nato napolni z božjo milostjo. V religioznem kontekstu človek ne more oziroma ne sme ostati dolgo prazen. Problem je tu vsebina in tudi to, kako lahko vsebina spremeni vsebnik. Človekova volja, tista, ki po Mojstru Eckhartu zasleduje odstranitev volje, deluje samo na začetnem, pripravljalnem nivoju: gre za nivo, ki omogoča delo na sebi, da se človek osvobodi vsebin, označenih kot ne vrednih, s ciljem, da se lahko primerno odpre za srečanje z Bogom.

Kdor boleha za anoreksijo, ne pričakuje nobenega razodetja. Njegovo izpraznjenje ni osmišljeno v poznejši zapolnitvi, ki je od njega (ali nje) neodvisna in ki bi ga naposled z globljim in trdnejšim odnosom od tistega z rečmi (z odnosom z božanskim) preobrazila. Nasprotno: anoreksik se sprazni, da bi se izpraznil. Čistost, ki jo zasleduje, je torej sama sebi cilj. Želi pa vsekakor nekaj dokazati: ne pride do ničesar, razen do samopotrditve skozi lastno žrtvovanje.

295

Tudi vedênje anoreksika je potemtakem nihilistično, saj zasleduje nič. Še več, gre za izraz utelešenega nihilizma. Gre za nihilizem, prevzet nase, prisvojen in na ogled: vsaj pred ogledalom; vsaj na ogled sebi in tistim, ki mislijo kot on.

Anoreksikov nadzor je torej nekaj, kar potrebuje preverjanje in dokazovanje. Zato se mora kazati in dokazovati, mogoče v oblikah, ki ne sprožijo takojšnjega alarma. Saj morajo skrajni rezultati njegove odločitve zavračanja hrane osebam, ki niso del te skupine – na primer starši ali vzgojitelji –, iz bojazni do graje ali intervencije proti njegovi volji vsekakor ostati skriti.

### 10. Narcizem anoreksije

Rekel sem, da je pojav anoreksije druga plat *slow fooda*. To sem rekel, ker je v anoreksičnem nihilizmu izničen predvsem okus. Še več, izničen je okus kot

privilegiran občutek, ki me odpira vsemu: vsemu, kar napolni življenje tistega, ki kot lačni polž uživa pot počasnega prehranjevanja.

V resnici je to, kar izvajata tako anoreksik kot bulimik, *epoché* okusa. Bulimik požira vse do točke, ko ne razlikuje več okusov, do trenutka, ko postane okus nepomemben. Anoreksik ponižuje vsakršno možnost okušanja sveta. V obeh primerih je odnos do drugega pripeljan do skrajnega nesmisla. Zato sta obe, bulimija in anoreksija, patologiji odnosa. Vendar je nekaj v ozadju, kar paradoksalno ponuja nekaj zadoščenja. Gre za možnost premišljevanja o tem, kaj kdo počne, za možnost občudovanja in, znotraj določenih meja, biti občudovan. Drugače povedano, v ozadju je narcistično obnašanje. Še posebej v primeru anoreksije.

Opozoril sem že, kako ima vid oziroma izgled pri anoreksiku pomembno vlogo. Pri bulimiku tega ni potrebno poudariti, saj je dovolj, če opazujemo njegova dejanja, da se zavemo njegovih nenadzorovanih in neukrotljivih teženj po pripajanju sveta. Četudi bi ostajala patologija uradno skrita, se v primeru anoreksika še vedno najde način, kako jo lahko pokaže: sebi in tistim, ki se obnašajo kot on.

296

Obsesivna pozornost za lastno težo, hranjenje dnevnika o zaužitih kalorijah, vse to so obnašanja (marsikdaj ovekovečena na spletu), s katerimi preizkuša, kako predstaviti doseženo čistost. Najpomembnejši pogled je v teh primerih lasten. Drugi so iz tega zornega kota samo ogledalo, kolikor potrjujejo moje samozadovoljstvo nad tisto samokontrolo, ki jo moje telo kaže in uteleša.

Tu se anoreksija poveže z narcizmom. Izprašujem se o doseženih rezultatih svoje moči samonadzorovanja, sprti, korak za korakom preverjam svoje napredke na poti do očiščenja, toda predvsem pogled, kako samega sebe vidim, je to, kar mi daje ne samo gotovost glede opravljene poti, temveč tudi zadovoljstvo nad prehojenim. Gledam in to, kar vidim, se ujema s tem, kar bi želel videti. Vidim se v svoji lepoti, ne glede na odpor, ki ga moja suhost sproža v drugih.

Če bi želeli najti sintetični izraz, ki bi lahko definiral – s filozofskega vidika, kakršen je vsekakor cilj te male knjige – stanje tistega, kdor boleha za anoreksijo, bi lahko rekli, da slednji doživlja neke vrste narcistični nihilizem. Gre za *nihilizem*, ker sta bit in nič, živeti in umreti iz perspektive izpraznjenja povsem nepomembna. Gre za *narcistični nihilizem*, kolikor je to ravnodušje,

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do katerega vodi samonadzorovanje na poti k izpraznjenju, razkazovano in uživano. Vsaj za samega sebe: čestitam si za vse, kar sem moral pretrpeti, da sem lahko kljuboval potrebi po prehranjevanju.

### 11. *Napaka gurmana*

Bulimija in anoreksija sta patologiji odnosa. Podobno kažeta na enostransko in napačno dojetanje odnosa do užitja hrane tako v izkušnji *fast fooda* kot *slow fooda*. Napaka na splošno tiči v razumevanju hranjenja kot dejanja, ki zadeva samo subjekt: njegovo potrebo po prehranjevanju, ugajanje njegovemu okusu, njegovo željo po zdravem prehranjevanju.

Bodimo jasni: ne gre za vedënja, ki bi jih morali cenzurirati. Ne želim demonizirati tistega, kdor v hrani najde vir užitka ali kdor razmišlja o posledicah hrane za njegovo lastno prebavo. Seveda je bolje najti užitek v nečem, kar lahko pripravimo in predvsem pojemo v zdravih in primernih količinah, kakor da zapademo v omenjeni prehranjevalni patologiji. Toda tema, ki jo tu razvijam, ne zadeva zdrave prehrane (ki se veže na neko pojmovanje individualnega dobrega počutja), temveč je etičnega značaja. Etika pa ne sovпада samo s povečanjem užitka in kvalitete naših življenj, prav tako se ne prepozna izključno v zasledovanju osebne dobrega počutja. Če potemtakem želimo poglobiti temo etike uživanja hrane in hkrati razumeti, kako je možno, da se v naši dobro prehranjeni, zahodni družbi pojavljajo omenjene patologije, se moramo vrniti k specifični odločitvi, ki jo pogosto le tiho sprejemamo kot normo vedënja tudi v kontekstu prehrane: od človeškega subjekta in njegovega okusa je odvisna vrednost vsega, s čimer lahko on (ali ona) stopa v odnos.

Ta izbira je rezultat napačne perspektive. Gre za napako, ki sega dlje od vedënja *gurmana*, četudi se pri njem kaže zelo jasno.<sup>17</sup> Ves čas moramo upoštevati, da tisto, česar se človek lahko posluži, četudi sam to proizvede, ni namenjeno samo njegovemu (ali njenemu) užitku ali koristi. To bi bilo enako, kakor reči, da je Leonardo *Mono Lizo* naslikal zato, da bi jo lahko sam zase občudoval ali da bi užival občudovanje drugih ob pogledu na to sliko, ali

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<sup>17</sup> *Gurman* je požeruh, v hrani najde dovršitev svojega najbolj popolnega užitka. A ne smemo ga zamenjevati z *gastromom* in njegovim veliko bolj posrednim odnosom do hrane, s katerim do jedi in pijač zasleduje kompetenco izvedenca.

zaradi kupčevega denarja. Nasprotno, kultura preoblikuje nekaj, kar je že na razpolago, to umetniško razvije in to, kar je razvila, vnovič ponudi vsem na razpolago: drugim ljudem in celotnemu svetu.

298 Napaka perspektive je potemtakem, če odnos mislimo kot nekaj že vzpostavljenega, abstraktno umeščenega s strani subjekta, medtem ko bi ga morali razumeti kot načelo, kot mrežo, v katero se vsakdo s svojim dejanjem umešča in vstopa v odnos z dejanji drugih. Toda, če je vsako dejanje nekaj že postavljenega – če je že sam obstoj nečesa, kakor trdi Kant, odvisen od zavednega subjekta in njegovega dejanja umeščanja<sup>18</sup> –, potem se taisti subjekt lahko počuti poklicanega, da s svojim dejanjem postavljanja zaobjema celoten svet, ki ga sedaj lahko dojema kot nekaj, kar je odvisno od njegovih dejanj, in tako verjame, da ga lahko pripoji nase, natanko tako, kakor to počne Heglov absolutni subjekt. Ali pa se lahko prepriča, da se je sposoben, če si tega želi, z nadzorovanjem učinkov in predvsem samega sebe v tej sposobnosti nadzora vzdržati vsakršnega odnosa, kakor se dogaja pri Nietzschejevem nadčloveku. Bulimija in anoreksija sta torej patologiji, ki segata onstran naših prehranskih navad, saj razkrivata točno določeno miselnost, specifično vedenje do reči, ki jo je teoretizirala tudi filozofija.

## 12. Vegetarijanci in vegani

Toda to niso edina vprašanja, ki se porajajo v našem odnosu do hrane. Z vprašanji se srečujemo tudi pri drugem, danes prav tako razširjenem načinu vzpostavljanja odnosa do hrane. Hranjenja ne dojemamo več kot nekaj, kar je odvisno od našega okusa in naše specifične subjektivnosti, temveč izhajamo iz tega, kako dojemamo hrano oziroma to, kar po našem mnenju lahko postane hrana.

Gre za, tako rečeno, »objektivni« del prehranjevalnega odnosa. Uveljavi se ideja, da hrana sama po sebi prvenstveno ni hrana, temveč je sprva nekaj povsem zase, nekaj ločenega od kakršnegakoli odnosa z nami. Oblikuje se prepričanje, da to, kar jemo, ni nujno namenjeno našemu prehranjevanju, temveč ima predvsem svoje življenje in usodo.

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18 Na začetku spisa iz leta 1762 *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes*.

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Seveda je vse to prav. V večini primerov jemo živeča bitja. Jemo živali: take, ki se od nas razlikujejo, a prav tako organizme, ki so nam z več vidikov podobni in lahko v nas vzbujajo simpatijo ali celo ljubezen.

Zamenjajmo torej gledišče. Pomislimo na razliko med krožnikom dušenega zajca (z olivami) ter podobo mehkega in tresočega se zajčka v našem objemu. Pomislimo na jagenjčka, ki se stiska ob mami, v čredi, ter nato na njegovo odrto podobo, ki visi z glavo navzdol v mesnici.

Takšen način gledanja na reči, takšna sprememba perspektive, sloni na sprejetju točno določenih temeljnih načel. Po njih je predmet prehranjevalnega odnosa absolutiziran in ločen od svojega protipola v odnosu. Za *gurmana* vse služi povečevanju okusa. Podobno tudi tisti, kdor dejanje hranjenja postavlja v središče lastnega zadovoljevanja, smatra ves svet kot nekaj za okušanje. A sedaj se vpelje razlikovanje med tem, kar lahko jemo, in tem, česar ni dovoljeno jesti. Večine tako imenovanih »nečloveških živali« in tudi številnih drugih živih bitij ne moremo več smatrati kot hrane, niso več moka za naš kruh.

Takšen pristop ob nekritični uporabi pripelje do skrajnih posledic in se izkaže za fetišističen, saj tvega, da fetišizira določen del sveta. Točneje, gre za način mišljenja, ki izhaja iz presoje o absolutni vrednosti tega, kar druga bitja – na primer živali, ki se hranijo z drugimi živalmi – dojemajo kot užitno. Če sprejmemo tako misel, potem postanejo določena bitja – in s tem, kakor bomo videli, vsa živa bitja – nedotakljiva. Nedotakljiva so, ker jih dojemamo v njihovi avtonomiji in jih umeščamo v izključno njihov ekosistem. Ali drugače, ne vidimo več mesnega zrezka, temveč telička.

Miselnost vegetarijanskih in, v radikalnejši obliki, veganskih gibanj lahko umestimo v to perspektivo. Vemo, da se vegetarijanci vzdržijo uživanja mesa; vegani po drugi strani zavračajo uporabo vseh prehrabnih virov živalskega izvora kot virov preživetja in oblikujejo svoj življenjski slog tako, da se izogibajo kakršnikoli obliki izkoriščanja živali, ki se razlikujejo od človeka.<sup>19</sup>

Glede tega se želim takoj izjasniti, četudi tvegam, da bom še preveč jedrnat. Moja teza je naslednja: v svojem načinu dojemanja »objekta« (tega, kar lahko

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<sup>19</sup> Glej, za prvi primer: E. J. Mannucci, *La cena di Pitagora. Storia del vegetarianismo dall'antica Grecia a Internet*, Carocci, Roma 2008; za drugi primer: L. Caffo, *Vegan. Un manifesto filosofico*, Einaudi, Torino 2018.

zaužijejo) so vegetarijanci in vegani to, kar predstavljajo bulimiki in anoreksiki (čeprav z razlikami) s svojim načinom dojemanja subjekta in subjektovega odnosa do hrane. Vsi – vegetarijanci in vegani, bulimiki in anorkesiki – pozabljajo, da je hranjenje relacijska sposobnost ter da za dobro in pravilno prehranjevanje tega odnosa ne smemo vnaprej omejiti, temveč ga moramo razdelati v vsej njegovi kompleksnosti. Ponavljam: odprava enega pola izmed dveh vpletenih v odnosu le-tega še ne odpravi: niti ko eno stran speljemo k drugi (kakor stori, kdor golta, kdor pri tem uživa ali pa sploh ne jé), niti ko se na vse načine izogibamo, da bi nekaj dojemali kot užitno (kakor stori, kdor zagovarja njegovo nedotakljivost). Ne gre za to, temveč gre za to, da odnos dobro udejanjimo. Znova, vprašanje pred nami je vprašanje etične narave.

300 Tudi tu moramo biti že od samega začetka karseda jasni, še posebej danes, ko na področju prehranjevanja določena stališča in izbire vse bolj prevzemajo militantne in konfliktne oblike, in sicer ravno zaradi določenih navidezno etičnih razlogov.<sup>20</sup> Prav zato se bom poskusil čimbolj jasno izraziti tako glede tega, kar želim povedati v teh zadnjih izdihljajih poglavja, kakor tudi glede tega, kar nameravam širše argumentirati v tretjem poglavju. Hkrati prav tako pozivam bralca, naj ostaja potrpežljiv in pripravljen slediti mojemu razmišljanju vse do konca, brez nenadnih reakcij za teze – oziroma, bolj verjetno, proti tezam –, ki jih bom tu predstavil.

### *13. Ljudje in jastrebi*

Razmislimo. Človek je organizem, ki se hrani z drugimi organizmi. V resnici to počno številni drugi, tudi manj razviti organizmi, točneje, vsi heterotrofi – v nasprotju z avtotrofnimi organizmi, na primer algami, rastlinami, nekaterimi bakterijami, ki se prehranjujejo z neorganskimi molekulami – se prehranjujejo z organskimi zmesmi. Veliko organizmov se tako kot človek hrani z drugimi organizmi. V trenutku pretvorbe iz bitja v hrano so ti organizmi bolj ali manj še živi, na primer nekateri mehkužci ali nekatere užitne rastline, ali to več niso. V slednjem primeru, ko je organizem, sedaj hrana, mrtev, moramo pogledati, ali so že mrtvi ali jih je bilo treba ubiti. V obeh primerih, če je vir hrane že

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20 O tem glej klasično delo: H. S. Salt, *A Plea for Vegetarianism, and Other Essays*, Vegetarian Society Manchester 1886.

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mrtev ali ga je potrebno predtem ubiti, se pojavi vprašanje konzervacije, da bi ga lahko zaužili, preden se razgradi. Človek se namreč za razliko od jastreb ne prehranjuje z gnilimi organizmi.

Drži potemtakem to, kar že od Voltaira naprej nekateri trdijo: človek je predvsem trupla. V nasprotju z ravnokar rečenim se človek s tega vidika obnaša kot jastreb: kot ptice mrhovinarke se hrani z mrhovino drugih živali. A če dobro pogledamo, vidimo, da se v tem človek vede enako kot večina živih bitij. Z dodatkom, da se, tako kot številna druga bitja, posebej plenilci, človek navadno ne hrani z že mrtvimi živalmi, temveč je sam tisti, ki ubije, da si priskrbi trupla za hranjenje.

To so dejstva, ki jih ne smemo spregledati, še manj si o njih lagati. Prav zato pravilno ravnajo vegetarijanci in še bolj vegani, ko to poudarjajo, čeprav to počnejo samo za nekatere kategorije živih bitij. Tako se človeku izriše jasna alternativa: ali se hrani s trupli in njihovimi posmrtnimi ostanki – kar pogosto pomeni, da živo bitje ubije ali ga da ubiti, da bi ga nato pojedel – ali pa se odpove hrani, saj nismo avtofagni organizmi. Smo pred pravo neizpodbitno prehranjevalno dilemo, h kateri se bom še vrnil. Če se premestimo v manj radikalen scenarij, potem lahko bolj ali manj potihoma uvedemo vrsto razlikovanj, na podlagi katerih določimo ali izključimo bitja, ki jih je dovoljeno jesti. Vendar tudi v tem primeru ostaja nejasno, zakaj bi bilo zaužitje trave sredi polja boljše od hranjenja z omleto.

Stvar je nadvse kompleksna, še bolj, če gledamo iz perspektive odnosa človeka z drugimi živimi bitij in z okoljem, v katerem sam živi, oziroma če odmislimo sebe kot središče veselja in če odmislimo, da naj bi veselje imelo vrednost samo glede na to, kaj mi z njim storimo. Sprevržene posledice takšne ideje so namreč že dlje časa vsem na očeh. Tako stanje je privedlo do tega, da našo geološko epoho dojemamo kot antropocen in da kritično razmišljamo, kaj ti procesi pomenijo in kaj bodo pomenili za prihodnost človeštva.<sup>21</sup>

Če se želimo primerno spopasti s to kompleksnostjo, potem moramo najprej jasno odgovoriti na nekatera vprašanja. Gre za vprašanja, ki nam v opisanem scenariju omogočajo, da začrtamo meje in določimo, s katerimi živimi bitij

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21 Prim. na primer S. L. Lewis in M. A. Maslin, *The Human Planet: How We Created the Anthropocene*, Yale University Press, Yale 2018.

se lahko prehranjujemo in s katerimi se ne smemo, da bi našli način, kako jih legitimno uživati – jasno opredelimo, če in kako jih ubiti – ter v katerih oblikah in pod katerimi pogoji jih lahko spremenimo v hrano. Religije s svojimi prehranskimi predpisi in prepovedmi obravnavajo med drugim ravno te vidike. Vanje se bom poglobil v naslednjem poglavju.

Znotraj takega pristopa moramo najprej po hierarhiji razporediti živa bitja. To služi trojnemu namenu: da določimo meje, znotraj katerih lahko organizem dojemamo kot vir hrane, presodimo, ali lahko v ta namen organizem ubijemo, in opredelimo način, kako ga lahko ubijemo in kako ga lahko spremenimo v nekaj užitnega. Gre za tri vidike istega vprašanja.

Prvi vidik se sprašuje, kaj pomeni za organizem, da ga dojemamo kot živo bitje, in kdaj, če je tako razumljen, ga lahko uvrščamo med užitna. Užitno živo bitje je pravzaprav že solata. Za številne ljudi je užitno živo bitje prav tako ostriga. Ločnico v številnih primerih določamo na podlagi zavedanja. Točneje, ali se lahko organizem kakorkoli zaveda trpljenja, ali lahko občuti užitek oziroma bolečino in ali lahko človek to zavedanje prepozna.

302 Raziskovalci niso dosegli soglasja, kdaj lahko to trdimo, čeprav je v zadnjih desetletjih etologija nedvomno veliko prispevala k pripoznanju, da so vedénje, možganske in čustvene strukture pri nekaterih živalih zelo podobni človekovim. Kdor se opira na tovrstne argumente, obenem zatrjuje, da se ni dopustno hraniti s številnimi živalmi, tako kot ni dopustna njihova reja, da bi jih pretvorili (pogosto pod obupnimi pogoji) v hrano, saj živali, ali vsaj nekatere izmed njih, prav tako posedujejo neko »zavest« lastnega stanja in so sposobne začutiti bližajoči se konec.

Zgornje teze niso le plod ozaveščanja, da živali niso reči oziroma predmeti, funkcionalno podrejene ciljem, ki jih določa človek. Njihovo izhodišče je predvsem misel, ki je pridobila veliko naklonjenost med ljudmi in se je razširila v občo miselnost: človek je prav tako žival, rezultat evolucijskega procesa, ki ga je postopoma pripeljal do tega, kar je. Ni potemtakem nikakršnega specističnega preskoka, ni nikakršne posebne razlike med človekom in drugimi živalmi, ki se od njega (ali nje) razlikujejo. To potrjuje dejstvo, da človekovo sposobnost občutenja in zavedanja ugodja ali bolečine lahko opazimo tudi pri drugih živih bitjih. V tovrstni antispecistični perspektivi se človek umešča na isto raven šimpanza, prašiča ali petelina. Ker pa je za človeka nedopustno, da bi se hranil

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z drugim človekom, torej z nekom sebi enakim, potem se ne sme hraniti niti z drugimi živalmi.<sup>22</sup>

Drugi vidik se bolj podrobno nanaša na vprašanje uboja živali za prehranjevalne namene. V številnih primerih niti sklicevanje na potrebo po prehranjevanju ne upravičuje njihove usmrtitve. Če menimo, da ni dopustno ubiti čuteče živali ali celo nobenega živega bitja, potem je vegetarijanska oziroma, še radikalnejša, veganska možnost edina možna izbira.

Pristop, o katerem govorim, se veže na nenasilje kot osnovno postavko, utemeljeno na verskih ali filozofskih prepričanjih. O tem si lahko ogledate na primer teze, ki jih je v Italiji razvil Aldo Capitini v delu *Elementi di un'esperienza religiosa* (1937).<sup>23</sup> Vsekakor se pravo vprašanje nanaša na možnost razlikovanja med ravnmi. Potrebno je določiti, ali je izvajanje nasilja nekaj, čemur se moramo absolutno izogniti, in torej velja glede vseh živih bitij ali pa je mogoče opredeliti specifične okoliščine, v katerih se to izvajanje, ravno za prehranjevalne namene, izkaže za dopustno, upravičeno ali celo nujno. Tudi pri tem je razprava obširna in vse prej kot zaključena.

Tretji vidik vprašanja zadeva način, kako ubijati. V določenih kulturnih in verskih kontekstih lahko nekatere vrste živali ubijemo in pojemo. To je dopustno. Vendar takšen uboj mora slediti določenemu ritualu s posebnim načinom zakola in priprave tega, kar postane hrana. V judovskem prostoru, denimo, ni zgolj prepovedano hranjenje z določenimi živalmi (na primer

303

<sup>22</sup> Zelo splošno sem obnovil glavne argumente teoretikov pravic živali, ki sta jih nato nekoliko drugače naprej razvila Peter Singer (ki se v svojem projektu »živalske osvoboditve« poslužuje konsekvencialističnega modela) in Tom Regan (ki se v zagovoru »pravic živali« sklicuje na deontološki pristop). O tem glej: P. Singer, *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals*, Harper Collins, 1975, in T. Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*, University of California Press 1983. Podrobneje o njunih izhodiščnih postavkah bom govoril v tretjem poglavju. Celovitejšo predstavitev vprašanja pravic živali, tako kot Singerjevih in Reganovih tez, ponuja F. Allegri v svojem delu *Gli animali e l'etica*, Mimesis, Milano 2015. Za kritično obravnavo teh tez glej: J. B. Calicott, C. Korsgaard in C. Diamond, *Contro i diritti degli animali. Ambientalisti ma non animalisti*, ur. G. Rossi, Medusa, Milano 2012. Glej tudi, za splošnejši pregled: L. Battaglia, *Un'etica per il mondo vivente. Questioni di bioetica medica, ambientale, animale*, Carocci, Roma 2011

<sup>23</sup> Sedaj v: A. Capitini, *Scritti filosofici e religiosi*, ur. M. Martini, Protagon, Perugia 1994. Glej tudi antologijo istega avtorja: *Le ragioni della nonviolenza*, ur. M. Martini, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2016.

s tistimi, ki se plazijo in se nasploh tesno dotikajo tal), temveč mora tudi sam zakol živali, s katerimi se je dopustno hraniti, slediti predpisanemu postopku (*šekita* med drugim zadeva pravilno ravnanje s krvjo, ki je dojeta kot življenjsko počelo in zato kot nekaj, s čimer se je prepovedano hraniti). Podobni rituali zakola, utemeljeni tudi z izsledki iz *korana*, so zapovedani v muslimanskem kontekstu. Po tovrstnih postopkih ubita žival postane *košer* (v judovskem prostoru) ali *halal* (v muslimanskem). Njeno uživanje je dovoljeno, ker spoštuje značilnosti, ki sta jih določila razodetje in tradicija.

Sledenje tovrstnim praksam naj bi torej izganjalo nasilje uboja tega, s čimer se lahko hranimo. Praksa naj bi storilca nasilnega dejanja oprala sleherne krivde in hkrati upravičevala možnost uživanja živali. Usmrtitev živali potemtakem ni razumljena kot umor, četudi upravičen, temveč kot žrtvovanje. To je sprememba gledišča, ki ga vpelje religija.

304 Žrtvovanje je ena izmed oblik, kako človek stopa v odnos s sfero božjega. Iz te perspektive postanejo sam odnos do živali, odnos do hrane in prehranjevanje kot tako – kolikor so dejanja urejena in pravila spoštovana – nekako blagoslovljeni. Odprto ostaja, kaj se zgodi s tovrstnim razumevanjem v trenutku, ko se kultura, vsaj kar se tiče zahodnih verskih tradicij, odpove logiki žrtvovanja in izbere vse bolj sekularizirano pot.<sup>24</sup>

#### 14. Nasilje uživanja hrane

Temeljno vprašanje je vsekakor vezano na dejanje uživanja hrane, saj je notranje samemu dejanju. Gre za dejanje, ki je tako nujno kot nasilno. Gre za način dojemanja in udejanjanja odnosa z drugostjo – z drugim, drugačnim od mene in vendar ne tako drugačnim, da ne bi bil užiten, torej združljiv z mojim organizmom. Gre torej za dejanje prilastitve.

Besede so tu pomembne. Ne gre za preprosto dejanje »asimilacije«. Drugo, da bi bilo hrana, mora biti združljivo z mano, a ne tudi nujno meni

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24 Tema žrtvovanja je v središču razmišljanj Renéja Girarda, od njegovega dela *La violence et le sacré*, Editions Bernard Grasset, 1972, naprej. Girardovo razmišljanje sem že omenil pri temi anoreksije. O razvoju in iztrošenju logike žrtvovanja v kontekstu Zahoda glej: G. G. Strumsa, *La fin du sacrifice. Mutations religieuses de l'antiquité tardive*, Odile Jacob, Pariz 2005.

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podobno. Kvečjemu mora postati podobno skoz proces prebave.

Niti ne gre vedno za pripajanje. Drugega lahko posrkamo, si ga vbrizgamo, ga vnašamo na različne načine v svoj življenjski cikel. Ni vedno nujno ugrizniti ali prežvečiti, da bi drugega prirojili svojim ustom in želodcu. Drugi lahko postane moj tudi, ko je še cel, preprosto ga pogoltnem, požrem v enem kosu. Bistvo je vedno isto: s hranjenjem drugi postane natanko *moj*. Samo *moj*. Tako kakor se zgodi v nekaterih, ne vedno uravnovešenih ljubezenskih izkušnjah.

Tu se skriva nasilje. Judovski filozof Emmanuel Levinas je to jasno pokazal (čeprav ni želel uvideti izvirnosti takšne misli). Med hranjenjem se odvija proces prilaščanja. V prilaščanju drugi izgubi svoj značaj drugega. Odvzeto mu je to, kar je. Postane samo funkcionalno podrejen zadovoljevanju mojih potreb.<sup>25</sup>

Prehranjevanje torej nikakor ni gostoljubje. Ne more biti. Medtem ko jemo, lahko seveda zbolimo, ker gostimo bakterije, ki so prisotne v hrani. Vendar je to stranski učinek. Hranjenje je nasprotno ravno dovršitev tistega procesa, po katerem nekaj drugega postane notranje, intimno: hrana, kolikor je nujna za moje preživetje, postane na koncu prebavnega procesa *interior intimo meo* (tisto globlje kot moja najgloblja notranjost, če si zunaj konteksta sposodimo besede Avguščina iz Hipona).<sup>26</sup>

305

Tu se razkrije pravi problem. Mi nismo gostoljubna bitja. Da bi preživel, moramo biti, simbolično ali dejansko, nasilni. Drugače ne moremo, ker gre za naša življenja. Lahko se poskušamo obvladovati in zmanjšamo porabo. Lahko prevzamemo odgovornost glede neizbežnega, a pred tem si ne moremo zakrivati oči. Tako kot ne moremo iskati opravičil, upravičevati ali zmanjševati dometa tistega nasilja, ki nas vsekakor ohranja.

Etika je poklicana, da se s tem sooči. Vendar je to predtem storila religija, o čemer sem ravnokar pisal. Da bi bolje razumeli, o čem govorimo, se zato spleča obrniti k verski sferi in poglobiti odnos med sakralnim in hrano, ki se je znotraj nje vzpostavil.

Prevedel Jurij Verč

25 Glej drugi razdelek (*»Intériorité et Économie«*) dela E. Levinasa, *Totalité et infini*. Essai sur l'extériorité, La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff 1961.

26 *Izpovedi*, III, 6, 11.



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# MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

The journal *Phainomena* welcomes all submissions of articles and book reviews in the field of phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophy, as well as from related disciplines of the humanities. Manuscripts submitted for the publication in the journal should be addressed to the editorial office, the secretary of the editorial board, or the editor-in-chief.

The journal is published quarterly, usually in two issues. The tentative deadlines for the submission of manuscripts are: March 31, for the June issue; August 31, for the November issue.

The submitted manuscript should preferably be an original paper and should not be concurrently presented for publication consideration elsewhere, until the author receives notification with the editorial decision regarding acceptance, required (minor or major) revision(s), or rejection of the manuscript after the concluded reviewing procedure. After submission, the contributions are initially evaluated by the editorial office and may be immediately rejected if they are considered to be out of the journal's scope or otherwise unfit for consideration. The ensuing process of scientific review, which can—provided that no additional delays occur—take up to 3 months, includes an editorial opinion and a double-blind peer review by at least two external reviewers. The articles that do not report original research (e.g.: editorials or book reviews) are not externally reviewed and are subject to the autonomous decision of the editor-in-chief or the editorial board regarding publication. When republishing the paper in another journal, the author is required to indicate the first publication in the journal *Phainomena*.

The journal publishes original papers predominantly in Slovenian, English, French, and German language, as well as translations from foreign languages into Slovenian. Authors interested in the publication of their work in another language should consult the editors regarding such a possibility prior to the submission of the manuscript. Before publication, the texts are proofread with regard to guidelines and formatting, but the authors are responsible for the quality of language.

The manuscripts submitted in the MS Word compatible format should not exceed 8,000 words (ca. 50,000 characters with spaces) including footnotes. The submission should include a separate title page with the author's full name, academic qualification, institutional affiliation(s), and (email) address(es), bibliography of referenced works at the end of the main body of text, and an abstract of the article (accompanied by up to 5 keywords) in the language of the original as well as in English translation (100–150 words).

308 The contributions should be formatted as follows: Times New Roman font style; 12 pt. font size; 1.5 pt. spacing (footnotes—in 10 pt. font size—should, however, be single spaced); 0 pt. spacing before and after paragraphs; 2.5 cm margins; left justified margins throughout the text. Instead of line breaks please use internal paragraph indentations (1.25 cm) to introduce new paragraphs. Do not apply word division and avoid any special or exceptional text formatting (e.g.: various fonts, framing, pagination, etc.). Footnotes and tables should be embedded using designated MS Word functionalities. Do not use endnotes. Notes should be indicated by consecutive superscript numbers placed in the text immediately after the punctuation mark or the preceding word.

The author should use **boldface** for the title, subtitle, and chapter titles of the manuscript, and *italics* for emphasis and interpolations of foreign words or phrases, as well as for the titles of cited books and journals. Double quotation marks—in the specific typographical format of the text's original language—should be used for the citation of articles published in journals and collective volumes, as well as for the quotations enclosed in the contribution. Single quotation marks should be used only to denote material placed in double quotation marks within the citation. Any block quotation of 40 or more words should be denoted with additional 1.25 cm margin on the left and separated from the main text by a line space above and below the paragraph (without

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quotation marks, 10 pt. font size). Omissions, adaptations, or insertions within citations should be indicated with square brackets.

As a general rule, please use the (shorter) lengthened hyphen (the en-dash) to denote a range of numbers (e.g.: 99–115) or a span of time (e.g.: 1920–1970). The (longer) lengthened hyphen (the em-dash) can be used (only) in the English language to indicate an interruption in thought or an interpolated sentence (e.g.: “[...] thus—for instance—Aristotle says [...]”). The standard hyphens (-) can be (in the English language) used for compound nouns, adjectival phrases, or between repeated vowels.

The author of the paper is required to adhere to the author-date source citation system according to the rules of *The Chicago Manual of Style*. Within the in-text parenthetical reference the date of publication immediately follows the quoted author’s name, the indicated page number is separated by a comma, e.g.: (Toulmin 1992, 31); (Held 1989, 23); (Waldenfels 2015, 13). The bibliography list at the end of the text should include all referenced sources in alphabetical order of the authors’ surnames, as in the following example:

309

Held, Klaus. 1989. “Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit.” In *Phänomenologie im Widerstreit*, edited by Otto Pöggeler, 13–39. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Toulmin, Stephen. 1992. *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 2015. “Homo respondens.” *Phainomena* 24 (92-93): 5–17.

Only exceptionally other reference styles can be accepted upon previous agreement with the editor-in-chief or the guest editor of the issue.

The authors are expected to submit a consistent manuscript free of typographical, grammatical, or factual errors. The author bears the responsibility for the content of the contribution submitted for publication consideration within the journal *Phainomena*.

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## NAVODILA ZA PRIPRAVO ROKOPISA

Revija *Phainomena* sprejema prispevke in recenzije s področja fenomenološke ter hermenevtične filozofije in tudi sorodnih disciplin humanistike. Za objavo predlagane rokopise naj avtorji naslovijo neposredno na uredništvo, tajnika uredniškega odbora ali glavno urednico revije.

Revija izhaja štirikrat letno, navadno v dveh zvezkih. Okvirna roka za oddajo prispevkov sta: za junijsko številko 31. marec, za novembrsko številko 31. avgust.

Predloženi rokopis naj bo (prvenstveno) izvirni znanstveni članek, ki ne sme biti predhodno objavljen ali ponujen v objavo pri drugi reviji, dokler po zaključenem recenzijskem postopku avtor ne prejme obvestila z uredniško odločitvijo glede odobritve, zahtevanih (manjših ali večjih) sprememb ali zavrnitve objave rokopisa. Prispevek po oddaji najprej pregleda uredništvo in lahko takoj zavrne njegovo objavo, če ne ustreza programski usmeritvi revije ali na kakšen drugačen način ni primeren za obravnavo. Nadaljnji postopek znanstvene recenzije, ki lahko, če ne pride do dodatne nepredvidene zamude, traja 3 mesece, vključuje uredniško mnenje in »dvojno slepo« strokovno oceno najmanj dveh neodvisnih recenzentov. O objavi rokopisov, ki ne temeljijo na izvirnem znanstvenem raziskovanju in zato niso podvrženi zunanji recenzentski obravnavi (npr. uvodniki ali knjižne ocene), avtonomno odloča glavni urednik ali uredništvo. Ob ponovni priobčitvi članka v drugi reviji mora avtor navesti prvo objavo v okviru revije *Phainomena*.

Revija objavlja izvirne znanstvene avtorske članke zlasti v slovenskem, angleškem, francoskem in nemškem jeziku ter prevode iz tujih jezikov v

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slovenski jezik. Avtorji, ki bi svoje delo morebiti želeli objaviti v drugem jeziku, naj se o tem pred oddajo rokopisa posvetujejo z uredništvom. Pred objavo uredništvo besedila sicer lektorsko in korekturno pregleda, vendar je avtor sam odgovoren za kakovost in neoporečnost uporabljenega jezika.

Rokopise je potrebno predložiti v računalniškem formatu, združljivem s programom MS Word. Besedila naj, upoštevajoč opombe, ne presegajo 8000 besed (ca. 50000 znakov s presledki). Oddana datoteka mora biti opremljena s posebno naslovno stranjo z avtorjevim polnim imenom, akademskim nazivom, ustanovo zaposlitve ali delovanja in naslovom (elektronske pošte), bibliografijo navedenih del na koncu osrednjega dela besedila in povzetkom prispevka (s 5 ključnimi besedami) v jeziku izvirnika in v angleškem prevodu (100–150 besed).

312 Besedila je potrebno oblikovati takole: pisava Times New Roman; velikost 12 pik; razmik med vrsticami 1,5 pik (opombe – velikosti 10 pik – z enojnim razmikom); 0 pik razmika pred in za odstavkom; robovi 2,5 cm; leva poravnava celotnega teksta. Med odstavkoma naj ne bo prazne vrstice, temveč naj bo naslednji odstavek naznačen z zamikom vrstice v desno (za 1,25 cm). Avtorji naj pri pisanju ne uporabljajo deljenja besed in naj se izogibajo posebnemu ali nenavadnemu oblikovanju (npr. rabi različnih pisav, okvirjanja, številčenja ipd.). Opombe in tabele je potrebno v besedilo vnesti s pomočjo ustreznih urejevalnih orodij programa MS Word. Uporabljane naj bodo izključno sprotne opombe, ki naj bodo označene z zapovrstno oštevilčenim nadpisanim indeksom in levostično postavljene takoj za ločilom ali besedo.

Naslov, podnaslov in poglavja rokopisa je potrebno pisati **krepko**, medtem ko se za poudarke in vstavke tujih izrazov ali fraz ter za naslove navedenih knjig in revij uporabljajo *ležeče črke*. Z dvojnimi narekovaji – v tipografski obliki, značilni za izvirni jezik besedila – se označuje naslove člankov, objavljenih znotraj revij ali zbornikov, in dobesedne navedke. Enojni narekovaj naznanja gradivo, znotraj navedka označeno z dvojnimi narekovaji. Daljši navedek (40 ali več besed) je potrebno izločiti v samostojen odstavek z dodatnim desnim zamikom (za 1,25 cm) in s prazno vrstico nad in pod njim (brez narekovajev, velikost pisave 10 pik). Izpuste iz navedkov, njihove prilagoditve ali vrivke vanje označujejo oglati oklepaji.

Obojestransko stični pomišljaj se praviloma uporablja za nakazovanje številskega obsega (npr. 99–115) ali časovnega obdobja (npr. 1920–1970),

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medtem ko obojestransko nestični pomišljaj naznanja prekinitev miselnega toka ali vrinjeni stavek (npr.: »[...] tako – denimo – Aristotel pravi [...]«). Podaljšani obojestransko stični pomišljaj (—) je značilen (predvsem) za angleški jezik. Stični vezaj (-) se lahko, v skladu z ustaljeno rabo, zapisuje med sestavnimi deli zloženek, pri kraticah ipd.

Avtor prispevka naj pri sklicevanju na vire in literaturo upošteva znotrajbesedilni način navajanja v skladu s pravili Čikaškega stilističnega priročnika (*The Chicago Manual of Style*). Kazalka v okroglem oklepaju neposredno za navedkom prinaša priimek avtorja in letnico objave, ki jima sledi z vejico razločeno napotilo na stran znotraj citiranega dela, npr.: (Toulmin 1992, 31); (Held 1989, 23); (Waldenfels 2015, 13). Bibliografski seznam na koncu besedila naj vsebuje vse navedene enote, urejene po abecednem vrstnem redu priimkov avtorjev, kakor je razvidno iz spodnjega primera:

Held, Klaus. 1989. »Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit.« V *Phänomenologie im Widerstreit*, uredil Otto Pöggeler, 13–39. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

313

Toulmin, Stephen. 1992. *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Waldenfels, Bernhard. 2015. »Homo respondens.« *Phainomena* 24 (92-93): 5–17.

Samo izjemoma je mogoče, po vnaprejšnjem dogovoru z glavnim ali gostujočim urednikom revije, uporabiti drugačne načine navajanja.

Pričakuje se, da bodo avtorji predložili dosledno in skrbno pripravljen rokopis brez tiskarskih, slovničnih in stvarnih napak. Avtor nosi odgovornost za vsebino besedila, predanega v obravnavo za objavo pri reviji *Phainomena*.



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# *phainomena*

REVIJA ZA FENOMENOLOGIJO IN HERMENEVTIKO  
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Objavljene številke | Previous Issues

- 1 Svet življenja
  - 2-3 O resnici
  - 4 Franz Brentano in začetki fenomenologije
  - 5-6 Intencionalnost in jezik
  - 7-8 Nietzsche
  - 9-10 Fenomenologija in teologija
  - 11-12 Platon
  - 13-14 Heidegger
  - 15-16 Aristotel
  - 17-18 Descartes
  - 19-20 Subjekt in eksistenca
  - 21-22 Krog razumevanja
  - 23-24 Okrožja smisla
  - 25-26 Etika-poetika
  - 27-28 Tradicija in prestop
  - 29-30 Metapolitika
  - 31-32 Nihilizem
  - 33-34 Fenomeni in pomeni
  - 35-36 Izvornosti
  - 37-38 Horizonti in perspektive
  - 39-40 Risbe, razrisi
  - 41-42 Bivanje v interpretaciji
  - 43-44 Začetki
  - 45-46 Evropsko sporazumevanje – filozofsko razumevanje
  - 47-48 Signature
  - 49-50 Kulturnost – slikovnost – pojmovnost
  - 51-52 Filozofska narečja
  - 53-54 Hermenevtika in humanistika I
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
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57-58	Globalizacija: svetovni etos in svetovni mir
59	Humanism in Culture
60-61	Europe, World and Humanity in the 21st Century
62-63	Evropa, svet in humanost v 21. stoletju
64-65	Dedukcije
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68-69	The Faces of Europe
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72-73	Analogije
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82-83	Selected Essays in Contemporary Italian Philosophy
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88-89	Virtualities
90-91	Notice
92-93	Open forms
94-95	Respondenca
96-97	Naznake
98-99	The Horizons of Embodiment
100-101	
102-103	One Hundred per Cent
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112-113	Eo ipso
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
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


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
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