Given the unconditional favour that scholars imbued with classical ideas should bestow on any manifestation of business freedom and entrepreneurial spirit, it was not a given that classical jurists and economists would join the ranks of those who in the late 19th century complained about the corporatisation of the American economy. The usual explanation is that they did so out of doctrinal and practical concerns for the effect of the associated rise of monopolies and trusts. A complementary account exists, however, offered by law historians and based on the doctrinal controversies about the true nature of corporations triggered by the famous Santa Clara decision (1886) of the US Supreme Court. The paper casts new light on the latter account by uncovering those aspects of classical economics that made it impossible for its supporters – economists and jurists alike – to unreservedly support the corporate form before and beyond the trust problem.

Beyond trust: why American classical jurists and economists could not love the corporation

Nicola Giocoli
2023-01-01

Abstract

Given the unconditional favour that scholars imbued with classical ideas should bestow on any manifestation of business freedom and entrepreneurial spirit, it was not a given that classical jurists and economists would join the ranks of those who in the late 19th century complained about the corporatisation of the American economy. The usual explanation is that they did so out of doctrinal and practical concerns for the effect of the associated rise of monopolies and trusts. A complementary account exists, however, offered by law historians and based on the doctrinal controversies about the true nature of corporations triggered by the famous Santa Clara decision (1886) of the US Supreme Court. The paper casts new light on the latter account by uncovering those aspects of classical economics that made it impossible for its supporters – economists and jurists alike – to unreservedly support the corporate form before and beyond the trust problem.
2023
Giocoli, Nicola
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11568/1176555
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