A formal notion of viewpoint, relying on an extension of first order predicate calculus with an axiomatization of provability and reflection rules, is presented. The extension is not conservative and it is, in our intention, the best we can do if we care about consistency. Viewpoints are defined as set of sentences at the meta-level. The paper investigates to what extent notions such as belief, knowledge, truth and situations can be uniformly modeled as provability in “specialized viewpoints”, obtained by imposing suitable constraints on viewpoints.
Viewpoints subsume beliefs, truth and situations
SIMI, MARIA
1991-01-01
Abstract
A formal notion of viewpoint, relying on an extension of first order predicate calculus with an axiomatization of provability and reflection rules, is presented. The extension is not conservative and it is, in our intention, the best we can do if we care about consistency. Viewpoints are defined as set of sentences at the meta-level. The paper investigates to what extent notions such as belief, knowledge, truth and situations can be uniformly modeled as provability in “specialized viewpoints”, obtained by imposing suitable constraints on viewpoints.File in questo prodotto:
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