A Science of Values West Churchman’s Pragmatist Experimentalism

This essay reconstructs the philosophical foundations of Charles West Churchman’s pragmatist experimentalism. Drawing on Churchman’s writings from the 1940s through the early 1960s, the essay argues that the argument from inductive risk – made famous by one of Churchman’s students, Richard Rudner – arose within a broader and largely overlooked program in philosophy of science, one that was best exemplified in Churchman’s work. In particular, I will argue that Churchman’s rejection of the value-free ideal of science was grounded in, and justified by, two main theoretical assumptions: an anti-reductionist theory of meaning, aimed at replacing hierarchical models of scientific languages with an interrelational and “spiral” conception; and a teleological, non-relativistic account of inquiry, which purports to understand scientific decision-making in terms of purposes, ends, and ideals. Finally, I will argue that this conceptual framework naturally culminates in Churchman’s ambitious proposal for a “science of ethics,” a discipline designed to bring value judgments under experimental control.