Aesthetics as philosophy of art, or Hegel’s reconciliation of Kantian dualism

Despite the extraordinary influence of Hegel’s aesthetics, the very term “aesthetics” features very seldom in his body of work. Considering both ongoing radical uncertainty as to the status of aesthetics as well as Hegel’s profound and persistent influence on aesthetics, it is worth reflecting on the reasons for, and potential alternatives to, Hegel’s use of the term “aesthetics.” This is the goal of this paper, which combines a reconstruction of Hegel’s variations on the topic with a broader perspective on what they can still teach us today. I begin by discussing Hegel’s presentations of the topic of his lectures on aesthetics (Section II). In Section III, I argue that both Hegel’s ambivalence towards aesthetics and his eventual identification of the latter with a philosophy of art are rooted in his confrontation with Kant’s seminal, yet insufficient, attempt to surmount dualism through his theory of reflective judgment. The attempt to address Kant’s unresolved dualism ultimately leads to the equivalence, both conceptual and terminological, of aesthetics and philosophy of art, and to the autonomy of art as a form of the absolute spirit (Section IV). In the concluding section, I outline the fundamental tensions left open by this equivalence as open challenges in contemporary aesthetics (Section V).