A Formal Analysis for Capturing Replay Attacks in Cryptographic Protocols

Gao, H.; Bodei, Chiara; Degano, Pierpaolo; Riis Nielson, H.

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-76929-3_15

We present a reduction semantics for the LySa calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.

Titolo:	A Formal Analysis for Capturing Replay Attacks in Cryptographic Protocols
Autori interni:	H. GAO BODEI, CHIARA DEGANO, PIERPAOLO H. RIIS NIELSON mostra contributor esterni nascondi contributor esterni
Anno del prodotto:	2007
Rivista:	LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE
Abstract:	We present a reduction semantics for the LySa calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.
Handle:	http://hdl.handle.net/11568/109438
Appare nelle tipologie:	4.1 Contributo in Atti di convegno

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http://hdl.handle.net/11568/109438

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