We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in an homogeneous product industry, under efficient rationing and constant (and identical across firms) marginal cost until full capacity utilization. We solve for the unique equilibrium in a subset of the no pure-strategy equilibrium region of the capacity space in which differencies in individual capacities are sufficiently small.
Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in an almost symmetric oligopoly
SALVADORI, NERI
2013-01-01
Abstract
We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in an homogeneous product industry, under efficient rationing and constant (and identical across firms) marginal cost until full capacity utilization. We solve for the unique equilibrium in a subset of the no pure-strategy equilibrium region of the capacity space in which differencies in individual capacities are sufficiently small.File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
