Building on agency theory, this article investigates whether family firms’ accounting behavior regarding long-lived asset write-offs differs from that of nonfamily firms. We provide evidence that nonfamily firms use write-offs for earnings management purposes, while family firms report write-offs coherent with the firm performance. Family firms experience dwindling sales and lower profitability in the years following the write-offs, consistently with an effective decline in their assets value. The findings are consistent with reduced owner-manager agency conflicts in family firms. We find no indication of family entrenchment, which is consistent with family owners being concerned with the reputational damage associated with a loss of a firm’s asset value.
|Autori interni:||GRECO, GIULIO|
|Autori:||Greco, Giulio; Ferramosca, Silvia; Allegrini, Marco|
|Titolo:||The Influence of Family Ownership on Long-Lived Asset Write-Offs|
|Anno del prodotto:||2015|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||10.1177/0894486515590017|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|