The present work aims at reconsidering the progress in the Bank of Italy’s independence from Italian Government during the 1980s in the light of inconsistency of anti-inflationary policy, of possible strategic games between the two main authorities, of attempts of restoring public finance, of European commitments (i.e. EMS and EMU) and of the international financial liberalization advance. The institutional reforms carried out during those years do not appear to respond to the unique anti-inflationary goal. The collaboration between Bank of Italy and Treasury, never finished after the “divorce”, does not mean that Bank of Italy and Government jointly decide policy. This separation becomes clear since the tree-year plans of the early 1980’s and since the obsolescence of Domestic Total Credit goal. Policy changes its philosophy in 1980’s: from aids directed to improving the performance of economic sectors, it moves towards creating incentives for virtuous behaviours which were not considered spontaneous. In this context international agreements fostered these incentives. The paper finally stressed the unawareness showed by both public authorities and public opinions of consequences deriving from Maastricht Treaty.