Passive systems noticeably those which are capable of transferring thermal power from a heat source to a sink without the use of energy which is not coming from gravity are in use of nuclear technology since the pioneering design of reactors. They received a step-wise, fashion-type, renewed interest following the three major nuclear accidents in 1979, 1986 and 2011. The words thermal-hydraulic passive systems, design and safety, open to a myriad of research and application activities, which without surprise may appear contradictory and, at least, not converging into a common understanding. In the present paper an attempt is made to use the word reliability in order to select a space in the design and safety assessment and to derive agreeable outcomes for the technology of passive systems. The key conclusions are: (a) passive systems are not the panacea for protecting the core of nuclear reactors in each foreseeable accident condition; (b) specific licensing rules are strictly needed and not yet formulated; (c) reliability of operation, once a target mission is assigned, may reveal not unit; (d) systems implying the use of active components like pumps shall not be avoided in future designed/built nuclear reactors.

Status report on thermal-hydraulic passive systems design and safety assessment

D'Auria F.
Primo
Conceptualization
2018-01-01

Abstract

Passive systems noticeably those which are capable of transferring thermal power from a heat source to a sink without the use of energy which is not coming from gravity are in use of nuclear technology since the pioneering design of reactors. They received a step-wise, fashion-type, renewed interest following the three major nuclear accidents in 1979, 1986 and 2011. The words thermal-hydraulic passive systems, design and safety, open to a myriad of research and application activities, which without surprise may appear contradictory and, at least, not converging into a common understanding. In the present paper an attempt is made to use the word reliability in order to select a space in the design and safety assessment and to derive agreeable outcomes for the technology of passive systems. The key conclusions are: (a) passive systems are not the panacea for protecting the core of nuclear reactors in each foreseeable accident condition; (b) specific licensing rules are strictly needed and not yet formulated; (c) reliability of operation, once a target mission is assigned, may reveal not unit; (d) systems implying the use of active components like pumps shall not be avoided in future designed/built nuclear reactors.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11568/941614
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