Anger, Hatred, Prejudice. An Aristotelian Perspective

Anger and hatred are examined in relation to contempt and prejudice. Aristotle’s claim that anger responds to an apparent slight is interpreted to mean that a) the slight is apparent but not necessarily real; b) it is conspicuous; c) it is the enactment of the opinion that the offender despises the offended. Two points are made regarding contempt: a) someone may feel despised and loved at the same time, for example in paternalistic relationships, or when treated with benevolence in an environment dominated by prejudice; b) feeling belittled may have heuristic value and help discover injustice. The paper highlights the communicative aspects of anger, the hope embedded in it. In contrast, it addresses the thesis that hatred does not aim at the other qua agent, but qua representative of a negative property. Hate has a depersonalizing effect on the hater as well. It supposedly lacks communicative intent and is linked with feelings of powerlessness.