This study considers whether an incumbent firm can find it profitable to recognise a union and bargain over wages and employment, rather than to face a competitive labour market without unions. Using a sequential game model, this analysis shows that an incumbent firm may recognise a union to deter entry when network effects are sufficiently low.
Do labour union recognition and bargaining deter entry in a network industry? A sequential game model
Fanti, Luciano;
2020-01-01
Abstract
This study considers whether an incumbent firm can find it profitable to recognise a union and bargain over wages and employment, rather than to face a competitive labour market without unions. Using a sequential game model, this analysis shows that an incumbent firm may recognise a union to deter entry when network effects are sufficiently low.File in questo prodotto:
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