The present contribution focusses on the process of consultation and decision-making that in 1541 led to Charles V’s carrying out an amphibious attack, which ended in disaster, against Algiers. On the basis of the documentation analyzed, the most relevant variable turns out to be the ‘human factor’, in the persons of Charles V, Andrea Doria, and a less well known but very interesting figure, the proveedor general of the armada Francisco Duarte. Between May and August 1541 there was a kind of blackout in the communications between the emperor and his admiral. They both held stubbornly to their views, which were antithetical, and they refused to speak out to each other frankly. Duarte tried to mediate, telling Doria in person and Charles by letter what the two refused to write in their correspondence. Doria was strongly against the Algiers expedition, which he considered inopportune in the geopolitical and military context of that year. Charles V thought, instead, it was the only way he could save his honour since he was avoiding dealing personally with Süleiman the Magnificent’s invasion of Hungary. The result was a seriously dysfunctional decisional process. Aside from the inherent factors of uncertainty in any military operation, a very difficult challenge was undertaken on the wrong foot.

Il presente saggio è dedicato al processo consultivo e deliberativo che nel 1541 portò all’esecuzione da parte di Carlo V di un attacco anfibio contro Algeri, conclusosi in un disastro. In base della documentazione analizzata, la variabile più rilevante è risultata essere il ‘fattore umano’, che assume le sembianze di Carlo V, Andrea Doria e di un personaggio meno noto ma molto interessante, il proveedor general dell’armata Francisco Duarte. Tra il maggio e l’agosto del 1541 si verificò una sorta di blackout nelle comunicazioni tra l’imperatore e il suo ammiraglio. Entrambi si impuntarono su posizioni antitetiche, smettendo di confrontarsi direttamente. Duarte fece da mediatore, riferendo a voce al Doria e per lettera a Carlo quello che i due non si dicevano nella loro corrispondenza. Il Doria era contrario all’impresa di Algeri, che considerava inopportuna nel contesto geopolitico e militare fortemente negativo di quell’anno. Carlo V la considerava come l'unico modo per preservare il suo onore nel momento in cui rinunciava ad affrontare di persona il sultano Solimano il Magnifico in Ungheria. Il risultato fu un processo decisionale gravemente disfunzionale. A prescindere dai fattori di incertezza intrinsecamente connessi ad ogni operazione militare, una sfida molto impegnativa fu affrontata partendo con il piede sbagliato.

Algeri 1541: problemi di pianificazione strategica di un disastro annunciato

Arturo Pacini
2019-01-01

Abstract

The present contribution focusses on the process of consultation and decision-making that in 1541 led to Charles V’s carrying out an amphibious attack, which ended in disaster, against Algiers. On the basis of the documentation analyzed, the most relevant variable turns out to be the ‘human factor’, in the persons of Charles V, Andrea Doria, and a less well known but very interesting figure, the proveedor general of the armada Francisco Duarte. Between May and August 1541 there was a kind of blackout in the communications between the emperor and his admiral. They both held stubbornly to their views, which were antithetical, and they refused to speak out to each other frankly. Duarte tried to mediate, telling Doria in person and Charles by letter what the two refused to write in their correspondence. Doria was strongly against the Algiers expedition, which he considered inopportune in the geopolitical and military context of that year. Charles V thought, instead, it was the only way he could save his honour since he was avoiding dealing personally with Süleiman the Magnificent’s invasion of Hungary. The result was a seriously dysfunctional decisional process. Aside from the inherent factors of uncertainty in any military operation, a very difficult challenge was undertaken on the wrong foot.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11568/1019272
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