EnglishWe present a reduction semantics for the LySa calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.
| Titolo: | A Formal Analysis for Capturing Replay Attacks in Cryptographic Protocols |
| Autori: | |
| Anno del prodotto: | 2007 |
| Rivista: | |
| Abstract: | We present a reduction semantics for the LySa calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks. |
| Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11568/109438 |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 4.1 Contributo in Atti di convegno |
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