This paper will propose an interpretation of Kant's thought based on an analysis of the well- known Kantian metaphor of the "Tribunal of Reason". 1 By so doing, it will be argued that the activity of reason is not foundational, but jurisdictional. The task of reason is not to form the foundation of our frameworks of theoretical and practical knowledge, but rather to form their legitimation. In addition, it will be argued that the non-foundational character of reason is consistent both with its ultimate autonomy and with its established proceedings. These are of a jurisidictional nature: the procedure of transcendental deduction. In other words, the non- foundational character of reason does not imply that reason itself is indeterminate and vague (and therefore absolutely useless).
|Titolo:||The Tribunal of Reason: Kant and the Juridical Nature of Pure Reason|
|Anno del prodotto:||1999|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|