The Covid-19 emergency has concentrated decision-making power in the hands of the government, marginalizing both the Parliament and the regions. The analysis of the normative acts enacted by the Government in the emergency suggests that the trend towards concentration is not so much the expression of a temporary adjustment of the legal order, but instead fits a broader and long-term evolution of the Italian form of government. This trend points to the centrality of the Government and even more so of the Prime Minister. The role of technical bodies is instead more ambiguous, even when considering the inevitable role played by scientific expertise in a health emergency.
I poteri del governo nell’emergenza: temporaneità o effetti stabili?
catelani E
2020-01-01
Abstract
The Covid-19 emergency has concentrated decision-making power in the hands of the government, marginalizing both the Parliament and the regions. The analysis of the normative acts enacted by the Government in the emergency suggests that the trend towards concentration is not so much the expression of a temporary adjustment of the legal order, but instead fits a broader and long-term evolution of the Italian form of government. This trend points to the centrality of the Government and even more so of the Prime Minister. The role of technical bodies is instead more ambiguous, even when considering the inevitable role played by scientific expertise in a health emergency.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
