Verso la regolazione economica degli extra-profitti bancari. Apparenze e realtà

The theory of profit (and, consequently, of windfall profit) is of utmost importance for market regulation law. In fact, windfall profit is primarily a measure of economic efficiency, which affects the allocation of resources in the economy: the company that generates it produces goods or services of greater value compared to production costs and is incentivized to invest in new projects, thereby expanding its production. Windfall profits thus serve as a driver of economic development, stimulating innovation and expanding productive sectors. For these reasons, for at least a century, the taxation of windfall profits has been used as a tool for market regulation. However, recent regulatory interventions in this area seem to signal the emergence of an even more radical form of public intervention: the taxation of windfall banking profits risks becoming a tool for public control over private banks. Despite the extreme timeliness and relevance of the issue, to date, there are no studies in market regulation law that have explicitly addressed the matter. Considering that, even with the recent reform of Article 41 of the Constitution, the sole purpose of the company remains profit-making, to what extent can this be externally constrained through the taxation of windfall profits? Can the need to coordinate and direct economic activity towards social and environmental goals also justify the “expropriation” of windfall profit, allowing for a public-oriented function of the profits achieved by the company? These are some of the questions this contribution aims to answer.