This article presents a three-stage non-cooperative disclosure decision game (DDG), in which R&Dinvesting firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival in a Cournot-like environment. Though firms have no (private) incentive to disclose information unilaterally on their cost-reducing R&D activity to prevent a rival from engaging in free appropriation, this work reveals opportunity for the government to design an optimal policy aimed at incentivising R&D disclosure. Following this welfare-improving path, sharing R&D-related information becomes a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium strategy. These findings suggest that using public subsidies to R&D disclosure can lead to a win-win result, eliminating the unpleasant non-disclosing outcome from a societal perspective.

The disclosure decision game: Subsidies and incentives for R&D activity

Domenico Buccella;Luciano Fanti;Luca Gori
2023-01-01

Abstract

This article presents a three-stage non-cooperative disclosure decision game (DDG), in which R&Dinvesting firms choose whether to disclose R&D-related information to the rival in a Cournot-like environment. Though firms have no (private) incentive to disclose information unilaterally on their cost-reducing R&D activity to prevent a rival from engaging in free appropriation, this work reveals opportunity for the government to design an optimal policy aimed at incentivising R&D disclosure. Following this welfare-improving path, sharing R&D-related information becomes a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium strategy. These findings suggest that using public subsidies to R&D disclosure can lead to a win-win result, eliminating the unpleasant non-disclosing outcome from a societal perspective.
2023
Buccella, Domenico; Fanti, Luciano; Gori, Luca
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11568/1195187
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 3
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 3
social impact