In this paper we show that environmental consciousness may act as a substitute for environmental regulation. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly in which the high quality firm pollutes more than the low quality rival. Consumers attach a positive value to the green firm, while stigmatizing the brown one. For relatively high values of this environmental concern, only the green firm is active in the market. When this happens, a downward leapfrogging mechanism takes place, leading to a recursive race to the bottom. At equilibrium, polluting emissions can be reduced to the level established by environmental agencies.
Green monopoly and downward leapfrogging
Vergari, Cecilia
2020-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we show that environmental consciousness may act as a substitute for environmental regulation. We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly in which the high quality firm pollutes more than the low quality rival. Consumers attach a positive value to the green firm, while stigmatizing the brown one. For relatively high values of this environmental concern, only the green firm is active in the market. When this happens, a downward leapfrogging mechanism takes place, leading to a recursive race to the bottom. At equilibrium, polluting emissions can be reduced to the level established by environmental agencies.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
GreenMonopolyACL.pdf
solo utenti autorizzati
Descrizione: articolo pre-referaggio
Tipologia:
Documento in Pre-print
Licenza:
NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione
82.79 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
82.79 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.