The Italian crime of surrogacy seems to have a strong capacity of deterrence at home, where no transgressions have emerged yet; those citizens who wish to take advantage of this procreative practice are rather pushed abroad, where surrogacy is allowed and the Italian prohibition doesn’t work due to the rules on the spatial extent of national criminal law. This paper criticizes, in particular, the way in which this prohibition has been used by the Constitutional Court first, then by the United Sections of the Supreme Court, insofar these judges basically affirmed that the crime of surrogacy would express a “public order” principle, whereby the transcription, in Italy, of birth certificates regularly perfected abroad after surrogate motherhood would be prohibited. Such an opinion does not consider the uncertainties about both the real field of application of the crime and its protective purpose, that must not be ultimately connected to the need of biological veritas in maternal relationship, but to the need to prevent a “maternity dissociation”, on account of which such a veritas might not in any way be guaranteed, not at least consistently to the constitutional protection of maternity.
Il divieto italiano di surrogazione di maternità, penalmente sanzionato, ha dimostrato un’ottima capacità di deterrenza in patria, al punto da non essere emerse trasgressioni in Italia; le coppie intenzionate a ricorrere a questa pratica procreativa sono state, piuttosto, spinte all’estero, dove essa è invece consentita, e dove il divieto stesso non può operare in ragione dei limiti circa l’applicazione della legge penale nello spazio. Il presente contributo valuta criticamente l’uso che di quel divieto hanno fatto la Corte costituzionale e le Sezioni Unite della Cassazione civile, ritenendolo espressione di un “ordine pubblico” ostativo alla trascrizione, in Italia, degli atti di nascita regolarmente perfezionati, oltre confine, a seguito di maternità surrogata. In specie, questo argomento non considera le incertezze, rilevate in sede penale, circa la portata applicativa del reato e il suo scopo di tutela, che non si ritiene possa essere collegato all’esigenza di far prevalere la veritas biologica della maternità, riguardando, semmai, l’esigenza di prevenire “dissociazioni di maternità” rispetto alle quali quella veritas non potrebbe essere affermata, in nessun modo, in termini costituzionalmente adeguati.
La maternidad subrogada desde la perspectiva del Derecho Penal. El caso italiano y el problema del “turismo procreativo”.
A. Vallini
2021-01-01
Abstract
The Italian crime of surrogacy seems to have a strong capacity of deterrence at home, where no transgressions have emerged yet; those citizens who wish to take advantage of this procreative practice are rather pushed abroad, where surrogacy is allowed and the Italian prohibition doesn’t work due to the rules on the spatial extent of national criminal law. This paper criticizes, in particular, the way in which this prohibition has been used by the Constitutional Court first, then by the United Sections of the Supreme Court, insofar these judges basically affirmed that the crime of surrogacy would express a “public order” principle, whereby the transcription, in Italy, of birth certificates regularly perfected abroad after surrogate motherhood would be prohibited. Such an opinion does not consider the uncertainties about both the real field of application of the crime and its protective purpose, that must not be ultimately connected to the need of biological veritas in maternal relationship, but to the need to prevent a “maternity dissociation”, on account of which such a veritas might not in any way be guaranteed, not at least consistently to the constitutional protection of maternity.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
