Conflict, Inertia, and Phillips Curve from a Sraffian Standpoint

The recent post-Keynesian debate on conflict inflation revolves around plausible magnitudes of the parameters of the standard model. We assess this debate by examining the economic meaning of the 'bargaining' and 'indexation' parameters, and proposing a reinterpretation in which the bargaining power is reflected in the relative frequency of wage and price increases in a period. Inflation then depends on the size of the inconsistent distributive claims and the absolute frequency of wage and price increases. Distribution depends on the relative frequency of such increases. From the latter we derive the real wage and profit resistance parameters, which determine the structural degree of inflation inertia. By adding the employment rate as a determinant of the desired real wage, we get a conflict-augmented Phillips curve. We show how different assumptions on the real resistance parameters affect the shape of the Phillips curve and the distributive outcomes in different conflict inflation models. A NAIRU occurs only when there is both full real wage and real profit resistance. Conflict generates inflation (not acceleration) with less extreme assumptions. The old-type conflict-augmented Phillips curve, with income distribution depending on the relative frequency of wage and price adjustments, is the most plausible case.