In this brief article we present the following paradox: one cannot assume that mathematicians are trustworthy when they express their mathematical (dis)beliefs, while also maintaining four basic theses about natural and mathematical language. We carefully present the very natural hypotheses on which this paradox is based and then we show how to deduce the paradox from these assumptions. We end by presenting the possible ways in which one can reject the paradox, together with their conceptual implications.
What is it to believe in a mathematical assertion?
Venturi G
2021-01-01
Abstract
In this brief article we present the following paradox: one cannot assume that mathematicians are trustworthy when they express their mathematical (dis)beliefs, while also maintaining four basic theses about natural and mathematical language. We carefully present the very natural hypotheses on which this paradox is based and then we show how to deduce the paradox from these assumptions. We end by presenting the possible ways in which one can reject the paradox, together with their conceptual implications.File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
What is to believe in a math assertion.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
Versione finale editoriale
Licenza:
Creative commons
Dimensione
140.48 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
140.48 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
