Obbligo, colpevolezza e pena alla prova dell'ignorantia legis nel De legibus di Suárez

According to Suárez a law can obligate quoad sufficientiam even those who are unaware of its existence. Consequently, the obligation that constitutes the necessary effect of the law cannot consist in the psychological condition in which the subject is put by the legislator’s command. In this paper I hypothesize that a theory of obligation could emerge from the pages of De Legibus that is consistent with the conclusions Suárez arrives at regarding the question of promulgation and ignorance of the law. A reconstruction of the Suarezian theory of obligation that takes into account such conclusions could allow us to understand why, according to Suárez, all laws, even moral laws, are to all effects penal laws in the broad sense. A reconstruction of this kind could also allow us to perhaps understand what exactly is the obligation added by the legislator to the natural duty to do or not to do the act that he prescribes or prohibits.