In this paper, I argue that the standard interpretation of Russell as a causal eliminativist is partial and misleading. Instead, I defend the thesis that his criticism of causality was actually part of the more ambitious project of transposing the common-sense concept of “cause” in the categories that articulate the representations of modern science. I also show that Russell endorsed such a project all along his philosophical career, despite the numerous changes of mind that characterized the development of this thought.
On Russell’s Criticism of Causality
Giacomo Turbanti
2023-01-01
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the standard interpretation of Russell as a causal eliminativist is partial and misleading. Instead, I defend the thesis that his criticism of causality was actually part of the more ambitious project of transposing the common-sense concept of “cause” in the categories that articulate the representations of modern science. I also show that Russell endorsed such a project all along his philosophical career, despite the numerous changes of mind that characterized the development of this thought.File in questo prodotto:
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