An Assessment of the Italian 2007 Complementary Social Security Reform: a Simulation Approach

In this paper we aim at assessing the outcomes of the 2007 Italian reform of the complementary social security scheme and at identifying the determinants behind them. The reform provided workers with relevant incentives to switch the investment of about 7 per cent of their gross yearly wages from a firm-managed scheme (which took the form of a termination indemnity payment, the Trattamento di Fine Rapporto scheme) to an external pension fund. We provide a theoretical framework to model the workers’ problem of choosing between these two different forms of complementary social security schemes and we then perform an agent-based simulation taking into account all the details of the reform. Differently from previous contributions, we stress the impact that the investment decision has on the financial health of firms and, consequently, on workers’ employment stability. Our simulations are able to replicate the Italian data in terms of adhesion rates to complementary social security and also to identify some of the key determinants of that outcome, such as fiscal incentives, individual preferences, the working of both the Italian labour and the financial markets and the productive structure of the Italian economy.