In this paper the possibility to introduce high-powered incentive schemes in public organizations is analyzed taking into account the attempts to reform public service in Italy since Dlgs n. 29/93 until the most recent normative and contractual developments. A simple formal model of promotions is presented and is examined by introducing typical features of public employment such as pensions, lateral entry restrictions and job security. From this model it emerges that with a well-defined system of promotions it is possible to introduce high-powered incentives even when dismissal is not an issue and out-put is hard to measure. In this perspective the last part of the paper is concerned with "tournaments" as means to define promotions. It is pointed out what could be the advantages and the disadvantages of using tournaments in the public sector especially when public employees are risk-adverse as empirical evidence seems to confirm.
Carriere e "tornei" come incentivi nel pubblico impiego: una valutazione teorica alla luce dei recenti sviluppi normativi e contrattuali
MECCHERI, NICOLA
2000-01-01
Abstract
In this paper the possibility to introduce high-powered incentive schemes in public organizations is analyzed taking into account the attempts to reform public service in Italy since Dlgs n. 29/93 until the most recent normative and contractual developments. A simple formal model of promotions is presented and is examined by introducing typical features of public employment such as pensions, lateral entry restrictions and job security. From this model it emerges that with a well-defined system of promotions it is possible to introduce high-powered incentives even when dismissal is not an issue and out-put is hard to measure. In this perspective the last part of the paper is concerned with "tournaments" as means to define promotions. It is pointed out what could be the advantages and the disadvantages of using tournaments in the public sector especially when public employees are risk-adverse as empirical evidence seems to confirm.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
