This paper studies how alternative managerial delegation contracts in a duopoly product market interact with wage decisions taken by a central (industry-wide) union in the labor market. Interestingly, results prove to be more varied with respect to findings by the managerial delegation literature with exogenous production costs. Most notably, it is pointed out that, in equilibrium, both firm profitability and welfare outcomes can be superior under both sales delegation and relative profit delegation, depending on various factors such as the degree of product differentiation and the competition regime.

Managerial delegation contracts under centralized unionization

MECCHERI, NICOLA;FANTI, LUCIANO
2014

Abstract

This paper studies how alternative managerial delegation contracts in a duopoly product market interact with wage decisions taken by a central (industry-wide) union in the labor market. Interestingly, results prove to be more varied with respect to findings by the managerial delegation literature with exogenous production costs. Most notably, it is pointed out that, in equilibrium, both firm profitability and welfare outcomes can be superior under both sales delegation and relative profit delegation, depending on various factors such as the degree of product differentiation and the competition regime.
Meccheri, Nicola; Fanti, Luciano
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Final pdf.pdf

embargo fino al 31/12/2016

Tipologia: Documento in Post-print
Licenza: Tutti i diritti riservati (All rights reserved)
Dimensione 2.61 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
2.61 MB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11568/208727
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 19
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact