We propose a way to abstract from various specifications of authentication and to obtain idealized protocols “secure by construction”. This feature enables us to prove that a cryptographic protocol is the correct implementation of the corresponding abstract protocol. Our proposal relies on the combination of two authentication primitives, proposed by the authors in [20, 18] to a simplified version of the spi calculus.
Authentication Primitives for Refining Protocol Specifications
Bodei, Chiara;Degano Pierpaolo;Priami, Corrado;
2002-01-01
Abstract
We propose a way to abstract from various specifications of authentication and to obtain idealized protocols “secure by construction”. This feature enables us to prove that a cryptographic protocol is the correct implementation of the corresponding abstract protocol. Our proposal relies on the combination of two authentication primitives, proposed by the authors in [20, 18] to a simplified version of the spi calculus.File in questo prodotto:
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