This article attempts to define the epistemological presuppositions which simultaneously guide and legitimate the scientific practice of the George Circle. The aim is to outline some typical discourse patterns, through which this group of young writers and scholars displays its idea of science and knowledge in the 1910s and 1920s. Assuming that the George Kreis’ Brand of scholarly production is subject to a paradigm, the Georgean worldview is set in the broader context of a reaction against positivism within fin-de-siècle Europe. The rejection of mechanism and specialism as target values of positivistic science entails a rising demand for alternative cognitive models (such as intuitionism and holism). In this respect, this article considers first the fictive creation of an undisputed ›master‹ figure. Second, it elucidates the function of the ›community‹, which is seen in its role as the emotional basis for epistemic identification, as the mirror image of specific values and beliefs. Finally, this article discusses the most important argumentative topoi of the Georgean science critique, with a particular focus on the fundamental distinction between ›Gestalt‹ and ›concept‹, that is to say between image and structure.