In Shame and Necessity and in "Plato and the Immoralist" Bernard Williams raised two objections to Glaucon’s speech (Republic II): 1) In Gyges’ example shame is interpreted as fear of being concretely seen by others while performing unjust deeds. When others cannot see what we do, we feel no shame. Plato fails to understand that shame expresses values we inter-subjectively share. 2) Glaucon’s view of the absolutely just man who is considered unjust by everybody else can be seen as a case of solipsism. Williams interprets Plato’s appeal to the idea of justice as the culmination of Glaucon’s solipsistic just man. The article shows that Williams fails to appreciate how Glaucon’s theory is revised in the course of the Republic in such a way to meet both objections.
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