Modern Philosophy and Philosophical Modernity: Hegel’s Metaphilosophical Commitment

I begin by arguing that Hegel’s general project of the selffulfilment of philosophy is to be read as an answer to the actual need of the modern world, that is, the need to philosophically found and establish the principle of subjective freedom. Hence, the structural connection between the two statements is made explicit in and through Hegel’s inversion of the common view of the True, which is now to be thought and expressed not as substance, but also as subject (1). I then proceed to argue that Hegel’s metaphilosophical commitment to philosophy implies the renunciation of every static and substantialistic conception not only of philosophical knowledge (2), but also of the actual world and of the human nature; therefore, this idea is incompatible with the assumption of a given form of reality as the ultimate actualisation of freedom (3).