The RBMK core is constituted by more than one-thousand pressurized channels housed into stacked graphite blocks and connected at the bottom and at the top by small diameter (D) and long length (L) pipes (less than 0.01 and more than 10 m, respectively) that end up into headers and drum separators. Control valves are installed in the bottom lines. Due to the large L/D value and to the presence of valves and other geometric discontinuities along the lines connecting with the pressure channels, the Fuel Channel Blockage (FCB) event is possible and already occurred in two documented NPP events. Pressure tube rupture occurred in a third NPP event not originated by FCB. Previous investigations, have shown the relevance of these events for the safety technology, and the availability of proper computational technique for the analysis, see the first and the third companion paper in this journal issue, respectively. The occurrence of the FCB event remains undetected for a few tens of seconds because of the lack of full monitoring for the individual channels, fourth companion paper in this journal issue. Therefore, fission power continues to be produced in the absence of cooling. This brings in subsequent times to fuel rod overheating, pressure tube failure, damage of the neighbouring graphite brick and ejection of damaged fuel. Following the pressure tube rupture, reactor cavity pressurization, radioactivity release into the same area and change of fluid properties occur that allow the detection of the event and cause the reactor scram at a time of a few tens of seconds depending upon the channel working conditions and the severity of the blockage. Notwithstanding the [delayed] scram and the full capability of the reactor designed safety features to keep cooled the core, the multiple pressure tube rupture (MPTR) issue is raised. The question to be answered is whether the ‘explosion’ of the blocked pressure tube damages not only the neighbour graphite bricks but propagates to other channels causing the potential for several channel failure. In order to address the MPTR issue fuel channel thermal-hydraulics and three-dimensional (3D) neutron kinetics analyses have been performed, as well structural mechanics calculations for the graphite bricks and rings (graphite rings surround the pressure tube to accommodate for thermal and radiation induced expansions). The bases for the analysis and the results of the study are presented. The conclusion, not reported within a licensing based format, is that the MPTR consequences are not expected to be relevant for the safety of the RBMK installations. This is supported by the analysis of experiments performed at the TKR facility available at the EREC research Centre near Moscow.
The Multiple Pressure Tube Rupture (MPTR) issue in RBMK safety technology
D'AURIA, FRANCESCO SAVERIO
2008-01-01
Abstract
The RBMK core is constituted by more than one-thousand pressurized channels housed into stacked graphite blocks and connected at the bottom and at the top by small diameter (D) and long length (L) pipes (less than 0.01 and more than 10 m, respectively) that end up into headers and drum separators. Control valves are installed in the bottom lines. Due to the large L/D value and to the presence of valves and other geometric discontinuities along the lines connecting with the pressure channels, the Fuel Channel Blockage (FCB) event is possible and already occurred in two documented NPP events. Pressure tube rupture occurred in a third NPP event not originated by FCB. Previous investigations, have shown the relevance of these events for the safety technology, and the availability of proper computational technique for the analysis, see the first and the third companion paper in this journal issue, respectively. The occurrence of the FCB event remains undetected for a few tens of seconds because of the lack of full monitoring for the individual channels, fourth companion paper in this journal issue. Therefore, fission power continues to be produced in the absence of cooling. This brings in subsequent times to fuel rod overheating, pressure tube failure, damage of the neighbouring graphite brick and ejection of damaged fuel. Following the pressure tube rupture, reactor cavity pressurization, radioactivity release into the same area and change of fluid properties occur that allow the detection of the event and cause the reactor scram at a time of a few tens of seconds depending upon the channel working conditions and the severity of the blockage. Notwithstanding the [delayed] scram and the full capability of the reactor designed safety features to keep cooled the core, the multiple pressure tube rupture (MPTR) issue is raised. The question to be answered is whether the ‘explosion’ of the blocked pressure tube damages not only the neighbour graphite bricks but propagates to other channels causing the potential for several channel failure. In order to address the MPTR issue fuel channel thermal-hydraulics and three-dimensional (3D) neutron kinetics analyses have been performed, as well structural mechanics calculations for the graphite bricks and rings (graphite rings surround the pressure tube to accommodate for thermal and radiation induced expansions). The bases for the analysis and the results of the study are presented. The conclusion, not reported within a licensing based format, is that the MPTR consequences are not expected to be relevant for the safety of the RBMK installations. This is supported by the analysis of experiments performed at the TKR facility available at the EREC research Centre near Moscow.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
