This chapter intends to examine political conditionality and, in particular, the European Union (EU)’s toolkit in the framework of its external trade policy, which is used to promote non-trade values with a focus on human rights, democracy, rule of law, in EU agreements and in the General System of Trade Preferences (GSP). Reference will also be made to financial aid instruments for the benefit of third countries. After a definition of conditionality in general terms, clarifying its structure and rationale, explaining the difference between positive and negative conditionality, and highlighting the relevance and difficulties of establishing monitoring mechanisms, the chapter examines EU political conditionality tools. After an overview of EU unilateral and conventional conditionality mechanisms, the analysis focuses on the behavior required from recipient countries in conditionality clauses contained in trade agreements and in unilateral trade arrangements, respectively. It also examines certain aspects and problems associated with the application of EU conditionality, and it looks at monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The conclusions bring together the main points and findings of the chapter and offer some general reflections on the function and limits of conditionality clauses.
EU Political Conditionality as a Tool for the Promotion and Protection of Non-trade Values in Non-EU Countries
Francesca Martines
2020-01-01
Abstract
This chapter intends to examine political conditionality and, in particular, the European Union (EU)’s toolkit in the framework of its external trade policy, which is used to promote non-trade values with a focus on human rights, democracy, rule of law, in EU agreements and in the General System of Trade Preferences (GSP). Reference will also be made to financial aid instruments for the benefit of third countries. After a definition of conditionality in general terms, clarifying its structure and rationale, explaining the difference between positive and negative conditionality, and highlighting the relevance and difficulties of establishing monitoring mechanisms, the chapter examines EU political conditionality tools. After an overview of EU unilateral and conventional conditionality mechanisms, the analysis focuses on the behavior required from recipient countries in conditionality clauses contained in trade agreements and in unilateral trade arrangements, respectively. It also examines certain aspects and problems associated with the application of EU conditionality, and it looks at monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The conclusions bring together the main points and findings of the chapter and offer some general reflections on the function and limits of conditionality clauses.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
