Making use of a Conjectural Variation model, the present note re-examines the subject of the firms' profits ranking under different degrees of market competition in a unionized duopoly with industry-wide Efficient Bargaining (EB). It is shown that, while Cournot-like competition profits are always larger than Bertrand-like ones with separated wage negotiations, an uniform wage bargaining can lead to the appearance of the reversal.
Profits Under Centralized Negotiations: The Efficient Bargaining Case.
Fanti Luciano;
2019-01-01
Abstract
Making use of a Conjectural Variation model, the present note re-examines the subject of the firms' profits ranking under different degrees of market competition in a unionized duopoly with industry-wide Efficient Bargaining (EB). It is shown that, while Cournot-like competition profits are always larger than Bertrand-like ones with separated wage negotiations, an uniform wage bargaining can lead to the appearance of the reversal.File in questo prodotto:
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