In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (Brookings Pap Econ Act (2):139–199, 1994) results to an environment which may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single monetary authority and several fiscal bodies. We show that, even assuming that the monetary and the fiscal authorities share the same ideal targets, in the presence of asymmetric shocks the “symbiosis” result found by Dixit and Lambertini (J Int Econ 60:235–247, 2003) no longer obtains. Thus, fiscal rules as those envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact may work as monetary/fiscal coordination devices that improve welfare. The imposition of common targets, however, may work as a substitute for policy coordination only if these are made state contingent, an aspect that the recent version of the Stability and Growth Pact takes into account in a more appropriate way than its original version.
|Autori:||DELLA POSTA, POMPEO; DE BONIS, VALERIA|
|Titolo:||Strategic interactions among central bank and national fiscal authorities in a monetary union subject to asymmetric country shocks|
|Anno del prodotto:||2009|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1007/s11079-007-9065-1|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|