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# Discussion

# The Stoic Concept of Proneness to Emotion and Vice

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*Abstract*: According to an old view of Ian G. Kidd based on some passages from Galen's treatise *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, the Stoic concept of the soul's proneness to emotion and vice was formulated for the first time by Posidonius and became, through Cicero, a *communis opinio* in Roman Stoicism from the first century BC. Against this account the present contribution confirms, thanks to a new reading of a fundamental Galenic passage, that this concept was in some way already present in Chrysippus' reflexion and demonstrates, through the witness of Seneca's *Epistle* 94, that it had been professed even a generation before him by the dissident Stoic philosopher Aristo of Chios. Accordingly, the concept of proneness should be considered as a permanent tenet of Stoic philosophy dating back directly to the first generation of Zeno's disciples. This shows also, in line with Teun Tieleman's recent interpretation of Posidonian psychology, that not even in this point Posidonius substantially distanced himself from Early Stoicism.

According to an old opinion expressed by Ian G. Kidd in 1983, the Stoic concept of the soul's proneness (εὐεμπτωσία) or propensity (εὐκαταφορία)[1] for emotion and vice was formulated for the first time by Posidonius and became common in Stoicism from the first century BC, when it passed into the general philosophical discussion.[2] This thesis has in fact been superseded by a recent study of Margaret R. Graver, who basing herself on the interpretation of some passages from Galen's *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* and, though not mentioning Kidd's article, maintains its presence already in Early Stoicism and, more specifically, in Chrysippus.[3] However, as I shall argue in this paper, the historical origin of this specific concept inside the Stoic school cannot be traced neither in Posidonius' nor in Chrysippus' reflexion, but dates back directly to the first generation of Zeno's disciples.

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[1] The precise semantic difference between these two terms does not emerge with clarity from our sources. Sometimes, as in the case of Stobaeus discussed below (cf. *infra*, n. 5 and 7), they are used interchangeably.

[2] See Kidd 1983, 107–113, especially 112: "If *euemptosia* is Posidonian as it certainly is in the context of *pathos*, then it has crept into doxography by the first century BC. The distinction between proneness to disease (*euemptosia*) and disease (*nosos*) passes into the general discussion at the same time, as in Philodemus and Cicero".

[3] See Graver 2001, 205 and 218; Graver 2007, 142–144.

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## 1. The Stoic Doxographies

In fact, the teaching in question is included as a commonly accepted opinion in the Stoic doxographies transmitted by Cicero, Diogenes Laertius and John Stobaeus. The last one, in the survey of Stoic ethics reported in the second book of the *Eclogae* and conventionally attributed to Arius Didymus, after having defined the vices (κακίαι) as negative διαθέσεις, i.e. negative 'dispositions' or 'non-scalar conditions'[4], enumerates εὐεμπτωσία/εὐκαταφορία[5], along with sicknesses (νοσήματα) and infirmities (ἀῤῥωστήματα), among the negative ἕξεις, negative 'states' or 'scalar conditions'[6] of the soul. In this regard, he makes the examples of tendency to grief (ἐπιλυπία), irascibility (ὀργιλότης), enviousness (φθονερία) and susceptibility to irritation (ἀκροχολία). In what follows he adds that we can also have pronenesses to other actions against nature (εἰς ἄλλα ἔργα τῶν παρὰ φύσιν) such as theft, adultery and assault.[7] According to Kidd, in this scholastic summary of Stoic moral teaching considered by him of Chrysippean inspiration,[8] such passage, together with that containing the similitude of the victims of passion who are said to be "swept away as if by a disobedient horse"[9], must be derived from Posidonius.[10] However, this latter's name, differently from what happens in the physical section of the summary (where it is cited several times), is here never mentioned.

In the long doxographical report included by him at the end of Zeno's life, Diogenes Laertius does not care to specify either to which particular Stoic philosopher this specific *doxa* dated back.[11] He contains himself to establishing a parallelism between the soul's εὐκαταφορίαι, in which he includes compassion (ἐλεημοσύνη) and quarrelsomeness (ἔριδες), and the body's εὐεμπτωσίαι, such as, for example, proneness to catarrh and diarrhea, applying also to this concept that medical analogy which had been inaugurated by Plato and was already present to different degrees in Aristotle and the Cynics, but was especially characteristic of the Stoic philosophers. As is known, the last ones insisted in a special manner on the close analogy between physical and mental illnesses submitting this part of ethics to a systematic medicalisation that was brought about up to the smallest details also on the aetiological plane.[12] The Stoic taxonomy of emotions and vices did not restrict itself to distinguishing their various forms, but studied their different evolution degrees, taking as a model the clinical progress of illness. It was above all Chrysippus the one who coherently adopted this method in his treatise *On Emotions*, in particular in Book IV, which, on this account, was also called *Ethical* or *Therapeutic Book*. Herein he had elaborated a specific vocabulary that distinguished the emotional states in νοσήματα, the soul's permanent sicknesses originating from a false opinion and raising a desire

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4 According to the classification offered by Graver 2007, 135–138.
5 The two terms are used by him interchangeably.
6 See Graver 2007, 135–138.
7 Cf. Stob. *ecl.* II 7, 5 f Wachsmuth (= Chrysipp. frg. 104 *SVF* iii); II 7, 10 e (= Chrysipp. frg. 421 *SVF* iii).
8 This would be inferable from the general impression to be drawn from our reading of it and would be confirmed by the final section (Stob. *ecl.* II 7, 12 Wachsmuth), which only mentions the name of Chrysippus.
9 *Ecl.* II, 7, 10 a Wachsmuth).
10 See Kidd 1983, 107 and 112f. See also Kidd 1988, 584.
11 Cf. Diog. Laërt. vii 115 (= Chrysipp. frg. 422 *SVF* iii). Cf. also Suid. s.v. ἀρρώστημα.
12 Cf., e.g., Cic. *Tusc. disp.* iv 23 (frg. 424 *SVF* iii), and Long/Sedley 1987, 385; Vegetti 1995, 222–230, especially 223f.

contrary to reason, and ἀῤῥωστήματα, also enduring infirmities but associated with weakness (μετ' ἀσθενείας).[13]

The scant information provided on that subject by Diogenes and Stobaeus must be integrated with a passage of Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations* where the author, in the framework of the wide summary of Stoic moral psychology of mostly Chrysippean inspiration brought about in Books III and IV,[14] holds forth quite extensively on the concept of *proclivitas*:

> Some people are more prone than others to contract certain illnesses; for instance, we say that certain people suffer from sinus or suffer from cholic, meaning not that they are suffering from it but that they often do. In the same way, some people are more prone to fear and others to other emotions. It is thus that we speak of anxiety in some people – that is a tendency to become anxious – irascibility in others. Irascibility is different from anger: it is one thing to be angry, another to be irascible. Similarly there is a difference between suffering from anxiety and feeling anxious. For not everyone who feels anxious now and then suffers from anxiety, nor are those who suffer from anxiety anxious all the time. It is like the difference between drunkenness and fondness for drink, or between beeing amorously inclined and beeing in love. The proneness of different persons to different illnesses is used extensively, for it has application to each of the emotions and manifests itself also in many of the vices, although in that case there is no separate term for it. Hence people are envious or spiteful or malicious or timid or pitying not because they experience those emotions all the time, but because they are exceptionally prone to them. Continuing, then, the analogy with the body one should use the term 'infirmity' to refer to these various proclivites, provided we understand it to mean a proclivity to become infirm. Meanwhile, a tendency toward what is good should be termed a 'facility'. For one person is more inclined to one good quality, another to another. But a tendecy toward the bad should be called a 'proclivity', to suggest propensity for falling into error, while a tendency toward things neither good nor bad should be called by the former term.[15]

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[13] Cf., e.g., Stob. *ecl.* ii 93, 1 Wachsmuth (Chrysipp. frg. 421 *SVF* iii); Diog. Laërt. vii 115 (frg. 422 *SVF* iii); Cic. *Tusc. disp.* iv 23; 26–27; 29; 31–32; (frgg. 423–427; 430 *SVF* iii); Sen. *ep.* 75, 11 (frg. 428 *SVF* iii); Galen. *de loc. aff.* viii 32 Kühn (frg. 429 *SVF* iii); viii 138 (frg. 457 *SVF* iii); *de plac. Hipp. et Plat.* iv 1, 364–366 De Lacy (frg. 461 *SVF* iii); iv 4, 385–387 (frg. 476 *SVF* iii); iv 5, 394 (frg. 479 *SVF* iii); iv 5, 396–397 (frg. 480 *SVF* iii); iv 6, 403–408 (frg. 473 *SVF* iii); iv 7, 419–421 (frg. 466 *SVF* iii); v 2, 432; 435; 443 (465 *SVF* iii); v 3, 444–447 (frg. 841 *SVF* ii); vii 1, 588–591 (frg. 259 *SVF* iii); Philod. *de ira* col. 1, 12–20 Indelli (frg. 470 *SVF* iii); Orig. *contra Cels.* i 64; viii 51 (frr. 474–475 *SVF* iii); Muson. *fragm. min.* 36, and among the many studies on this subject, Edelstein 1952; Frede 1986; Nussbaum 1987 and 1994, §§. 1 and 9; Hadot 1969, 143–145; Donini 1995, 314f., and 1999, 712–714 and n. 119.

[14] The fact that Cicero based himself for the greatest part on a detailed knowledge, either direct or indirect, of Chrysippus' treatise *On Emotions* has been demonstrated by Pohlenz 1906 and Dougan/Henry 1934, I, xxx–xlvii, and has been recently repeated with good arguments by Graver 2001, 203–207 and 215–219; Graver 2007, 12 and n. 7, 92, 36, 43, 138.

[15] Cic. *Tusc. disp.* iv 12, 27–28 (frg. 423 *SVF* iii). The translation is by Graver, with several modifications. The emendation of *lividi* into *libidinosi* by Pohlenz or its expunction by Wesenberg, which were based on either hypercritical or ungrounded argumentations, do not seem to be strictly necessary. The metaphorical meaning of *lividus*, *-a*, *-um*, 'malicious, spiteful, envious', is perfectly pertinent with the sequence of adjectives in which it is found and introduces in it a further semantic nuancing.

So as the terms *morbus*, *aegrotatio* and *offensio* are normally used by Cicero as *termini technici* indicating respectively 'sickness', 'infirmity' and 'aversion'[16] of Stoic moral philosophy, similarly it seems certain from his words that *proclivitas* (whereof an odd synonym, *lapsio*, is here offered) corresponds to the Stoic concept of proneness to emotion and vice. Even from a semantic point of view, it is possible to liken, on the one hand, the substantive *proclivitas* (from *proclivis*, lit. 'going or sloping downwards'), which is attested only here with a philosophical value,[17] to the original Greek term εὐκαταφορία (from εὖ, 'well', and κατάφορος, -ον, lit. 'rushing or tending downward') and, on the other, the noun *lapsio* (a *hapax* from *lapso*, 'to slip' or 'to fall') to the word εὐεμπτωσία (from εὖ, 'well', and ἔμπτωτος, -ον, lit.'falling into').

Basing again on the close parallelism between physical and mental pathological conditions, Cicero compares the men's greater or lesser proneness to single emotions (*alii ad aliam perturbationem* [*sunt procliviores*]) with someone's different propensity for some bodily illnesses, and distinguishes carefully this psychological condition proclive to illness from beeing subject to it in a merely occasional and contingent manner.[18] It is not the same thing, he claims, being by nature prone to an emotion and being prey to it only now and then (*aliquando*) for accidental reasons and adduces as examples of *proclivitates* anxiety, irascibility, enviousness, malevolence, animosity, timorousness and compassion. The proclives are those who, although not being currently dominated by illness, suffer from it often (*non quia iam sint, sed quia saepe sint*) but not always and not in every moment. The existence of a proneness to various emotions on the part of the most different persons is said to have wide application (*late patet*) and is extended to all emotions (*perturbationes*)[19] and also to many vices (*vitia*). As far as this latter case is concerned, Cicero specifies that there is no specific word for designating it (*nomen res non habet*).

The concept of proneness is applied by Cicero in the passage discussed here also in the case of two further ἕξεις or 'states' of the soul: (i) in the domain of moral good (*in bonis rebus*) by the word *facilitas* (whereof *aptus* is the adjective, here used as a comparative) to signify the men's different facility for virtuous actions, and (ii) in the realm of indifferents (*neutra*) by the same term *facilitas* for indicating the greater or lesser aptitude to effect with efficacy morally neutral operations. We do not know precisely what the original Greek words corresponding to these two particular states were.[20] The fact is that the former has not been included in many modern classifications of Stoic positive mental con-

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16 'Aversion' is defined by Cicero (iv 11, 26) as "a vigorous opinion, deeply attached and rooted, that some object is worthy of avoidance which is in fact not worthy of avoidance". In particular, he makes the examples of misogyny, misanthropy and inhospitality. The corresponding Greek word προσκοπή is mentioned only in the doxographical report conventionally attributed to Arius Didymus in Stob. *ecl.* ii, 7, 10 e Wachsmuth.

17 The only other attestation in Latin known to me is [Caes.] *Bell. Afr.* 37, 3, where it has obviously no philosophical value.

18 Notice also the linguistic insistence: *differt*; *aliud* […] *aliud*; *interest*; *aliudque* […] *aliud*.

19 This is the word commonly employed by Cicero for generically indicating the emotions.

20 Ἐπιτήδευμα, 'habitude' or 'pursuit', which is taken by the sources, as much as Cicero's *facilitas* in its former meaning, to be a positive ἕξις of the soul, seems to correspond symmetrically to νόσημα, rather than to εὐεμπτωσία/εὐκαταφορία. Cf. Stob. *ecl.* ii 7, 5 b 11; 7, 5 f; 7, 5 k Wachsmuth, and Graver 2007, 145–148.

ditions or "goods of mind".[21] In any case, to exclude the suspect that both concepts might be a personal addition by Cicero himself is sufficient the evidence of his effort to transpose into Latin the very terminology of the original Greek sources, an evidence that is especially typical of Books III and IV of the *Tusculans* and that appears here even more patent.[22]

Cicero returns to the concept of proneness to emotion and vice at the end of Book IV, where he briefly restates the universal diffusion of this mental condition and the irrelevance for it of one's current health conditions, which may even be excellent:

> So minds can have a proclivity to one vice or another in much the same way that each person can appear to be naturally prone to some illness of body even while the actual health is excellent. Others are said to have certain vices not by nature but culpably. Vices of this latter kind consist in false beliefs about what things are good or bad, so that different people are prone to different emotional movements.[23]

Here, along with the comparative *proclivior*, also the synonym *propensior* (comp. of *propensus*, p.p. of *propendeo*, lit. 'hang forward or down') is used. Furthermore, as in the other Ciceronian passage quoted above, the Roman philosopher speaks not only of proneness to emotion or to 'emotional movements' (*motus perturbationesque*), but also of proneness to vices (*vitia*). Yet, differently from there, here he seems to do so without any apparent discrimination between them.[24] More importantly, he distinguishes the diverse causes originating proneness on the one hand and vice on the other: while the former is said to be a natural matter, inborn in us from birth (*natura* […] *proclivior*), vice in itself, consisting in false opinions about what is good or bad, is the consequence of a fault (*culpa*).

Seneca also, in Book IV of *De beneficiis*, refers to the fact that "the fool holds all vices but is not by nature prone (*pronus*) to all of them: one is inclined (*inclinatur*) to avarice, another to lust, another to insolence".[25] And further on he adds: "All vices are present in all men, but not all subsist in each of them: one is impelled by nature (*natura*) to avarice, another is prone to wine, another to lust or, if he is not yet, he is so formed (*formatus*) that he is prompted to it by his character (*mores*)".[26] What strikes here is the absence of the vocabulary that is customary to Cicero. However, in place of *proclivis*, the adjective *pronus* (lit. 'hanging forward' or 'going/inclined downward'), another strict synonym of its, is utilised. Also the employment of the verb *inclinatur* (refl. from *inclino*, 'to incline', etymologically cognate to *proclivis*) as the predicate of the explicative sentence that follows *pronus*

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[21] This is the case of Graver 2007, 135–138, who does not discuss the relevant term in Graver 2001, comm. *ad loc.*, either.

[22] Notice, in particular, the insistent presence of prescriptive subjunctives of *verba dicendi* at the end of the passage (*dicatur*, *nominetur*, *significet*, *habeat* […] *nomen*).

[23] Cf. Cic. *Tusc. disp.* iv 37, 81. Translation by Graver, with some modifications.

[24] As is known, the actual difference between emotion (πάθος) and vice (κακία) for the Stoics is not inferable with precision from our sources. The most general discriminant is provided by the former passage of Stobaeus quoted above, at n. 7 (while vices are permanent dispositions of the soul, emotions are only states: the latter admit of increase or decrease, the former do not). Another indication is furnished by Gal. *de plac. Hipp. et Plat.* iv 5, 31 De Lacy (Posidon. F 164 E.-K.), and Cic. *Tusc. disp.* iv 34, who both put the arising of emotions in connection with the presence of vice (as long as vice is there, there are emotions). Cf. also *infra*, n. 31. But we must recognise the insufficiency of the information at our disposition on this point.

[25] Sen. *de ben.* iv 27, 1 (frg. 659 *SVF* iii).

[26] *Ibid.*, iv 27, 3.

*est* confirms that Seneca is refering to *proclivitas* in a very similar sense as Cicero does. Anyway, the natural proneness of some men to some vices and of others to other ones arises with enough clarity from these words. In particular, the rootedness of such proneness in many human beings is especially emphasised here when it is said that it is either nature (*natura*) or one's character (*mores*) what induces someone to greed, others to drunkenness, others to lust.[27]

## 2. *Posidonius' Criticism of Chrysippus: The Witness of Galen's* De Placitis

The most significant witness on the subject concerning us here, however, is a long passage from Book V of Galen's treatise *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* in which the author comments in detail on the criticism expressed by Posidonius in his treatise *On Emotions* to Chrysippus' statements on proneness. I report the passage in its entirety:

> Both of them (*scil.* Chrysippus and Posidonius) are in agreement that this movement does not arise in the minds of the refined [i.e. sages]. But they do not give the same explanation concerning what kind of mind the fools have during emotions and prior to emotions. For Chrysippus says that it is analogous to bodies which have a tendency to incur fevers or diarrhea or things like that upon a slight and chance pretext. Posidonius critisises this comparison: he says that the mind of the fools should be compared not to such bodies but simply to healthy bodies. For whether they become feverish for large or small causes does not make any difference as concerns their experiencing this, that is, having the *pathos*, at all; rather, they differ only in that some are prone and others not. For this reason he says that Chrysippus is improperly comparing the health of the mind to that of the body, and the illness [of the mind] to the condition which falls easily into illness. For there is a mind which is free of emotions (*pathe*) – that of the sage, obviously – but no body is free of illness (*pathe*). It would have been more just to compare the minds of the fools "either to bodily health, which includes a proneness to illness" (for that is the expression Posidonius uses) "or to illness itself'", since a condition can be either disease-like or already diseased. But even he is in agreement with Chrysippus in that he says that all the fools are sick in mind and that their illness resembles the above-mentioned states of body. In fact, this is what he says: "For this reason, also, illness of mind does not, as Chrysippus thinks, resemble a disease-like condition of body through which it is subject to incur irregular non-periodic fevers; rather, mental illness resembles either bodily health, which includes a proclivity to illness, or the illness itself. For bodily illness is a condition already diseased, but the illness Chrysippus is talking about is more like a proclivity to fevers". This much I approve of Posidonius in that he says that the minds of the fools, whenever their condition is out of the emotions, are similar to bodies that are healthy, but I do not approve him giving the name 'disease' to conditions of that sort.[28]

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[27] This fact is not a valid reason for suspecting Seneca of heterodoxy as does Brennan 1998, 64 n. 50. As we have seen, the connaturality of proneness to emotion and vice in many human beings is explicitly stated in the latter of the Ciceronian passages commented on above and is indirectly inferable also from Chrysippus' and Aristo's own positions on the same subject.

[28] Gal. *de plac. Hipp. et Plat.* v 2, 432–434 De Lacy (Posidon. F 163 E.-K.). The translation is by Graver, with several modifications.

The question in dispute is the disagreement between Chrysippus and Posidonius about the different application of the medical analogy to the fool's mental conditions "during emotions (κατά τε τὰ πάθη) and prior to emotions (πρὸ τῶν παθῶν)". This initial specification by Galen is important because it confirms that, although in the following lines, coherently with the Stoic medical analogy, the terms employed are always relating to physical health and illness, the matter under discussion is represented by emotions and proneness to emotion. As has been pointed out by Kidd, in this text we can identify three different sections: first, a report in indirect form of Posidonius' criticism to the kind of medical analogy employed by Chrysippus; second, two literal quotations from Posidonius on the same subject; and, finally, a pedantic critique of the Posidonian stance by Galen which both for its irrelevance and for reasons of brevity, I have cut here.

According to Galen, Chrysippus had compared the soul free of emotions of the sage to the body's health (τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑγιείᾳ) and that of the fool to a quasi- or crypto-pathological bodily condition (νοσώδει καχεξίᾳ τοῦ σώματος) being only partially comparable to real illness, wherein fevers and tremor attacks supervene at irregular intervals, without any order and for small causes.[29] Now, for Galen, this specific version of the medical analogy was criticised by Posidonius for several reasons: first of all, because the gravity and random character of the pathogenic causes are irrelevant for the current state of illness;[30] in the second place, because while mental health – that of the sage – is totally proof against the emotions (ἀπαθῆς), there is no bodily health which is completely immune to illness; third, mental illness does not correspond strictly speaking to the unclear physical state described by Chrysippus ("a disease-like condition of body through which it is subject to incur irregular non-periodic fevers", in Posidonius' words), but either to bodily illness in itself (τῇ νόσῳ) or to bodily health with its natural proneness to illness (ὑγιείᾳ ἐχούσῃ τὸ εὐέμπτωτον εἰς τὴν νόσον). In this way, Posidonius distinguishes two different states (one κατά τε τὰ πάθη and another πρὸ τῶν παθῶν) where Chrysippus seems to have confusedly spoken of one and the same state. From this situation derives for Posidonius the necessity of re-formulating (without rejecting it altogether) Chrysippus' similitude.

Now, according to Kidd, it was precisely with the scope of overcoming the problems raised by Chrysippus' comparison that Posidonius would have introduced the concept of proneness to illness and, more precisely, the distinction, both from a physical and a psychological point of view, between proper illness and health prone to illness using a terminology that from Galen's words seems to be typically Posidonian (οὕτω γὰρ ὠνόμασεν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος). In particular, this distinction, which returns in another passage of *De placitis*[31] again with regard to Posidonius, would represent for Kidd, on the philosophical plane, one of the answers of this philosopher to the difficulties entailed by Chrysippus' theory of emotions and moral psychology. According to this scholar, for Posidonius the soul, like the body, has within itself the pathogenic principles that induce it by nature to emotion and such principles do not issue, nor could, from the soul's rational principle, but depend on some 'movements' or forces of an irrational kind that reside in the heart and coexist with the intellect in the same human subject. This is comprehensible for Kidd in the light of Posidonius' complex theory of the soul, which, differently from Chrysippus' monolithic psychology, would be based on the existence of more faculties or 'powers'

[29] Cf. also *ibid.*, v 2, 298, 3–7 De Lacy (Chrysipp. frg. 465 *SVF* iii).
[30] Cf. *ibid.*, v 2, 294, 32–296, 36 De Lacy (Posidon. F 163 E.-K.); iv 5, 264, 9 ff. (Posidon. F 164 E.-K.).
[31] Cf. *ibid.*, iv 5, 31 De Lacy (Posidon. F 164 E.-K.).

(δυνάμεις, according to the terminology attributed by Galen himself to Posidonius) of the soul, one rational and one or more irrational.[32] In this specific theoretical framework which, according to Galen, was influenced by Plato's and Aristotle's psychological theories (and indeed to the former Posidonius expressly alluded)[33], the concept of proneness to emotion and vice found for Kidd its first historical collocation. It is since our irrational 'powers' tend to their own natural goals (οἰκειώσεις) that we are by nature prone (εὐέμπτωτοι) to error, and it is precisely in virtue of this proneness that we let ourselves be overcome by false opinions (ψευδεῖς δόξαι). These excite an excessive impulse (ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα) of the soul's irrational 'power' which, by its emotional pull (παθητικὴ ὁλκή), impels reason to grant them its assent (συγκατάθεσις) and to take a decision (κρίσις) consistent with them.[34]

However, Kidd's interpretation appears today to be flawed both in its conclusions and in its historical premises inasmuch as it tries to recognise the origin of the concept of proneness to emotion and vice in the supposed Posidonian reform of Stoic psychology and in the latter's presumed distancing from Chrysippus in this field.[35] The fact is that this position widely bases on a *communis opinio* dating back for the most part to Max Pohlenz[36], and espoused still today by scholars such as Richard Sorabji[37], which has been recently put into discussion and almost completely refuted by the studies of Janine Fillion-Lahille[38], John Cooper[39], Christopher Gill[40] and, above all, of Teun Tieleman[41]; the opinion being that Galen's report may be considered essentially creditable. On the contrary, these scholars have showed with several arguments that the report supplied by Galen in Books IV and V of *De placitis* about Posidonius' supposedly pluralistic psychology and its alleged originality towards that strictly monistic of Chrysippus, upon which the old historiographical account was based, is to a great degree unreliable and partial.[42]

According to Tieleman, Galen tends to assimilate the Posidonian position to that of Plato and Aristotle: to the Platonic position by expressly attributing to him the tripartition of the soul in rational, irascible and concupiscible, and to the Aristotelian one by making him speaking, rather than of parts (μόρια, μέρη), of 'powers' (δυνάμεις) of the soul that have their seat in the heart. This would put Posidonius in substantial continuity with Zeno and Cleanthes, who had also both postulated the existence of irrational factors in the human mind, and in open contrast with Chrysippus who, according to Galen, believed

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32 Cf. Posidon. F 31; 34; 142–146; 169 E.-K.
33 Cf. Posidon. T 101–102; F 34; 157 E.-K.
34 Cf. Posidon. F 158–162; 169 E.-K.
35 See the partial reservations already expressed by Phillip H. De Lacy (1983, especially 116f.) in his response to Kidd's paper.
36 Pohlenz 1933.
37 Sorabji 2000.
38 Fillion-Lahille 1984, 153–162.
39 Cooper 1998.
40 Gill 1998.
41 Tieleman 2003, 198–287, to whom it is to refer for the whole discussion. See also Tielemann 1996. Paradoxically, the sole element that has substantially been left outside Tieleman's discussion is precisely the concept of proneness, which is mentioned by him only incidentally in the space of a footnote (see Tieleman 2003, 187 n. 161).
42 In fact, as Tieleman himself has remarked (2003, 200), no trace of Posidonius' supposed heterodoxy appears in any sources other than Galen, Cicero and Plutarch.

in the existence of a sole psychological principle, the rational one (τὸ λογιστικόν). Now, for Tieleman the evidence supplied by Galen is insufficient for authorising so great a doctrinal divergence between Posidonius and Chrysippus. As much as this latter, Posidonius also considers emotion as an excessive impulse provoked by an error of reason. And, according to the author of the pseudo-Plutarchean opuscule *On Lust and Grief*, for him too, similarly as for Chrysippus, emotions depend on "judgements and suppositions".[43] Not even in the coexistence, along with the rational principle, of non-rational factors in the soul (which, as is known, are to be regarded by no means neither as parts nor as independent 'powers') there is actually for Tieleman a real doctrinal divergence between Posidonius and Chrysippus.

The point is that, as this scholar has showed, Galen is hostile to Chrysippus and is interested in polemically contrasting Posidonius to him. Taking the opportunity offered to him by the allusions that Posidonius himself made to Plato, the author of *De placitis* tendentiously ascribes to him the Platonic tripartition of the soul, even though in an Aristotelising version and in terms of 'powers' rather than of parts. In reality, for Posidonius Plato's psychological model was only an imperfect anticipation of the theory of the soul formulated for the first time by Zeno and Cleanthes and furtherly developed by Chrysippus. Tieleman has demonstrated that the allusions which Posidonius made at the beginning of the treatise *On Emotions* in the so-called "Ancient Report" (παλαιὸς λόγος) to philosophers such as Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle were only but a historical survey of the psychological theories previous to him. Toward these he did not by any means give unconditional assent, as Galen tendentiously assumes.

To the contrary, according to Tieleman, Posidonius' aim was projecting the Stoic psychological model common to Zeno, Cleanthes *and also to Chrysippus* which he himself followed – i.e. the Stoic conception of emotion as excessive impulse –, to some older philosophers held as forerunners of Stoicism for demonstrating the continuity and legitimacy of an entire philosophical tradition.[44] Galen exploited such attempt of reinterpretation and appropriation of the ancient philosophers on Posidonius' part to present this latter as a perfect follower of *his own* philosophical and medical ideal. Hence, Posidonius certainly admired Plato, but he did not use him altogether, as Galen professes, for distancing himself from Chrysippus. His psychology was collocated, according to Tieleman, in the same theoretical framework as Chrysippus' one and provided in case terminological "refinements".[45]

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[43] Cf. [Plutarch.] *de libid. et aegr.* 4–6 (Posidon. F 154 E.-K.).

[44] This process of projection and legitimation of some important Stoic doctrines played a central role in Early Stoicism. See Erler 2001; Long 1988; Ranocchia 2007, 116–132. This means, once again, that Posidonius considered and *de facto* collocated himself in substantial continuity with the Founding Fathers of the school.

[45] Differently from what had previously been supposed by various scholars, not even with regard to Diogenes of Babylon, Panaetius and Hecaton we could speak of a real psychological dualism. According to Tieleman (2003, 242–250), our sources (above all Philodemus, Cicero and Nemesius), which would be either hostile or vitiated by partiality, do not authorise drawing this conclusion. For these reasons, according to him, the headings 'Middle Stoa' and 'Middle Stoics' used for Panaetius and Posidonius and, hence, the traditional periodisation of Stoic philosophy, which are the consequence of an old historiographical schematism, are inadequate and equivocal.

As a matter of fact, in the fragments of certain attribution Posidonius does not ever make use of the term δύναμις, as Galen pretends,[46] but always of παθητικαὶ κινήσεις, 'emotional movements', and of παθητικόν, 'emotional side or aspect' of the soul, the latter never being used in the meaning of 'power' or 'part' of the soul. Now, as Tieleman has pointed out, the παθητικόν is attributed by Stobaeus to Zeno in person without implying any partition of the soul. Also Cleanthes' dialogue between Reason (Λογισμός) and Anger (Θυμός) reported by Posidonius himself in polemic with Aristotle would reflect this same psychological model. So, in Tieleman's analysis, for Posidonius there is neither a tripartition nor a partition *tout court*. His psychology, like that of Zeno, Cleanthes, *and Chrysippus*, included both a rational aspect (τὸ λογιστικόν) and an emotional one (τὸ παθητικόν) without thereby entailing any form of dualism. Finally, for Posidonius as well as for his predecessors emotion consists in an impulse (ὁρμή) of the soul that always depends on both a (false) judgement of the intellect and, *at the same time*, some 'emotional movements' which are manifestations of the 'emotional principle' of the soul.

This new hermeneutical paradigm, which has meanwhile widely been accepted by the scholars, helps us to collocate in the just light Galen's witnesses and allows us to understand more correctly Posidonius' criticism of Chrysippus' similitude and also the position of Chrysippus himself. Let us go back, then, to the above passage from *De placitis* and try to distinguish, if possibile, more accurately the respective views of these two Stoic philosophers. According to Posidonius' textual words (i.e. those contained in the two Posidonian quotations reported by Galen), Chrysippus had conflated and confused two different bodily and mental states, namely "bodily health, which includes a proneness to illness" and "illness itself". While for Posidonius bodily illness is "a condition already diseased" (ἕξις ἤδη νοσοῦσα), Chrysippus' illness is not equivalent to real illness, but it represents, rather, a "condition which falls easily into illness" or a sort of "proclivity to fevers", namely what one should call proneness to illness. And, as Galen points out by paraphrasing Posidonius, "a condition can be either disease-like (νοσώδης) or already diseased (ἤδη νοσοῦσα)". In this sense, real illness is a condition ἤδη νοσοῦσα, proneness to illness is only νοσώδης. Chrysippus omits, for Posidonius, to make this important distinction. This charge is coherent with and confirms Posidonius' further two criticisms on which Galen reports in the initial section of the passage, i.e. (a) the irrelevance of the kind of pathogenic causes for the current state of illness and (b) the unsoundness of the other comparison between bodily and mental health.

Summarising, Posidonius criticised Chrysippus for having failed to catch with exactitude the articulated correspondence between the different physical and mental states (bodily health ≠ mental health; mental illness ≅ *either* bodily illness *or* bodily health with its natural proneness to illness) and, therefore, for having incorrectly made use of the Stoic medical analogy. A direct consequence of this is the following fact: if for Posidonius illness of mind, whenever it does not coincide with current and actual illness, is equivalent to bodily health with its natural proneness to illness, then all the fools who are not yet dominated by emotion are anyway prone to it. In particular, as the healthy bodies "differ – according to Posidonius – in that some are prone (εὐέμπτωτα) and others not (δύσπτωτα)",

[46] As a matter of fact, Galen does not manage to adduce one Posidonian text in which such term is expressly used. On the problem of the δυνάμεις or 'powers' of the soul, on their number and on the different ways of giving account of the contradictions existing in the sources, see Inwood 1985, and the criticism contained in the discussion by Ioppolo 1987.

say, to fevers or to diarrhea, so some fools are prone, and others not, e.g. to outbursts of anger or attacks of fear. But in fact, if this reasoning is correct, for him all the fools who are still free of emotions must find themselves in this specific condition.

## 3. *Chrysippus' Position*

But what about Chrysippus himself? Which was his real position on the subject regarding us here? Did Posidonius' criticism get Chrysippus' point or not? Recently, Margaret R. Graver[47] has proposed to answer negatively to the last question. Her view may be reducible to the following statements: (a) for Chrysippus, one can experience an emotion now and then without having the corresponding proclivity; (b) "Chrysippus did not intend to contrast ordinary susceptibility with the stable affective health of the wise, but to explain that some of the non-wise are more inclined than others to experience certain emotions upon small provocation"; (c) for him "the minds which are analogous to healthy bodies are those of ordinary people who, as Posidonius says, remain susceptible to emotions generally but who are not especially prone to any *one* emotion". Since, for Graver, Posidonius fails to understand this, his criticism would be unfounded. Now, (b) and (c) do not seem to find sufficient textual support in Galen's passage here discussed. Let us first check (b). The claim that Chrysippus' real intention was not – as Graver maintains – to contrast "ordinary susceptibility" with the health of the wise still needs to be proven. Actually, the only fact we know from Galen is that, according to Posidonius, he improperly compared the health of the mind (i.e. that proper to the wise) to the health of the body (i.e. that typical of the fools, a category which for the Stoics included also so-called "ordinary people") and that is all. Also the statement whereby for Chrysippus "some of the non-wise are more inclined than others to experience certain emotions" does not appear anywhere in Galen's report. The only thing Galen repeats about Chrysippus' position about the non-wise is, simply, that for him their mind "is analogous to bodies which have a tendency to incur fevers or diarrhea or things like that upon a slight and chance pretext" without refering to any graduation in the intensity of this tendency.

As far as (c) is concerned, we know from Posidonius' criticism that for Chrysippus the only minds which are analogous to healthy bodies are, once again, those of the wise. There is no evidence in Galen's report which authorises us to believe that Chrysippus intended, instead of these, those of "ordinary people". Likewise, there is in it no ground for thinking, as Graver does, that he made any distinction between men who are "susceptible to emotions generally", i.e. "ordinary people", and other men who are especially prone to one emotion. As Galen remarks at the beginning of his report, the whole discussion is about the different explanations given by the two Stoic philosophers on "what kind of mind *the fools* have during the emotions and prior to emotions" (ὁποία δὲ τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῶν φαύλων ψυχὴ κατά τε τὰ πάθη καὶ πρὸ τῶν παθῶν) without any particular distinction among them. As for (a), this statement is certainly true and consistent in itself (a similar assertion is made, for example, by Cicero in the former passage of the *Tusculan Disputations* quoted above) but, once again, it is *not* deducible from Galen's report.

So, it is likely that Posidonius understood correctly Chrysippus' similitude with its several limitations. At the same time, it is also possible from what we have said above that

[47] Graver 2007, 143 f.

Galen tendentiously exaggerated the distance between these two Stoic philosophers for pursuing his own *demonstrandum*. In effect, it remains a fact clearly inferable not only from Galen's report, but also from Posidonius' textual words that Chrysippus in person explicitly alluded to "bodies which have a *tendency* to incur (*ἐπιτηδείοις σώμασιν* […] *ἐμπίπτειν*) fevers or diarrhea", that he spoke of "*proclivity* to fevers (*εὐεμπτωσία* […] εἰς πυρετούς)" and that he recognised a state of body "which *falls easily* into illness (*ῥᾳδίως* εἰς νόσημα *ἐμπιπτούσῃ* καταστάσει τοῦ σώματος)". Now, it is not difficult to read in such expressions some affinities with the Stoic concept of proneness to emotion and vice as it arises from our sources and in particular from Galen. Even the terminology (εὐεμπτωσία, εἰς νόσημα ἐμπίπτειν) recalls explicitely that employed by them. This cannot but mean that the philosophical concept of proneness both in physical and in mental sense was in some way present already in Chrysippus.

For that reason, it seems legitimate to speak, also in the case of this specific concept and despite the divergences pointed out above, of a substantial continuity between Chrysippus and Posidonius. It is Galen himself to remark this continuity in the passage discussed above when he specifies that, in any case, "even he (*scil.* Posidonius) is in agreement with Chrysippus in that he says that all the fools are sick in mind and that their illness resembles the above-mentioned states of body". That is to say that the core of the medical analogy was not under discussion between them and that it was substantially the same for both. Including the terminology εὐέμπτωτος/εὐεμπτωσία, which according to Kidd was typically Posidonian, is not necessarily so. Galen contains himself to saying that "this is the expression Posidonius uses" (οὕτω γάρ ὠνόμασεν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος), but he does not claim that it was typical of this philosopher nor that Posidonius was the first one to have used it.

But in which particular relationship could this philosophical concept stand to Chrysippus' theory of emotions? We know from other passages of *De placitis* that for him mental illness was very similar to bodily weakness and that emotion was due to a weakening of the psychic tension (τόνος), which after a certain point induces the subject not to obey to reason any more.[48] Now, it is reasonable to suppose that this weakness (ἀσθένεια) and bad tension (ἀτονία) of the soul could have for him some relationship to the concept of proneness in the generation process of emotion. Precisely because for Chrysippus the sick soul is in "a condition which falls easily (ῥᾳδίως) into illness" on a small or chance cause it happens that it falls prey to emotion when the soul's tension weakens and makes it difficult to obey to the right judgement (ὀρθὴ κρίσις). In other words, when the soul's tension sufficiently diminishes or vanishes, emotions and vices irrupt into the soul *in virtue of its proneness to them*.

In this way, while mental weakness and lack of τόνος represent only indirect (necessary but not sufficient) internal conditions for the arising of emotion and false opinions are its proximate efficient causes, proneness to it constitutes, in this interpretation, the remote and structural factor that moves the subject towards the emotional response. Now, as is indirectly deducible also from the Senecan passage quoted above, for the Stoics proneness can be considered as either an inborn component of the soul genetically trasmitted to us by our parents or a negative character trait induced in us by a bad education. In effect, we know that the Stoics distinguished for the shaping of a person's character between antecedent (i.e. indirect and non-cognitive) and sustaining (i.e. direct and cognitive)

[48] Cf. Gal. *de plac. Hipp. et Plat.* v 2, 437–440 De Lacy (*SVF* iii 471); iv 6, 403–405 (*SVF* iii 473).

causes and that included in the former genetic elements as well as one's physical environment and the influences produced in us by our relatives and friends.[49] In particular, Cleanthes mantained that children resemble their parents not only in physiognomy, but also in their character traits (ἤθη), their emotions (πάθη) and dispositions (διαθέσεις)[50], and Chrysippus that they do in their habits (τρόπος) and, again, in their character (ἦθος).[51] More generally, early Stoics recognised hereditary impacts on human mind deriving from the parent's sperm.[52]

## 4. *Aristo of Chios*

But was the concept of proneness inside Early Stoicism a peculiarity of Chrysippus' moral psychology or did it rather find a wider diffusion within it? In particular, can we be sure that the historical origin of this philosophical concept coincided precisely with Chrysippus' reflexion or can we argue the existence of an even earlier formulation of it? Well, from a wider inspection of our sources it arises that a special version of the same concept is documentable for a Stoic philosopher a generation anterior to Chrysippus. He was a fellow-disciple of Cleanthes and one of the oldest followers of Zeno: the 'heterodox' Stoic thinker Aristo of Chios.[53] The proof of this is inferable from a passage incorporated in Seneca's *Epistle* 94, 2–17, which represents, in turn, the most conspicuous surviving testimony concerning this Stoic philosopher. The passage is reported here:

> Two are the reasons by which we err: either there is in the mind a malice contracted from false opinions, or, even if it is not occupied by error, it is prone to it and gets quickly corrupted by a presentation to which it should not assent. Therefore, we ought either to cure the sick mind and free it from the vices or, if it is still proof of them but is prone to the worse, to forestall it. The fundamental principles of philosophy do both. Hence this preceptive genre does not have any utility.[54]

The expressions *Ariston Stoicus* of § 2 and *Haec ab Aristone dicuntur* of § 18, wherewith Seneca's long witness respectively begins and ends, indicate that the author of the whole portion of text included between § 2 and § 17, and so also of our passage, is Aristo of Chios. The general topic is, as is known, the criticism levelled by this philosopher against precepts (*praecepta*) and suggestions (*suasiones*) as means for acquiring virtue. There are no sufficient reasons to doubt, as some scholars have done in the past, the authenticity of

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[49] Cf. Cic. *de fato* 7–9, and, for the relative discussion, Sedley 1993; Bobzien 1998, 296–301. See also Brennan 2001 and 2005, 242–269.

[50] Cf. Nem. *de nat. hom.* 20, 14–17 Morani; Tertull. *de an.* 5.4, 787.17–19.

[51] Cf. Plutarch. *Stoic. repugn.* 1053 d.

[52] Cf. Diog. Laërt. vii 158–159. See Bobzien 1998, 292; Graver 2007, 169f.

[53] See below for Aristo's and Chrysippus' chronologies.

[54] Sen. *ep.* 94, 13 (Aristo Chius frg. 359 *SVF* i): *duo sunt, propter quae delinquimus: aut inest animo pravis opinionibus malitia contracta aut, etiamsi non est falsis occupatus, ad falsa proclivis est et cito specie quo non oportet trahente corrumpitur. Itaque debemus aut percurare mentem aegram et vitiis liberare, aut vacantem quidem, sed ad peiora pronam praeoccupare. Utrumque decreta philosophiae faciunt. ergo tale praecipiendi genus nil agit*. The translation is by Graver, with several modifications. For a comprehensive analysis of Aristo's theory of emotions and, in particular, of this passage, see Ioppolo 1980, 244–248.

this important Senecan witness on Aristo. In particular, against a secure attribution of these paragraphs to the philosopher of Chios it has been objected that it would not be possible to separate what belongs to Seneca from what belongs to Aristo. In this regard, the presence at § 8 of the Epicurean maxim about the nature of pain has been recalled (if prolonged, it is endurable; if not endurable, it is short),[55] which would not be compatible with Aristo of Chios' thought.[56] It has also been claimed[57] that the exposition of the moral principles which Seneca makes in *Epistles* 94 and 95 would conflict with the theory of natural law typical of Early Stoicism. However, this latter view has been persuasively confuted by Philipp T. Mitsis.[58]

As for the former objection (difficult separability of what is Aristo's from what is Seneca's), it is applicable to the most part of indirect citations and, in any case, cannot be employed for this specific witness, which is corroborated from beginning to end by the comparison with many independent passages securely attributable to Aristo of Chios. Actually, not only the whole discussion about the inutility of precepts for education (for which see especially §§ 2; 5–17), but also the reference to the absolute indifference of external goods for the moral choice made at §§ 7–8, the mention of the doctrine of circumstances at § 12, the use of the similitude of the actor at § 6, the remarked necessity of exercise for acquiring virtue of § 3, the comparison between this latter and health of § 17, the invective against the bad education of pedagogues and nurses of § 9 and the harsh polemic against richness of § 7 clearly refer to doctrines or postures which inside Stoicism were typical of the rigorist moral thinker Aristo of Chios.[59] As is known, in his philosophical position the κοινωνία between Cynicism intended as "shortcut to virtue" (σύντομος ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδός) and Stoic moral philosophy interpreted in the ascetic and Cynicising version originally proposed by Zeno, reached its utmost expression.[60] Finally, concerning the Epicurean maxim about pain, it is found also otherwise in Seneca[61] and, therefore, may well be an interpolation by this philosopher. Anyway, the mere observation of its presence inside the long Aristonean testimony cannot be considered *per se* sufficient for denying the authenticity of this witness.

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55 Cf. Epicur. frg. 446 Usener = deest Arrighetti; frr. 204–206 Arrighetti[2].

56 See Schofield 1984.

57 By Watson 1971, Inwood 1986 and, above all, Vander Waerdt 1989 (see also Vander Waerdt 1994, 4854 n. 10).

58 Mitsis 1993, 293 and n. 28.

59 See, for §§ 2; 5–17 (inutility of precepts), Sext. Emp. *adv. math.* vii 12 (frg. 356 *SVF* i); for §§ 7–8 (absolute indifference of external goods), Anonym. *in Aristot. eth. Nic.* 1137 a 26–30, in *CAG* XX, p. 248, 17–27 = deest *SVF*); Gal. *de plac. Hipp. et Plat.* vii 2, 595–600 De Lacy (frg. 256 *SVF* iii); for § 12 (doctrine of circumstances), Stob. *flor.* iv 31 d, 110 H. (frg. 397 *SVF* i); for § 6 (similitude of the actor), Diog. Laërt. vii 161 (frg. 351 *SVF* i); for § 3 (necessity of exercise), Clem. Alex. *strom.* ii 20, 108 (frg. 370 *SVF* i); for § 17 (comparison between virtue and health), Plutarch. *de virt. mor.* 440 f (frg. 375 *SVF* i) for § 9 (invective against pedagogues and nurses), Sext. Emp. *adv. math.* vii 12 (frg. 356 *SVF* i); for § 7 (polemic against richness), Stob. *flor.* iii 4, 110 H. (frg. 350 *SVF* i); Cic. *de fin.* iv 69 (frg. 368 *SVF* i); Sen. *ep.* 115, 8 (frg. 372 *SVF* i); Stob. *ecl.* ii 31, 95 W. (frg. 396 *SVF* i); *fl.* iv 31 d, 110 H. (frg. 397 *SVF* i); *gnom. Vat.* 120 (deest *SVF*).

60 Cf. Diog. Laërt. vi 103–104 (v a 135; v b 368–369; v b 497 *SSR* = fr. 354 *SVF* i); vi 105 (v a 135 *SSR* = deest in *SVF*).

61 Cf., for instance, *ep.* 78, 7, and also Marc. Aur. Imp. vii 33; 64.

Once rejected this doubt, let us go back to what Aristo says in the passage reported above. This philosopher claims, in a similar way as Posidonius does, that two are the possible mental conditions which induce us to evil actions: either the soul is sick (*aegram*) and already prey to evil (*malitia*) in that it is dominated by false opinions (*pravis opinionibus*) or, although being free (*vacantem*) of error, it is prone to it (*ad falsa proclivis*), to the point that it will quickly (*cito*) succumb to a mental representation (*specie*) which will drive it to give to the error an assent that it should not (*quo non oportet*). As a remedy against this we need to adopt, accordingly, an also twofold therapy: if the soul is already sick, it is necessary to cure it in depth (*percurare*) and to try to extirpate the vices from it (*vitiis liberare*); if, on the contrary, it is still sane but prone to the worse (*ad peiora pronam*) i.e. to illness, we should forestall (*praeoccupare*) it.[62] By *praeoccupare* (from *prae*, 'before', and *occupo*, 'occupy') Aristo probably means to fill the proclives' mind in advance with true opinions of what is good and what is bad in order to prevent the inverse process of its getting corrupted by false representations.[63] And since, according to Aristo, the universal principles of philosophy (*decreta philosophiae*) achieve both, there is no need for the preceptistic (*tale praecipiendi genus*).

First of all, we can observe, here also, moral and medical terminology to be employed simultaneously and a calculated use of the illness comparison. In particular, the presence of both *proclivis* and *pronus* (two strict synonyms which, as we have seen, are etymologically very close to εὐκατάφορος, -ον, of the Greek sources) confirms that Aristo is alluding to the concept of proneness in a similar sense as Cicero and Seneca do in the passages discussed above. And, although the reference is here only to vices (*vitia*), the important distinction between illness of soul and health prone to illness and also the adoption of two different therapies for the two different mental states of the fool substantially overlap with what we know in different degrees about the concept of proneness to emotion and vice from Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius, Cicero, Seneca and, above all, from Galen. What, in addition, is here remarkable is the emphasis on the psychic structure of vice and proneness to it and, in particular, the accurate, though brief, description of the mental process which underlies these two psychic conditions.

Even the comparison with Chrysippus' position is not totally inappropriate. We know indeed from Galen that for this philosopher proneness to emotion was comparable to a proclivity to fall into illness upon a weak or chance stimulation (ἐπὶ μικρᾷ καὶ τυχούσῃ προφάσει) while Aristo speaks, rather, of a tendency or a promptness to assent quickly to false opinions (*pravis opinionibus*) and to fall into vices. Yet, if we prescind for a moment from their different accentuation (on the medical-clinical aspects, by Chrysippus, and on the psychological process, by Aristo), both Stoics agree in recognising a mental condition of the fool which, by its own, falls easily (ῥᾳδίως) or quickly (*cito*) into respectively emotion or vice. And, even if Chrysippus in Galen does not appear to make any reference to its psychic structure (but he did largely so in his treatise *On Emotions*) Aristo uses for its description a very similar medical terminology as Chrysippus does. The real difference between them was, in case, the odd conflation of the two mental states of the fool on Chrysippus' part, a position of which Aristo, like Posidonius after him, could not approve.

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[62] On the prevention of emotions and vices in Chrysippus and Aristo, see Ioppolo 1987, 247f.

[63] Chrysippus also recommended to prevent emotions by imagining events before they happen (προενδημεῖν τοῖς πράγμασι). Cf. Gal. *de plac. Hipp. et Plat.* iv 7, 417–419 De Lacy (frg. 482 *SVF* iii).

If that is true, we must conclude that the concept of proneness belongs to the earliest stage of Stoic reflexion, may be as the Founder of the school was still alive. As is known, Zeno's chronology is controversial.[64] However, it emerges with sufficient security from Philodemus' *History of Stoa* (cols. 28–29 Dorandi) and *On Stoics* (cols. 1–8 Dorandi) that he died during Arrheneides' archonship (262/1 BC). This fact is corroborated by the collocation during Jason's archonship of Cleanthes' death (230/29), whom we know from Philodemus himself to have been head of the school after Zeno for 32 years. About Aristo, instead, we have insufficient chronological data. We know only that he was a contemporary of Arcesilaus (against whom he harshly polemicised), of Bion of Borysthenes and of the Epicurean Colotes and, therefore, his life must have covered at least the former half of the third century BC. If his pupil Eratosthenes was born, as the *Suida* claims, during the 126th Olympiad (276–272), then he was still alive after 255.[65]

As to Chrysippus, according to Apollodorus' calculations recorded in Diogenes Laertius (vii 184), he was born between 281 and 277, went to Athens probably around 260, and died at the age of 73 during the 143rd Olympiad (208–204). As Tiziano Dorandi has explained, "[t]his takes away any basis for the claim that Chrysippus also studied with Zeno, though he may well have been a student of Cleanthes".[66] In that way, while Zeno's and Aristo's philosophical reflexion is mainly situated in the former half of the third century BC, Chrysippus' one is to be collocated almost entirely in the latter half of it. Furthermore, if his important work *On Emotions*, wherein he discussed at length and in detail the medical analogy including the concept of proneness, had to belong – as it is likely – to his mature philosophical production, the chronological distance between Aristo's and his own formulation of this philosophical concept appears to be equivalent to at least 25/30 years.

Also in Aristo's case, as in Chrysippus' one, the presence of this particular concept had to be well integrated in his own moral psychology. In general, we know from Plutarch that "Aristo also made virtue unique and called it health (ὑγίειαν)".[67] Symmetrically, for him moral insanity was equal to illness of mind (*animi mala valetudo*).[68] In particular, we can infer from the passage quoted above that the philosopher of Chios also divided, like Posidonius, the fools into two categories (*duo sunt, propter quae delinquimus*), namely those who are possessed by vice as a consequence of their wrong judgements and those who are structurally prone to it. This implies that for Aristo, as far as for Posidonius, all the fools who are not yet prey to emotion or vice, are anyway prone to them. And, even if here, differently from what Cicero and Seneca do in the passages quoted above, Aristo does not explicitly speak of connaturality, also in his case, as in Chrysippus' one, proneness to vice cannot but be understood as either an innate and reflexive phenomenon present in us from birth or a feature imprinted on our character by our bad frequentations or education.[69]

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[64] See, for instance, Lefèvre 1995; Knoepfler 1995; Dorandi 1999, 37f.

[65] Cf. Suid. s.v. Ἐρατοσθέσης; and Guérard, 403.

[66] The former claim derives from Alexander Polyhistor, the latter from Diocles. Cf. Diog. Laërt. vii 179, and Dorandi 1999, 40.

[67] Plutarch. *de virt. mor.* 2, 440f.

[68] Cf. Sen. *ep.* 94, 17 (*SVF* i 359).

[69] In effect, we know that for Aristo the causes of emotion and vice reside in a bad education consisting either in the wrong advice given to the young by mothers, nurses, preceptors and poets or in the bad attractions offered by daily life. Cf. Sen. *ep.* 94, 9; Sext. Emp. *adv. math.* vii 12 (frg. 356 *SVF* i), and Ioppolo 1980, 130–133, 245–246. As to the other possibility (i.e. connaturality of proneness), compare what it has been said above about Chrysippus.

Thus, also for Aristo, like for Chrysippus, the aetiology of vice (and obviously also of emotion, although this latter is not expressly nominated by Aristo) seems to be dependent on both cognitive (and hence voluntary) and non-cognitive (connatural or induced by others) elements residing together in the soul. Including Aristo's therapeutical approach, as far as we know of it, seems to reflect this dualism. According to Clemens of Alexandria and Seneca himself, the remedy he prescribed for preventing or extirparting emotion and vice was twofold: for the intellect, the continuous meditation of the universal principles of philosophy (amongst which, first of all, the definition of the *summum bonum*) and, for the habit of mind (*habitus animi*), the soul's constant discipline and training.[70] For this reason, education for Aristo could neither be solely theoretical nor exclusively practical. To the contrary, both theoretical knowledge and the constant application of the Stoic doctrine through the personal training were for him necessary for acquiring virtue.

Someone could wonder how the Stoic concept of proneness to emotion and vice may be compatible with those ancient sources that ascribe to Early Stoics the opinion whereby there is in man a facility for good.[71] However, none of these witnesses is exclusive, in the sense that none of them attests that this is the only propensity man has. Besides, as is known, for the Stoics virtue is not innate nor does it supervene in a natural way like the other parts of the body.[72] For these reasons, it is logical to conclude, also on the basis of what we learn from the former of the Ciceronian passages quoted above,[73] that for Early Stoics there are in men both facilities for moral good and pronenesses to emotion and/or vice. Yet, as Seneca points out, not all facilities or pronenesses are present in all men: one is inclined to a moral good, another to another one; one is prone to an evil, another to another one.

In conclusion, the Stoic concept of proneness to emotion and vice neither represents as such an invention of Posidonius introduced by Cicero into Roman Stoicism nor an idea advanced for the first time by Chrysippus. Rather, this *doxa* was professed by the Stoics from the very beginning of their reflexion and it has many chances to belong to the theoretical nucleus of Stoic teaching from the very outset of its history. In fact, this philosophical concept, among many other Stoic doctrines, looks like a sort of *file rouge* that goes through the history of Hellenistic and Roman Stoicism, with different nuances but without substantial modifications, from the foundation of the school to the early Imperial age. This fact contributes, by the way, to confirm from another, though quite specific, point of view Tieleman's case for a substantial doctrinal continuity between so-called Early and Middle Stoic psychology.[74]

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[70] Cf. Sen. *ep.* 94, 3; Clem. Alex. *strom.* ii 20, 108, and also Stob. *flor.* iv 52 a, 18 H. (*SVF* i 399). See Ioppolo 1980, 91–96, 115–118, 244–248.

[71] Cf. Diog. Laërt. vii 89 (Chrysipp. frg. 228 *SVF* iii); Gal. *de plac. Hipp. et Plat.* v 5, 459 De Lacy (Chrysipp. frg. 229 a *SVF* iii); *quod an. mores* iv 820 Kühn (Chrysipp. frg. 235 *SVF* iii).

[72] Cf. Clem. Alex. *strom.* vii 3, 19 (Chrysipp. frg. 224 *SVF* iii); i 6, 34, 1–35, 2 (Chrysipp. frg. 225 *SVF* iii); Lact. *div. inst.* vi 14, 17–18 (Chrysipp. frg. 444 *SVF* iii), and Ioppolo 1980, 145 f.

[73] Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

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