

Intersubjective Anticipation: Accountability, Anticipation, and Conversation as a Zero-Sum Game or, the (Real) Pleasures of a Pluralistic Society¹

Carmen Dell'Aversano

Università di Pisa

Orcid: 0000-0002-9912-5924

carmen.dellaversano@unipi.it

Abstract The purpose of this paper is fourfold. The first is theoretical: to show how the Commonality and Sociality corollaries can be connected in a new theoretical construct, “intersubjective anticipation”. The second is to explore the applicability of this new construct, and to demonstrate its usefulness, by focusing on the analysis of a single factor in its functioning. The third is to address a major theoretical issue within PCP, that of how the defining act of the Kellian subject, anticipation, is actually performed. The fourth is to show how these theoretical musings are relevant to some of the most urgent issues in present-day multicultural societies. These aims are pursued through a systematic demonstration of the workings of a theoretical construct by US sociologist Harvey Sacks, “accountable/not accountable.”

Keywords: Intersubjectivity, anticipation, accountability device, Harvey Sacks, PCP corollaries

1. Two introductions

1.1 A methodological introduction

During the Open Space Technology of the XIII EPCA Conference in July 2016 I proposed a group discussion on the submerged poles of Kellyan theory. In the two years between the conference and the writing of this paper my PCP-related research has concentrated on the connections between the Commonality and Sociality corollaries. In their admirably abstract formulations, the Corollaries manage not raise the issues of how the constructions of experience employed by different persons can come to be similar (a fact that, given the unconditional validity, and therefore the superordinate logical status, of the Individuality corollary,² is definitely in need of an explanation in a PCT framework), or of the probably very different effects of constructions of other persons' experiences which are systematically validated, as opposed to those which require the continuous, pervasive and unflinching exercise of hostility to be salvaged from the scrap heap. In addition, to my knowledge, for all the recent attention (both in PCP and outside it) to the fascinating issue of intersubjectivity, there has been no systematic attempt to explore the connection between the two corollaries: there are situations where people do not simply “construe the construction processes of” others (as the Sociality corollary states), but they do so on the basis of a “similar construction of experience”, that is, because of commonality. Not only that, but they are fully and continuously aware of that similarity in construction, and of the fact that others are aware of it too. The importance of such situations, which could be called “intersubjective

¹ To Giulia Bigongiari and Michael Diozzi Mascolo, for two exquisite intellectual pleasures: feeling new ideas take shape in my mind in our “Seminario autogestito di studi queer”, and arguing with him.

² Both the Commonality and the Sociality corollaries begin with “To the extent that”; one does not need Kelly's formal training in mathematics to realize that that “extent” can be zero. In the Individuality corollary, on the other hand, the statement that “persons differ from each other in their construction of events” is presented as an absolute, and is therefore not subject to conditions or limitations.

anticipation” because both of their statistical prevalence, and of their relevance in social life and in interpersonal relations, is far from negligible. This makes them, in my opinion, deserving of enquiry.

This paper is an attempt to get started on that enquiry by focusing on a single, well-defined and well-delimited factor in intersubjective anticipation. As such, I hope that it might contribute to the discussion of another fundamental concept of PCP. Both Kelly’s writings and subsequent elaborations of PCP have been movingly eloquent on the importance of anticipation, but strikingly silent on the question of *how* people anticipate. (This is quite a typical oversight among founders of cosmogonically brilliant, monumentally influential psychological theories and their followers: Freud stated that people repress, and made repression a core construct of psychoanalysis, but we had to wait for Billig (1999) to have any idea of *how* they do it. Spoiler alert: conversational devices turn out to play a major role in both of these impressive feats of “individual” psychology.)

I hope that these considerations will be enough to convince theorists of PCP, PCP therapists, and (from what I can anticipate about my readership) no-card-carrying, no-fee-paying members of the George Kelly Society to engage with a paper which for the most part does not mention PCP or Kelly, but which was conceived and written with the aim of elucidating core constructs of PCP, and of showing how apparently unrelated theories can help us become aware of theoretical gaps in the PCP monolith, and get us started in the work of filling them.

1.2 An anecdotal introduction

The Facebook feed of any vegan who foolishly neglects to enact a “no omnivores” policy for the selection of her contacts is an ideal place to observe a curious rhetorical phenomenon. People do not simply post would-be enticing pictures of the meat dishes they are going to consume (as they would for a bean soup or a salad) but, in an astonishingly high number of cases, see it fit to add the comment, the hashtag, or even the caption, “Take that, vegans!”⁴

The reason why I choose to focus on this apparently mundane phenomenon is that I believe its analysis can offer vital insights into the real impact of multiculturalism on the lives of a sizable proportion of the people who find themselves living in multicultural societies nowadays. These insights into the actual lived experience of multiculturalism (which I think can be shown to be quite different from what the soothing bromides of progressive pluralism would have us believe) can, in their turn, help us understand a number of political, ethical and practical positions that most progressive pluralists (like myself and, I assume, most readers of this paper) find deeply problematic, unsettling and distressing.

As is evident from their routinely sharing pictures of their meat dishes with hundreds or thousand of contacts, these people are perfectly comfortable with consuming meat. Just as evidently, they know about veganism, and have probably met vegans, otherwise they would not be able to conceive of vegans as the addressees of their taunts.

It is worth noting that these encounters with difference have somehow failed to lead to the broadening of minds and horizons, soul-searching, honest in-depth self-questioning, and ultimately reconstruction (cue appropriate music) which is assumed to be their normal effect in the progressive paradigm of illuminated optimism. Instead, they lead to polarization,

⁴ Of course, since I believe it is safe to assume that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, it is not vegans’ corpses that are being consumed, the ones “taking that” are not vegans but animals. This systematic oversight stands in rather stark contradiction with the fact that the great majority of the posters very likely assume that what gives them the right to kill other animals because they like the way their corpses taste is their own superior rationality; this points to a potentially enlightening further level of analysis, but one I shall not pursue in the rest of this paper.

hostility (in both the Kellian and the non-Kellian sense) and, not infrequently, violence.⁵ In this respect the experience of omnivores confronted with veganism shows interesting analogies to that of a huge number of people who have always unthinkingly assumed that their way of life was the “normal”, the “natural”, the “only” way humans could live, only to have that reassuring core construct challenged by someone who upholds entirely different values, and who accordingly lives in an entirely different way; that is, to the experience of many of the people who, without having bargained for it, find themselves living in a multicultural society today.

I believe that some crucial aspects of this experience can be explained through use of a theoretical construct elaborated by American sociologist Harvey Sacks in the early Sixties, and that this explanation can have potentially momentous repercussions on the way multiculturalism is conceptualized, and its consequences anticipated. The construct is “accountable/not accountable”.

2. Accountability

Sacks introduces the concept of “accountable action” in the very first of his *Lectures on Conversation*:

what one does with “Why?” is to propose about some action that it is an “accountable action”. That is to say, “Why?” is a way of asking for an account. Accounts are most extraordinary. And the use of accounts and the use of requests for accounts are very highly regulated phenomena (Sacks, 1992, I, p. 4).

Among the social rules regulating “accounts”, the first is that not all activities can be considered “accountable”:

A: Hope you have a good time.

B: Why?

The “Why?” here is quite apparently a paranoid return, and the whole conversation from which this comes makes it quite clear that the person who produces it is paranoid.

(Sacks, 1992, I, p. 19)

As is evident from Sacks’s example, the social sanctions for mixing up “accountable” and “non-accountable” activities can be severe: treating a “non-accountable” activity as “accountable” entails the risk of a (more or less official) psychiatric diagnosis; a more benign case are the far from friendly reactions described by Garfinkel in his reports about “breaching

⁵ Vegans are routinely ridiculed and bullied, with occasionally devastating consequences, as in the recent case of a British schoolboy who killed himself (<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/louie-fenton-schoolboy-found-hanged-vegan-bullies-threw-meat-hertfordshire-inquest-a7973261.html>); vegan restaurants are sometimes the targets of terrorist attacks, which are almost never reported by the mainstream media (news about a gunman hitting a vegan restaurant in Padua on January, 21, 2018 only appeared on animal-rights websites like this one <http://www.centopercentoanimalisti.mobi/sparano-con-il-fucile-da-caccia-al-ristorante-vegano-a-padova/>). People whose livelihoods and social status depend on killing animals often attack vegans publicly in ways that would be considered unacceptable for any other group; one famously vocal example was chef Antony Bourdain, who stated, among other things, that “[v]egans are disgusting and loathsome. I’m often asked why vegans are the enemy of everything good and decent and must be hunted down and destroyed so their genes don’t pass onto future generations. It’s because if you can’t enjoy even a nice, stinky, runny, ripe cheese like this you may as well kill yourself now.” (<http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/06/the-death-of-chef-vegan-views-and.html>). A quick Web search with the keyword “vegephobia” will turn up a wealth of other depressing examples.

experiments”⁶.

The ethical, social and political consequences of this rule cannot be overstated. As a consequence of its automatic, ubiquitous, and almost imperceptible functioning, it becomes almost impossible to articulate doubts about socially prevalent practices and values; this gives it the power, which proves overwhelmingly effective, to nip in the bud any attempt to question the status quo, and therefore to make the emergence of a critical consciousness, the expression of dissent, the practice of activism, and the achievement of progress extremely difficult. In the overwhelming majority of social situations, questions like “Why must children have two parents of different sexes?”, “Why can’t children have more than two parents?”, “Why is a person who for years has been a resident of a country where she regularly pays taxes not a citizen of that country?” or, for that matter, “Why do you consume animal products?” are not considered worthy of being answered by a rational argument commensurate with the very considerable ethical and political import of the issues they raise. Instead, they are dismissed by a number of gimmicks that could never be employed to deal with a request for an account that is socially perceived as legitimate: ridiculing the person who asked the question, hinting at dubious motives for her interest in the issue, declaring that one’s position is not only self-evidently right but that, because it is the “normal” and “natural” one, there are no alternatives to it, treating the request for an account as a provocation, or simply ignoring it.

Just as relevant to the pragmatics of the concept of “accountable action” are two of Sacks’s remarks in other parts of the *Lectures*.

Variations from ‘normal’ are noticeable phenomena. [...] And if the product of some monitoring comes up with one of the variant states, that provides that that state is noticeable, and provides, then, an occasion for an account of that variant state. That is, it provides for an inquiry being launched as to how come it’s that. (Sacks, 1992, I, p. 58)

This means that “accountability” is a social property of states that are perceived as “variations from ‘normal’”. This is the second rule regulating accounts: for example, I hope I am not the only one who has noticed that, even though theories about the aetiology of homosexuality proliferate, no theory about the aetiology of heterosexuality has ever been proposed.⁷

Moreover, “accounts” are always potentially controversial:

⁶ Harold Garfinkel, the creator of ethnomethodology (a branch of sociology that studies the methods used by members of a culture to make sense of reality, particularly by explaining their own and other people’s actions) had a considerable influence on Sacks; when the two first met Sacks was working with Erving Goffman towards a PhD degree in sociology, while Garfinkel was a professor of sociology at UCLA. One of the most original methods envisioned by Garfinkel to study social norms are the so-called “breaching experiments”, where in an everyday social situation someone deliberately and systematically breaks one of the most basic rules that should govern the interaction. If anyone should be interested in spicing up their social life, they will glean useful suggestions from the second chapter of Garfinkel 1967, “Studies of the routine grounds of everyday activities”. Some years later, on the other side of the US, Stanley Milgram was asking his students to perform a kind of breaching experiment he had apparently come up with independently:
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/excuse-me-can-i-have-your-seat-please-547159.html>

⁷ Actually, this observation has been made before (Epting, Raskin, Burke 1994); that the ones making it were fellow Kellians is probably a sign of the fact that what to us looks like common sense is not going to enter the mainstream anytime soon.

the task of the person who is offered the account can then be to, in some way, counter it.
(Sacks, 1992, I, p. 5)

The adequacy of any account is assessed by the person who requested it, who has the right to question or reject as they see fit. This is the third rule regulating accounts: as a consequence of it, labeling something as “accountable” implicitly, and almost necessarily, means putting the person who is called upon to deliver the “account” in a position of inferiority, since to deliver an account means to find oneself at the mercy of the listener, who is free to accept, question or reject the account. In practice, one of the relational effects of the use of the accountability device is to transform the identities of the participants in a conversational exchange into those of judge and defendant; the psychological and social impact of this can be severe.

Just how severe can be inferred from an example that Sacks talks about at some length:

The fact that you could use questions – like “Why?” – to generate accounts, and then use accounts to control activities, can be marked down as, I think, one of the greatest discoveries in Western civilization. It may well be that that is what Socrates discovered. With his dialectic he found a set of procedures by which this thing, which was not used systematically, could become a systematic device. Socrates will constantly ask “Why?,” there will be an answer, and he'll go on to show that that can't be the answer. And that persons were terribly pained to go through this whole business is clear enough from the *Dialogues*. And it's also clear in our own experiences. (Sacks, 1992, I, p. 118)

The actual (and momentous) import of what Socrates was actually up to is explained in the most memorable way by Nietzsche:

in his critical pilgrimage through Athens, and calling on the greatest statesmen, orators, poets, and artists, he [Socrates] discovered everywhere the conceit of knowledge. He perceived, to his astonishment, that all these celebrities were without a proper and accurate insight, even with regard to their own callings, and practised them only by instinct. “Only by instinct”: with this phrase we touch upon the heart and core of the Socratic tendency. Socratism condemns therewith existing art as well as existing ethics; wherever Socratism turns its searching eyes it beholds the lack of insight and the power of illusion; and from this lack infers the inner perversity and objectionableness of existing conditions. From this point onwards, Socrates believed that he was called upon to correct existence[.] (Nietzsche, 1910 [1872], p. 104)

Of course, the people in Athens eventually got fed up with Socrates’s utter disregard of the distinction between accountable and not accountable opinions, attitudes and behaviors, and with his reflex of invariably countering the accounts that he was given – and sentenced him to death.

In comparison with Socrates’s times, we have made some progress: in our culture all forms of specialist knowledge regard, at least in principle, *all* states of the world, and *all* opinions and actions, as accountable: medicine is interested in accounting both for the way digestion normally works (physiology), and for the ways digestion may go wrong (pathology), and a doctor who showed herself unable to account for the way she came up with a diagnosis, or for the reasons she recommends a therapy, would soon find herself without patients. This is a remarkable progress, but a strictly localized one: in interpersonal relationships, in social situations, in political life, the situation is still exactly the same as in Socrates’s times, with a sharp and unequivocal divide between accountable and not accountable states of the world; and in all contexts in which specialist knowledge intersects social values strongly ambivalent situations arise: for instance, the great majority of US

pediatricians believe that it is essential to cut off a part of a male newborn's penis, while pediatricians in the rest of the world think that submitting a completely asymptomatic newborn to a surgical procedure is an unjustifiable professional practice.

Taken together, the properties of accounts I have been outlining explain the fundamental role that accountability as a device plays in the social control of deviance. What happens is that any observable deviation from the normal can potentially trigger the following process:

- 1) the "deviant" is asked for an account;
- 2) she is socially obliged to provide one;
- 3) her account is countered;
- 4-∞) wash, rinse, repeat.

3. Accountability in conversation: the phatic-epideictic dimension of discourse

The workings and effects of accountability are a focal case of intersubjective anticipation. Both the person asking for the account and the person being asked to provide it can correctly anticipate the unfolding of this process in the most minute, and (for the "deviant") most unpleasant, detail. And the reason why they can is not only that both grew up in a society where this device is ubiquitously and publicly employed, but that the social locus of the accountability device is one in which all members of a culture are socialized from shortly after birth: informal conversational exchange.⁸

For a long time, the kind of idle, apparently unfocused conversation that forms the backbone of informal social exchange has been conceptualized according to Malinowski's theory of phatic communion, "a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words" (Malinowski, 1923, p. 315), one of the key points of which was that in phatic communion the *content* of the words being exchanged was irrelevant:

Let us look at it [Phatic Communion] from the special point of view with which we are here concerned; let us ask what light it throws on the function or nature of language. Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not! They fulfill a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener. Once again we may say that language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought. (Malinowski, 1923, p. 315)

Quite recently, a revision of Malinowski's theory has been proposed by Italian literary theorist Alessandro Grilli (2018). Grilli maintains that

phatic communion is the locus where socially shared knowledge about the world is ritually rehearsed and socially transmitted. This is why I have chosen to replace Malinowski's concept of "phatic communion" with that of a "phatic-epideictic dimension" of discourse. In Western rhetorical tradition "epideictic" designates a kind of speech which is aimed not at persuading the audience but at rehearsing already shared beliefs. However, such a rehearsing is only apparently neutral, since it shapes the socially shared sense of reality; therefore what may appear as idle and benign, actually conceals a powerful repressive thrust against any and all deviations from the norm, as is apparent, for instance, in the social function of gossip. (Grilli, 2018, p. 114)

⁸ Which can therefore be assumed to be a promising place to start investigating specimens, structures, and principles of intersubjective anticipation. Sacks's main claim to fame is, of course, as the inventor of Conversation Analysis: his methods and insights could, I feel, make a momentous contribution to this investigation.

Far from being irrelevant, the mundane content of phatic-epideictic communion, *because of its very mundanity*, constitutes, rehearses and upholds the normal, and constantly and pervasively polices deviance: this happens in the first place through the participants' continuous rehearsing of their alignment with, and loyalty to, normality in a huge number and range of everyday situations. The contents of phatic-epideictic communion are ubiquitous and, because of their very ordinariness, their ideological dimension is neither questioned nor perceived: for instance, when we watch a commercial, we are aware that its purpose is to persuade us to purchase the product it advertises, and therefore we can be vigilant and critical about this; but it is quite possible for us to be completely oblivious to another dimension of its content, which is at least as significant. The characters, situations, and settings present as "normal", as "natural" even, a number of *other* ideas about which it would be appropriate to be equally alert and critical: for instance, that a family is made up by a mother, a father and their children, all of the same race, all not disabled, who look a certain way and are a certain age; that their roles and patterns of interaction follow a number of well-defined and immediately recognizable scripts; that people live according to specific ethical and consumption standards, and so on. The real product advertised by commercials – as by all forms of communication, from the pub chat to the newspaper editorial, from the news to the reality show... – is not a single product, which we could choose not to consume, but a *form of life*, which is presented as *natural* and therefore, because of the absence of conceivable and practicable alternatives, as *compulsory*. The myriad aspects that concur in its composition – tastes, aspirations, behaviours, beliefs, desires, relationships... – are naturalized by means of a relentless propaganda that is the real object of phatic-epideictic communion, and which has as one of its main functions the marginalization and stigmatization of deviations from the norm through a number of devices.

One of the most important of these devices, both for its devastating effects and for the frequency with which it is employed, is accountability.

However, the very publicity and ubiquity of the use of accountability to police and repress deviance also allow all members of a society to anticipate with near-perfect accuracy the innumerable actions, attitudes, and opinions for which the device will *not* be employable (see beginning of Section 2 above). This is a prime example of *intersubjective anticipation*, where commonality generates sociality: the fact that the subject "employs a construction of experience which is similar to that employed by another" is the reason why not only "his psychological processes are similar to those of the other person" but "[he] construes the construction processes" of the other person. And he does so correctly. As a consequence, unsurprisingly, the observable behavior of most people tends to stick to the "not accountable" pole of the "accountable/ not accountable" construct.

4. The pleasures of multiculturalism

The reassuring universal collusion in the use of the accountability device by normals for the repression of deviants starts to crumble the moment someone starts asking *the normals* to account for their normality, which should by definition be safe from the devastating impact of the accountability device. This can happen in two ways. The first is as a consequence of simple *contact* with a different culture: if in a social group everybody goes to church every Sunday, nobody will dream of asking for an account of this rather peculiar habit; however, as soon as the group comes into contact with another group, where people go to a mosque on Friday, or to a synagogue on Saturday, or mind their own business on all three days, they will no longer perceive what they do as the "normal", the "natural", the "only" thing to do, but as something for which a reason must be sought and found, that is, as something accountable. The problem is that, as Nietzsche's perceptive remarks about Socrates make clear, what people do "only by instinct" is not easy to account for; and this

quite apart from the fact that there is no account which cannot be deemed unsatisfactory and returned to the sender. The joint action of these two components makes intercultural contact a considerably stressful experience.

It is worth noting that, in the situation we are dealing with now, the need for an account does not arise from an explicit request by someone, but is perceived by the “normals” purely as a consequence of a change in their social environment: this means that intercultural contact is *intrinsically* stressful. A second case, quite different both practically and theoretically, is one in which a minority questions its own deviant status, refuses to continue to submit to the repressive effects of the accountability device, and speaks up to demand an account (which will of course turn out to be unsatisfactory) of the discriminatory treatment to which it is subjected. This is what has been happening over the last decades, and is still happening now, in the relations between nonwhites and whites, between women and men, between homosexual and trans persons and cisgender heterosexuals, between disabled and able-bodied people, and between vegans and omnivores.

Despite what we would all like to think, in the vast majority of cases, the people who are suddenly forced to experience their “normal” way of life as accountable are not, even for the briefest and most fleeting moment, led to serious and honest soul-searching or to a change in their core constructs, since these are both activities of which the vast majority of humans is completely incapable. They are simply mad that the device of accountability, which they had been using extensively and systematically to keep deviants in line, is now being turned against *them*. And they hate the “newcomers”,⁹ who they feel are responsible for this.

This is the reason why a multicultural society is stressful; and this is the reason that a nostalgic appeal to a monocultural past (that is, to a past when minorities were so thoroughly and systematically oppressed that their voices were never heard, and their perspectives could be considered non-existent) will always prove appealing to all those who are unaccustomed to finding themselves in the position of being expected to give accounts.

The reflex response of militant omnivores of the “Take that, vegans!” variety to the vegan move of making the consumption of animal products accountable is that vegans deserve their backlash because they are guilty of encroaching on other people’s personal freedom by telling them they should change their way of life. Unfortunately for progressive supporters of democratic pluralism, this response is not only perfectly legitimate and absolutely reasonable, but can actually be generalized, with potentially very unsettling consequences, to a huge number of situations in which its relevance may not be, to most of us, immediately apparent.

Throughout recorded human history, “the normals” have defined themselves differentially, by opposition to a number of “deviant” categories. The poor, people of different races (whether at home or abroad), sexual minorities, the differently abled, and, of course, women (to name only the most conspicuous examples) were universally and tacitly excluded from the enjoyment of rights; not only that, but hardly anybody felt this situation to be in any way problematic or deserving of redress; so much so, indeed, that acknowledging their humanity was socially, and sometimes legally, sanctioned. As a consequence, the “normals” were able to enforce a kind of “tribalistic universalism”, in which the values, interests and worldview of one segment of the population was endowed with natural, God-given, universal value, and all other possible perspectives were not simply discounted or erased, but considered non-existent. For those who held the winning tickets in this lottery, the immediate perception and unshakeable conviction of their natural superiority to a mass of

⁹ Of course, the “newcomers” had in most cases been there all along, and quite a few of them (those with visible stigmas) did not even attempt to hide their “deviance”: only, their perspectives were systematically discounted, so that they could be considered, for all practical purposes, non-existent.

racially, socially, cognitively, physically, sexually etc. defective people was a source not only of considerable material privilege, but of their sense of self, as is abundantly clear from the massive presence of statements of racist, sexist, homophobic (etc.) prejudice in social discourse, and from their evident phatic-epideictic function.

It is impossible to understand sexism, racism, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, xenophobia and other aberrations of this sort unless we are willing to realize that what democratic pluralism is asking of the “normals” is to give up a condition of privilege which differs from that enjoyed by omnivores over other animals more in degree than in kind.

In this respect, despite what we would all like to think, democratic pluralism is not a win/win situation but a zero-sum game, because the privilege the “normals” have enjoyed as their birthright since the beginning of time is logically and practically incompatible with the most basic rights of the groups they have always oppressed. For a disturbingly large number of people, their rights are enshrined in, and predicated upon, the “natural” inferiority of someone else, whether human or nonhuman. These people will experience, with good reason, the democratic pluralistic program of “equal rights for all” as an attempt to rob them of their birthright, one that justifies and deserves militant and, if necessary, violent backlash. We are now experiencing that backlash, and this, though deeply unsettling and extremely alarming, is in no way surprising.

Good luck to us all, humans and nonhumans alike.

References

- Billig, M. (1999). *Freudian Repression: Conversation Creating the Unconscious*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Epting, F., Raskin, J., Burke, T. (1994) Who is a homosexual? A critique of the heterosexual-homosexual dimension, *The Humanistic Psychologist*, 22:3, 353-370.
- Garfinkel, H. (1967). *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Grilli, A. (2018), On doing ‘being a misfit’: towards a contrastive grammar of ordinariness. *Whatever. A Transdisciplinary Journal of Queer Theories and Studies*, 1, 105–121 (<https://whatever.cirque.unipi.it/index.php/journal>)
- Malinowski, B. (1923). The problem of meaning in primitive language. In C. K. Ogden & I. A. Richards (Eds.), *The meaning of meaning: A study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism* (pp. 296–336). New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Nietzsche, F. (1910 [1872]) Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism*. (W. M. A. Haussmann, Trans.). London: Allen & Unwin. <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/51356/51356-h/51356-h.htm>
- Sacks, H. (1992). *Lectures on Conversation*. G. Jefferson & E. Schegloff (Eds.), 2 vols., Oxford: Blackwell.