Sellars, Kant e la svolta scientifica della metafisica

Starting from the conviction that Sellars advocates a form of neo-Kantianism, in this article, I will discuss how Sellars re-elaborates some key issues of what he con- siders Kant’s metaphysics. My investigation will adopt the arguments of Sellars’s Science and Metaphysics as a common thread. In the first section, I will focus on what ‘metaphysics’ means to Sellars, insisting on the point of divergence with Kant. In the second section, I will describe how Sellars reads Kant’s distinction between phenomenon and noumenon in light of his scientific realism. In the last section, I will reconstruct Sellars’s interpretation of Kant’s ambiguous use of the notion of intuition (understood as both “sheer receptivity” and “blind spontaneity”), and how McDowell and Brandom interpret this point differently in turn.