The paper comments the above judgement of the Court of Milan. The Author, in particular, subjects to close scrutiny the assertion of the Court that variable forms of managers’ remuneration can facilitate the commission of unlawful acts, even to the benefit of the employer. The contractual nature of the employment relationship, on the one hand, fully legitimizes agreements that allow remuneration to be linked to productivity targets and, on the other hand, enables the employer to react in the face of issues connected to intentional or negligent conduct by executives. Finally, the Author reflects on the importance that compliance programs pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 231 of 2001 may have in identifying ex post corrective mechanisms for remuneration systems (malus and clawback clauses), which can be incorporated into individual employment contracts.
Il contributo analizza alcuni passaggi della sentenza del Trib. Milano, sez. II penale, 22 aprile 2024, n. 1070. L’Autore, in particolare, sottopone a serrata critica l’affermazione del Tribunale di Milano secondo cui forme variabili di retribuzione dei manager possono agevolare la commissione di illeciti, anche a beneficio del datore di lavoro. La natura contrattuale del rapporto di lavoro, da un lato, offre piena legittimità ad accordi che consentano di parametrare la retribuzione ad obiettivi di produttività e, dall’altro, consente al datore di lavoro di reagire a fronte di patologie collegate a comportamenti dolosi o colposi dei dirigenti. Infine, l’Autore riflette sull’importanza che i modelli organizzativi ai sensi del d.lgs. n. 231/2001 possono avere nell’individuare sistemi di correzione ex post dei meccanismi retributivi (clausole di malus e claw back) che possano essere recepiti nei contratti individuali di lavoro.
Spigolature giuslavoristiche a margine di Trib. Milano, sez. II penale, 22 aprile 2024, n. 1070
RAFFAELE GALARDI
Primo
2024-01-01
Abstract
The paper comments the above judgement of the Court of Milan. The Author, in particular, subjects to close scrutiny the assertion of the Court that variable forms of managers’ remuneration can facilitate the commission of unlawful acts, even to the benefit of the employer. The contractual nature of the employment relationship, on the one hand, fully legitimizes agreements that allow remuneration to be linked to productivity targets and, on the other hand, enables the employer to react in the face of issues connected to intentional or negligent conduct by executives. Finally, the Author reflects on the importance that compliance programs pursuant to Legislative Decree No. 231 of 2001 may have in identifying ex post corrective mechanisms for remuneration systems (malus and clawback clauses), which can be incorporated into individual employment contracts.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
