Spazi kantiani

In setting up a philosophical framework to deal with the two inherent risks of human knowledge, dogmatism and scepticism, Kant introduces a systematic, though not always consistent, taxonomy of philosophical spaces in the second paragraph of the Introduction to his Critique of Judgment, entitled On the domain [Gebiet] of philosophy in general. Based on some remarks in Leonardo Amoroso’s paper Kant e il problema di una regola delle regole, this article investigates this taxonomy (sections 1-2), with a specific focus on his notion of “habitat” (Aufenthalt). Habitats are the spaces of empirical contingency, where humans cannot hope to establish necessary and universal laws, but at most a provisional, a posteriori order of familiarity and, as I will highlight, the groundwork for this possibility is an aesthetic one (section 3). In the concluding section 4 I will discuss the paradoxical centrality of the liminal space of the “habitat” and sketchily develop it toward a non-dualistic, Wittgensteinian concept of culture and game.