In this paper the dynamical effects of public environmental policies are investigated in a Cournot duopoly with heterogeneous expectations in a context of limited rationality. It is shown that the introduction of upper limits to emissions always tends to destabilise and generate a chaotic market dynamics. By contrast the role played by the cost of the abatement technology is more complicated, although in most cases higher costs imply a higher likelihood of stability loss, in some cases increases of such costs when their level is sufficiently low tends to stabilise and in such cases if the market is stable either a decrease or an increase of such costs may lead to a stability loss. The policy implications of these results suggest caution in the use of environmental policies from a market stability point of view.
Environmental standards and Cournot duopoly: a stability analysis
FANTI, LUCIANO
2012-01-01
Abstract
In this paper the dynamical effects of public environmental policies are investigated in a Cournot duopoly with heterogeneous expectations in a context of limited rationality. It is shown that the introduction of upper limits to emissions always tends to destabilise and generate a chaotic market dynamics. By contrast the role played by the cost of the abatement technology is more complicated, although in most cases higher costs imply a higher likelihood of stability loss, in some cases increases of such costs when their level is sufficiently low tends to stabilise and in such cases if the market is stable either a decrease or an increase of such costs may lead to a stability loss. The policy implications of these results suggest caution in the use of environmental policies from a market stability point of view.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
