The present article aims to show that Husserl’s lifelong treatment of language could offer an interesting way to approach, via approximation, the metaphilosophical questions that the linguistic turn of analytic philosophy assumes. To pursue this goal, in the first section I will focus on Richard Rorty’s metaphilosophical reflection on the path of linguistic philosophy, and his reference to Husserl in particular; here I will consider the hypothesis that Husserl’s perspective can be taken as a missed linguistic turn. In the two following sections, I will discuss the motifs that led Michael Dummett to share this hypothesis. More specifically, in the second section, I will deal with Husserl’s problematic expansion of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference and, in the third section, with Husserl’s alleged fall into the Humpty Dumpty myth according to which the meaning of a word depends on the way we choose to use it. Finally, in the last part of the third section and in the fourth, I will discuss both why Husserl does not take the path of adhering to the linguistic turn and to what extent his philosophical path can nevertheless provide an interesting reading of the dispute, fully played out within the analytic tradition, between the research program of ideal language and that of ordinary language.
No way with words? Husserl and the Linguistic Turn
MANCA D
2025-01-01
Abstract
The present article aims to show that Husserl’s lifelong treatment of language could offer an interesting way to approach, via approximation, the metaphilosophical questions that the linguistic turn of analytic philosophy assumes. To pursue this goal, in the first section I will focus on Richard Rorty’s metaphilosophical reflection on the path of linguistic philosophy, and his reference to Husserl in particular; here I will consider the hypothesis that Husserl’s perspective can be taken as a missed linguistic turn. In the two following sections, I will discuss the motifs that led Michael Dummett to share this hypothesis. More specifically, in the second section, I will deal with Husserl’s problematic expansion of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference and, in the third section, with Husserl’s alleged fall into the Humpty Dumpty myth according to which the meaning of a word depends on the way we choose to use it. Finally, in the last part of the third section and in the fourth, I will discuss both why Husserl does not take the path of adhering to the linguistic turn and to what extent his philosophical path can nevertheless provide an interesting reading of the dispute, fully played out within the analytic tradition, between the research program of ideal language and that of ordinary language.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
