Hegel’s Metaphysics of Freedom. A Discussion of Klaus Vieweg’s Das Denken der Freiheit

If one had to reduce the complexity of Hegel’s thought to a single keyword, the most appropriate one would probably be ‘philosophy of freedom’. This is possibly true of many of the greatest philosophical constructions, from Plato to Kant passing through Spinoza. However, this thought assumes a peculiar radicality given the Hegelian assertion of a tight correspondence between different forms of absolute spirit and the progressive historical actualization of freedom in ethical, political and cultural institutions. The philosophical form is the only completely adequate one for the embodiment and articulation of freedom in the modern world. Thus, in the expression ‘philosophy of freedom’, freedom is both the object and the subject of philosophy. Philosophy is the product of freedom, and freedom is the product of philosophy. Philosophy is not simply an inquiry into the shapes of the actualization of freedom in the world: it makes those shapes possible. Hence the absolute character of Hegel’s idealism, hence the unity of practical and theoretical reason, and hence the much debated and much misunderstood intertwinement of reason and actuality. Vis-à-vis this radical claim and the demanding strings attached to it, philosophers and scholars have often inclined either to reject Hegel’s thought in its entirety, or to disentangle specific pieces of it (e.g., the practical philosophy) from the heavy metaphysical framework. While the latter choice is hardly compatible with Hegel’s own requirements, it can be asked whether it is fruitful for the contemporary philosophical agenda, insofar as it differs from the Hegelian one. In my discussion of Klaus Vieweg’s magnum opus Das Denken der Freiheit, I am led, as I take Vieweg to be, by this question and by the above-sketched reflections with regard to Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Right (PR). Given the ambition of Vieweg’s project and the complexity of its subject-matter the following can only do partial justice to the work: the first part contains an outline of the book and its central theses, and the second part aims to open the space for discussion by developing two critical points about the methodological implications and historical location of this important study.