We investigate a generalized Nash equilibrium problem where players are modeled as nodes of a network and the utility function of each player depends on his/her own action as well as on the actions of his/her neighbors in the network. In the case of a quadratic reference model with shared constraints we are able to derive the variational solution of the game as a series expansion which involves the powers of the adjacency matrix, thus extending a previous result. Our analysis is illustrated by means of some numerical examples.

A note on generalized Nash games played on networks

Passacantando, Mauro;
2021-01-01

Abstract

We investigate a generalized Nash equilibrium problem where players are modeled as nodes of a network and the utility function of each player depends on his/her own action as well as on the actions of his/her neighbors in the network. In the case of a quadratic reference model with shared constraints we are able to derive the variational solution of the game as a series expansion which involves the powers of the adjacency matrix, thus extending a previous result. Our analysis is illustrated by means of some numerical examples.
2021
Passacantando, Mauro; Raciti, Fabio
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11568/1070194
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