The realisation of the European Banking Union since 2014 has been a major reform process o in response to the 2008 crisis, with significant progress in the creation of a single EU rulebook and the establishment of a new EU financial architecture as a cornerstone of governance in the area of bank supervision and resolution. The reforms that began in 2014 were mainly regulatory in nature and reflect the EU’s long-standing commitment to harmonising rules in support of economic liberalisation, as well as the proposal for a single banking rulebook for the financial system as a remedy for market instability and fluctuation. Yet the European Banking Union, the most radical of EU reforms in recent times, is not only regulatory. In view of a reshaping of the established approach to the governance of the financial system based on harmonisation, liberalisation and rules, the Banking Union is an executive and institutional reform as well. The creation of centralised organisational models for the supervision and resolution of banks along with the provision of a deposit protection system show the EU legislator’s commitment to creating a banking governance system capable of leading a crucial sector for the EU towards greater political, legal, and economic integration in response to the severe crises of the past, as well as future ones. In this research area, the legal scholarship that has recently focused on organisational models in the European banking sector has provided compelling accounts on these matters. However, what has been lacking and, in our view, is still lacking, despite the significant results achieved, is an analysis taking into account, above all on the functional side, of procedural activity but with implications in the field of organisation, the great richness deriving from the dialogue between the centre and periphery of European banking governance, and more precisely between the central and decentralised bodies that in various capacities and at different levels of government are called upon to manage the procedures for the supervision of banking intermediaries in the European legal system. To this end, it seemed useful to retrace, not only in a reconstructive sense but also from a critical angle, the fundamental stages that led to the European Banking Union with a view to understanding the reasons and investigating the limits, criticalities, and issues behind the radical reform of governance and the shift from a ‘decentralised’ to a ‘centralised’ model of administrative control of banking intermediaries. Once the problems, limits, and criticalities have been investigated and the reasons behind the radical reform that has led European banking governance towards a ‘centralised’ architecture have been explored, the article analyses the main features of the single supervisory systems (SSM), delving into the complex network of organisational relations and the multiple range of competences, functions, and powers allocated between the different levels of government, in order to argue the crucial importance of ‘cooperation’ as a general clause of a procedural nature in the relations between central and peripheral bodies for the administrative efficiency of the economic system as a whole. In emphasising the pivotal role that cooperation can play as a leading standard to which the administrative functions and powers and, more generally, the administrative activities of the various bodies at the centre and periphery involved in supervision procedures should conform, the article suggests a legal-organisational model inspired by a multilevel ‘network’ governance, rather than the traditional hierarchical model of command and control.
Unione bancaria e cooperazione nell’era delle crisi. Alla ricerca di un modello giuridico-organizzativo della governance multilivello
Donato Vese
Primo
2022-01-01
Abstract
The realisation of the European Banking Union since 2014 has been a major reform process o in response to the 2008 crisis, with significant progress in the creation of a single EU rulebook and the establishment of a new EU financial architecture as a cornerstone of governance in the area of bank supervision and resolution. The reforms that began in 2014 were mainly regulatory in nature and reflect the EU’s long-standing commitment to harmonising rules in support of economic liberalisation, as well as the proposal for a single banking rulebook for the financial system as a remedy for market instability and fluctuation. Yet the European Banking Union, the most radical of EU reforms in recent times, is not only regulatory. In view of a reshaping of the established approach to the governance of the financial system based on harmonisation, liberalisation and rules, the Banking Union is an executive and institutional reform as well. The creation of centralised organisational models for the supervision and resolution of banks along with the provision of a deposit protection system show the EU legislator’s commitment to creating a banking governance system capable of leading a crucial sector for the EU towards greater political, legal, and economic integration in response to the severe crises of the past, as well as future ones. In this research area, the legal scholarship that has recently focused on organisational models in the European banking sector has provided compelling accounts on these matters. However, what has been lacking and, in our view, is still lacking, despite the significant results achieved, is an analysis taking into account, above all on the functional side, of procedural activity but with implications in the field of organisation, the great richness deriving from the dialogue between the centre and periphery of European banking governance, and more precisely between the central and decentralised bodies that in various capacities and at different levels of government are called upon to manage the procedures for the supervision of banking intermediaries in the European legal system. To this end, it seemed useful to retrace, not only in a reconstructive sense but also from a critical angle, the fundamental stages that led to the European Banking Union with a view to understanding the reasons and investigating the limits, criticalities, and issues behind the radical reform of governance and the shift from a ‘decentralised’ to a ‘centralised’ model of administrative control of banking intermediaries. Once the problems, limits, and criticalities have been investigated and the reasons behind the radical reform that has led European banking governance towards a ‘centralised’ architecture have been explored, the article analyses the main features of the single supervisory systems (SSM), delving into the complex network of organisational relations and the multiple range of competences, functions, and powers allocated between the different levels of government, in order to argue the crucial importance of ‘cooperation’ as a general clause of a procedural nature in the relations between central and peripheral bodies for the administrative efficiency of the economic system as a whole. In emphasising the pivotal role that cooperation can play as a leading standard to which the administrative functions and powers and, more generally, the administrative activities of the various bodies at the centre and periphery involved in supervision procedures should conform, the article suggests a legal-organisational model inspired by a multilevel ‘network’ governance, rather than the traditional hierarchical model of command and control.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
