In many dialogues Plato makes reference to the famous precept «Know yourself» at the entrance of the temple of Apollo in Delphi. In the Alcibiades I, the dialogue that dedicates the most space to this topic, Socrates offers an interpretation of the Delphic precept that appears far from any other traditional reading, by means of a παράδειγμα drawn from the experience of the ὄψις. To see itself, the eye must look at the pupil of another eye, that is, the part where vision, its primary function, resides. In the same way, in order to know itself, the soul will have to look at another soul and more particularly at the part in which the soul’s virtue, σοφία, is located (132c-133c). ‘Knowing oneself’ therefore means knowing the most divine part of one’s soul or something similar to the soul. The various explanation of this image provided by critics can be grouped into two main trends: a theocentric or vertical interpretation and an anthropocentric or horizontal interpretation. On the basis of a more in-depth analysis of the context of the dialogue and a comparison with the Phaedrus (254d-e), it is possible to go beyond these two trends and recover the erotic character of the image, interpreting it in the light of the doctrine of the eros that Plato develops in the Phaedrus and in the Symposium.
LA MASSIMA DELFICA ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥTOΝ FRA CURA DI SÉ, EROS E DIALOGO NELL’ALCIBIADE I
michele corradi
2022-01-01
Abstract
In many dialogues Plato makes reference to the famous precept «Know yourself» at the entrance of the temple of Apollo in Delphi. In the Alcibiades I, the dialogue that dedicates the most space to this topic, Socrates offers an interpretation of the Delphic precept that appears far from any other traditional reading, by means of a παράδειγμα drawn from the experience of the ὄψις. To see itself, the eye must look at the pupil of another eye, that is, the part where vision, its primary function, resides. In the same way, in order to know itself, the soul will have to look at another soul and more particularly at the part in which the soul’s virtue, σοφία, is located (132c-133c). ‘Knowing oneself’ therefore means knowing the most divine part of one’s soul or something similar to the soul. The various explanation of this image provided by critics can be grouped into two main trends: a theocentric or vertical interpretation and an anthropocentric or horizontal interpretation. On the basis of a more in-depth analysis of the context of the dialogue and a comparison with the Phaedrus (254d-e), it is possible to go beyond these two trends and recover the erotic character of the image, interpreting it in the light of the doctrine of the eros that Plato develops in the Phaedrus and in the Symposium.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
