International human rights law currently offers protection against removal in an increasing variety of situations, thanks to the express content of certain international provisions or their evolutionary interpretation. Where internationally regulated statuses are not applicable, it is the domestic legal systems that have to deal with the legal position of the individual concerned. In doing so, this chapter argue that a bona fide implementation of the obligation of non-removal (and therefore of the duty to respect the essential legal goods protected by it) requires the fulfilment of a further obligation, of a positive nature, consisting in granting the individual a lawful status that allows the enjoyment of a dignified life. This would be an obligation of result. The ways in which this outcome can be achieved can be different: they can range from the extension of a recognised protected status to the introduction of domestic statuses, of a general or specific nature. What no longer seems tenable is that compliance with the obligation not to remove exhausts its function in the mere tolerance of a person’s physical presence on national territory, and that any recognition of a migration status is left entirely to the discretion of states.
The expanded notion of the non-refoulement guarantee under human rights law as a premise for a fully-fledged complementary protection
di filippo marcello
2025-01-01
Abstract
International human rights law currently offers protection against removal in an increasing variety of situations, thanks to the express content of certain international provisions or their evolutionary interpretation. Where internationally regulated statuses are not applicable, it is the domestic legal systems that have to deal with the legal position of the individual concerned. In doing so, this chapter argue that a bona fide implementation of the obligation of non-removal (and therefore of the duty to respect the essential legal goods protected by it) requires the fulfilment of a further obligation, of a positive nature, consisting in granting the individual a lawful status that allows the enjoyment of a dignified life. This would be an obligation of result. The ways in which this outcome can be achieved can be different: they can range from the extension of a recognised protected status to the introduction of domestic statuses, of a general or specific nature. What no longer seems tenable is that compliance with the obligation not to remove exhausts its function in the mere tolerance of a person’s physical presence on national territory, and that any recognition of a migration status is left entirely to the discretion of states.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


