The essay offers an engrossing and theoretically grounded analysis, impelled by an apparent paradox: despite the mountain of information uncovered by judicial investigations detailing the decades-long and pervasive links between criminal syndacates and politicians in Italy, there is very little evidence suggestive of financial contributions from the Mafia into the Italian parties' coffers. On the basis of this puzzle, the essay develops an origina typology of the possible interactions between the criminal and the political worlds, in which the crucial variables are the stability and degree of control achieved by both sets of actors in a given context. An high degree of control on both sides, as illustrated by the prolonged interaction between Cosa Nostra and the Democrazia Cristiana in Sicily during the post World War II era, allows for an interated game in which political contributions become largely unnecessary. A generic pact in which both sets of actors agree to protect each other against the vagaries of elections and law enforcement replaces the flow of financial contributions. Votes, mobilized my criminals endowed with territorial control, become the currency that defines the relationship. In some cases this may even generate reverse money flows, in which politicians purchase the electoral services of criminal organizations. Other situations, defined by the instability of one set of actors or both, lead to different types of links, in which the naked sponsorship of parties by criminals or their purchasing of specific political decisions thruogh corruption become distinct possibilities.
The Godfather’s Party. Organized crime and political financing in Italy
VANNUCCI, ALBERTO
2013-01-01
Abstract
The essay offers an engrossing and theoretically grounded analysis, impelled by an apparent paradox: despite the mountain of information uncovered by judicial investigations detailing the decades-long and pervasive links between criminal syndacates and politicians in Italy, there is very little evidence suggestive of financial contributions from the Mafia into the Italian parties' coffers. On the basis of this puzzle, the essay develops an origina typology of the possible interactions between the criminal and the political worlds, in which the crucial variables are the stability and degree of control achieved by both sets of actors in a given context. An high degree of control on both sides, as illustrated by the prolonged interaction between Cosa Nostra and the Democrazia Cristiana in Sicily during the post World War II era, allows for an interated game in which political contributions become largely unnecessary. A generic pact in which both sets of actors agree to protect each other against the vagaries of elections and law enforcement replaces the flow of financial contributions. Votes, mobilized my criminals endowed with territorial control, become the currency that defines the relationship. In some cases this may even generate reverse money flows, in which politicians purchase the electoral services of criminal organizations. Other situations, defined by the instability of one set of actors or both, lead to different types of links, in which the naked sponsorship of parties by criminals or their purchasing of specific political decisions thruogh corruption become distinct possibilities.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
