This document aims to reconstruct the procedures, generally secret or at least not very detailed, with which the use of nuclear weapons is decided in the nine States that currently possess them (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, N. Korea and Israeli). Since in all nuclear powers, in order to guarantee the safety and reliability of the deterrent system, the command and control of the nuclear arsenal is entrusted to the highest political office of the country (the head of state or government), it seems useful to verify to what extent the authority recognized to the holder of the “red button” derives or not from the role recognized by the constitution, possibly as chief of the armed forces (or commander-in-chief) or holder of exceptional powers in case of war. The presence in the constitution of an order of succession among the high political-institutional positions also allows to avoid that the decision-making process on the use of nuclear weapons is interrupted by sudden power vacuums, a scenario that the nuclear countries try to avoid also adopting special extra-legal procedures that allow the transfer of the command authority.
L’articolo si propone di ricostruire le procedure, generalmente segrete o quantomeno poco dettagliate, con cui viene deciso l'uso delle armi nucleari nei nove Stati che attualmente le possiedono (Stati Uniti, Russia, Cina, Regno Unito, Francia, India, Pakistan, Corea del Nord e Israele). Poiché in tutte le potenze nucleari, al fine di garantire la sicurezza e l'affidabilità del sistema di deterrenza, il comando e il controllo dell'arsenale nucleare sono affidati alla più alta carica politica del Paese (il capo di Stato o di governo), appare utile verificare in che misura l'autorità riconosciuta al detentore del "pulsante rosso" derivi o meno dal ruolo riconosciuto dalla Costituzione, eventualmente come capo delle forze armate (o comandante in capo) o titolare di poteri eccezionali in caso di guerra. La presenza nella costituzione di un ordine di successione tra le alte cariche politico-istituzionali consente inoltre di evitare che il processo decisionale sull'uso delle armi nucleari venga interrotto da improvvisi vuoti di potere, uno scenario che i Paesi dotati di armi nucleari cercano di evitare anche adottando apposite procedure extra-legali che consentano il trasferimento dell'autorità di comando.
Comando delle armi nucleari e sistemi costituzionali. Un’analisi comparata.
CASELLA RINO
2025-01-01
Abstract
This document aims to reconstruct the procedures, generally secret or at least not very detailed, with which the use of nuclear weapons is decided in the nine States that currently possess them (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, N. Korea and Israeli). Since in all nuclear powers, in order to guarantee the safety and reliability of the deterrent system, the command and control of the nuclear arsenal is entrusted to the highest political office of the country (the head of state or government), it seems useful to verify to what extent the authority recognized to the holder of the “red button” derives or not from the role recognized by the constitution, possibly as chief of the armed forces (or commander-in-chief) or holder of exceptional powers in case of war. The presence in the constitution of an order of succession among the high political-institutional positions also allows to avoid that the decision-making process on the use of nuclear weapons is interrupted by sudden power vacuums, a scenario that the nuclear countries try to avoid also adopting special extra-legal procedures that allow the transfer of the command authority.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


