Kant’s Der Streit der Fakultäten sets the faculty of philosophy against the higher faculties of Theology, Law and Medicine. The latter have a ministerial function, at the service of the government, which is, prima facie, beyond dispute, because their expertise is useful both for the state and for society at large. The former, whose scope used to be basic or fundamental research, seems to be useless and even dangerous, because it is disconnected from the service to the government and inclined to criticize even the most “useful” of the established doctrines in its quest for the truth. Kant, however, does not try to demonstrate that an independent fundamental research has a long-term utility, and even depicts any attempt to do it as “unlawful” or inappropriate. According to him accepting to debate about the utility of basic research would mean abandoning research altogether, by choosing an umpire whose rule is utility – or, better, the particular utility settled, from time to time, by the government. He flips, instead, the question: how could an institution which states that the truth is not among its concerns claim any kind of legitimacy, even political? How could people trust a government, or a system of institutional science as well, if they declare that their (own?) utility outdoes truth?
Faculty of Opposition. The University and the Public Use of Reason in “Der Streit der Fakultäten”
Maria Chiara Pievatolo
2025-01-01
Abstract
Kant’s Der Streit der Fakultäten sets the faculty of philosophy against the higher faculties of Theology, Law and Medicine. The latter have a ministerial function, at the service of the government, which is, prima facie, beyond dispute, because their expertise is useful both for the state and for society at large. The former, whose scope used to be basic or fundamental research, seems to be useless and even dangerous, because it is disconnected from the service to the government and inclined to criticize even the most “useful” of the established doctrines in its quest for the truth. Kant, however, does not try to demonstrate that an independent fundamental research has a long-term utility, and even depicts any attempt to do it as “unlawful” or inappropriate. According to him accepting to debate about the utility of basic research would mean abandoning research altogether, by choosing an umpire whose rule is utility – or, better, the particular utility settled, from time to time, by the government. He flips, instead, the question: how could an institution which states that the truth is not among its concerns claim any kind of legitimacy, even political? How could people trust a government, or a system of institutional science as well, if they declare that their (own?) utility outdoes truth?I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


